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House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 

Report on Russian 
Active Measures 

March 22, 2018 


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Beri v e d ffm r Mu ltipl e ' Sources 
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Table of Contents 

(U) Abbreviations ii 

(U) Referenced Persons iii 

(U) Preface viii 

(UJ Introduction and Overview 1 

(U) Summary Table of Findings 4 

(U) Summary Table of Recommendations 8 

(U) Chapter 1 - Russian Influence Campaigns in Europe 11 

(U) Chapter 2 - Russia Attacks the United States 22 

(U) Chapter 3 —America Reacts 38 

(U) Chapter 4 - Campaign Links to Russia 60 

(U) Chapter 5 - Intelligence Community Assessment Leaks 99 

(U) Chapter 6 - Summary of Related Committee Oversight Efforts 111 

(U) Chapter 7 - Conclusions and Recommendations 114 

{U) Appendices 131 

(U) Appendix A: Scope and Methodology 
(U) Appendix B: Russia Investigation Parameters 
(U) Appendix C: Russia's Media Propaganda Apparatus 

(If) Appendix 0; Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 107.1 

(U) Appendix E: HPSCi Majority Memo About FISA Abuses 

(U) Appendix F: HPSCI Minority Memo About FISA Abuses 

(U) Appendix G: Senate Judiciary Memo About Christopher Steele Referral 

(U) Appendix H: Committee Correspondence with DOJ and FBI 
































Associated Press 
Advanced Persistent Threat 
Central Intelligence Agency 
Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph 
Deputy Attorney General 
Democratic Congressional Campaign 

Department of Homeland Security 
Defense Intelligence Agency 
Democratic Nations) Committee 
Director of National Intelligence 
Department of Justice 
U.S, Election Assistance Commission 
European Union 
Foreign Agents Registration Act 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Federal Election Commission 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
Foreign intelligence Surveillance 

Russian Federal Security Bureau 
Fiscal Year 

Russian General Staff Main 
Intelligence Directorate 
House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence (the Committee) 
Human intelligence 
Intelligence Authorization Act 
Intelligence Community 
I nteil i g enc e Com in u nity Ass e ssm e nt 
Intelligence Community Directive 
Intelligence Community Policy 

Internet Research Agency 





















National Association of Secretaries 
of State 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center 
Non-governmental Organization 
National Institute for Standards and 

National Security Agency 
Candidate Trump's National Security 
Advisory Committee 
National Security Council 
Office of the Director of National 

Presidential Transition Team 
Republican National Committee 
Formerly known as Russia Today 
Sensitive Compartmented 
Signals intelligence 
Moldovan Intelligence Service 
Supervisory Special Agent 
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service 
United Kingdom 
Voice Over Internet Protocol 
Virtual Private Network 





(U) Referenced Persons 

* Assange 

Barm on 




! Steve 























I Igor 

Fou nde r of Wi k 3 lea ks 

Former Senior Counselor to :he President anti White House Chief 
Strategist {January-August 2Q17); former Chief Executive Officer of { 
Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign; former Executive Chair- ! 


man of Breitbart News 

Former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom {2010*2016) 

i Prosecutor ©onoral of Un Russian Fedor.ilian {2006-prnsen:) 

| Former Director of National Intelligence (2010 2017) 

Nomina*ed ;i.n the Democratic candidate ior Presidenl in 2016, for¬ 
mer Secretary of State (2009-2013); former First Lady of the United 

*M — * - t 4 -A 1 

Senior White House Advisor to the United States Department of Ag¬ 
riculture (2017-presnnt), National Co-chair of Donald Frump's 2016 
presidential campaign 

Executive Vice President of the Trump Organization and special 
Counsel to Donald Trump 

■ ■hA* ■■■ - j^l -g r - - — ~ — 

Former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation {20J.3-2Q17) 

Counselor to the President {2G17-p r esent); Campaign Manager of 
Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign [August 17, 2016 
November 5,2016) 

| White House Deputy Chief of Staff for legislative, Intergovernmental 1 
Allatri (2017~present); Executive Director of the 2016 Presidential 
Transition Team 

Deputy Chief for Internal Policy of the Russian federation 


i Dmitriev 

! Downer 

■ - 

1 Dvorkovich 

Fatah ol-Sisi 

■ Milo 

Former President of Momnnop/o from 1998-2002; former Prime 
Minister from 2003 2006, 200 S- 2010 , find 2Q12 2016 






Chief Executive Officer of the Russian DJieci Investment fund 
Australian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of Russian Railways 


(U) Referenced Persons (cont) 




National Security Advisor (January 2017 February 2017) 


Deputy to Paul Manafort (June-August 201G) 









Director of National Security of Donald Trump's 2016 presidential 

United States Senator from South Carolina (2C03-present}; former 
member of the United States House of Representatives from South 
Carbine (1993^2003) 


1 - * — 




k -r -■ ► 

United States Senator from fowa {1981-presem}; former member of 
the United States House of Representatives from Iowa (1973-1981) 

White House Director of Communications (20lV-present}; former 
White House Director of Strategic Communications (January 2017- 
September 2017); National Press Secretory of the Presidential Tran¬ 
sition Team; Communications Director of Donald Trump's 2016 
presidential campaign; former employee of thi j Trump Organtodtion 

Former Secretory of Homeland Security {2013-2017) 




Executive Secretary and Chief of Stoff of the National Security Coun¬ 
cil [February 2017-present); Acting National Secur ity Advisor 

4 - 

(February 2017); foreign policy advisor of Donald Trump's 2016 pres- 
idonhal campaign 

Secretary of State ol the State of Georgia [2010*present) 



| Senior Advisor to the President; sondn-law of the President {married 
! Ivanka Trump in 2009); real-estate developer 



Minister of foreign AH airs of the Russian Federation (200^-present) 





Former Attorney General of ihe United Slates (2015-2017! 
, President of France (20IV-present) 





; John 

j* 4 1 


Chairman of Donald trump's 20L6 presidential campaign (Junu- 
August 2016) 

'■P - P — ™ * -- —* " --* ■ »-► » ■-«« 

Co-leu, with Senator Sessions, the foreign policy advisory panel of 
Donald Trump's 2016 pm identic camp aign 

Former Deputy Director of the Federal Quroau of investigation {2016 



(U) Referenced Persons (cont) 


Senate Majority Leader (2GlS-presenl); United Slates Senior from 
1 Kentucky [1985-prosit) 

^ Former Ac tin 6 Assistant Attorney General of the United States (2016 
| -2017); former Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Wa- 
i tianal Security (2014-2016) 


I Don 

White House Counsel (January 2017-presenO; General Counsel of 
the Presidential Transition Team (November 2016-January 2017); 
Counsel to the Trump campaign during Donald Trump's 2016 presi¬ 
dential campaign 



Chancellor of Germany (2005-present) 

. rvtiiekei 

I Robert 

Special Counsel for the United States Department of Justice (May 
2017-present); farmer Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga¬ 
tion (2001-2013) 




Farmer Prcslttant of the United Status (200U 2017| 

fa <>41 


Former member of the foreign polity advisory panel to Donald 
I Trump's 2016 presidential campaign 



Minority leader of the United States House of Representatives 
(2Dll present); former Speaker ot the United States House of Rep¬ 
resentatives (2007 2011); member of the United States House of 
Representatives from California (19^7-present) 



Vice President of the United States (2017* present); former Governor 
of Indiana (2013-2017); former member of the United States House 
of Representatives from Indiana (2001-2013) 



_ i 

Chairman of Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential campaign; former 
i White House Chief of Staff; former Counselor to me President 



Secretary of Slate nominee (March 201S); DJr*?clo r oF the Central 
Intelligence Agency (January 2017-present); former member of the 
United stmes House of Representatives from Kansas (2012-2017) 



/hi r\ 



(U) Referenced Persons (cont) 



1 ' ^I - T - , — IF — — I — «i 

President of the Russian Federation (2012-present) 


Harry Former Minority Leader of the United States Senate {2015 2017); 

former United States Senator from Nevada {198V-2017) 









Former National Security Advisor (2013-1017}; former United 
States Ambassador to Lhe United Notions {2009-2U13] 

Former Republican nominee for President (2012): former Governor 
of Massachusetts (2003-2007) 

Speaker of the United States House of Representative.*; (2015- 
present); member of the United States House of Representatives 
from Wisconsin (13!)9-present) 

Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Gvel 
Office Operations (January 2017-September 2017); forme/ Director 
of Security for the Trump Organization (2004-2017} 

' Former foreign policy advisor to Donald Trump; former inspector 
General of the United Stales Department of Defense {2002-2005} 

Attorney General of the United States {2017-present); member of 
the 2016 Presidential Transition ream nnd Donald trump's 2016 
presidential campaign; former Unuoo States Senator from Alabama 



Founder of British research firm Orb Is Business intelligence; former 
British intelligence professional 

Former advisor of Donate! Trump's 2016 president's I campaign 

Senior Policy Advisor of Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential cam¬ 
paign; former National Security Advisor to the Vico President {2013 


Donald J. 


Trump, Jr. 


President of The United States (2017-present); career real estaTe 
developer and television host and producer 

President Trump's son; Trump Organization executive 


(U) Referenced Persons (cont) 


1 Yates 

former President of Ukr&rne (2010-2014) 

Former Acting Attorney General of the United States (Jan 2017); 
former Deputy Attorney General of che United States (2015 2017) 


TOP - SCCRE - f 


(U) Preface 

(U) In 2015, Russia began engaging in a 
covert influence campaign aimed at the U.S. 
presidential election. The Russian govern- 
ment, at the direction of President Vladimir 
Putin, sought to sow discord in American 
society and undermine our faith in the dem¬ 
ocratic process. Now, more than a year 
after the election, the American people 
rightfully want to know what the Russians 
did; how they did it; with whose support, if 
anyone's; and what can be done to counter 
any election tampering by foreign adver¬ 
saries In the future. 

(U) With this charge, the House Perma¬ 
nent Select Committee on Intelligence (the 
Committee) initiated an investigation in Jan¬ 
uary 2017 with the mandate to examine (1) 
what Russian cyber activity and other active 
measures (covert influence activities run by 
the Russian intelligence services) were di¬ 
rected against the United States and its al¬ 
lies; (2) whether the Russian active 
measures include links between Russia and 
individuals associated with presidential 
campaigns; (3) what was the U.S. govern¬ 
ment response to these Russian active 
measures and what do we need to do to 
protect ourselves and our allies in the fu¬ 
ture; and (4) what possible leaks of classi¬ 
fied information took place related to the 
Intelligence Community's assessment of 
these matters. Our goal was to provide, to 
the greatest extent practicable, a full ac¬ 
counting of what happened, how it hap¬ 
pened, and recommendations for protecting 

our democratic processes and Institutions in 
the future. 

(U) From the investigation's inception, 
we were determined to follow the facts 
wherever they might lead within the agreed 
-upon scope and refer any criminality (if 
found) to the appropriate authorities. Dur¬ 
ing the investigation we identified numer¬ 
ous shortcomings, including counterintelli¬ 
gence concerns, classified leaks, puzzling 
legal processes, and inappropriate or ques¬ 
tionable behavior. All of these are enumer¬ 
ated in this report through findings, recom¬ 
mendations, and conclusions. 

(U) We reviewed every piece of rele¬ 
vant evidence provided to us and inter¬ 
viewed every witness we assessed would 
substantively contribute to the agreed-upon 
bipartisan scope of the investigation. We 
acknowledge that Investigations by other 
committees, the Special Counsel, the media, 
or interest groups will continue and may 
find facts that were not readily accessible to 
the Committee or outside the scope of our 
investigation. We will ensure any new dis¬ 
coveries are considered in the due course of 
the Committee's continuing oversight re¬ 

(U) We would like to recognize the tire¬ 
less work of the Committee's staff, which 
remained professional and dedicated 
throughout this inquiry. They deserve our 
nation's gratitude. We would also like to 
thank the thousands of men and women 
who serve in the 1C. They will wake up to- 



morrow and continue their watch to protect 
the American people against further threats 
from Russia and other adversaries* 

(U) Nevertheless, the Committee re¬ 
mains concerned that Russia will continue 
to undermine western democracies by stok¬ 
ing social strife, political unrest, and divi¬ 
sion, As a country, it is time for us to re¬ 
flect, understand what happened, fix the 
discovered problems, and unify around the 
common purpose of countering any future 
influence campaigns by Russia or any other 



(U) Introduction and Overview 

(U) Russia's interference in the 2016 
U.S. presidential election was nothing novel 
for the Kremlin. The Kremlin aspires to sow 
chaos and discord and advance its agenda in 
targeted nations, particularly in Europe and 
former Soviet republics such as the Baltics 
and Ukraine. To do this, Russia effectively 
combines decades of experience in propa¬ 
ganda and psychological warfare techniques 
with its vast media apparatus, a strata of 
well-educated and proficient technicians, 
and a robust intelligence and security corps. 

(U) In the United States, Russian 
cyberattacks related to the 2016 elections 
starkly highlighted technical vulnerabilities 
in U.S. digital infrastructure and bureau¬ 
cratic shortcomings that were exploited by 
the Kremlin. Russia's active measures cam¬ 
paign achieved its primary goal of inciting 
division and discord among Americans. For 
more than a year, U.S. politics have been 
consumed by bitter recriminations, charges, 
and counter-charges about the attacks. The 
reliability of the democratic vote—the bed¬ 
rock of the U.S. republic—was widely and 
repeatedly questioned. 

(U) Atthe time of the 2016 U.S. presi¬ 
dential election cycle, the Committee was 
already concerned with Russian malfea¬ 
sance and aggression in levels that had not 
been seen since the Cold War. In fact, the 
IAA for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 included 
multiple provisions to improve the United 
States' ability to counter Russian aggression. 
However, the Kremlin's malicious activities 

during the 2016 U.S. presidential election 
triggered the Committee to announce a spe¬ 
cific inquiry into Russia's campaign (see Ap¬ 
pendix B). The bipartisan parameters fo¬ 
cused the investigation and this report—this 
Committee examined: (1) Russian cyber ac¬ 
tivity and other active measures that were 
directed against the United States and its 
allies; (2) whether the Russian active 
measures include links between Russia and 
individuals associated with presidential 
campaigns; (3) the U.S. government re¬ 
sponse to these Russian active measures 
and what we need to do to protect our¬ 
selves and our allies in the future; and (4) 
what possible leaks of classified information 
took place related to the Intelligence Com¬ 
munity's assessment of these matters. 1 The 
Committee interviewed 73 witnesses, con¬ 
ducted 9 hearings and briefings, reviewed 
approximately 307,900 documents, and is¬ 
sued 20 subpoenas. This allowed the Com¬ 
mittee to find answers crucial for identifying 
and addressing institutional weaknesses to 
assist the United States with identifying and 
responding to inevitable hostile acts in the 

(U) While the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election helped focus American attention on 
Russian cyber and information operations, 
the Russian government has conducted ac¬ 
tive measure campaigns In Europe for years. 
Believing it is engaged in an information war 
with the West, Russia's influence activities 
employ an array of tactics—usually tailored 


to the target country's population and envi¬ 
ronment—in an effort to accomplish the 
Kremlin's goals. These goals generally in¬ 
clude influencing an opponent's leadership 
and population, advancing a narrative, or 
inducing a behavior change. The factors 
that make these campaigns successful also 
make them hard to counter. However, gov¬ 
ernments, non-governmental organizations, 
and media organizations in Europe have be¬ 
gun taking actions to address and mitigate 
the threat that Russian influence campaigns 

threat and defend their systems. State and 
local governments were slow to grasp the 
seriousness of the threat and when notified 
of breaches continued to resist any action 
that implied federal direction or con¬ 
trol. Some states opted not to cooperate 
with important defensive measures offered 
by the DHS. While no tabulation systems, or 
systems that count votes, were impacted, 
the overall security posture of the U.S. fed¬ 
eral, state, and local governments was 
demonstrated to be inadequate and vulner¬ 

(U) The Russian active measures cam¬ 
paign against the United States was multi¬ 
faceted. it leveraged cyberattacks, covert 
platforms, social media, third-party interme¬ 
diaries, and state-run media. Hacked mate¬ 
rial was disseminated through this myriad 
network of actors with the objective of un¬ 
dermining the effectiveness of the future 
administration. This dissemination worked 
in conjunction with derisive messages post¬ 
ed on social media to undermine confidence 
in the election and sow fear and division in 
American society. 

(U) The U.S. government's subsequent 
response to the Russian active measures 
campaign during the 2016 election was slow 

evolved, the FBI's notification to victims and 
oversight committees was inconsistent in 
timeliness and quality, which contributed to 
the victims' failure to both recognize the 

(U) The Committee's investigation also 
reviewed the opening, in summer 2016, of a 
FBI enterprise counterintelligence investiga¬ 
tion intoTrump campaign associ- 

i | Because of "the sensitivity of the 
matter," the FBI did not notify congressional 
leadership about this investigation during 
the FBI's regular counterintelligence 
briefings. 2 Three original sub¬ 

jects of the FBI investigation have been 
charged with crimes and the Committee's 
review of these cases covers the period pri¬ 
or to the appointment of Special Counsel in 
May 2017. 

(U) While the Committee found no evi¬ 
dence that the Trump campaign colluded, 
coordinated, or conspired with the Russian 
government, the investigation did find poor 
judgment and ill-considered actions by the 
Trump and Clinton campaigns. For exam¬ 
ple, the June 2016 meeting at Trump Tower 
between members of the Trump campaign 



and a Russian lawyer who falsely purported 
to have damaging information on the Clin¬ 
ton campaign demonstrated poor judge¬ 
ment. The Committee also found the 
Trump campaign's periodic praise for and 
communications with Wikileaks—a hostile 
foreign organization—to be highly objec¬ 
tionable and inconsistent with U.S. national 
security interests. The Committee also 
found that the Clinton campaign and the 
DNC, using a series of cutouts and interme¬ 
diaries to obscure their roles, paid for oppo¬ 
sition research on Trump obtained from 
Russian sources, including a litany of claims 
by high-ranking current and former Russian 
government officials. Some of this opposi¬ 
tion research was used to produce sixteen 
memos, which comprise what has become 
known as the Steele dossier. 

(U) The effectiveness and relatively low 
cost of information operations, such as the 
dissemination of propaganda, make it an 
attractive tool for foreign adversaries. Un¬ 
less the cost-benefit equation of such oper¬ 
ations changes significantly, the Putin re¬ 
gime and other hostile governments will 
continue to pursue these attacks against the 
United States and its allies. Based on the 
investigation, the Committee recommends 
several solutions to help safeguard U.S. and 
allies' political processes from nefarious ac¬ 
tors, such as the Russians. 

1, HFSG Press Release, Intelligence Committee Chairman , Ranking Member Establish Parameters for Russia investigation, 
Mar, X, 2017. 

2, HPSCl, "RussiaAcHve Measures investigation Open Hearing/ 1 2 Mar t 20, 2017. 


(U) Summary Table of Findings 

(U) Finding #1: The Kremlin exploits free or independent media spaces and open democra 
ores to conduct active measures in Europe. 

(U) Finding #2: Russia supports fringe political parties and non-governmental organizations 
in Europe to further the Kremlin's agenda while also disparaging or discrediting politicians 
and groups seen as hostile to Moscow. 

(U) Finding #3: Russia conducts increasingly aggressive cyber operations against European 
governments; a tactic that will continue to present a profound threat. 

(U) Finding #4: Russia targets disaffected European populations and exploits social, politi¬ 
cal, and racial divisions in an effort to sow discord, encourage unrest, and incite protests. 

(U) Finding #5: Russia leverages business and economic ties in Europe to achieve the Krem¬ 
lin's goals, message displeasure, or inflict punishment. 

(U) Finding #6: European governments and media outlets are conducting a variety of activi¬ 
ties to combat Russian influence campaigns. 


V I * u r 


(U] Finding #7: Russia conducted cyberattacks on U.S. political institutions in 2015-2016. 

(U) Finding #8: Russian-state actors and third-party intermediaries were responsible for the 
dissemination of documents and communications stolen from U.S. political organizations. 

(U) Finding #9: The Russian government used RT to advance its malign influence campaign 
during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 

(U) Finding #10: Russian intelligence leveraged social media in an attempt to sow social dis¬ 
cord and to undermine the U.S. electoral process. 

(U) Finding #11: The Federal Bureau of Investigation's notification to numerous Russian 
hacking victims was largely inadequate. 

(U) Finding #12: Communication between the Department of Homeland Security and state 
election officials was impeded by state officials' mistrust of federal government overreach 
coupled with a unprecedented level of Russian cyber intrusions._ 


(U) Summary Table of Findings {cont) 


(U) Finding #13: The joint Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Department of 
Homeland Security public statement attributing election interference to Russia was ineffec¬ 

(U) Finding #14: The Executive Branch's post-election response was Insufficient, 

(U) Finding #15: The majority of the Intelligence Community Assessment judgments on 
Russia's election activities employed proper analytic tradecraft. 

(U) Finding #16: The Intelligence Community Assessment judgments on Putin's strategic 
intentions did not employ proper analytic tradecraft 

(U) Finding #17: The Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an enterprise counterintelli¬ 
gence investigation into the Trump campaign after receiving information related to Trump 

fnraicrn r\^li j ^; 

*_ ~ % m m _ m t |^ a m ^ )| p h._« | hij, <_j j | Qj 1^1 | | J m 

(U) Finding #18: As part of the enterprise counterintelligence investigation into the Trump 
campaign, the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an individual counterintelligence 
investigation into Carter Page. 

(U) Finding #19: The dossier compiled by Christopher Steele formed an essential part of an 
application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to obtain electronic surveillance 
on Carter Page, 

(U) Finding #20: Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted Paul Manafort on several charges, 
none of which relate to allegations of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the 
Trump campaign and the Russian government. 

(U) Finding #22: General Flynn pleaded guilty to making a false statement to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation regarding his December 2016 conversations with Ambassador Ki$- 
lyak, even though the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents did not detect any deception 
during Flynn's interview. 

(U) Finding #23: Executive Branch officials did not notify the Trump campaign that mem¬ 
bers of the campaign were assessed to be potential counterintelligence concerns. 

(U) Finding #24: The February 201E indictment of the Internet Research Agency and Rus¬ 
sian nationals exposes Russian actors and their intent to spread distrust towards the candi¬ 
dates and the political system in general. 



(U) Summary Table of Findings (cont.) 


{U) Finding #25: When asked directly, none of the interviewed witnesses provided evi¬ 
dence of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the Rus¬ 
sian government. 

(U) Finding #26: The Committee found no evidence that President Trump's pre-campaign 
business dealings formed the basis for collusion during the campaign. 

(U) Finding #27: The Republican national security establishment's opposition to candidate 
Trump created opportunities for two less-experienced individuals with pro-Russia views to 
serve as campaign advisors: George Papadopouios and Carter Page. 

(U| Finding #28: The change in the Republican Party platform regarding Ukraine resulted in 
a stronger position against Russia, not a weaker one, and there is no evidence that Paul 
Manafort was involved. 

(U) Finding #29: There is no evidence that Trump associates were involved in the theft or 
publication of Clinton campaign-related emails, although Trump associates had numerous 
ill-advised contacts with WikiLeaks. 

(U) Finding #30: Carter Page did not travel to Moscow in July 2016 on behalf of the Trump 
campaign, but the Committee is concerned about his seemingly incomplete accounts of his 
activity in Moscow. 

(U) Finding #31: George Papadopouios' attempts to leverage his Russian contacts to facili¬ 
tate meetings between the Trump campaign and Russians was unsuccessful. 

(U) Finding #32: Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort attended a June 9, 
2016, meeting at Trump Tower where they expected to receive—but did not ultimately ob¬ 
tain—derogatory information on candidate Clinton from Russian sources. 

(U) Finding #33: Donald Trump Jr. briefly met with a Russian government official at the 
2016 National Rifle Association annual meeting, but the Committee found no evidence that 
the two discussed the U.S. presidential election. 

(U) Finding #34: The Committee found no evidence that meetings between Trump associ¬ 
ates—including Jeff Sessions—and official representatives of the Russian government- 
including Ambassador Kislyak—reflected collusion, coordination, or conspiracy with the 
Russian government. 


{U Summary Table of Findings (cont.l 


1 ' + , , , 

* . . 

(U) Finding #35: Possible Russian efforts to set up a "back channel" with Trump associates 
after the election suggest the absence of collusion during the campaign, since the commu¬ 
nication associated with collusion would have rendered such a "back channel" unneces¬ 

(U) Finding #36: Prior to conducting opposition research targeting candidate Trump's busi¬ 
ness dealings, Fusion GPS conducted research benefiting Russian interests. 

(U) Finding #37; The law firm Perkins Coie hired Fusion GPS on behalf of the Clinton cam¬ 
paign and the Democratic National Committee to research candidate Trump's Russia ties. 

(U) Finding #38: Christopher Steele claims to have obtained his dossier information second- 
and third-hand from purported high-placed Russian sources, such as government officials 
with links to the Kremlin and intelligence services. 

(U) Finding #39: Christopher Steele's information from Russian sources was provided di¬ 
rectly to Fusion GPS and Perkins Coie and indirectly to the Clinton campaign. 


i J . jf* m • . ‘ 4. jl 1 - L r ■ • i 

* * * * *■] - ■ i " 

(U) Finding #40: Leaks of classified information regarding Russian intentions to sow discord 
in the U.S. presidential election began prior to the election day—November 8, 2016. 

'i (U) Finding #41; Leaks of classified information alleging Russian intentions to help elect 
candidate Trump increased dramatically after the election day—November 8, 2016. 

(U) Finding #42: The leaks prior to the classified Intelligence Community Assessment's pub¬ 
lication, particularly leaks occurring after the U.S. presidential election, correlate to specific 
language found in the Intelligence Community Assessment. 

(U> Finding #43: Continued leaks of classified information have damaged national security 
and potentially endangered lives. 

(U} Finding #44: Former Director of National intelligence James Clapper, now a CNN nation¬ 
al security analyst, provided inconsistent testimony to the Committee about his contacts 
with the media, including CNN. 


{U) Summary Table of Recommendations 

-- 11 in ■ i - 


(U). Recommendation #3: European governments, non-governmental organizations, busi¬ 
nesses, think tanks, and academia should strengthen legal and regulatory environments, 
promote media pluralism, build professional media associations, and improve the financial 
sustainability of legitimate news outlets. 

**■ ~ ~ --- ™ 

fu) Recommendation #2: European governments, non-governmental organizations, busi¬ 
nesses, think tanks, and academia should implement and encourage multi-pronged, coun¬ 
try-wide efforts by both public and private entities to combat Russian propaganda, tech¬ 
nical, and cyber operations. 

(U) Recommendation #3* European governments, non-governmental organizations, busi¬ 
nesses, think tanks, and academia should implement more stringent cyber security practic¬ 
es, such as multifactor authentication and encryption of sensitive data, as well as educating 
workforces on basic cyber security topics and best practices. 

(U) Recommendation JM: European governments should look to long-term solutions to 
lessen economic dependence on Russia, 

■ . -J?- ■ ! ll ' - -r ? ■- -—-—*-- - 


(U) Recommendation it 5: Congress should identify options available to the private sector 
and federal government that would address the social media vulnerabilities exploited by 
the Russian government. 

(U) Recommendation #6: Congress should consider updating the Foreign Intelligence Sur¬ 
veillance Act to cover malicious international cyber actors. 

fU) Recommendation ff7: The Federal Bureau of Investigation should improve cyberattack 
victim notification. 

(U) Recommendation 118: Threats identified by the Intelligence Community to state and lo¬ 
cal elections infrastructure should be immediately briefed to appropriate state and local 
officials. When threats are Identified, the federal government should conduct an expedit¬ 
ed declassification review to ensure that the threat information can reach all necessary 
state and local officials In a timely manner. 

(U) Recommendation 89: The Secretary of Homeland Security should provide certain desig¬ 
nated state and local election officials appropriate security clearances to enable those offi¬ 
cials to respond to election-related threats. 


(U) Summary Table of Recommendations (cortt.} 




1 ■' 

(U) Recommendation #10: Significant threats to U,S. elections identified by the Intelligence 
Community, including cyberattacks directed at political organizations, should be immedi¬ 
ately reported to the Congressional intelligence committees. 

(UJ Recommendation #11: Congress should encourage the adoption of National Institute of 
Standards and Technology cyber security standards, such as those adopted by the Elections 
Assistance Commission, by providing federal resources to state and local governments to 
facilitate such adoption. Funds should be tied to the adoption and certification of elections 
systems to appropriate standards. 

(UJ Recommendation #12: Congress should consider additional funding for the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology to enable better outreach to state and local govern¬ 

{U) Recommendation #13: Congress should consider a one-time grant to state and local 
election agencies to conduct a risk assessment of those agencies' computer systems. 

(U) Recommendation #14: Congress should consider strengthening the Help America Vote 
Act of 2002 to ensure that both statewide voter registration and tabulation systems are 
better protected from foreign cyber threats. 

(UJ Recommendation #15: The Department of Homeland Security should provide the own¬ 
er or operator of any electronic election infrastructure affected by any significant foreign 
cyber intrusion with a briefing and include steps that may be taken to mitigate such intru¬ 

- IT—^ ^ 1 ** 

(U) Recommendation #16: State and local governments should be encouraged to establish 
redundancies that are not dependent on current elections infrastructure, such as a mecha¬ 
nism that retains individual vote records, ensuring the integrity of the vote in the event of 
a compromise of voting infrastructure due to a foreign cyberattack. An example of such a 
redundancy is a contemporaneously created paper record reflecting the voter's selections. 

(UJ Recommendation #17: While it is important to implement lessons learned from the Ex¬ 
ecutive Branch's response, Congress should not hamper the Executive Branch's ability to 
use discretion in responding to a particular foreign threat. 

<U) Recommendation #18: Congress should consider repealing the Logan Act. 


(U) Summary Table of Recommendations (cont.) 



(U) Recommendation #19: All U.S. presidential campaigns should receive unclassified coun¬ 
terintelligence briefings at an appropriate time prior to a nomination convention. 

(U) Recommendation #20: When consistent with national security, the Intelligence Com¬ 
munity should immediately inform U.S. presidential candidates when it discovers a legiti¬ 
mate counterintelligence threat to the campaign, and promptly notify Congress. 

(U) Recommendation #21: Both houses of Congress should consider requiring all staff to 
receive an annual counterintelligence awareness briefing. 


(U) Recommendation #22: Political campaigns and law enforcement should ensure that 
their counterintelligence defenses appropriately account for the role of cut-outs and inter 

(U) Recommendation #23: Congress should consider amending current campaign finance 
laws to further increase transparency regarding services provided by foreign persons or 


(U) Recommendation #24: Each component of the Intelligence Community should update 
its guidance regarding media contacts to ensure the guidance applies to every employee, 
including senior officials. 

(U) Recommendation #25: Congress should consider legislation to increase the penalties 
for unauthorized disclosures of classified information. 

(U) Recommendation #26; The Executive Branch should consider Instituting mandatory pol¬ 
ygraphs for all nan-confirmed political appointees that have top secret clearances. 

■ . >-»- T *- 


(U) Chapter 1—Russian influence Campaigns in Europe 

Key Question til: What Russian cyber activity and other active measures were directed 
against the United States and its aliies ? 

(U) While Americans became acutely 
aware of Russian cyber and information op¬ 
erations after the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election, these activities were not new to 



Vj'v/ir.w irv yj.* rt£< A No.*h. »•» 
M,mv s -4( M Alfa.* 


{U) Russia conducts information war 

fare in an effort to manipulate the populace 
and leadership of the nations it targets. To 
these ends, Russia employs an array of tac¬ 
tics for its influence activities in an effort to 
advance the Russian government's inter¬ 
ests. When successful, these activities can 
influence an opponent's leadership and 
population to advance a narrative and in¬ 
duce a behavior change, concurrently serv¬ 
ing multiple Russian objectives. 

(U) Russia’s goals for these campaigns 
include: to advance the Kremlin's interests; 
discredit the West; confuse or distort events 
that threaten Russia's image; break Western 
political cohesion; and defend Russia's role 
as a vital global power. More specific and 
country-tailored goals also include to: weak" 
en, divide, and halt further expansion of 
consensus-driven institutions like NATO and 
the HU; sow confusion and amplify divisions 
among segments of Western populations; 
challenge establishment politics; damage 
U S. foreign policy goals; advance Russia's 
version of world events; distract from con¬ 
troversial Russian policies and activities; re¬ 
verse perceived anti-Russian policies; im¬ 
prove bilateral relations; and strengthen 
economic ties. 


(U) Aiding in Russia's influence aclivi- 
lives, the modern world's widespread use of 
the internet and social media for news and 
communications has allowed Russia to: 
quickly and easily weapontae data stolen in 
cyber breaches; disseminate propaganda, 
misinformation, and disinformation; and 
aggravate social, racial, and political divi¬ 

(U) Finding Jfl: The Kremlin exploits free or 
independent media spaces and open de¬ 
mocracies to conduct active measures in 

(U) Russia also exploits free media 

spaces and open democracies through a 
network of Russian state-owned news out- 
fets and media platforms, such as Sputnik 
and HT, which promote Russia's image 
abroad and show foreigners world events 
from a Russian perspective (see Appendix 

(U)The Kremlin's active measures, or 
information warfare, strategy includes sev¬ 
eral tactics: 

• (U) After alleged Russian interfer¬ 

ence in the Brexltvote, in October 
2013, the U.K. Electoral Commission 
announced a probe into this activity. 
According to open source reporting, 
Russian-based Twitter accounts post¬ 
ed more than 45,000 messages 
about Brexit in 48 hours during the 
2016 referendum vote/ 


to Moscow. 

(U) Plant and propagate false news sto¬ 
ries: Russia uses "troll" armies to set up fake 
social media accounts and blogs, including 
through an organization known as the Inter¬ 
net Research Agency (IRA). 11 A study by the 
European Endowment for Democracy de¬ 
scribed large numbers of paid Russian 

(U) Finding #2: Russia supports fringe po¬ 
litical parties and non-governmental organ 
izations in Europe to further the Kremlin's 

agenda while also disparaging or discred¬ 
iting politicians and groups seen as hostile 



(U) In a tactic dating back to the Soviet 
era, Moscow also denigrates and discredits 
people and groups seen as hostile to its in- 

(U) Kremlin-linked journalists and media 

outlets also will engage in misinformation: 
weaving truth and falsehoods together to 
create misleading reports intended to im- 



13 * 



(U) In another example during the re¬ 
cent French Presidential elections, Russian- 
controlled media highlighted defamatory 
stories about the private life and campaign 
funding of the more Russia skeptic candi¬ 
date Emmanuel Macron. Two days before 
the final presidential election, data hacked 
from Macron's En Marche party was posted 
on a data sharing website. Cybersecurity 
researchers attributed the hack to the same 
GRU group that hacked the DNC/' 

(U) Finding #3: Russia conducts increasing¬ 
ly aggressive cyber operations against Eu¬ 
ropean governments; a tactic that will con¬ 
tinue to present a profound threat. 



% -* 

sh ®" i 


* a 

(U) Finding #4; Russia targets disaffected 
European populations and exploits social, 
political, and racial divisions in an effort to 
sow discord, encourage unrest, and incite 



(U) Finding ffS: Russia leverages business 
and economic ties in Europe to achieve the 
Kremlin's goals, message displeasure, or 
inflict punishment. 

(U1 Russia is adept at utilizing economic 
ties to its advantage* Moscow aims ic 
deepen business ties with individuals that 

i— t \ E i / 



‘ wororir. 

can be used as agents of influence, and 
countries whose dependence on trade with 
Russia create vulnerabilities to Russian influ¬ 
ence. Economic vulnerability—such as reli¬ 
ance on Russia for trade or energy—can be 
leveraged to change behavior, message dis¬ 
pleasure, or inflict punishment. For exam¬ 
ple, Germany imports about 40 percent of 
its natural gas from Russia. Because of this, 
many business leaders are lobbying for the 
removal of sanctions against Russia. J/ 

(U) Finding #6: European governments and 
media outlets are conducting a variety of 
activities to combat Russian influence cam¬ 


(U) According to a 2016 study by the 
RAND Corporation, Russia's various tactics 
for conducting information operations, 
combined with its lack of a consistent, ideo¬ 
logical goal, make countering these activi¬ 
ties difficult. This study found that the fac¬ 
tors that make Russian disinformation effec¬ 
tive—the high volume of stories, its rapid, 
continuous nature, and lack of consisten¬ 
cy—are the same factors that make it diffi- 
cult to counter. '' 




(U) Many European governments are 
taking proactive steps to counter Russian 
propaganda and disinformation efforts. 
NATO has prioritized efforts to counter 
"hybrid threats" by developing a strategy 
that includes strengthened coordination 
with the European Union, as well as training 
and exercises through its new Intelligence 
Division. The Strategic Communications 
Center of Excellence in Riga, Latvia and the 
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excel¬ 
lence in Tallinn, Estonia also contribute to 
these efforts. In addition, several MATO al- 

TBf JggRW 


lies and European Union members signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding to estab¬ 
lish a European Center of Excellence for 
Countering Hybrid Threats in April 2017. 43 

(U) In France, the French newspaper Le 
Monde launched a web platform to allow 
readers to check the reliability of French 
and international websites with an Internet 
browser extension that will alert readers 
when they come across false or unverified 
stories. 46 

{U} In 2017, Ukraine banned Russian 
social media platforms, as well as RT and 
Sputnik—though the latter two can still be 
accessed online. Additionally, media 
platforms such as StopFake are used to 
identify false news stories. 60 

(U) in November 2016, the European 
Parliament adopted a resolution to counter¬ 
act a nti-EU propaganda by third parties. 51 


(U) Russia's active measures campaign 
in Europe is nothing new, but the growing 
frequency and intensity of Russian influence 
efforts pose an increasingly significant 
threat to the United States and its allies. 

The Committee has taken significant 
measures to highlight this growing threat to 
the American people since at least 2015. 
Specifically, the Intelligence Authorization 
Act (IAA) for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 in¬ 
cluded multiple provisions to improve the 
United States' ability to counter Russian ag¬ 

• (U) FY 2016 IAA, Section 502. As¬ 
sessment on funding of political par¬ 
ties and nongovernmental organiza¬ 
tions by the Russian Federation. 

o (U} FY 2016 IAA, Section 503. As¬ 
sessment on the use of political as¬ 
sassinations as a form of statecraft 
by the Russian Federation. 

♦ (U) FY 2017 IAA, Section 501. Com¬ 

mittee to Counter Active Measures 
by the Russian Federation to Exert 
Covert Influence Over Peoples and 

• (U) FY 2017 IAA, Section 502. Travel 

of Accredited Diplomatic and Consu¬ 
lar Personnel of the Russian Federa¬ 
tion in the United States. 

• (U) FY 2017 IAA, Section 503. Study 

and Report on Enhanced Intelligence 
and Information Sharing with Open 
Skies Treaty Member States. 

(U) Additionally, in 2016 the Committee 
held two hearings and seven briefings for 
Committee Members on Russia and related 
issues, and the Chairman and Members of 
the Committee sent, six letters to the Admin¬ 
istration urging stronger action against Rus¬ 
sia. For example, Committee Members 
urged the Obama administration to hold 
Russia accountable for multiple violations of 
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty, and expressed concern over likely 
Russian attempts to utilize the Open Skies 
Treaty for intelligence collection purposes. 
Additionally, in spring 2016, Chairman 
Nunes declared the inability to predict the 
plans and intentions of the Putin regime 
"the biggest intelligence failure since 



■ . ■ "Ha, t 4 * 1 , J-mM i*JI , ' i ■ n t 

9/11." 55 

7. Atexi Mostrous, Mark Bridge, Katie Gibbons, "Russia Used Twitter Dots and Trolls "To Disrupt" Brexit Vote/ 1 The Times 
UK, Nov. 15, 2017. 

11. Son am 3 both, "Our Task Was to Set Americans Against Thek Own Government": New Details Emerge About Russia's 
Trolling Operation, Business Insider, Oct 17, 2017, 

12. European Endowment for Democracy, Bringing Plurality ond Balance to the Russian Language Medio Space, June 25, 



15 . 





20 . 

21 . 

22 . 






HPSCt, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 15, 2017. 

I IPSO, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 15, 2017; XE Currency Converter, EUR to USD, .vww. / 
C u r t c n eye o n va rter/conv e r t / ?Am o u n 1=2£Fi a n\r £ U R &T o - USD . 

HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Berlin, Germany, Sept 16, 2017, 

TrendMicro, "From Espionage to Cyber Propaganda: Pawn Storm's Activities over the Past Two Years," Apr. 2S, 2017. 

HPSG, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Berlin, Germany, Sept. 1G, 2017; LcxIsNexls, Discovery Services fact Sheet: "How Many 
Pages in a Gigabyte?," Dec. 23, 2017. 

37. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Berlin, Germany, Sept. 16, 2017, 


39 . 




33* NATQ, "NATO Welcomes Opening of European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats," Apr 11 H 2017. 

49. HPSCI, HP5CI Staff Delegation to Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 15, 2017. 

50. HPSCI, H PS Cl Staff Delegation to Kiev, Ukraine, Sept* 21 r 2017. 

51 European Parliament, "European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communications to coun¬ 
teract propaganda against it by third parties," Nov* 23, 2016. 

52 t 



GAO, Russia: U,S. Government Takes a Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformation Overseas , May 2017, 


56. Bridget Johnson, "Chairman: Biggest Post 9/11 Intelligence Failure was Misreading Putin," PJ Medio , Apr. 13, 2016; Saa^ 
gar Enjeti, "US Response to Rusian Spying is 'Biggest Intelligence Failure Since 9/11," Sept, 15, 2016; Susan Jones, "Rep. 
Devin Nunes: We've Been Warning Administration About Russian Hacking 'And They Did Nothing/" CNS News, Jan. 9, 



(U) Chapter 2 - Russia Attacks the United States 

Key Question HI: What Russian cyber activity and other active measures were directed 
against the United States and its allies? 

(U) The Russian government's multifac¬ 
eted malign influence campaign was the 
subject of extensive public reporting in the 
months before the January 5, 2017, publica¬ 
tion of the classified ICA titled Assessing 
Russian Activities ond intentions in Recent 
US Elections. While many of the facts con¬ 
cerning the attack have been widely dissem¬ 
inated, there are important elements of the 
Russian campaign that remain classified. 

{U) The purpose of the Committee's re¬ 
view of the Russian information operations 
was to establish the facts, as well as the fed¬ 
eral government's understanding of those 
facts. This chapter specifically examines (1) 
the cyberattacks that targeted U.S. political 
organizations (including the method of the 
attack and its attribution}; (2) the dissemina- 


tion of hacked material; and (3} the role of 
Russian state media and social media in 
Russia's malign influence campaign, 

(U) Finding #7: Russia conducted 
cyberattacks on U.S. political institutions in 

(U) The Committee agrees with this 
statement and finds the ICA assessment of 

Russian responsibility to be based on com¬ 
pelling facts and well-reasoned analysis. 

' TOP CDGn i CT// 



SPEAR PHISHING is a Cybernet a ck that uses email 
to lure a victim into open mg attachments, following 
links or disclosing their credentials, Theso messag¬ 
es are highly specific nnd seem authentic to tne 


CREDENTIAL HARVESTING is the process of idemi 
fying the usernames, passwords, and hashes of tar 
Rets which can then bn used to (join unauthorized 
access to d user's system. 

1 m ■*■+■ 


TO t 1 3ECAET/J 

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(U) Attribution is a Bear 



{U) While the intelligence case for 
attribution to Russia is significant, alterna¬ 
tive scenarios have been examined to in¬ 
clude an insider threat or another cyber ac¬ 
tor. No credible evidence was found sup¬ 
porting either alternative, including a review 
of information contained in classified intelli¬ 
gence reports. 

(U) Finding ti 8: Russian-state actors and 
third-party intermediaries were responsi¬ 
ble for the dissemination of documents 
and communications stolen from U.S. po¬ 
litical organizations. 

4 * 

(U) Russian-state actors and third party 
intermediaries were responsible for the se¬ 

lective dissemination of information from 
hacked U.S. political systems. This repre¬ 
sents a "significant escalation in directness, 
level of activity, and scope of effort" in Rus¬ 
sia's "longstanding desire to undermine the 
US-led liberal democratic order." It is there¬ 
fore likely that high-level Russian govern¬ 
ment approval was required in both plan¬ 
ning and execution of the operation. 10 

(U) Russian-state Actors 

(U) Guccifer 2.0 and DC Leaks 





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Source: (gucdferi, wcrdpress.corn) 




(U) From their first appearances, both 
Guccifer 2.0 and DC Leaks sought to conceal 
their identities. During a media interview 
on June 21,2017, Guccifer 2.0 identified 
himself as a Romanian "hacker, manager, 
philosopher, women lover," and a "freedom 
fighter." He further explained in broken 
English his desire to follow in Marcel Lazar's 
(the original Guccifer) footsteps to "fight for 
freedom of minds <snd for a world without 
illuminati." 19 

(U) Meanwhile, DC Leaks identified it¬ 
self as a group of American hacktivists en¬ 
gaged in "a new level project aimed to ana¬ 
lyze and publish a large amount of emails 
from top-ranking officials and their influ¬ 
ence agents all over the world." The self- 
described premise of the DC Leaks effort 
was that "politicians have forgotten that in a 
democracy the people are the highest form 
of political authority."^ 

* (U) Both Guccifer 2.0 and DC Leaks 

worked to conceal their true identi¬ 
ties, physical locations, and motiva¬ 

♦ (U) Guccifer 2.0's first appearance 

online and claim of responsibility for 
the DNC hack occurred within 24 
hours of the public announcement 

that the DNC had 

been hacked by actors affiliated with 
the Russian government; 22 



*> (U) Multiple cybersecurity firms 

have evaluated Guccifer 2.0's activi¬ 
ty and have published evidence that 
the online persona used a Russian- 
based VPN service to transmit files 
and communicate. Additionally, 
posted documents were processed 
on a computer using Russian lan¬ 
guage settings; 2 ' 1 

• (U) During interactions with the me¬ 

dia, Guccifer 2.0 denied any relation¬ 
ship with the Russian government 
and claimed to be Romanian. How¬ 
ever, when pressed to explain how 
he hacked into the DNC in his native 
Romanian language, he failed to 
demonstrate fluency, Guccifer 2.0 
terminated the interview when chal¬ 
lenged on this point; 21 * 

(U) WikiLeaks 

{U) WikiLeaks played a key role in Rus¬ 
sia's malign influence campaign and served 
as a third party intermediary for Russian in¬ 
telligence during the period leading up to 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election. 

(U) The global reach of WikiLeaks and 
its established ties to the media makes it an 
attractive outlet for the dissemination of 
stolen documents intended to undermine 
the United States and its electoral process. 
In addition, WikiLeaks' historic actions, 
which have undermined U.S. interests and 
been beneficial to Russia, make the organi¬ 
zation an ideal intermediary for Russian in¬ 
telligence. 7 



r ,> ni • \ 

Source: Twitlcr 


(U) WikiLeaks relies on hackers, leak¬ 
ers, and other criminal agents to acquire 
personal, confidential, and classified materi- 

dissemination, WikiLeaks sent 118 tweets 
promoting the hacked material. WikiLeaks 
messaging was then magnified by 426,000 
other users' tweets. According to Twitter, 
as much as 25% of these tweets could have 



been the result of automated activity asso¬ 
ciated with Russia's malign influence cam- 






T *+ r^H wni u> 


r*» *ua» w<a CJarc; 

Scarce VtfaLeatewscdte 

« * 

Finding #9: The Russian government used 

RT to advance its malign influence cam¬ 
paign during the 2016 U.S. presidential 


7h*?cdwi* f trulls 

{U) The Committee finds ample evi¬ 
dence that RT is not only a state-enterprise, 
but is subject to the editorial control of the 
Russian government. This control allowed 
the Kremlin to use RT to advance its malign 
influence efforts during the 2016 U.S. presi¬ 
dential election. 

(U) RT, formerly Russia Today, became 
an international news channel in 2005.. It is 
available in more than 100 countries and 
has its iargest viewer base in Europe. RT's 
stated goal is to "create news with an edge 
for viewers who want to question more" 
and produces content which appeals to 
skeptics of both the mainstream media and 
the establishment. 30 

(U) RT is subject to the control of the 
Russian government. The State Department 
describes it as a "State-owned international 
satellite news network broadcasting in mul¬ 
tiple languages," which "spreads Russian, 
propaganda tailored to international mar¬ 
kets." The 1C has identified RT as "the Krem¬ 
lin's principal international propaganda out¬ 
let" 31 

profer nr of the lls. house of r epresemtattves 


(U) During the 2016 U.S. presidential 
elections, RT ran stories consistent with its 
past editorial bias against the West and sug¬ 
gested that the U.S. electoral process had 

been corrupted. RT was critical of presiden- 


tial candidates from both major parties but 
was consistently critical of candidate Clinton 
through the election. 

(U) RT's attacks against candidate Clin¬ 
ton were wide-ranging, including the Insinu¬ 
ation that the Clinton family were criminals. 
RT also used advertising to promote materi¬ 
al leaked by Russian intelligence, which tar¬ 
geted candidate Clinton and the Democratic 
Party. 32 - 

(U) Finding #10: Russian Intelligence lever¬ 
aged social media in an attempt to sow so¬ 
cial discord and to undermine the U.S. elec¬ 
toral process. 

(U) The Internet Research Agency (IRA), 
a Russia-based "troll farm" with ties to the 
Kremlin, was responsible for placing ads and 
maintaining both human operated and au¬ 
tomated social media accounts for the ma- 
lign influence campaign, 

(U) Twitter 




S times when the Clintons escaped federal 

t**m ImttXK to «rO 

i i 

^ ftr * '•». 

WikiLeaks reloads latest batch 
of entails from Clinton campaign chair 

fm/ uciOV rotX4«lt lB»*C BtWw. 

Vilii *i> » «S 1 *in5 rsrr t* tf v=5»-‘i rvt 

» « 

• «• s» & (ft 0 © Er 6 

i * •» 

Source: Twilfer 


(U)The 2016 Russian Twitter operation 
was coordinated with the use of other social 
media platforms to undermine the U.S. po¬ 
litical process and divide Americans. Both 
presidential candidates ((©HNlaryClintan 
and @>realDonaldTrump) were directly en¬ 
gaged through "retweets" and "likes," as 
were various politically active and divisive 


T e p ' OccncT/ 

factions of American society. 

(U) In total, Twitter identified 36,746 
automated Russian accounts which were 
responsible for producing 1.4 million unique 
tweets. In addition, Twitter identified 2,7S2 
human-operated accounts. Some of these 
accounts masqueraded as the news media, 
activists, and political organizations. One 
Russian account, @TEN_GOI\ successfully 
Impersonated the Tennessee Republican 
Party and grew to have significantly more 
followers than the legitimate Twitter ac¬ 
count. After tweeting "We Love You, Mr. 
President" to Donald Trump, @ten_GOP 
received a thank you from the presidential 
candidate. 35 

(U) @TEN_GOP and other Russian- 
linked accounts incited racial divisions, anti- 
Muslim, and anti-immigrant messages. 

They also promoted the dissemination of 
material stolen from U.S. political organiza¬ 
tions by the GRU. The Russian cyber per¬ 
sonas DC Leaks and Guccifer 2.0 used 
Twitter to promote stolen material, as did 


@HillaryClinton and 



(U) Russian operators also used Face- 
book Pages and advertising to advance their 
malign influence campaign. The company's 

4 * 

internal review found the creation and pro¬ 
motion of 120 unique Facebook Pages by 
the IRA. These pages generated approxi¬ 
mately 80,000 posts over the two year peri¬ 
od preceding the election. These posts ap¬ 
peared in 29 million users' Facebook "News 
Feeds," When Facebook calculated the cu¬ 
mulative impact of "Shares" "Likes" and 
"Follows," the company estimated that 129 
million people may have been served Rus¬ 
sia's malign Influence content. 30 

(U) According to Facebook, much of the 
Russian activity was designed to promote 
divisive social and political messages across 
the ideological spectrum and that advertis¬ 
ing was intended to drive followership of 
divisive Pages. Four of the top Impression- 
generating (or number of times an ad was 
on screen) advertisements were from ficti¬ 
tious personas claiming to represent organi¬ 
zations Including "Back the Badge," 
"Blacktivist" "Being Patriotic," and "Woke 
Blacks." 17 

32.25-1 M 


to 416,632 





TdJ’Qctlng ^HillaryCUrrtcn 

Cc'.utc: Tvjss; 

Targeting ^ealOonnWTrurr.p 
toll Givers 

(U) Russian malign influence activities 
on Facebook were significant but they were 
not well-funded or large-scale operations 
relative to the overall scope of election- 
related activity on these platforms: 


• Prior to the election, Russian opera¬ 
tors used paid advertising on Face- 

book to reach 5 million Americans 







p i tva rp! £/m] 


*trt e-^lr:r*»* iW* 

UA 4 M ti»;A W 

Jffr L^iJ 

EH** GSf/ti 

SVfl/lf*) y** ^pL,V»J-V"JJ CW CA^' TA J C*J pwSl^ ^ 


fV™** A 

«4*3 CWVM ite* Ha 

f l^5 

^ PV K J^Tt* t* 


WUBH* WJ t/T Ckttff 4 |VpO 

Ltm tsr& >sr*r/ 

’j ^ i ivtT '■'»> i—v* • krtwiwi 

iin- Pf -«« 

PJE^j toor 

WM fcvuii il! r DiTbWE 01 lG 6 “ <s>!Tr^/nj^ vTjttcs toa Jiaast 



!+' maim rw 

®ri Ufc* 

Source: Facebook 



(based on impressions). At the same 
time, 33 trillion stories were served 
on Facebook Pages and users aver¬ 
aged 220 per day; 

« 56% of the 11.4 million impressions 

associated with Russian Facebook 
advertising occurred after the elec¬ 

• 99% of Russian Facebook ads were 

funded with less than $1,000 and 
25% were never seen. 

(U) Google 

(U) Google also was used as a media 
platform for Russia's malign influence cam¬ 
paign. The company's investigation re¬ 
vealed that $4,700 was spent promoting 18 
channels and 1,100 YouTube videos (43 
hours of content). 

(U) Google describes this as a limited 
investment compared to overall election- 
related spending on Google. In total, 

0.0002 percent of 2016 U.S. election adver¬ 
tising was found to be associated with Rus¬ 
sian malign actors. In addition, Google not¬ 
ed that this Russian-funded media had very 
low view counts with only 3% reaching 
views of 5,000 or more. 

(U) However, it should be noted that 
Google and its services have been and con¬ 
tinue to be used by Russia for the dissemi¬ 
nation of propaganda through RT. This is 
partly evidenced by RT's 2.2 million sub¬ 
scribers on YouTube, but also by the fact 
that RT propaganda is served to Americans 
by Google in the same manner as legitimate 
news sources. 

(U) The Committee's Investigation 
found that.Twitter, Facebook, Google, and 
other social media platforms face significant 
challenges In their effort to identify and act 
on malign Influence campaigns. Some of 
those challenges include: 

• Sophisticated actors adapt to auto¬ 
mated defenses; 

• Social media does not require true 
name usage; 

» Users can easily conceal their physi¬ 
cal location with virtual private net¬ 
work connections; 

• Social media seeks authentic ex¬ 
changes and does not want to cen¬ 
sor speech; and 

• Social media platforms do not have 
access to intelligence reporting. 



13. HPSO, Full CcmrrJtfee Briefing cj* Russia Cyber ACiiviiy [Dosed Sess ion), Sept 6, 2016: HF5G, fulS Cc^mitt^e Briefing on 
Eussra Cyber Activity (Closed Session)., Jan. 10,2016; HP£Q h Fuli Ccmm'iiies Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity [Closed Ses¬ 
sion), D&t. % 2026;^|^m ^Oroft incident investigation Report for the Demacnypc Notional CQTTttittee, Aug. 2A f 

2 016; incident Investigation Report for the Democratic CongressionalCompcSgo Committee^ Aug. S, 
2016. _ 

14. Incident investigationt Report for the Democratic Nattonaf Committee* Aug. 24,2016; 

Draft fneitfen f investigation Report far thz Demaarctic Congress atj&I Caropgsgzr CommH^e^i Aug. 3_. 2016. 

13. Draft incident UjvBsfigoTfon Report for the Semccrctfc NattunoJ CcmmJtteej Au^ 24, 2£>J S'; 

Draft Incident Invssfigatfon Report for The Demoantfc Ccngres&cnaS Co&pafgn GotnmitZEC, Aug. 8 r 2G1&; LcdsNads, Dti- 
covety Services foci Sheet: ^Jovv HaoyPoges in a (ffgcbyie?" D^. 23,2017. 



16. ODNt, intelligence Community Assessment; Assessing Russian Activities and intentions in Recent US Elections , Jan, 5, 
2017; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activities (Closed Session), Dec, 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee 
Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed), Jan. 10, 2016; 

; GDNl, intelligence Community Assessment. Cyber Threats to the 7016 US Presi¬ 
dential Election (ICA 2016-37HC) t Sept. 12, 2016. 


IS, HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activities (Closed), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Rus¬ 
sia Cyber Activity [Closed Session), Jam 10, "The definitive Trump-Russio Timeline of Events " 

Politico, Dec, 1, "'Hacking Democracy: The Post's new 

findings in Russia's bold campaign to influence the 11,5. election," Washington Post, July 11, 2017; 

prise in Cyberspace Operations (NlCM 2017-06), Jan* 30, 2017. 

19* "interview with Guccifer 2*0/' VICE , June 21, 2017. 

20, Twitter, @DCLeaks_ 

21 * 

ODNI, Growing Risk of Strategic Sur- 

"Bears in the Midst: intrusion into the Democratic Notional Committee" CrowdStrfke Blog, June 15, 
2016; ^ Inside Story ; Now Russians Hacked the Democrats' Emails, Associated 
Press, Nov. 4, 2017; "AN Signs Point to Russia Being Behind the DNC Hack ," VICE, July 25, 2016; 

"interview with Guccifer 2.0" VICE, June 21, 2017. 

24. "Two Years of Pawn Storm," Trend Micro , Apr* 25, 2017; ThreatConnect, " Guccifer 2.0: Alt Roods Lead 

Each to Russia July 26, 2016; 

25, "Interview with Guccifer 2.0/' VICE, June 21, 2017. 

26. ThreatConnect, "Does a BEAR teak in the Woods? ThreatConnect Identifies DCLeaks as Another Russian-Backed Influ¬ 
ence Outlet/" Aug, 12,2016 

7. ^° e 

Becker, Steven Erianger, and Eric Schmitt, "How Russia Often Benefits When Julian Assange Reveals the West's Secrets," 
The New York Times , Aug. 31, 2016. 

2B,, About WikiLeaks (, Dec* 22, 2017; Feike Hacqtiebord, "Two Years of Pawn Storm," 
Trend Micro , Apr, 25, 2017; ThreatConnect, "Guccifer 2.0; All Roads lead Back to Russia," July 26,2016; 

; HPSQ, Full 

Committee Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan, 10,2016* 

29* HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on 
Russia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan. 10, 2016; Matthew Nussbaum, "The definitive Trump-Russta Timeline of 
Events," Politico, Dec. 1, "Hacking Democracy: The Post's 

new findings in Russia's bold campaign to influence the U*S, election," Washington Post, July 11, 2017; 

30., About, Dec. 23, 2017; 

31* LIS. Department of State, Media organizations controlled and funded by the Government of the Russia Federation 
(Report 0025801 Nov* 7,2017. 



34, Written testimony Acting Genera! Counsel of Twitter, Jnc., Nov. 1, 2017; HPSG, "Russia investigation 

Task Force Hearing on Social Media,"" Nov, 1,2017, 

35. Written testimony Acting General Counsel of Twitter, Inc*, Nov* 1, 2017. 

36. Written testimony ofGeneral Counsel, Facebook, Nov* 1, 2017* 

37, HPSCI, "Russia Investigation Task Force Nearing on Social Media," Nov. 1, 2017, 


(U) Chapter 3 - America Reacts 

Key Question 113: What was the U.S. government response to these Russian active measures 
and what da we need to do to protect ourselves and our allies in the future? 

(U) As discussed in Chapter 2, the 1C 
was at the tip of the spear of the U.S. gov¬ 
ernment's response to Russia's nefarious 
cyber activities. While the NBA focused on 
detection and attribution, the FBI took the 
lead on victim notification, and the DHS was 
the primary agency responsible for provid¬ 
ing assistance to victims and coordinating 
with state and local election officials. 

(U) The federal government's ability to 
effectively respond to cyber threats de¬ 
pends on the IC's ability to pass information 
efficiently to the FBI at the lowest classifica¬ 
tion level possible. It is also dependent on 
the sufficiency of the interactions between 
the federal government and victim, whether 
that victim is a private organization such as 
the DNC, or a state or local government en¬ 
tity. Given the response to Russia's malign 
influence campaign, the Committee believes 
that FBI and DHS need to Improve the pro¬ 
cesses used to engage with victims and 
stakeholders, who independently control 
their respective systems. 

(U) The Executive Branch's policy re¬ 
sponse to Russia's active measures cam¬ 
paign included extensive deliberation, but 
not significant pre-election action. This is 
explained by two factors. First, the Execu¬ 
tive Branch was justifiably concerned about 
raising an alarm so close to the election. 
Second, elections are not run by the federal 
government. State and local governments 

are under no obligation to cooperate with 
federal officials, nor are political organiza¬ 
tions that operate their own networks. In 
short, the developing Intelligence on Rus¬ 
sian active measures throughout 2016, the 
complexity of the political situation, and the 
lack of federal authority to act limited the 


options for aggressive pre-election actions. 
The Executive Branch took some actions, to 
include a joint DHS and ODNI public state¬ 
ment issued on October 7, 2016. 

the CIA created a fu¬ 
sion cell on Russian election interference, 
which was comprised of analysts from the 
CIA, FBI, and NSA. This fusion cell produced 
a series of papers for the White House, di¬ 
rectors of each of the three agencies, and 
the DNI. The cell operated through the 
election, standing down in mid-November. 

(U) On December 6, 2016, President 
Obama directed CIA Director John Brennan 
to conduct a review of all intelligence re¬ 
lating to Russian involvement in the 2016 
elections, and produce a single, comprehen¬ 
sive assessment. The result, an ICA titled 
Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions 
in Recent US Elections, was drafted by^| 


was coordinated with 
the NSA and the FBI. While most of the 

analysis contained in the ICA held up to 
scrutiny, the Committee investigation Found 
that ICA judgments on Putin's strategic ob- 



Jectives failed to meet most of the analytic 
standards set forth In the primary guiding 
document for 1C analysis, Intelligence Com¬ 
munity Directive (ICD) 203, Analytic Stand¬ 

(U) Another component of the Execu¬ 
tive Branch's response to the Russian gov¬ 
ernment's efforts to interfere in the 2016 
presidential campaign was FBI's opening of 
a counterintelligence investigation into "the 
nature of any links between individuals as¬ 
sociated with the Trump campaign and the 
Russian government and whether there was 
any coordination between the campaign 
and Russia's efforts." 1 

(U) The Committee collected facts relat¬ 
ed to the FBI's investigation through May 
2017, until the appointment of Special 
Counsel Robert Mueller. The Committee 
did not examine events that occurred there¬ 
after in order to avoid interfering with Spe¬ 
cial Counsel Mueller's ongoing investigation. 
While this chapter addresses the FBI's inves¬ 
tigation, facts identified by the Committee 
relating to Russia contacts with Trump cam¬ 
paign associates, including the individuals 
under FBI investigation, are addressed in 
Chapter 4. 

(U) Finding All: The Federal Bureau of In¬ 
vestigation's notification to numerous Rus¬ 

sian hacking victims was largely inade 

(U)The Committee is also concerned 
that many, perhaps even a majority, of Rus¬ 
sia's known victims were never contacted 
by the FBI. In November 2017, the Associat¬ 
ed Press (AP) reported that it contacted ap¬ 
proximately 80 people out of a list of ap¬ 
proximately 500 victims. Only two who 
were contacted by the AP "learned of the 
hacking attempts of their personal Gmail 
accounts from the FBI." 8 Although the Com- 




mitiee cannot verify the accuracy of the 
A P's reporting, Clinton campaign senior pol¬ 
icy advisor Jake Sullivan testified to the 
Committee that, consistent with the ftp's 
analysis, his personal Gmail account was the 
subject of numerous hacking attempts, but 
that he never received any sort of notifica¬ 
tion from FBI 5 

(U) interaction with the DNC illustrated 
that even when the FBI expeditiously made 
contact with a victim, and conveyed rela¬ 
tively detailed information, the engagement 
failed to elicit the desired response— 
namely, the DMC's swift and serious atten¬ 
tion. Director Co me y testified that, in retro¬ 
spect, "[w}e would have sent up a much 
larger flare. Yeah, we would have just kept 
banging and banging on the door, knowing 
what l know now. We made extensive 
efforts to notify. I might have walked over 
there myself, knowing what I know now." JU 
Similarly, former DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson 
reflected that, '‘You know, in retrospect, it 
would be easy for me to say that 1 should 
have brought a sleeping bag and camped 
out in front of the DNC in late summer, with 
the benefit of hindsight."' 1 

(U) finding #12: Communication between 
the Department of Homeland Security and 
state election officials was impeded by 
state officials' mistrust of federal govern¬ 
ment overreach coupled with an unprece¬ 
dented level of Russian cyber intrusions. 

(U) DHS was the first agency to raise 
awareness lo state election officials and the 
general public regarding cybersecurity con¬ 
cents with the 2016 election infrastructure. 

In August 2016, Secretary Johnson hosted a 
conference call with the National .Associa¬ 
tion of Secretaries of State (NASS) and other 
Chief Election Officials. This call was fol¬ 
lowed in Septemoer and October 2016 by 
four statements encouraging state and local 
elections officials to request DHS's cyberse- 
curity assistance. 12 

(U) During the August 2016 phone call. 
Secretary Johnson offered assistance to 
state officials in managing risks to voting 
systems in each state's jurisdiction. He also 
encouraged state officials to implement rec¬ 
ommendations from the Department of 
Commerce's NIST and the U.S. EAC on se¬ 
curing election infrastructure. At that time, 
DHS was "not aware of any specific or credi¬ 
ble cybersecurity threats relating to the up¬ 
coming genera) election systems," and, on 
the call with state officials, "Secretary John¬ 
son reiterated that DHS, the Election Assis¬ 
tance Commission, NiST, and DOJ are availa¬ 
ble to offer support and assistance in pro¬ 
tecting against cyber attacks." 13 

(U) On August 18, 2015, the FBI Cyber 
Division, in an effort to aid cyber security 
professionals and system administrators to 
guard against the persistent malicious ac¬ 
tions of cyber criminals, issued an alert to 
states entitled, ''Targeting Activity Against 
State Board of Election Systems.""’The bul¬ 
letin warned that in late June 2016, an 
"unknown actor scanned a state's Board of 
Election website for vulnerabilities." 15 The 
FBI recommended that all states search ac¬ 
tivity logs for any escalation attempts and 
suggested three recommendations as pre- 


• jrcr.rr/j 

property of me u.s. house of representatives 




w e - ronix 

cautionary measures.^ 



SknllCC Y^fi* 


(U) (n a September 16, 2016 statement, 
Secretary Johnson announced "we have 
seen cyber intrusions involving political in¬ 
stitutions and personal communications. 

We have also seen some efforts at cyber 
intrusions of voter registration data main¬ 
tained in state election systems " w Secre¬ 
tary Johnson encouraged election officials 
to reach out to DHS and also offered a varie¬ 
ty of cybersecurity services to state and 
election officials, Including: 

• Scans on internet-facing systems, 
including reporting of vulnerabilities 
and mitigation recommendations; 

• Risk and vulnerability assessments; 

• Support from the National Cyberse- 
curlty and Communications Integra¬ 
tion Center (NCCIC) to provide on¬ 
site assistance in identifying and re¬ 
mediating a cyber incident; 

« Information sharing of relevant 

cyber incidents, threats, and vulner¬ 
ability Information; 

* Best practices for securing voter reg¬ 
istration databases and addressing 
potential threats; and 

* Field-based cybersecurity advisors to 
assist with planning and incident 
management . 18 

(U) Also on September 28, 2016, Speak¬ 
er Ryan and Leaders McConnell, Pelosi, and 
Reid sent a letter to the National Associa¬ 
tion of State Election Directors, "urg[ingj 
states to take full advantage of the robust 
public and private sector resources available 
to them..." and informing them that "fijn 
addition, the Department of Homeland Se- 
curity stands ready to provide cybersecurity 
assistance to those states that choose to 
request it," 13 

(U) On October 1,2016, Secretary John¬ 
son expressed gratitude for the letter from 
congressional leadership, and noted that 
there were a few cases in which malicious 
actors gained access to state voting-related 
systems. He also encouraged state and lo¬ 
cal election officials to seek DHS' cybersecu¬ 
rity assistance. "So far, 21 states have con¬ 
tacted us about our services. We hope to 
see more/'Mohnson said at the time/ 11 


(U) DHS and ODNI released a joint pub¬ 
lic statement on October 7, 2016. DHS con- 
tinued to urge state and local election offi¬ 
cials to remain vigilant and seek its assis¬ 
tance with cybersecurity.' M On October 10, 
2016, Secretary Johnson provided an up¬ 
date on DHS election cybersecurity services 


fo O P OftN 


that "to date, 33 states... election agen¬ 
cies have approached the Department of 
Homeland Security about our Cybersecurity 
services." Johnson stressed that time was 
an important factor, with only 29 days until 
election; it could take up to two weeks for 
DHS to run scans and identify vulnerabili- 
ties, and an additional week for election 
officials to mitigate any vulnerabilities. This 
was the Secretary's final public attempt to 
encourage state and local election officials 
to reach out to DHS for assistance. 22 



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(U) Challenges encountered by DHS in¬ 
cluded the unprecedented sl2e and scope of 
Russian active measures, lack of public- 
attention, and mistrust from state and local 
election officials—many of whom lacked 
access to classified information. Ultimately, 
36 states took advantage of DHS's assis¬ 
tance, but many election officials were re¬ 
sistant to the idea of designating election 
infrastructure as critical infrastructure. 23 As 
former Secretary Johnson explained to the 
Committee, "one thing I discovered in this 
conversation. State election officials are 
very sensitive about what they perceived to 
! be Federal intrusion into their process. I 
heard that firsthand over and over: This is 
our process. It's our sovereign responsibil¬ 
ity. We're not interested in the Federal 

•j • 

takeover." ‘ A clear example of mistrust was 
a letter sent from Georgia’s Secretary of 
State Brian Kemp to Secretary Johnson on 
December 8, 2016, which accused DHS of 
attempting to breach the Georgia Secretary 
of State’s firewall. "I am writing to ask you 
I whether DHS was aware of this attempt 
j and, if so, why DHS was attempting to 
| breach our firewall," Mr. Kemp stated. 2S 
Nevertheless, on January 6,2017, DHS des¬ 
ignated election infrastructure as a subsec¬ 
tor of the existing Government Facilities 
critical Infrastructure sector. 26 

(U) Finding »13: The joint Office of the Di¬ 
rector of National Intelligence and Depart¬ 
ment of Homeland Security public state¬ 
ment attributing election interference to 
Russia was ineffective. 

(U) No major public actions were taken 

rm- %9 • i»mii 



between October 7, 2016 and election day. 
It is unclear exactly when policymakers be¬ 
gan focusing on Russian efforts to influence 
the election. As further discussed below. 
Attorney General Loretta Lynch recalls being 
briefed by FBI senior leadership^^^H 

the Counterintelligence Division had essen- 
tially uncovered some information or re¬ 
ceived information involving Russian intelli¬ 
gence operatives." 27 

(U) On May 18, 2016, speaking at the 
Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington, 

D.C., DNI Clapper stated, "we've [the 1C] al¬ 
ready had some indications of that 
[attempts of cyberattacks on presidential 
campaign websites] and the combination of 
DHS and FBI are doing what they can to ed¬ 
ucate both campaigns against potential 
cyber threats." 28 

(U) By summer 2016, CIA Director Bren¬ 
nan had become aware of information 
about "specific Russian efforts to influence 
the election," 7 -' and the National Security 
Council (NSC) Principals Committee began 
discussing actions to take in response to 
what the Russians had been doing. 30 As Di¬ 
rector Brennan continued to brief the Prin¬ 
cipals Committee on Russia, the CIA—as 
discussed previously in this report—"pulled 
together experts from the Central Intelli¬ 
gence Agency (CIA), NS A, and 
|^H| to focus on the issue, drawing in mul¬ 
ti pie perspectives and subject matter ex¬ 
perts with broad expertise to assess Russian 
attempts to interfere in the U.S. Presidential 
e lection 

While DHS was providing assistance to 
states to conduct cyber reviews of their 
electoral mechanisms, the Principals Com¬ 
mittee was awaiting "with urgency whatev¬ 
er the Intelligence Community could pro¬ 
vide" that "would illuminate [their] under¬ 
standing of [Russian interest in the elec¬ 
tion]." 33 



Joint Statement from rbe Department Of 
Homeland Srcurip/and Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence on Election Security 

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(U) On August 4, 2016, Director Bren¬ 
nan, in a scheduled call with Alexander Bort- 


nikov, the head of Russia's Federal Security 
Bureau (FSB), became the first U.S. official 
to raise the issue of Moscow's meddling. 34 
Brennan told Bortnikov that a campaign 
against the United States would certainly 
"backfire" and that all Americans "cherished 
their ability to elect their own leaders with¬ 
out outside Interference or disruption." 35 
Additionally, former Attorney General 



W ' SGOnCT/ 

Loretta Lynch testified that the decision was 
made to have "the President of the United 
States speak directly to President Putin, 
confront him with knowledge that we were 
aware of his efforts on a variety of fronts 
and that it was unacceptable, and that that 
discussion took place during a pull-aside ... 
at one of the G- either 7 or 20 meetings in 
the early fall." 36 Former National Security 
Advisor Susan Rice corroborated in testimo¬ 
ny before the Committee that President 
Obama and President Putin discussed Rus¬ 
sian meddling in the 2016 election at the 
end of bilateral discussions during the G20 
Summit in China in early September 2016. 37 

(U) The most significant pre-election 
public action was the October 7, 2016, joint 
DHS and ODNI statement, indicating in part 
that the 1C "is confident that the Russian 
Government directed the recent compro¬ 
mises of e-mails from US persons and insti¬ 
tutions, including from the US political or¬ 
ganizations," ,fl The 1C assessed that the dis¬ 
closures of alleged hacks on websites such 
as, WikiLeaks, and byGuccifer 
2.0 were consistent with Russian methods 
and motivations. According to Secretary 
Johnson, the statement "did not get the 
public attention that it should have, frankly, 
because the same day the press was fo¬ 
cused on the release of the 'Access Holly¬ 
wood' video. That's what made our news 
below-the-fold news that day." 39 Addition¬ 
ally, the public dissemination of Podesta's 
emails commenced on October 7. 40 

(U) In considering a public response, 
the Executive Branch was in a unique posi¬ 

tion—It was dealing with extremely sensi¬ 
tive intelligence and had to consider the Im¬ 
pacts of jeopardizing sources and methods 
when declassifying Intelligence.” Further¬ 
more, In the midst of an ongoing campaign, 
it had to carefully consider any public state¬ 
ments or actions, as it did not want to be 
perceived as taking sides and politicizing the 
election—or, according to former Secretary 
Johnson fueling claims that the election was 
"rigged." 47 

(U) Finding #14: The Executive Branch's 
post-election response was insufficient. 

(U) In the weeks following candidate 
Trump's victory over candidate 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Execu¬ 
tive Branch officials began brainstorming 
options for punitive actions against Russian 
activities. On Decembers, 2016, President 
Obama ordered Director Brennan to con¬ 
duct a review of all intelligence relating to 
Russia and the 2016 elections, including a 
comprehensive assessment that would 
eventually be made public.'” 

(U) On December 29, 2016, among oth¬ 
er measures. President Obama announced 
the expulsion of 35 Russian intelligence op¬ 
eratives under diplomatic cover, the closure 
of Russian compounds in Maryland and New 
York, sanctions against nine entities and in¬ 
dividuals associated with Russian intelli- 


gence services, and the Treasury Depart¬ 
ment's designation of two Russian individu¬ 
als for "using cyber-enabled means to cause 
misappropriation of funds and personal 
identifying information." 4 ' 1 Also on Decem¬ 
ber 29, the FBI and DHS released a Joint 




Analysis Report of declassified technical In¬ 
formation on Russian cyber activity to help 
network defenders identify and disrupt Rus¬ 
sian malicious cyber activity. 

(U) On January 6, 201,7, DHS designated 
election infrastructure as a subsector of the 
existing government facilities critical Infra¬ 
structure sector." 6 The same day, a declassi¬ 
fied version of the ICA was released to the 
public.' 16 

(U) Finding #15: The majority of the Intelli¬ 
gence Community Assessment judgments 
on Russia's election activities employed 
proper analytic tradecraft. 

(U) The 1C produced three versions of 
the ICA: (1) a highly compartmented docu¬ 
ment, which included all sources and refer¬ 
ences to the underlying intelligence, (2) a 
Top Secret version that omitted details from 
compartmented reports, and (3) an unclas¬ 
sified version, The full ICA was briefed to 
President Obama on January 5, 2017 and 
President-elect Trump on January 6,2017. 

• M( y . t 

The unclassified version of the ICA was also 
released to the public on January 6,2017. 
While the level of detail varies greatly 
among the three versions, the final conclu¬ 
sions and key judgments of each are the 

(U) The Committee determined that the 
majority of the ICA judgments on Russia's 
election activities employed proper analytic 
tradecraft. These were mostly well rea¬ 
soned, consistent with observed Russian 
actions, properly documented, and— 
particularly on the cyber intrusion sec¬ 

tions—employed appropriate caveats on 
sources and identified assumptions. Some 
of the key ICA judgments that the Com¬ 
mittee found credible because they were 
based on proper analytic tradecraft are 
summarized below: 

• (U) Russian efforts to influence the 
2016 U.S. presidential election rep¬ 
resent the most recent expression of 
Moscow's longstanding desire to un¬ 
dermine the U.S.-led liberal demo¬ 
cratic order. 

* (U) Russian intelligence services, 
acting on the orders of Russian Presi¬ 
dent Vladimir Putin, launched cyber 
and conventional influence opera¬ 
tions—notably by leaking politically 
sensitive emails obtained from com¬ 
puter intrusions—during the 2016 

(U) Finding #16: The Intelligence Communi¬ 
ty Assessment judgments on Putin's strate¬ 
gic intentions did not employ proper ana¬ 
lytic tradecraft. 

(U) While the Committee found that 
most ICA analysis held-up to scrutiny, the 
investigation also identified significant intel¬ 
ligence tradecraft failings that undermine 
confidence in the ICA judgments regarding 
Russian President Vladimir Putin's strategic 
objectives for disrupting the U.S. election. 
Those judgments failed to meet longstand- 

■ Tor * flccuDr/ 



ing standards set forth in the primary guid¬ 
ing document for 1C analysis, ICD 203, Ana¬ 
lytic Standards including: 

• {U) ' Properly describe quality and 
credibility o? underlying sources.” 

• (U) "Properly express and explain 
uncertainties associated with major 
analytic judgments." 

• (U) "incorporate analysis of alterna¬ 
tives [particularly] when major 
judgments must contend with sig¬ 
nificant uncertainties or... high- 
impact results." 

• (U) Base confidence assessments on 
"the quantity and quality of source 

• (U) "Be informed by all relevant in¬ 
formation available." 

« (U) "Be independent of political 

co nsi deratio n s 

{U) The Committee emphasizes that the 
tradecraft failures identified in this investi¬ 
gation should not be broadly ascribed to 
CIA, MSA or FBI analysis, as the shortcom- • 
ings were confined to select judgments— 
specifically, a key assessmenton Putin's 
strategic intentions—and not to the entire 
ICA product. Moreover, the ICA was 
writteCIA analysts and their 
draft was subjected to an unusually con¬ 
strained review and coordination process, 
which deviated from established CiA prac¬ 
tice, The Committee is not aware of these 
problems being prevalent in other CIA, FBI, 
or N5A products. 


10) The Committee's findings on iCA 
tradecraft focused on the use of sensitive, 
10 intelligence cited by the ICA. 

This presented a significant challenge for 
classification downgrade. The Committee 
worked with intelligence officers from the 
agencies who own the raw reporting cited 

in the ICA to downgrade the classification of 

(U) The Committee is planning addition¬ 
al action regarding this information in early 
spring 2018. 

(U) Finding #17: The Federal Bureau of In¬ 
vestigation opened an enterprise counter¬ 
intelligence investigation into the Trump 
campaign after receiving information relat¬ 
ed to Trump campaign foreign policy advi¬ 
sor George Papadopoulos. 

(U) in addition to the other Executive 
Branch responses described above, in late 
July 2016, the FBI opened an enterprise Cl 
investigation into the Trump campaign fol¬ 
lowing the receipt of derogatory infor¬ 
mation about foreign policy advisor George 
Papadopoulos. The purpose of an enter- 
prise Cl investigation is to obtain infor¬ 
mation of intelligence value, "most times .. 

. not with any kind of intent or objective of 
reaching a criminal charge/' 43 FBI's enter¬ 
prise Ci investigation into the Trump cam¬ 
paign was led by a small team at FBI head¬ 
quarters. 41 ' The timeline of this investiga¬ 
tion can be found on the next page. 



(U) The derogatory information result¬ 
ed from the relationship between Papado- 

anonymized In Papadopoulos' charging doc¬ 
ument as "the Professor").' 10 Based on the 
charging documents, the two first met in 
Italy on or about March 14, 2016, and 
"Papadopoulos was interested in I 

because ... [he] claimed to have substantial 
connections with Russian government offi¬ 
cials, which Papadopoulos thought could 
increase his importance as a policy advisor. 

"Si was j ntereste( j j n p a p ac jopou- 

los because of his role in the Trump cam¬ 
paign. 52 The first meeting with|^^H 0C ' 
curred approximately one week prior to 
candidate Trump publicly naming Papado¬ 
poulos as a foreign policy advisor. 5 * 3 

(U) In late March, Papadopoulos had a 
follow-on meeting withH^m London, 
where ^H^ntroduced Papadopoulos to 
a woman who claimed to bo a relative of 
President Putin "with connections to senior 
Russian government officials." 5 '* Papado¬ 
poulos informed the campaign about this 
meeting, with a campaign supervisor pro¬ 
claiming that Papadopoulos conducted 
"great work." 55 Papadopoulos continued to 
correspond with who connected 

Papadopoulos with an individual 
m claiming to. have connections with the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 56 Papa- 

dopoulos communicated with this Russian 


contact throughout the summer of 2016, 
attempting to arrange meetings between 

the Russian government and campaign offi¬ 
cials. 57 

(U) On April 26, 2016, over breakfast at 
a London hotel,m told Papadopoulos 
"that he had just returned from a trip to 
Moscow where he had met with high-level 


Russian government officials."' 6 fur- 

ther indicated he had learned that the Rus¬ 
sians had obtained 'dirt' on candidate Clin¬ 
ton. Specifically that "'the Russians had 
emails of Clinton,' 'they have thousands of 
emails.'" 55 However, the Committee was 
unable to discern if the referenced emails 
were the missing emails from candidate 
Clinton's server while she was Secretary of 
State or the emails that were stolen from 
the DNC. 





counterintelligence investigation into the 
Trump campaign, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation opened an individual coun¬ 
terintelligence investigation into Carter 

(U) By the time Page was announced as 
a Trump campaign foreign policy advisor on 
March 21, 2016, he was already a subject of 
interest for the FBI. Page previously lived 

and worked in Russia and maintained con- 
tact with known Russian intelligence offic¬ 
ers, inciuding|^^^^^|^^|—who was 
described in a 2015 court filing as an SVR 
officer posted to the Russian Mission to the 
United Nations. Page previously worked 

with the FBI in the prosecution of_ 

and other Russian intelligence officials. 08 



(U} Finding #19: The dossier compiled by 
Christopher Steeie formed an essential part 
of an application to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court to obtain electronic sur¬ 
veillance on Carter Page. 

(U) In late October 2016, OOJ sought 
from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

mittee did not find—any evidence of any 
cooperation or conspiracy between Page 
and Papadopouios. Additionally, the so- 
called "dossier" compiled by Christopher 
Steeie formed a substantial and essential 

(For ad 

ditional information about the Steele dossi¬ 
er, see Chapter 4.) 

(U) Finding #20: Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller indicted Paul Manaforton several 
charges, none of which relate to allega¬ 

tions of collusion, coordination, or conspir¬ 
acy between the Trump campaign and the 
Russian government. 

(U) Paul Manafort joined the Trump 
campaign on March 29, 2016, and was ele¬ 
vated to campaign chairman on May 19, 
2016. Manafort became campaign manager 
after the campaign removed 

on June 20,2016. The Committee 
agreed to avoid, to the greatest extent prac¬ 
tical, any potential interference with Special 
Counsel Mueller's investigation. Given the 
ongoing litigation concerns associated with 
Manafort, the Committee, will only discuss 
information in this report that has been 
publicly disseminated by the Special Coun¬ 
sel's office. Although the Committee would 
have appreciated the opportunity to inter¬ 
view Manafort regarding his role on the 
Trump campaign, the Committee is limited 
in this regard due to Special Counsel 
Mueller's investigation and indictments. 

{LI} On October 27, 2017, a grand jury 
indicted Manafort and his associate, fellow 
lobbyist and deputy Trump campaign man¬ 
ager Rick Gates, for various financial crimes, 
as well as making false statements.' 1 All of 
the financial crimes took place prior to Man¬ 
afort serving as Trump campaign manager, 
and nothing in the indictment relates to any 
potential collusion, conspiracy, or conspira¬ 
cy between the Trump campaign and the 
Russian government. 

(U} On February 22, 2017, a grand jury 
issued a superseding indictment for Mana¬ 
fort and Rick Gates, which included addi¬ 
tional allegations of financial crimes, indud- 


‘I - j ^ |r*^ V 



to p occftny 

f rcoronM 

ing bank fraud. Similar to the October 27, 
2017, indictment, the superseding Indict¬ 
ment does not include any reference to the 
Trump campaign, including no mention of 
collusion, coordination, or conspiracy be¬ 
tween the Trump campaign and the Russian 

(U) While the Committee will not go 
into further detail on the charges against 
Manafort due to ongoing litigation con¬ 
cerns, Special Counsel Mueller's indictment 
of Manafort illustrates the necessity for U.S. 
presidential campaigns to better investigate 
individuals who serve in senior positions 
within the campaign. If the accusations 
against Manafort are true, he should have 
never served as a senior official with a cam¬ 
paign for the U.S. presidency, much less 
campaign chairman or manager. 

(U) General Flynn began advising the 
Trump campaign on or before February 
2016 and subsequently became a central 
figure on the campaign trail. He was the 
former Director of DIA and was one of can¬ 
didate Trump's closest advisors on national 
security issues. Following the election, and 
during the transition period, he was desig¬ 
nated as the future National Security Advi¬ 
sor to the President. General Flynn served 
as PresidentTrump's National Security Advi¬ 
sor for less than a month, resigning on Feb¬ 
ruary 13,2017. According to FBI Director 

Comey, General Flynn's resignation oc¬ 
curred after it came to light that he had mis¬ 
led Vice President-Elect Pence about his 
contacts with Russian Ambassador Sergey 
Kislyak during the transition period. /s 

(U) Prior to his trip to Moscow, General 
Flynn and his son met with Russian Ambas¬ 
sador Kislyak at the ambassador’s private 
residence in Washington, D.C. on December 
2, 2015. The meeting was later described 
by General's Flynn's son in an email to the 
Russian embassy as "very productive." 75 
The email indicates that the meeting was 
arranged at the request of General Flynn or 
his son. 30 The Committee was unable to in¬ 
terview General Flynn and his son because 
of their written intent to assert their Fifth 
Amendment rights against self¬ 




(U) Finding #22: General Flynn pleaded 
guilty to making a false statement to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding 
his December 2016 conversations with Am¬ 
bassador Kislyak, even though the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation agents did not de¬ 
tect any deception during Flynn's inter¬ 

{U) According to the charging docu¬ 
ments, on or about December 22,2016, "a 
very senior member of the Presidential 
Transition Team" (PTT) directed General 
Flynn to contact representatives of foreign 
governments. 64 This request concerned a 
resolution about Israeli settlements sub¬ 
mitted by Egypt to the U.N. Security Council 
around Oecember 21, 2016.^ Later, on De¬ 
cember 22, General Flynn contacted Ambas¬ 
sador Kislvak and "requested that Russia 

vote against or delay the resolution." 60 The 
next day. Ambassador Kisiyak informed 
General Flynn that Russia would not comply 
with the request. 8 ' 

(U) On December 29, 2016, President 
Obama 'authorized a number of actions"— 
including new sanctions—"in response to 
the Russian government's aggressive har¬ 
assment of U.S. officials and cyber opera¬ 
tions aimed at the U.S. election in 2016." 35 
Following this announcement, the charging 
documents state that General Flynn dis¬ 
cussed "what, if anything, to communicate 
to the Russian Ambassador about the U.S. 
sanctions," with a senior PTT official. 2 ' 



(U) Finding #23: Executive Branch officials 
did not notify the Trump campaign that 
members of the campaign were assessed 
to be potential counterintelligence con¬ 

(U) The Committee found that the 
Trump campaign was not notified that 
members of the campaign were potential 
counterintelligence concerns. This lack of 
notification meant that the campaign was 
unable to address the problems with each 
campaign member and was ignorant about 
the potential national security concerns. AG 
Lynch recalled that, during her first meeting 
with Director Comey and McCabe about 
Page, "one of the possibilities the three of 
us discussed was whether or not to provide 
what is called a defensive briefing to the 
campaign, wherein there would bo a 
meeting with a senior person with the 
Trump campaign to alert them to the fact 
that... there may be efforts to compromise 
someone with their campaign." 102 

(U) Such a defensive briefing would not 
have been unusual. According to Lynch, 

"[i]t is not an uncommon thing to do ... in 
intelligence matters." 103 However, the FBI 
did not provide any such warning about 
Page, although it was again discussed by the 
administration's most senior policymakers 
after Director Comey briefed the National 
Security Council Principals about the Page 
information in "late spring" 2016, 104 



(U) The Trump campaign did not re¬ 
ceive a general counterintelligence briefing 
until August 2016, and even then, it was 
never specifically notified 3bout Papado- 
poulos, Page, Manafort, or General Flynn’s 
Russia ties. ‘ Further, the counterintelli¬ 
gence briefing provided to Trump and his 
top advisors did not identify any individuals 
by name, but rather focused on the general 
threat posed by adversaries, including Rus¬ 
sia and China. 

(U) Finding #24: The February 2Q18 indict¬ 
ment of the Internet Research Agency and 
Russian nationals exposes Russian actors 
and their intent to spread distrust towards 
the candidates and the political system in 

(U) In mid-February 2018, the Depart¬ 
ment of Justice charged 12 Russians and the 
Russia-based Internet Research Agency LLC 
with interference operations targeting the 
United States political and electoral process¬ 
es. The indictment claims that the stated 
goal of the Russian actors was to "spread 
distrust towards the candidates and the po¬ 
litical system in general" and provides in¬ 
sight into the methods used by the IRA, 
such as the use of stolen identities, travel to 
the U.S. for the purpose of collecting intelli¬ 
gence, and the procurement of computer 
infrastructure to hide the Russian origin of 
activities,' ,:to The indictment by Special 
Counsel Mueller contains assertions that are 
• consistent with information examined by 
the Committee during its investigation. Spe¬ 
cifically, according to an accompanying DOJ 

announcement, "There is no allegation in 

the indictment that any American was a 
knowing participant in the alleged unlawful 
activity. There is no allegation in the indict¬ 
ment that the charged conduct altered the 
outcome of the 2016 election." 107 




9. H PSC i, E xecu live Se ssi o n In t erview of to fce Su3I1vh i% D e c 21, 2017 . 

10. BPSCL ''Russian Active Measures investigation/ Mar, 20, 3D17, 

11. NPSO, ^Russia investigative Task Force Meeting with Former Secretary of Homela no Securiiy Jeh Johnson/ June 2 3, 


12, KPSCtj, "Russia Investigative Task Force Hearing with Former Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson/ June 21, 


13, OHS, Handout of Secretary Johnson r s Cati ivfrfc S tote Section Officials About Cybersecurity, htt ps:.; .■ >wjw d i> s -go l . / 

n c ws/2 016 /QS J IS/ r q.^d u u t- $ ec r eta tv -1 ah n s o i > s-c a II -si a t e- elec lion * o frc! a Is- cvbe r s ecu ri t v. Aug. IS, 2016. 

14, FBI, Ffl/ f/osh: AcfrVJfy State ftoa/rf o/ £tec ttori Systems, Aug. 13, 2016. 

15, FBI, hBI fins h: Targeting Activity Againsi State Board of F/echoir Systems, Au g, 1. R, 2016. 

16, F BI, f Bl fiosh: Taring Activity Against 5 fote Snaftl of election Systems, Aug. Ift, 2C16, 

17, OHS, Stnteme/u by Secretary Johnson Concerning die Cybersccarliy of the Nation's Election Sysrems, h ttp:// 

Wv/W <\ h v./j 1 v /i \t*w ,%/ V U.U U Q?/1n h t n I - m * r:rn l *i *\ - ■ a h n a fii t ^ f r n n r t m tiff- CV t’Kifijet U11 tv n a honV e le r I ton - W S t 

Sop L 16, 2016, 

1H . DH5, .5 f o teme a t by Set re J at y m hman Cat it*? n tin g the Cyb <. v security of i he nqi ton's £ (e alon Systems, h u \yJ£ 

w w w ,i l h ?. mvfn e w s/ 2 016/0*1/1.6/ a ten; o n i - s e c re t^rv^ hn<o iyconco ml nil- cv her**?*.* .Jity ^uitrip^ -nlgcli ofMvMems. 

Sopl. IG, 2016, 

10. Paul 0, Ryan, Nancy Pole A MHtfi McConm?ii ( Marry JUila, letter to Todd i/afenttm ,Scph 28,2016. 

20, DhlS h Stcrfrmcnf &y Setrmry About Election Systems’ Cyhersecurtty, hitn:liln n t>//nt^v> 5 / ? t o 16/1 / 

. r 1‘!-ermary >ohi>s on a bmil ■ mtocia v < ylwr*>n qifUv. Oct. 1, 2 0 1 6 

21, DHS P Jain 1 5 rof cm un r from the Deponme nt of I iom eta; 1 6 S ecurti y at»(f Off cc of ti\ c Dire c tor of N a non of in tdti ge n re on 
Election Security, h it u %-Jj www, d I is, m wft ^ ws j 2 p 16/ U>yo 7/1 i>i n i ntome j 1 1- dana t tme n\ ■ f i omo [ a n d*secuht v* a nd- officg- 
dire cior-rtat - fina l. Oct, 7.2016. 

22, OHS, Update by Secretary Johnson On 0HS Eiectfon Cybene c urity Services, )ntt os :/,Av ww, dhs. ^u vMe w^/2,1)1 6/ 10/10/ 

LJ P £ ^tar y» loImf o n♦ dhv eIectIc ■ t■ cvht*rs<*curi 1 v-s afvieg s . Qtt. 20, 7.016 

23, HPSO/'flaiila InvtoBpattveTakforce Hearing with Former SeCretan/ of Homeland SecuntyJeh Johnson/June 21, 


24, HPSCI. * Russia i nvestigatwe Task Force Hearing with Former Secretary of Homeland Security Jcb Johnson/' June 21* 


25, The Office of SEcretery oi State of Georgia, Letter to Secretary Jeh Johnson, Dec. S, 2016. 

26, DHS, Staternent by Secretsr/ Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Flection Infrastructure as a Critical trifra stru rtu r^ Su b^ec- 
Lor. h ttr s;// w: dhs. eov /Vj e v/s/2017/0 1 / 06/s ta Laments e c r e ta tv -1 ob r>s o n-d es it* rra L* on- el ec ti on ^ t <if r^s t r ua ur ■* cri r ca i . 
J^n, 6, 2017* 

27, HPSCI. ExpcotA^ Session Interview of Loretta Lynch ( Oct. 3D, 201/, 

2ft. "The Global Digital Challenge Initiative - Keynote Address/ 1 Bipartisan Policy Center video, 36:29, h«p://brove,mt*/ 
zff9r4qq, May lit, 2016 

29. HPSCI, Executive Session trvteivk^A' of Loretta tynr.h, Oct, 20, 2017, 

30, I IPSO, £x«cuhve Session Interview of Lorvtta lyndi, Oct. 70,2017; The Principals Committee, convened nnrj chaired Ijy 
the National Seeuflty Advisor, Is a Cabinet level inier agency forum for considering policy Issues that oitotx the national 
security interests of the United States, Regular attendees of the Principals Committee include: ihe Secretary of Stole, the 
SecroLary of the Treasury* the Soemuity of Oofom:^ the Attgf nuy GorvcrnL thu SimrHnry of Hncjrgy, the Chhti of Staff lo 
the president, the Director of Notional lolelllgonco* the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Central 
intnlllgencL* Afi^ncy, the Natlonnt Securliy Advisor, tho Homeland Security Advisor, and the ReprisenloWvo of hie United 
StaUifl to the United Noiiom, 

31. HPSCI, 'Russian Active Measures During the 2016 Efecnon Campaign/ May 33, 2017. 

32, Thu Gari^ of ft is comprised of the Speaker of (he House of RopnesantatWes, the Minority i eatier of the House of Hepre- 
sen^ntlves, the Chairman ard Ranking Member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the Hnujjeof Rep* 



33 * 


35 . 

36 . 




41 . 

42 . 






4 S* 

49 . 







m- ■**- 



5 S. 





63 . 

rescntapv-as, ifoe frlafai^iy and Minority tenders or the LLS* Sonata, s^a the Chairmen and Vice Chairman of die Select 
Committee on ^rtteHlgcncd of the U.5. Serrate, 

HFSCJ, Cxscutive Session Interviewof Susan Pice, Sep* 2. 2017. 

rJPSCl, rf Puis:an Active Measures During the 2016 Electron Campaign/' May 23,2017* 

HrSCi, "Russian Active Measures During ihe 2016 Elesiitn Campaign/ May 23.2017. 

HPSCI, Executive Session interview of Icretta lynch, Ccl 20. 2017, 

HPSO, Fxecuiiue Session interview of Susan Rice, Sep* 3, 2017. 

Ohs, Joint StiKemem frcm f he Deportment ofttametand Security one Office of the Director of Naticrnol fa teUtgencs on 

Election Security, i* U oi- foflvywv.drs .gay/ng ws 7 2 Ci 9/10 / 37 /*i 'nt-sta tent enl- de pa am <L^hcrrrdans - secu nr* an c- or 1 c e 
rir gcror-natipr a3, Oct. 7,201b. 

HPiCI/Fussia Ircvestigadve Task Force hearing vAth Former Secret*^/ of Homeland Security >eh Johnson, June 21* 2017* 
WPSG* Executive Session Interview of John Pctjesta, Juno 27^ 2017. 

HP5CI. "Russia ^nvesrtgatrve Task Force hearing wrh former Secretary of HomelandSecurity Jeh Johnson; June 2 1, 2017, 
HPSa ’''Russia Investigative Task Force Hearing wkh Fcrriie r Secret ary of Kometand Security Joh Johnson/ June 21 2017, 

in September 2018^^^^ sharad similar infoimation in a orie-oivcsie meBtmg 
with FBI General Counsel James Baler* HP$Q, Executive Session Dec, 13, 2017* Around the same 

time as his meeting wren shared the information with journalists, lad uc iSlate, who pub- 

lishsd an article ac xh& end of Ode her. HP 50, Executive Sassbn of Dec, IS, 2017; 

a Trump Service Com mumcatmg Wfch Russia?/ Slate* Oct 31,2D16. Candidate Clinton promoted the| J article to tier 
social media followers the same day it was published. Twitter, @HilbryClInton, Od* 31, 2016, 4;3 2 PM, 

White House. Sioremenf &y tee Pnes/stesrori Ttafons in Response to Russiatt J Malicious Cyber Activity and Hnfcssfnent, 


QHs, SfoJemeot fry Secretory ted Johnson on ih-e Designation of ft?even Infrastructure os a Criticci irfwswcxure Subsec 
tor, flltoWAiVwv*. tit'S. ?>C v/ne ws,'20l7 i ; C.l/06/st^- B P^BT[-SgCretBfv-tC.- t -r*Sf3ri-^^>i ~ n ^lg jsH ucui rO-CriScal. 

Jan. 6, 2017* 

00*11, Assessing Russian Activities and intentions n Recent US Elections, Jan. 6, 2017. ■ 

00HI, intelligence Community Directive 203: Analytic Srnndcrds, Jan. 2, 2015, 

HPSO. Executive Session Interview of Mary McCord, Nov. 1, 2017. 

I IPSOj Executive Passion tritutYrew of Andrew McCabe, Dec. 201/. 
u*£* v. George Fznzdo peuios (3:L7*cr-i82, District of Cclumbfe], 

U*S. v. George ^apedopoulos (lJ.7'Cr-l32 / District ofCdumb^} 

U_S. v* G&cr^e P apedOpc-ulas (1 17-cr-l62, District of Columofe). 

Post Opinions Staff, *A transcript of Donald Trump's meeting with Ihe WasftinfftOO Pest editorial board/ '.VosbJji^Gjr 
Post, Mar. 23, 2016. 

U5. v* George Papadopouros (l;17-cr'lS2, District of Coluintiaj. 

U,5. v* George PapadopoL i !tM (Iir/-Cr-1B2, District of Columbia}; pineil from George: Papaccpciilos tc |m> 

"Ra: Meeting with Russian leadership —mdLsd;ngPticr^ M Mar* 24,2QiS [DJTFPOODlGllli* 
y*S- v* George Papadopaufos (lJ-T-cr-lS?/District of Coiu^claJ; Email from George Papadopuulos tc] 
r jFv/ci: (Jtas&tan Outreach)/ May 4 r 201G [DJ75FU0-TH4O5T 
U.S. v. George Papadopoulos (l:l?-cr-IE2, District of Cclup^a). 

U^. v. Gscrge P^pedopoulos (l^l7-cr-152, District' of CclumbldL 

T3.1 jlCRIT/, 




n w » 

i— I IIL ■ 

U.S. v. Evgen y Buryakov, a/k/a "Zhenya," ^^■■1, and^l^^l U.S. Southern District of New York, Janu¬ 
ary 23, 2015; "Russian Spies Tried to Recruit Carter Page Before He Advised Trump," The New York 

Times , Apr. 4, 2017; DOJ, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Application, Oct. 21, 2016, which was made available for 

review by HPSCI members and staff on March 17, October 31, November 2, December 14, December 15, and December 
i r imi 






74. U.S. v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates III (l:17-cr-201, District of Columbia). 

75. HPSCI, "FBI Coun terintelligence Investigations," Mar. 2, 2017. 




79. Michael G. Flynn, Email messages to Russian Embassy in United States, Flynn Intel Group Production, 
FLYNN_HPSCI_00000500, 00007542. 

80. Michael G. Flynn, Email message to Russian Embassy in United States, Flynn Intel Group Production, 
FLYNN_HPSCI_ 0QQQ0500, 00007542. 






86 . 


88 . 

U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). 

U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). 

U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). 

U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). 

Barack Obama, "FACT SHEET: Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment," The White 
House, Dec. 29, 2016. 

U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232. District of Columbia). 



j kJ rjECTuTI 

102. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Loretta Lynch, Oct. 20, 2017. 

103. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Loretta Lynch, Oct. 20, 2017. 

104. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Loretta Lynch, Oct 20, 2017. 

105. HPSCI, Staff meeting with Bil) Priestap, FBI Assistant Director, Head of the Counterintelligence Division, Oct 31, 2017. 

106. U.S. v. Internet Research Agency, et al. (l:18-cr-32, District of Columbia). 

107. DOJ, "Grand Jury Indicts Thirteen Russian Individuals and Three Russian Companies for Scheme to Interfere in the United 
States Political System," Feb. 16, 2018. 



top Gccnnfr 

(U) Chapter 4 - Campaign Links to Russia 

Key Question f/2: Did the Russian active measures include links between Russia and individ¬ 
uals associated with political campaigns or any other U.S. persons? 

(U) A key focus of the Committee's 
investigation was whether Russian active 
measures directed at the 2016 U.S. election 
(see Chapter 3) "include[d] links between 
Russia and individuals associated with 
political campaigns or any other U.S. 
persons/' 1 The first part of this chapter 
reflects the Committee's answer to that 
question with respect to the Trump 
campaign. The second part of this chapter 
addresses the Clinton campaign. 

(U) The "links" between individuals 
associated with the campaigns and Russia 
have often been publicly described as 
inquiries into whether there was "collusion" 
between individuals associated with either 
candidate Trump or Clinton and the Russian 
government. One challenge with describing 
potential "links" with the Russian 
government as "collusion" is that the term 
"collusion" may mean different things to 
different people, as exemplified in witness 
testimony before the Committee. 
Particularly in light of Special Counsel 
Robert Mueller’s continuing criminal 
investigation—which has a different focus 
and the Committee agreed not to impede— 
it is important to note that the term 
"collusion" does not, by itself, describe a 
criminal offense. Unlike the closely-related 
concept of "conspiracy," there is no 
applicable statute that sets out the 

elements of "collusion.” "Collusion" is 

therefore an ambiguous term, not a precise 
legal one. 

Trump Campaign 

(U) The Committee cast a wide net, 
generally asking each witnesses whether 
they had evidence of any "collusion," 
"coordination," or "conspiracy" between 
Russia and candidate Trump or any of his 
associates. The Committee also 
investigated potential Trump campaign links 
with Russia, focusing on credible allegations 
within the scope of the agreed-upon 
parameters. Matters investigated by the 
Committee include allegations pertaining to: 

• candidate Trump's business 

« the campaign's policy positions and 

* involvement in or knowledge about 
the publication of stolen emails; and 

♦ meetings with Russians. 

(U) In the course of witness interviews, 
reviews of document productions, and 
• investigative efforts extending well over a 
year, the Committee did not find any 
evidence of collusion, conspiracy, or 
coordination between the Trump campaign 
and the Russians. While the Committee 
found that several of the contacts between 
Trump associates and Russians—or their 
proxies, including WikiLeaks—were ill- 

top ocenrr/j 



advised, the Committee did not determine 
that Trump or anyone associated with him 
assisted Russia's active measures campaign. 



(U) Finding #25: When asked directly, none 
of the interviewed witnesses provided 
evidence of collusion, coordination, or 
conspiracy detween the Trump campaign 
and the Russian government, 

(U) The Committee interviewed high- 
ranking current and former government 
officials, along with numerous Trump 
campaign members. Trump administration 
officials, and other Trump associates. None 
of the witnesses testified they had evidence 
of collusion between the campaign and 
anyone affiliated with the Russian 
government. In most of the Committee's 
witness interviews, the witness was asked 
directly for any evidence of "collusion, 
coordination or conspiracy" with any 
element of the Russian government to 
influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election. This question was 
asked with respect to the witness' own 
actions; the actions of candidate Trump; the 
actions of anyone officially affiliated with 
the campaign; or the actions of anyone 
unofficially affiliated with the campaign, 
defined as including "wannabes," 2 "hangers- 
on,"'"' and "people who represented 
themselves as being part of the campaign."'’ 
Each witness was given wide latitude in 
answering these questions, but none 
produced any evidence. For example, 
Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor Jared 

Kushner stated categorically' that the Trump 
campaign "did not collude, cooperate, 
whatever other ‘C words you used, with 
any foreign governments." 5 

(U) Several former government officials 
testified that, even though there was no 
evidence of collusion between Trump 
campaign associates and the Russian 
government, they were aware of contacts 
and interactions of potential concern. For 
example, former CIA Director John Brennan 
stated in open session, "I encountered and 
am aware of information and intelligence 
that revested contacts and interactions 
between Russian officials and U.S. persons 
involved in the Trump campaign that t was 
concerneo about because of known Russian 
efforts to suborn such individuals, and it 
raised questions in my mind... whether or 
not the Russians were able to gain the 
cooperation of those individuals."' Brennan 
continued, however, "I don't know 'whether 
or not such collusion... existed.'"' 

(U) Similarly, former DNi James Clapper 
stated that he was aware of the same 
information to which Brennan referred, 
"that my dashboard warning lights were on 
just because of that," s However, 
reaffirming his prior public statements, he 
told the Committee that, "1 didn't have any 
evidence—l don't care how you want io 
caveat it—of collusion." 3 


(U) Finding #26: The Committee found no 
evidence that President Trump's pre- 
campaign business dealings formed the 



basis for collusion during the campaign. 

<U) As a political outsider who had 
never run for office, Donald Trump did not 
have a political record to analyze, criticize, 
or rely upon during the 2016 campaign. 
Therefore, his long and varied business 
career garnered significant attention from 
supporters, opponents, and opposition 
researchers alike. Eventually, as described 
in the second half of this chapter, candidate 
Trump's pre-campaign business dealings 
with Russians became a subject of 
significant opposition research. 

(U) As noted above, the Committee's 
investigation was focused on the time 
period of the 2016 election. Trump's pre- 
campaign dealings were within scope only 
to the extent they formed the basis for, or 
were otherwise linked to. Improper conduct 
during the elections, As one of the 
Committee Members said during an 
interview, the key question was if any 
business “relationships, whether directly or 
indirectly or just by some other means, had 
the effect that there was a preexisting 
relationship with Russia, and that that 
preexisting relationship may have in some 
way inspired the Trump campaign to have a 
contact with the Russian Government to 
coordinate, collude, or conspire to help 
them win the election over Hillary 
Clinton." 10 

I 1(1 

(U) The Committee focused only on any 
potential financial improprieties relating to 

\ *• ill it i# 1 • i • f M • 

the election* In particular, the Committee 

H • - i ■ 

examined the Miss Universe pageant in 
Moscow in 2013; the Trump Organization's 

unsuccessful efforts to build a Trump Tower 
in Moscow in late 2015 and early 2016; and 
other assorted claims of Russian financial 
ties to the Trump family, The Committee 
did not uncover any evidence that any of 
those matters formed the basis for 
collusion, coordination, or conspiracy 
between Trump or his associates and the 
Russian government during the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election. 

(U) Miss Universe 2013: Before he was 
a political candidate, Trump owned the Miss 
Universe Organization. The decision to hold 
the 2013 Miss Universe annual pageant in 
Moscow was a unanimous one made by 
representatives of the Trump Organization 
and NBC—the event's broadcaster—with 
approval of the president of the Miss 
Universe organization. 11 Michael Cohen, an 
attorney and former Executive Vico 
President of the Trump Organization, told 
the Committee 50 percent of the fees 
earned for the pageant went to NBC. u "fOl 
f the $12.2 million in foreign income that 
[the Miss 1 Universe pageant) earned [in 
2013], a substantial portion of it was 
attributable to the Moscow event." 13 

(U) The 2013 pageant's hosts were Aras 
and Emin Agalarov, father and son of a 
wealthy Azerbaijani-Russian family in 
Moscow. The Againrovs' company. Crocus 
Group, owned the venue where the pageant 
was held.’' 1 The Agalarovs and Crocus 
Group wanted to host the event in Moscow 

because they wanted to have the pageant in 
their company's building, Crocus City Hall, 
and it was a way to promote Emin's music 




career, who performed at the pageant/" 
The Agalarovs have connections with senior 
individuals and elements of the Russian 
government, 115 and Aras received the Order 
of Honor from Vladimir Putin.'' 7 The 
decision to hold the pageant in Moscow 
originated from an "off-the-cuff" discussion 
between Emin Agalarov, his manager, and a 
representative from the Miss Universe 
pageant/ 4 




(U) The Agalarovs first met Trump in 
person in 2013 in connection with the Miss 
USA pageant in Las Vegas . 3,5 The Agalarovs 
and Trump signed the contract to hold the 
pageant in Moscow during the weekend of 
the Miss USA pageant in January 2013. 3 ' 7 At 
the conclusion of the 2013 Miss USA 
pageant. Trump and the Agalarovs 
announced on stage that the Miss Universe 
pageant that year would be held in 
Moscow/ 1 In a June 18,2013 tweet, Trump 
publicly asked, "Do you think Putin will be 
going to The Miss Universe Pageant in 
November in Moscow — if so, will he 

become my new best friend?" 77 

(U) Leading up to the Miss Universe 
pageant, the issue of President Rutin 
possibly attending came "up a number of 
times" among those planning the pageant/ 4 
Emin's manager Robert Goldstone and the 
head of the pageant organization had 
"casual" conversations with one another, 
but every time Goldstone asked Emin about 
it, Emin replied the pageant would have had 
to go through "official channels" to make 
the request, indicating that the event was 
not officially related to the Russian 
government. 2 '’ At the time, according to 
Goldstone, Emin cast doubt on whether 
President Putin would attend, stating "if this 
was in America, would Barack Obama 
attend? Probably not. It's a beauty 
pageant. But there is a chance, maybe, of 
some kind of meeting."' 4 Before the 
pageant, however, President Putin's press 
secretary called and told Trump and others 
that President Putin would not attend the 
pageant and he did not.' 6 

{U} While in Moscow, Trump, along 
with his head of security, attended the 
pageant and several pageant-related 
events. 27 For example, Trump attended an 
event hosted by the Agalarovs at a well- 
known restaurant with local businessmen." 

(U) Although there were allegations in 
the Steele dossier that Trump engaged in 
illicit activities with prostitutes in the 
presidential suite at the Ritz-Carlton hotel, 
the .Committee found no evidence to 
support these allegations. Trump's former 
head of security, testified that 







although somebody during a meeting in 
Moscowf^^^Jdid not know who— 
"mentioned sending women to [Trump's] 
room/BH res P°nded "absolutely not, 
we don't do that.'"' 9 HU told the 
Committee he advised Trump of the 
comment, and they both laughed about it. 

also testified he walked Trump to 
his room that night, remained for a few 
minutes, and did not observe anybody enter 
the room. 30 

(U) Trump Tower Moscow: While in 
Russia for the Miss Universe pageant, 

Trump met with the Agalarovs and 
discussed a possible joint real estate 
development in Moscow/' 1 The proposed 
project was a Trump Tower in Moscow 
adjacent to the Agalarov-owned Crocus City 
Hall; according to Donald Trump Jr., "it 
fizzled out" after a few months. 32 

(U) Trump Organization lawyer Michael 
Cohen was not Involved in those original 
discussions regarding Trump Tower 
Moscow. In approximately September 
2015, he received a separate proposal for 
Trump Tower Moscow from a businessman 
named 39 According to Cohen, 

the concept of the project was that "[t]he 
Trump Organization would lend its name 
and management skills, but It was not going 
to borrow any money and it would not have 
any resulting debt for the purchase of the 
land and the building of the facility." 34 
Cohen worked on this idea with and 
his company, the Bayrock Group, a real 
estate consultancy that had previously 
worked with the Trump Organization. 

has a unique and colorful background, and 
described for the Committee his path from 
Wall Street banker to white-collar criminal 
to government informant. 35 

(U) After signing a letter of intent with 
a local developer in October 2015, 3f> Cohen 
andHI exchanged a number of emails 
and text messages in late 2015 detailing 
their attempts to move the project forward. 
For instance, in December 2015,^^Jtried 
to get Cohen and candidate Trump to travel 
to Russia to work on the project. 37 

(U) Several of^^H communications 
with Cohen involved an attempt to broker a 
meeting or other ties between candidate 
Trump and President Putin, and purported 
to convey Russian government interest in 
the project 33 Perhaps most notably, 
told Cohen in a November 3, 2015, email, 
"(b)uddy our boy can become President of 
the USA and we can engineer it." 39 m 
continued that if "Putin gets on stage with 
Donald for a ribbon cutting for Trump 
Moscow,... Donald owns the republican 
nomination." 10 This assertion apparently 
arose from^^H rather grandiose theory 
that cementing a deal with a hostile U.S. 
adversary would increase candidate 
Trump's foreign policy bona tides. 43 

(U}^H testified that his 
communications with Cohen regarding 
President Putin were "mere puffery," 
designed to elicit a response from the 
Trump Organization to move the project 
along. 1 * 2 explained that "(ujntil the 

bank writes the check, it's all salesmanship 
and promotion to try to get many, many, 


ft* oron » j) 



many parties towards the center to try to 
get the deal done. ' 4 '' Cohen similarly 
characterized^^! as "a salesman" who 
"uses very colorful language." 44 

(U) When the project started 
proceeding too siowiy for the Trump 
Organization/'' Cohen andd began to 
exchange acrimonious text messages. ’ 0 As 
part of those text messages JK told 
Cohen that President Putin's people were 
backing the deal, including "this is thru 
Putins [sic] administration, and nothing gets 
done there without approval from the top," 
as well as meetings in Russia with 
"Ministers" and "Putins [sic] top 
administration people." 47 also 
mentioned Dmitry Peskov (President Putin's 
spokesman) would "most likely” be 

(U) Cohen thus attempted to reach out 
to members of the Russian government in 
an attempt to make the project proceed, 
but apparently did not have any direct 
points of contact. For example, Cohen sent 
an email to a general press mailbox at the 
Kremlin in an effort to reach Peskov. 43 
Cohen's message notes that he has been 
working with a loca! partner to build a 
Trump Tower in Moscow-and that 
communications have stalled with the loca! 
partner.The email further seeks contact 
with Peskov so they may "discuss the 
specifics as well as arrang[e] meetings with 
the appropriate individuals." 41 Based on the 

documents produced to the Committee, it 
does not appear Cohen ever received a 
response from anyone affiliated with the 

Russian government. 

testimony likewise made 
dear that neither President Putin nor any 
element of the Russian government was 
actually directly involved in the project. For 
instance, in one exchange, testified he 
was offering the Trump Organization access 
to one of acquaintances. This 
acquaintance was an acquaintance of 
someone else who is "partners on a real 
estate development with a friend of 
Putin's."" testified that he was 
unaware of "any direct meetings with any 
IRussian] government officials" in 
connection with the Trump Tower Moscow 
project.'* In addition, neither candidate 
Trump nor Cohen traveled to Russia in 
support or the deal. 5 " 4 

(U)H was unequivocal in his 
testimony that none of the Russians 
affiliated with the Trump Tower Moscow- 
project had any communications with him 
"in which {hej wjas] asked to do something 
on behalf of the Russian government that 
[he] knew was on behalf of the Russian 
Government" with respect to the U.S, 
election."" None of those communications 
"were intended for^!^^ to take action to 
have a communication with or take some 
action to influence the 2016 Presidential 
election." 40 The Committee therefore 
assesses tha^^l was attempting to 
leverage political contacts for business 
purposes, rather than the other way 

(U) It appears the Trump Tower 
Moscow project failed in January 2016. E/ 



Trump Jr. testified that, as of early June 
201G, he believed the Trump Tower 
Moscow project was dormant. 18 The 
project failed because "[t]he due diligence 
did not come through" and the Trump 
Organization's representative "lost 
confidence in the licensee, and (he] 
abandoned the project." 51 ’ In fact, the 
Trump Organization did not have a 
confirmed site, so the deal never reached 
the point where the company was 
discussing financing arrangements for the 
project. 60 The Committee determined that 
the Trump Tower Moscow project did not 
progress beyond an early developmental 
phase, and that this potential licensing deal 
was not related to the Trump campaign. 01 - 

(U) Other Alleged Financial Dealings: In 

addition to the Miss Universe and Trump 
Tower Moscow projects, a number of 
witnesses were asked about Trump family 
financial dealings, sometimes stretching 
back decades. 1 "* For example, Trump Jr. was 
asked about Russians: buying units in 
Trump Tower in 1984 (when he was seven 
years old); 63 buying properties in southern 
Florida for which the Trump brand was a 
licensor; 6 ' 1 being involved in the Trump 
International Hotel in Toronto for which the 
Trump Organization was the brand and not 
the developer; 65 and having unspecified 
involvement in a licensing project for the 
Trump Ocean Club in Panama. 66 The 
Committee does not have any evidence that 
there is a nexus between these activities 
and the 2016 campaign, or information that 
contradicts representations made in a 

March 8, 2017 letter from Trump's lawyers 
regarding his Russia-related financial 
dealings over the previous ten years. 67 


(U) During the campaign, candidate 
Trump and several of his campaign advisors 
expressed policy views towards Russia quite 
different than those espoused by much of 
the Republican foreign policy establishment, 
including previous Republican nominee Mitt 
Romney, who labeled Russia "our number 
one geopolitical foe" during the 2012 
election, In fact, a significant number of 
Republican foreign policy experts made 
statements during the campaign that they 
would not work for the Trump campaign. 

As a result, the campaign relied on many 
lesser-known—or in some cases unknown- 
advisors on foreign policy issues. 

(U) Additionally, a pfank of the 2016 
Republican platform pertaining to the 
Ukraine has been the subject of substantial 
controversy. The question for the 
Committee was whether candidate Trump's 
policy positions—and the campaign's 
involvement in the debate over the Ukraine 
platform piank—reflected legitimate policy 
positions, or something more nefarious. 

The Committee found no evidence that the 
policy positions of the Trump campaign 
were the result of collusion, coordination, 
or conspiracy with the Russians. In the 
words ofTrump campaign 
policy official involved in the platform issue, 
"Itjhere was no coordination or thought for 
coordination. The idea to have better 
relations with Russia was a Mr. Trump idea 

i l/ 



that l thought was reasonable to support." ' 

(U) Finding #27: The Republican national 
security establishment's opposition to 
candidate Trump created opportunities for 
two less-experienced individuals with pro- 
Russia views to serve as campa ign 
advisors: George Papadopoufos and Carter 

(U) The Republican foreign policy 
establishment was critical of candidate 
Trump, who had to turn elsewhere for 
support. On March 2,2016,122 self- 
described "GOP National Security Leaders" 
signed an “Open Letter to Donald Trump" 
refusing tG support then-candidate Trump. 15 
The next day, Trump announced Senator 
Jeff Sessions as chairman of his National 
Security Advisory Committee (NSAC). A few 
weeks later, following continuing media 
criticism of his failure to publicly name a 

foreign policy team, 70 candidate Trump 


named five foreign policy advisors in a 
March 21. 2016 meeting with The 
Washington Post editorial board: Walid 
Phares, Carter Page, George Papadopoulos, 
Joe Schmitz, and Keith Kellogg.” 

(U) The opposition to Trump's 
candidacy by the vast majority of the 
conservative national security 
establishment paved the way for lesser- 
known individuals, such as the then 28-year- 
old Papadopoulos, to join the Trump 
campaign. Page was another unknown 
brought into the periphery of the Trump 
campaign to fill the vacuum left by more 
experienced national security specialists 
who were unwilling to advise candidate 

• rump. There is no evidence that anyone 
on the Trump campaign was aware of 
Page's past ties to Russian intelligence 
services—or Papadopoulos' more recent 
contacts with a Russian-connected 
professor—when these two individuals 
were included among the advisors that 
were publicly announced on March 21. In 
fact, as Kushner candidly put it, "we put 
together that list because we were getting a 
lot of pressure from the media to put out a 
list of foreign policy advisers." 77 


GOP National Security Leaders 
Open Letter to Donald Trump 


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(U) These five advisors were 
subsequently incorporated into the NSAC, 
which was part of the campaign's D.C.- 
based policy shop. 71 The NSAC was chaired 
by Senator Sessions and directed by J.D. 
Gordon, a retired Navy officer and former 
Department of Defense spokesman/' 1 Some 
members of the NSAC met with candidate 
Trump in Washington, D.C. on March 31, 
2016. Page did not attend. Each advisor in 
attendance, including Papadopoulos, 
briefed the group on a topic of their choice. 
Papadopoulos spoke about Russia. 

t or i 


However, in the opinion of one advisor, 
Walid Phares, the primary purpose of the 
meeting was about optics rather than 
substance: "the meeting was about the 
picture and to send the message that: I have 
a foreign policy team." 75 


Ta ilor 


(U) Page was, according to NSAC 
director Gordon, "very loosely affiliated 
with the campaign and had really no roles 
or responsibilities." 71 ’ The Committee 
assesses that Page played no major role In 
the campaign, and had no meaningful 
access to senior leadership. 

(U) Page did not attend the March 31, 
2016, NSAC meeting with then-candidate 
Trump, and has never met him. 77 Although 
members of the NSAC occasionally gathered 
for meals in the Washington, D.C. area, they 
never again met as a group with candidate 
Trump. 78 Kushner provided a blunt 
assessment of the role, or lack thereof, 

played by the individuals on the initial list of 
publicly-announced foreign policy advisors: 
"PI he amount of interaction they had with 

the actual campaign or influence they had 
on anything that happened in the campaign 
was virtually nonexistent." 70 Gordon 
testified to the Committee that he agreed 
with the assertion that the NSAC was 
minimally influential in the context of the 
broader campaign. 110 

(U) Finding #28: The change in the 
Republican Party platform regarding 
Ukraine resulted in a stronger position 
against Russia, not a weaker one, and 
there is no evidence that Paul Manafort 
was involved. 

(U) It has been widely reported that the 
2016 Republican Party platform was 
weakened with respect to Ukraine, perhaps 
as a favor to Russia or some other nefarious 
reason. After reviewing the Republican 
Party platform amendment process, 
Interviewing those involved, and reviewing 
document productions, the Committee 
determined that the original plank was 
strengthened, rather than weakened—and 
there is no evidence that language 
advocating for the provisions of "lethal 
defensive weapons" was improperly 

(U) On July 11,2016, the Republican 
National Committee Platform Committee 
met to discuss and debate amendments to 
the platform. As drafted, the platform 
referenced "a resurgent Russia occupying 
parts of Ukraine," but included no language 
about support to Kiev {see inset). 

' _ 1_. 7~ J of Texas, a member of the National 
Security/Military Platform Subcommittee, 
offered an amendment that would "support 


maintaining {and, if warranted, increasing} 
sanctions against Russia until Ukraine's 
sovereignry and territory integrity are fully 
restored/' 31 ^^proposed 
amendment further called on the United 
States to provide lethal defensive weapons 
to Ukraine's armed forces and greater 
coordination with NATO [North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization] on defense 
planning/'* 2 


Original RNC Plank 

(U) in the international arena, weakness invites 
aggression, me resets of the [Obama* Administra¬ 
tion's unilateral approach to disarmament are 
alreecy dear: An emboldened China in the South ! 
Chins See, a resurgent Russia occupying parts of j 
Ukraine and threatening neighbors from the Baltic j 
to the Caucasus, an aggressive Islamist terrorist j 
I network in Middle Easu All our adversaries heard J 
i the message In the [Obama] Administration's cut¬ 
backs: America is weaker and retreating. 


(U] Much of amendment was 

adopted, but—following debate among the 
delegates—the final version called for the 
United States to provide "appropriate 
assistance" rather than "tethai defensive 
weapons." 83 The Committee assesses that 
"appropriate assistance" provided flexibility, 
and could encompass lethal defensive 
weapons as well as humanitarian aid, 
medical supplies, and meals-ready-to eat. 
in any event, even without the words 
"lethal defensive weapons," the final draft 

of the platform "was tougher against 
Russia" than the original after incorporating 

ail but three words c 
amendment. 8 "* 


Final RNC Plank 

(U) Wd support maintaining and, ff warranted, 
increasing sanctiors, together with our aflies, 
against Russia unlass and until Ukraine's sover¬ 
eignty and territorial integrity are fuHy restored. 
We also support providing appropriate ^ssis^anco 
to the armed forces Ukraine and greater coordi¬ 
nation with NATO defense planning. 



(li) The Committee also investigated 
what role, if any, Paul Manafort played in 
the Trump campaign's response to 
Denman's amendment. Manafort, a 
veteran of numerous Republican 
campaigns. 83 had long represented the 
government of Ukraine, the pro-Russian 
former president of Ukraine Viktor 
Yanukovich, and Yanukovich's Party of 
Regions. 8 ® In late March 2016, candidate 
Trump hired Mana fort to-lead "delegate- 
corralling efforts at the Republican National 
Convention."* 7 Then-campaign manager 

testified that, when 

Manafort was hired, no 

attempt to vet him and was entirely 
unaware of Mana fort's past work in 
Ukraine. 6 ® In May 2016, Manafort was 

promoted to campaign chairman and, after 


fired the next month, 
"evolvefdj" into the role of de facto 
campaign manager. 8 ' 

(U) Manafort left the campaign in 
August 2016 following news reports that he 


had received $12,7 million In secret 
payments for his work on behalf of 
Yanukovich's Party of Regions; news 
reporting also alleged that Manafort and his 
aide Rick Gates had "directly orchestrated a 
covert Washington lobbying operation" on 
behalf of the party—while failing to register 
as foreign agents. 50 Campaign press 
secretary Hope Hicks recalled that, after 
receiving press inquiries about Manafort's 
"professional history," a major story broke 
on the evening of August 14, 2016. 03 
According to Hicks, 'Trump had made a 
decision to make a change in leadership on 
the campaign outside of Paul's issues that 
were being publicly reported," but those 
issues "certainly contributed to expediting 
and intensifying the way in which his role 
changed, and then ultimately he was fired 
at the end of that week." lV Trump directed 
his son-in-law Jared Kushner to ensure 
Manafort departed the campaign on August 
19, which he did.'** As Kushner put it, "|tl 
here was a tot of news that was out there, 
and the decision was that it was time for 



U* itffi.i'l- t.k ■!*■/ t'*-- |-H* J. 4 tilu t* 

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him to resign." 0 ' 5 

(U) Given Manafort's past work m 

1 ‘ l 'I '*i v f| 1 J i 

Ukraine, If the Ukraine plank change was 
made as a favor to the Russian government, 
it seems likely that then-campaign chairman 
Manafort would have known about it- 
However, campaign records produced to 
the Committee show that Manafort had no 
role in, or contemporaneous knowledge of, 
the platform change. On July 30, 2016, 
Manafort sent an emaii, copying Gates, to 
Rick Dearborn, then a senior campaign 
policy official and Sessions' chief of staff: "l 
gather that there was a change In the 
platform that removed arming Ukraine. I 
don't know anything about this change. 

Who pushed for it and why was It clone 

(U} in response, Dearborn generated a 
memorandum, dated August i, 2016, 
outlining a detailed sequence of events that 


occurred between July 10 and 12, 2016. 

As part of that memo, J.D. Gordon created a 
timeline that noted candidate Trump's 
policy statements—including at a March 31, 
2016. national security meeting—served as 
the basis for the modification of Denman's 
amendment, Gordon's timeline made it 
dear that the change was initiated by 
campaign staffers at the convention—not 
by Manafort or senior officials. Although 
Page expressed support after the feet, the 
Committee did not find any evidence that 
he actively participated in the modification 
of Denman's "red line amendment 
providing lethal assistance to Ukraine.'"* 



(U) Finding #29: There is no evidence that 
Trump associates were involved in the 
theft or publication of Clinton campaign- 
related emails, although Trump associates 
had numerous ill-advised contacts with 

(U) There is no evidence that Trump or 
anyone associated with him played a role in 
the hacking of emails from the DNC and 
Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta, 
among other entities and individuals, 
detailed in Chapter 2. As also discussed in 
Chapter 2, the Committee concurs with the 
IC's assessment that WikiLeaks was one of 
the vehicles for the public dissemination of 
emails stolen by Russians. As noted in 
Chapter 3. on October 7,2016, the 
Department of Homeland Security and 
Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence released a public statement 
that "[t]he U.S. Intelligence Community is 
confident that the Russian Government 
directed the recent compromises of e-mails 
from US persons and institutions, including 
US political organizations."" The statement 
also specifically tied WikiLeaks to the 
Russian*directed disclosures. 

(U) Trump campaign communications 
made ampie use of the publicly available 
emails, which were reported by virtually ali 
major media outlets. Regarding WikiLeaks, 
Trump Jr. testified that "[alt the time, 1 
looked at them as essentially a media 
outlet" and an "opportunistic organization" 
that would have also put out negative 
information on Trump if it had it. 100 For 
Senator Sessions, reference to WikiLeaks 

material in campaign statements was the 


product of deliberation: "And so, 1 
remember making a decision that it [a trove 
of hacked emails] was in the public domain, 
and it would be silly not to use it. So I used 
it although I could understand somebody 
eise not wanting to For campaign press 
secretary Hope Hicks, use of emails 
published by WikiLeaks was uncontroversial 
because such information was available in 
the public domain. 101 



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(U)Similarly, candidate Trump stated at 
a rally on October 10,2016—three days 
after the release of Podesta's emails began 
and the 1C pubiiciy tied WikiLeaks' 
dissemination to "Russia's senior-most 
officials"—that "I love WikiLeaks. ,JlB Trump 
had earlier encouraged the Russians to "find 
the 30,000 emails that are missing" from 
Hillary Clinton's private server. 10 ' (These 
emails, which were the frequent subject of 
campaign talking points, should not be 




top sccnny 



conflated with the DNC emails. The 
Committee did not receive evidence that the 
emails from Clinton's private server were 
stolen by the Russians—or anyone else.)" 1 ' 

(U) Particularly in light of candidate 
Trump's expressed enthusiasm for WikiLeaks, 
the Committee examined the relationship 
between his associates and the stolen emails. 
The Committee did not find any evidence that 
Trump associates were involved in the 
publication of emails by WikiLeaks and other 
outlets—or had access to such emails or other 
stolen information prior to their becoming 
publicly available. 106 

(U) The Committee did find that multiple 
Trump associates went beyond mere praise 
and established linos of communication with 
WikiLeaks during the campaign. Such contacts 
were imprudent in light of WikiLeaks' role in 
disseminating stolen emails in line with 
Russian interests—and CIA Director Mike 
Pompeo's post-election characterization of 
WikiLeaks as a hostile non-state intelligence 
service that "overwhelmingly focuses on the 
United States, while seeking support from anti 
-democratic countries and organizations" such 
as the Russian military intelligence service 
(GRU). 107 

(U) George Papadopoulos: Foreign policy 
advisor Papadopoulos was told by Russian- 
linked academic Joseph Mifsud in April 2016 
that the Russians had "dirt" on Clinton in the 
form of "emails of Clinton." 1 ' 5 * However, the 
Committee found no evidence that 

Papadopoulos obtained these emails or that 
the Trump campaign had a role in facilitating 
the Russian government’s dissemination of 

stolen data. Nor did any witness shed light on 
the provenance of the emails, or clarify that 
Mifsud was referring to emails actually stolen 
by the Russians (as opposed to, for example, 
emails missing from Clinton's private server.) 
The Committee also found no evidence that 
Papadopoulos told anyone affiliated with the 
Trump campaign about Mifsud's claims that 
the Russians had "dirt" on candidate Clinton. 

(U) Michael Flynn: On July 15, 2016, 
retired Lieutenant General and Trump 
national security advisor Michael Flynn 
forwarded an email to communications 
advisorH^^min an attempt to connect 
a friend from the military with the campaign's 
social media operation. Flynn included the 
following editorial comment: "There are a 
number of things happening (and will happen) 
this election via cyber operations (by both 
hacktivists, nation-states and the DNC)." 103 
This statement does not necessarily indicate 
non-pubiic knowledge, and could have instead 
reflected commentary on then-current public 
events—including the mid-June attribution of 
the DNC hack to Russia by the security firm 
CrowdStrike, and the subsequent claim of 
credit by the then-unknown persona "Guccifer 
2.0." (See Chapter 2.) 

(U) Donald Trump Jr.: During the course 
of the Committee's interview with Trump Jr., a 
news report from CNN appeared online 
claiming he was given a pre-release 
notification of a WikiLeaks release of Podesta 
emails. 110 The article appeared at 1:01 p.m., 

while Trump Jr. was still being interviewed by 
the Committee behind closed doors, which 
concluded at 5:51 p.m. 111 CNN's Initial report 






claimed Trump Jr. received an email on 
September 4, 2016, alerting him to an 
upcoming release of hacked emails. 

(U) The email in question was from an 
individual named who 

sent a lengthy email to a number of 
individuals associated with the Trump 
Organization, including Trump Jr., providing 
access to hacked DNC emails. 112 The email 
was actually dated September 14, 2016, the 
day after WikiLeaks published a tranche of 
Podesta emails, and thus did not 
substantiate allegations of prior knowledge 
of the release. 113 CNN subsequently issued 
a correction, noting the error. 114 

(U) When asked about the email by the 
Committee, Trump Jr. testified that he did 
not have any recollection of the email, 
stating that he "get[s] stuff from people that 
-you know, people put my email address 
online every few months, and I get a bunch 
of people that do the same thing and then 
they start bombarding you with stuff." 115 
Trump Jr. went further to state that while 
he may have met a at 

some point in time, he was not sure of the 
identity of this individual. 116 

(U) At the outset. Trump Jr. told the 
Committee that, although he was not aware 
of any coordination "between the Trump 
campaign and WikiLeaks to disseminate 
information acquired from the Podesta 
email or the DNC server," 117 he did 
exchange Twitter direct messages with 
WikiLeaks beginning on September 20, 

2016, and October 3, 2016. 118 WikiLeaks 
initiated both exchanges . 119 Trump Jr. 

testified that he was not aware of the 
reasons why WikiLeaks decided to reach out 
to him directly, but hypothesized that such 
direct messaging was likely due to the fact 
that he "was retweeting a bunch of their 
stuff..." and that he has "a relatively 
formidable social media platform." 120 

(U) In the first exchange, on September 
20, 2016, WikiLeaks sent a direct message 
to Trump Jr. to alert him to a "PAC run anti- 
Trump site" that was about to launch. 
WikiLeaks "guessed the password" and sent 
it to Trump Jr. and asked for comments. 121 
Trump Jr. responded the next day, "[o]ff the 
record I don't know who that is but I'll ask 
around." 122 Trump Jr. subsequently logged 
into the site using the WikiLeaks-supplied 
password, which had also been made 
publicly available. 123 

(U) Following that exchange. Trump Jr. 
emailed some Trump campaign officials, to 
include Kellyanne Conway, Steve Bannon, 
and Jared Kushner to advise them of the 
contact and seek their advice. 124 In a follow 
-up email, Trump Jr. noted the WikiLeaks 
message intimated "some connection we 
[the Trump campaign] should be aware 
of." 125 The Committee did not receive any 
documents or information that reflected a 
response to Trump Jr.'s email, although 
Hope Hicks recalled that—after being 
forwarded the email by Kushner—she 
"might have expressed concern to 
somebody about putting passwords in 

unknown websites, just as a general 
practice, not specific to WikiLeaks." 126 

(U) On October 3, WikiLeaks passed 



along a story reporting Clinton's comments 
about Julian Assange and noted "[i]t'd be 
great if you guys could comment on/push 
this story." 12 ' Trump Jr, responded about 
90 minutes later; "Already did that earlier 
today, It's amazing what she can get away 
with!’ 1 Trump Jr, then wrote: "What's 
behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading 
about?" 1 ' ' Trump Jr. was seeking 
Information on what was purported to be, 
another future leak of Podesta-related 
emails." 3 There was no response. 

{U} After October 3, 2016, Trump Jr. 
received numerous messages from 
WikiLeaks that: 

♦ suggest a website link to use if the 
campaign refers to WikiLeaks In a 
tweet and suggests having 
supporters search through the 
leaked Podesta emails, noting 
WikiLeaks "just released" "Part A" of 
those emails; 1 * 1 

• seek then-candidate Trump's tax 
returns and suggests leaking them to 
"improve the perception of 
(WikiLeaks'] impartiality"; 1 *'’ 

♦ suggest challenging the results 
should Trump lose the election; 1 "' 

• describe an election-night message 
of "[w]ow" and noting Obama 
administration wit! delete records as 
they leave; 1 *' 1 

■ suggest the President-elect push 
Australia to make Julian Assange 
that country's ambassador to the 
United States; 13 * 

* forward what appears to be a video 
with the caption "Fake News"; 13 '' and 

* on the date the news of the June 9, 
2016, Trump Tower meeting broke, 
seek copies of Trump Jr.'s emails.' 
With respect to the latter, Trump Jr. 
published those emails himself on 
his Twitter account. 

(U) Trump Jr. testified that he did not 
reply to any of these messages, nor did he 
have any communications with WikiLeaks 
before September 20 or after October 3, 
2016. 113 He testified that the direct 
message exchanges discussed above "is a 
complete record of any communications 
[he] had with WikiLeaks." 139 

(U) Cambridge Analytical In addition to 
Trump Jr.'s communications with WikiLeaks, 
Cambridge Analytica, a British firm the 
Trump campaign used for data analytics, 
reached out to Julian Assange in an effort to 
confirm whether WikiLeaks possessed the 
"missing" emails deleted from Clinton's 
private server. 1,1,1 That contact occurred in 
approximately June 2016 , l “ l between an 
employee of Cambridge Analytica and the 
speaker's bureau (a separate third party) 
representing Assange.' 42 WikiLeaks replied 
through the bureau that "they did not wish 
to take a telephone call or otherwise 
engage with us [Cambridge Analytica]."'"' 

{U} i rump campaign digital director 
testified that he did not 

participate in, nor was he aware of, 
Cambridge Analytica's attempted outreach 
to Assange. 14, ‘ The Chief Executive Officer 


(CEO) of Cambridge Analytics confirmed in 
his testimony that he "did not share this 
with anyone on the Trump campaign." 1 " 5 In 
fact, the CEO testified that the outreach 
occurred before the company was even 
retained by the Trump campaign.’' 4S 

(U) Roger Stone: Roger Stone has had a 
series of business relationships with Donald 
Trump dating back to at least 1981, and 
served as a paid campaign advisor for 
several months in 2015. 147 During 
testimony to the Committee, Stone 
addressed three public statements 
suggesting he might have important 
information about, and potentially advance 
knowledge of, disclosures during the 2016 
campaign: (1) an August 2016 Twitter 
message regarding Clinton campaign 
chairman John Podesta, (2) an August 2016 
public speech about purported contacts 
with Julian Assange, and (3) the March 2017 
acknowledgement of pre-election direct 
communications with Guccifer 2.0. 

(U) Stone denied that he "knew in 
advance about and predicted the hacking 
of... Podesta's email," notwithstanding his 
cryptic statement in an August 21, 2016, 
Twitter message—"Trust me, it will soon be 
Podesta's time in the barrel"—that 
predated by several weeks the initial public 
release of Podesta's hacked emails. us 
Stone noted that his Tweet "makes no 
mention whatsoever of Mr. Podesta's 
email." 1 " 3 Furthermore, it was posted "at a 
time that my boyhood friend and colleague, 
Paul Manafort, had just resigned from the 
Trump campaign over allegations regarding 

his business activities in Ukraine. I thought 
it manifestly unfair that John Podesta not be 
held to the same standard" regarding his 
alleged business activities. 1 ' 0 In October 
2017, John Podesta's brother Tony resigned 
from the lobbying firm the brothers co¬ 
founded amid revelations about the 
Podesta Group's role in pro-Ukraine 
lobbying efforts that also involved Manafort 
and his associate Rick Gates."" 

(U) Stone also addressed his August 
2016 public statement that "I've actually 
communicated with Julian Assange. I 
believe the next tranche of his documents 
pertain to the Clinton Foundation, but 
there's no telling what the October surprise 
may be." 152 In his testimony to the 
Committee, Stone sought to "clarify that by 
saying the communication I refer to is 
through a journalist who I ask [sicl to 
confirm wh3t Assange has tweeted, himself, 
on July 21st, that he has the Clinton emails 
and that he will publish them." 153 He 
subsequently identified the intermediary, 
but denied any access to non-public 
information. 154 Stone further disputed, 
under oath, that he "had advance 
knowledge of the source or actual content 
of the WikiLeaks disclosures." 155 

(U) In his testimony, Stone described a 
series of direct messages exchanged with 
Guccifer 2.0 in August and September 
2016—which he first publicly disclosed in 
March 2017—as "innocuous," and denied 
taking action in response to Guccifer 2.0's 
messages. 1 "'’ He subsequently provided 
additional messages with WikiLeaks 




extending from October 2016 to August 
2017. 157 

(U) Despite these multiple contacts, the 
Committee did not find any evidence 
contradicting Stone's claim that "(a)ny 
information ... disseminated via social 
media regarding the timing of the release of 
the DNC data or others was from publicly 
available sources" and "he in no way 
conspired, colluded, or coordinated with 
any agent of the Russian state." 153 


(U) The Committee examined meetings 
between Trump campaign associates and 
Russians, to include both official and 
unofficial representatives. The Russians 
found willing interlocutors in foreign policy 
advisors|^Bancl Papadopoulos. These 
advisors, however, were peripheral figures, 
and neither was in a position to influence 
Trump or his campaign. The Russians 
engaged Trump associates via official 
channels and—more notably—used 
apparent cut-outs and intermediaries to 
make contact with senior officials. 

However, questionable contacts like the 
Trump Tower meeting resulted in collusion, 
conspiracy, or coordination with the Russian 

(U) Finding #30:^m[|m did not travel 
to Moscow in July 2016 on behalf of the 
Trump campaign, but the Committee is 
concerned about his seemingly incomplete 
accounts of his activity in Moscow. 

(U) ^^^traveled to Moscow in early 
July 2016 to deliver a commencement 

speech at the New Economic School—the 
first American to do so since thon-President 
Barack Obama in 2009. At the time, 
served as a foreign policy advisor for the 
Trump campaign. The Trump campaign 
made it clear to that the trip was not 
on behalf of the Trump campaign, a point 
acknowledged in his testimony to the 
Committee. 1S? J.D. Gordon, the NSAC 
director, strongly advised against the trip, 
calling it "a bad idea." 160 However, Trump 
campaign manager 

authorized |Bto make the trip "out side 
of (his) role with the DJT (Donald J. Trump) 
for President campaign," 161 
mentioned the upcoming trip to Sessions at 
one of the occasional NSAC meals, 16,1 
although Sessions did not recall the 
interaction. 1<B 

(U) On July 9, 201G, while in Russia, 
m sent an "executive summary" of 
"Feedback From Russia" that stated in part 
"Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES 
[New Economic School) Board Member 
Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke before the 
event. In a private conversation, 

Dvorkovich expressed strong support for 
Mr. Trump and a desire to work together 
toward devising better solutions in response 
to the vast range of current international 
problems. Based on feedback from a 
diverse array of other sources close to the 
Russian Presidential Administration, it was 
readily apparent that this sentiment is 
widely held at all levels of government.” 16/1 
i ^^Padmlltecf to briefly greeting 
Dvorkovich before or after one of their 



speeches, but minimized the interaction in 
testimony before the Committee. 1115 

(U) Ultimately, K failed to dearly 
explain whom he meant when he referred 
to sources dose to Russian government in 
his executive summary. He denied having 
any private meetings with any senior 
Russian officials during his July 2016 trip, 
and stated that he mostly met with 
"scholars." 16 * The Steele dossier, a 
document compiled by former British 
intelligence officer Christopher Steele, 
alleges that while in Moscow in July 2016, 
Page secretly met with Igor Sechin, CEO of 
Russian state oil company Rosneft, and Igor 
Diveykin, a senior Russian intelligence 
official.* 07 Further, the Steele dossier claims 
that Sechin offered Page a brokerage fee in 
connection with the sale of 19 percent of 
Rosneft in exchange for the lifting of 
sanctions. 1 * 5 




(UJ Since the allegation of meeting with 
Sechin and Diveykin was first widely 
reported in September 2016, H has 

repeatedly and consistently denied meeting 
either Sechin or Diveykin, including under 


oath in testimony to the Committees The 
Committee has no information that 
confirms the Steele dossier's assertions 
regarding the purported meetings in 
Moscow, much less an offer by Sechin to 
f° r sucJl 3 r0 *- * n 3 Potentially lucrative 
transaction. After returning from Moscow, 

3 "leave of absence'' from the 
Trump campaign, and played no role in the 


transition or administration. 

{U) Finding #31: George Papadopoulos 1 
attempts to leverage his Russian contacts 
to facilitate meetings between the Trump 
campaign and Russians was unsuccessful. 

{U} Papadopoulos made minor 
contributions totheTrump campaign as s 
foreign policy advisor. He briefly served as a 
Trump campaign surrogate, a roie cut short 
in May 2016 when he publicly insulted UK 
Prime Minister David Cameron.’ 71 He also— 
in an apparent effort to increase his 
standing within the Trump campaign—tried 
to insert himself into any’number of 
international engagements. As described 
below, his particular focus was trying to 
broker meetings with foreign officials, but 
he often acted on his own without the 
official backing of the Trump campaign. 

(U) On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos 
sent an email to several members of the 
policy team pitching a "[mleeting with 
Russian leadership—including Putin''—and 
also volunteered to travel to meet the "next 
prime minister of Vietnam" alongside 
rvlifsud (whom he had first met just ten days 


r arerc T / 

before but nonetheless described as a 
"good friend of mine"). 1 ''' Campaign co¬ 
chair and chief policy advisorlBIHH 
responded that "we probably should not go 
forward with any meetings with the 
Russians until we have had occasion to sit 
with our NATO allies, especially France, 
Germany and Great Britain." 1 ' 1 In the same 
exchange, Papadopoulos then immediately 
switched gears, indicating that "[i)f we need 
any assistance with setting up meetings 
here in London or Paris, I have some good 
contacts that can open doors immediately 
to the leadership." 174 

(U] During the NSAC meeting with 
Trump on March 31, 2016—the only time 
Papadopoulos is known to have engaged 
directly with the candidate—Senator 
Sessions told the team that they were not 
authorized to speak for the campaign. 17S In 
his words "[t]hls committee was not... a 
group of people authorized to speak for 
[candidate) Trump, and they absolutely 
weren't authorized to go around the world 
pretending to represent him." 170 That 
sentiment was, according to Sessions, "a 
good statement to make quite clear." 177 

(U) When Papadopoulos offered that he 
could engage, and possibly travel to, Russia 
on behalf of the campaign, his suggestion 
was swiftly rebuffed by Sessions, who 
testified that "I felt like—and I'm the 
chairman of this group—I should not do 
anything that indicated to Mr. 

Papadopoulos that he was authorized to go 
to Russia or anyplace else to represent the 
Trump campaign and do some sort of 

negotiations. So I pushed back pretty 
sharply on that." 178 Sessions' account of his 
response has been corroborated by another 

attendee,^^^^|B- aIso 

attended and similarly recalled that when 
Papadopoulos raised the issue of obtaining 
contacts with the Russian government on 
behalf of the campaign, Senator Sessions 
interrupted and began "talking about the 
Logan Act," which criminalizes unauthorized 
negotiations with foreign governments. 1 *’ 

(U) Although the Committee has no 
information to indicate that Papadopoulos 
was successful in setting up any meetings 
between the Trump campaign and the 
Russian government, he worked with 
campaign chief executive Steve Bannon to 
broker a September 2016 meeting between 
candidate Trump and Egyptian president 
Abdel Fatah el-Sisi. 1E1 Trump was 
apparently pleased with the meeting, which 
he described in an interview as "very 
productive," describing el-Sisi as "a fantastic 

guy." 382 

(U) While on a trip to Athens, Greece in 
May 2016, Papadopoulos sent an email to 
Manafort stating that he expected to soon 
receive "an official invitation for Mr. Trump 
to visit Greece sometime this summer 
should his schedule allow." 180 In the same 
email to Manafort, Papadopoulos also 
forwarded a meeting Invitation from Ivan 
Timofeev, Director or Programs for the 


Russian International Affairs Council, and 
claimed that "Russia has been eager to 
meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and 
have been reaching out to me to discuss. I 





thought it would be prudent to send to 




(U) As of May 2016, Manafort had not 
yet been elevated to campaign chairman, 
but had a long track record of work abroad. 
Manafort forwarded Papadopoulos' email 
to his business and campaign deputy 
m noting that "[w]e need someone to 
communicate that D[onald] T[rump] is not 
doing these trips " 15S Manafort and^^ 
3greed to assign a response of a "general 
Setter” to "our correspondence 
coordinator" the person responsible for 
responding to all mail of non¬ 

{U) In June 2016, Papadopoulos sought 
a paid position and reimbursement for 
expenses from ~ a Sess < ons 

aide, who along with ran 

the Trump campaign's D.C. policy shop—for 
an upcoming trip "to DC for a high level 
meeting [with] the director of the Israel 
National Security Council" and past trips to 
"the UK, Israel and Greece over the past 
month engaging in some senior level 
meetings... ” 1S7 m^forwarded the 
message to Gordon 

Mashburn then replied as follows: "He cost 
us a lot more in having to deal with what he 
said about [then-UK prime minister David] 
Cameron 2 months ago... he got no 
approval for the travel and did it on his own 
initiative .... Let him eat the cost and 
maybe he will learn to play nice with the 
team, not go off on his own. 

would never have approved 
his going Off on world travels at campaign 

expense without asking permission first." 


mam re p ,iea t° 

word: "agreed."^ 

with one 

(U) |^mresponded to 
Papadopoulos that he could take the 
meeting, but he "should do that as a private 
citizen." 1 *' Making the point explicit, 
m wrote: "You're not authorized to 
meet with him by [sic] the campaign, nor 
can you reflect the views of the campaign 
on security issues in that meeting." 13 ' 

{U} Finding #32: Donald Trump Jr., Jared 
Kushner, and Paul Manafort attended a 
June 9,2016, meeting at Trump Tower 
where they expected to receive—but did 
not ultimately obtain—derogatory 
information on candidate Clinton from 
Russian sources. 

(U) In July 2017, the Committee became 
aware of a June 9,2016, meeting in Trump 
Tower, which became a key focus of the 
investigation. The Committee's findings 
were informed by interviews with six of the 
eight participants in the meeting. 

(U) Although they did not attend the 
meeting, the Agalarovs were the driving 
force to arrange it As previously noted, the 
Agaiarovs and Goldstone hod gotten to 
know businessman Donald Trump when the 
Agalarovs worked with Trump to host the 
Miss Universe pageant at the Agalarovs' 
building, the Crocus City Hall, in Moscow in 
2013. 132 The Agalarovs also had discussions 
with Donald Trump in 2013 to facilitate the 
possible development of a Trump Tower in 
Moscow. 1 * 3 The 2013 Miss Universe 






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pageant formed the basis of a casual 
friendship between the Trumps and the 
Agalarovs.™ Trump appeared in one of 
Emin Agalarovs's music videos with the 
2013 pageant winner, 1 Si and Trump 
maintained a friendly correspondence with 
Aras Agalarov— including during the busy 
2016 campaign. 196 

(U) Events, leading to the meeting were 
set in motion by a June 3, 2016, email from 
Goldston® to Trump Jr v stating: "Emin just 
called and asked me to contact you with 
something very interesting. The Crown 
prosecutor of Russia (possibly referring to 

Hussion Prosecutor General Vuri Chaika] 

met with his father Aras this morning and in 
their meeting offered to provide the Trump 


campaign with some official documents and 
information that would incriminate Hillary 
and her dealings with Russia and would be 
very useful to your fatner. This is obviously 
very high level and sensitive information but 
is part of Russia and its government's 
support for Mr. Trump - helped along by 

41 P ^ 

Arasand Emin.""' Trump Jr. replied to 
Goldsione's June 3 request by indicating "if 
it's what you say i love it especially in the 
summer." 163 

(U) This exchange indicates that Trump 
Jr. was open to discussing derogatory, 
information from Russian government 
sources that could be useful to candidate 
Trump. Goldstone proposed to deliver 
information concerning Hillary Clinton via a 
Russian government attorney. 195 Trump Jr. 
indicated that he had invited Kushner and 
Manafort," underscoring his belief in the 
importance of the information^^ 

with connections to the 
Agalarov family, was one of the individuals 
who attended the June 9 meeting at Trump 
Tower. The Committee discovered that the 
participants of the June 9 meeting did not 
all have the same understanding as to the 
reasons for the meeting, with 
testifying that he thought it was odd that all 
three senior Trump campaign officials would 
be taking a meeting on the Magnitsky Act, a 
U.S. human rights law that imposes certain 
sanctions on Russian interests. Accordingly, 
called a close 

associate of Emin Agalarov based in the 

United States, to inquire about the purpose 

of the meeting. explained that 

he believed the scheduled meeting at 
Trump Tower was about providing negative 
information on candidate Clinton to the 
Trump campaign. 201 

(U) Based on Trump Jr.'s testimony and 
the documentary evidence received by the 
Committee, there is no evidence to support 
that there were any prior communications 
between the Trump campaign and the other 
attendees: Russian lawyer 

Natalis Veselnitskaya; Russian-American 
lobbyist and former Soviet intelligence 
officer or Russian- 

American who served 

as a Russian interpreter. Furthermore, the 
Committee found no evidence that Trump 
Jr. knew the identities of these individuals 
before the meeting, 2 ^ 2 or that he discussed 
it with candidate Trump beforehand. 2 " 

(U)The Committee interviewed all 
attendees other than Manafort, due to the 
Special Counsel's ongoing investigation, and 
Veselnitskaya, who is a Russian national 
located overseas without a valid visa to 
enter the United States. Despite the pretext 
for the meeting, every person with direct 
knowledge of what occurred confirmed that 
there was no mention of derogatory or 
incriminating information directly relating to 
Hillary Clinton during the June 9 meeting. 
Goldstone testified that he had no evidence 
that the Russian government supported or 
favored Donald Trump, and admitted to 
embellishing the contents of the email 
solely for the purpose of gaining a response 
from Trump Jr., namely by using inaccurate 





/w oroRW 

information. 204 

(U) Veselnitskaya, Samochornov, 
Kaveladze, and Akhmetshin mot for lunch 
before the Trump Tower meeting. 205 During 
lunch, there was a discussion regarding the 
Trump Tower meeting. Veselnitskaya 
shared an approximately lOpage document 
in Russian to provide the lunch attendees 
with a synopsis of what would be discussed 
at the meeting, a summary that contained 
much of the same information as a similar 
document reportedly shared with Russian 
prosecutor general Yuri Chaika. 200 Based on 
this discussion, the lunch attendees 
believed the Trump Tower meeting was 
about the Magnitsky Act. 207 The lunch 
attendees then met Goldstone at Trump 
Tower shortly before the meeting. 208 They 
proceeded to the 25th Floor where they 
met Trump Jr., and he led the group to a 
conference room. 203 

(U) The June 9 meeting lasted as little 
as 20 minutes/ 10 Kaveladze testified that 
he believed Trump Jr. started the meeting 
and then turned it over to Veselnitskaya. 21 ' 
Interviewed meeting attendees agreed that 
Veselnitskaya presented information 
concerning the Magnitsky Act and the Ziff 
Brothers, including their alleged role in 
evading taxes in Russia and political 
contributions to the DNC and/or Clinton 
campaign/' 2 Several attendees also 
recalled discussion of Russian adoptions, 
which the Russian government suspended 
in retaliation for the Magnitsky Act. 213 

(U) Goldstone further testified that 
Kushner, Manafort, and Trump Jr. seemed 

visibly uninterested in the Magnitsky Act 
briefing provided by Veselnitskaya. 21 ' 1 


Manafort, according to Goldstone, "never 
looked up from his cell phone from the 


moment we began the meeting until the 
moment we ended." 215 Manafort and 
Kushner complained to one another via text 
message during the meeting that the 
meeting was a "waste of time." 210 Kushner 
asked his assistants to call and give him and 
excuse to leave, which one of them did 
shortly after the text. 217 At the end of the 
meeting, Goldstone apologized to Trump Jr. 
for the "bait-and-switch talk about 
something which we knew nothing about, 
which was, again, Russian adoption and the 
Magnitsky Act." 218 

(U) Kaveladze testified that he received 
two calls from Aras Agalarov after the 
meeting. During the second call, Kaveladze 
explained that the meeting was a "complete 
loss of time and about nothing," 210 Aras 
Agalarov and Kaveladze did not discuss the 
"dirt" on Hillary Clinton/ 20 Kaveladze also 
sent an email to his daughter after the 
meeting indicating that the "meeting was 
boring. The Russians did not have any bad 
info [ojn Hillary" 221 —a reference back to his 
conversation with Beniaminov, which he 
had apparently relayed to his daughter. The 
Committee received no testimony or 
documentary evidence indicating that the 
purpose of the meeting was to discuss 
WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, the hacking of 

DNC servers, and/or the John Podesta 
emails / 22 

(U) No witness, including the attendees. 





testified that candidate Trump was aware of 
ine meeting prior to its public exposure in 
June 2017. Steve Bannon, who had been 
previously quoted as saying '[t]he chances 
that Don Jr. did not walk [the meeting 
participants] up to his father's office is 
zero," conceded under oath that he had no 
evidence to support that claim.' 1 " The 
Committee also investigated a public 
statement made by candidate Trump during 
a speech after the final Republican primary 
contests on June 7, 2016, the same day as 
Trump Jr. exchanged emails with Goldstone 
regarding meeting attendees and 
logistics. 2 * 4 According to campaign press 
secretary Hope Hicks, Trump's publicly 
stated intent "to give a major speech ... 
next week.., discussing all of the things 
that have taken place with the Clintons" did 
not reflect knowledge about the upcoming 
meeting; instead, it referred to a planned 
speech "that was an outline of the book 
Clinton Cash," and was ultimately delivered 
approximately two weeks later after being 
delayed by a domestic terrorist attack/ 23 

(U) Finding #33: Donald Trump Jr. briefly 
met with a Russian government official at 
the 2016 National Rifle Association annual 
meeting, but the Committee found no 
evidence that the two discussed the U.S. 
presidential election. 

{U} In the weeks leading up to the 
National Rifle Association's (NRA) 2016 

annual meeting, there were a series of 


emails sent to a member of the campaign 
discussing Russian interest in the campaign 
35 it related to the NRA meeting. Despite 

the emails' rhetoric about setting up a 'back 
channel" between the United 5tates and 
Russian governments, the relevant 
testimony obtained in the Committee's 
interviews showed these email inquiries 
resulted in a brief meeting between Trump 
Jr. and a Russian government official that 
centered on shooting and hunting. It did 
not focus on the U.S. presidential election. 

(U) From May 19-22,2016, the NRA held 
its annual meeting and exhibits in Louisville, 
Kentucky." 3 In an interview with the 
Committee, Trump Jr, testified he received 
an invitation from ''[vjaricus people at the 
NRA" to attend the 2016 meeting/" In 
addition to Trump Jr.'s invitation, there 
were several emails sent to 
seeking to establish a connection at the NRA 
meeting between an emissary of the 
Russian government and candidate Trump. 

(U) In the first email, dated May 16, 
2016, a business executive emailed 

ith the possibility of candidate 
Trump meeting with Alexander Torshin, the 
Deputy Governor of the Bank of Russia, the 
country's central bank The email 
mentions an "overture to Mr. Trump from 
President Putin/"'' responds he 

will be "[w}orking on this first thing in the 



(U)m forwarded the email to 
Manafort, Gates, and Kushner, noting the 
"interesting request / ,2J1 ^m|email 
highlighted the entrepreneur's request that 
Torshin "meet with a high level official in 
our campaign" during the NRA meeting to 
discuss "3n offer he (Torshin] claims to be 





r e f^S CCKCT/ 

carrying from President Putin to meet with 
DJT." in response to that email, Kushner 
wrote: "Pass on this. A lot of people come 
claiming to carry messages. Very few we 
are able to verify. For now I think we 
decline such meetings," as well as "[b]e 
careful." 73 '' replied to the 

executive seeking the meeting: "I've asked 
about a mtg but we are not able to 
accommodate it at that event in KY." 733 

(U) In addition to the emails discussing 
a possible meeting with Torshin, on May 10, 
2016, who had previously 

approachec^^mi about advising a 
prospective Trump transition, 234 sent 
an e| mail about meeting with 
Russians at the NRA event. 735 The email 

purported "back- 
channel to President Putin's Kremlin," that 
"Russia is quietly but actively seeking a 
dialogue with the U.S. that isn't forthcoming 
under the current administration," and.that 
"the Kremlin believes that the only 
possibility of a true re-set in this 
relationship would be with a new 
Republican White House." 736 

(U) The email goes on to note that 
"President Putin's emissary" will be at the 
NRA convention and hopes to make contact 
with candidate Trump and present Mrs. 
Trump with a gift/ 32 The email discussed 
Putin's desire to build a relationship with 
candidate Trump, to include extending an 
invitation to the Kremlin. The email also 

askedto "talk through what has 
transpired and Sen. Sessions' advice on how 

to proceed." 2 ' 6 When asked about this 

email in his Interview before the 
Committee, Attorney General Sessions 
testified he was not aware of this email. 239 

testified that he may have met 
monce, and did not remember 
replying to his email. 7 ' 10 

(U) Although the campaign declined to 
hold a meeting, Trump Jr. was introduced to 


Torshin, at the request of an acquaintance, 
at a restaurant where they were dining 
separately/ 41 During their brief 
introduction, they spoke about "stuff as it 
related to shooting and hunting ... 
exchanged casual hellos" but did not 
exchange contact information. 2 ' 12 In his 
brief exchange with Torshin and a 
subsequent exchange with Torshin's 
assistant, Maria Batina, Trump Jr. testified 
he did not recall any discussion of the 
upcoming U.S. presidential election. 213 No 
other witness provided a contrary 

recollection to the Committee. 


(U) The Committee reviewed several 
emails discussing a meeting with Russians at 
the NRA meeting, an attempt to establish a 
back channel of communication between 

the U.S. and Russian governments, and a 


possible meeting between candidate Trump 
and President Putin. However, the 
Committee found that all of those email 
exchanges resulted in just one, brief 
meeting between Mr. Torshin and the 
candidate's son that did not include any 
discussion related to the U.S. election/' 14 

(U) Finding #34: The Committee found no 
evidence that meetings between Trump 
associates—including Jeff Sessions—and 


official representatives of the Russian 
government—including Ambassador 
Kislyak—reflected collusion, coordination, 
or conspiracy with the Russian 

(U) Meetings between U.S. senators 
and foreign government officials are 
considered a routine part of the job. 
However, there have been multiple media 
articles raising concerns about contacts with 
former Russian Ambassador to the United 
States Sergey Kislyak, particularly those 
involving then-Senator Sessions. 

(U) Mayflower Hotel Speech: In April 
2016, Senator Sessions, an early endorser of 
Trump and later a key figure during the 
transition, attended a foreign policy speech 
by Trump at the Mayflower Hotel in 
Washington, D.C. 245 Kushner also attended 
and recalled meeting 20 to 25 guests, 
including Ambassador Kislyak for the first 
time. Kushner stated that the 
conversation between him and Ambassador 
Kislyak mainly consisted of pleasantries, and 
concluded with an offer for Kushner to visit 
the Russian Embassy for lunch, which 
Kushner never attended. 247 

(U) Attorney General Sessions similarly 
described a pre-speech reception of maybe 
24 people; immediately following the 
speech, he went to a media stakeout to 
answer questions about the speech. 248 
Attorney General Sessions recalled "no ... 
discussions with the [Russian] Ambassador 
or any other representative from the 
Russian Government or their surrogate" at 

the Mayflower. 249 

(U) Republican National Convention: In 

July 2016, then-Senator Sessions attended 
the Republican National Convention in 
Cleveland, Ohio. Because he used his 
campaign funds to pay for his travel and 
lodging while in Ohio, his schedule focused 
primarily on his Senate campaign-related 
events. 250 For the five days that Sessions 
was in Cleveland, he attended numerous 
Trump campaign-related events. 251 

(U) Over 50 ambassadors to the United 
States also attended a reception associated 
with the 2016 Republican Convention. 252 
Sessions addressed this group of 
ambassadors, as the keynote speaker, at the 
Heritage Foundation's Embassy Row 
Ambassador's Buffett Lunch. 253 According 
to Sessions, his interaction with 
Ambassador Kislyak following that speech 
was brief, unexpected, and occurred in the 
presence of several other people. 254 


(U) J.D. Gordon testified about briefly 
encountering Kislyak twice at convention 
events in July 2016, including a brief 
conversation that occurred during a 
networking event that was also attended by 

|recalled seeing Gordon and 
chatting casually with Kislyak at the same 
event. 256 The Committee found no evidence 
that these brief public interactions related 
to the hacking of emails or collusion, 
coordination, or conspiracy between the 
Trump campaign and Russia. 

(U) Senate Office Meeting: On 
September 8, 2016, Senator Sessions met 





T C P- 3 'ee ftg 

e r oRr 

Ambassador Kisiyak In his Senate office/' 1 * 2 
As a Senator, such meetings In his Capitol 
Hill office are common. Notes of the 
meeting taken by Sessions' staff, and 
provided to the Committee, verified that the 
approximately 30-minute meeting was 
official in nature and not related to any role 
that Senator Sessions held with the Trump 

-■} CQ 

campaign/ - Sessions testified that the 
conversation mainly revolved around 
Ukraine, and the two “had a little testy 
conversation" about Ukraine given Sessions' 
support for the Ukrainian cause. 259 The 
Committee's investigation did not uncover 
anything improper about Senator Sessions' 
meetings with the Russian ambassador. 

Finding f/35: Possible Russian efforts to set 
up a "back channel" with Trump associates 
after the election suggest the absence of 
collusion during the campaign, since the 
communication associated with collusion 
would have rendered such a "back 
channel" unnecessary. 

(U) The Committee investigated 
meetings during the post-election transition 
period between Trump associates and 
Russians—with a focus on individuals who 
may have been acting as unofficial 
representatives of Moscow. In December 
2016, Kushner met with the head of Russian 
bank VEB, Sergei Gorkov, at the urging of 
Russian Ambassador Sergei Kislyak, with 
whom Kushner and Flynn had met earlier in 
the month. 260 Kushner took the meeting 
partly because he had been told Gorkov 
could provide "insight into what Putin's 
thoughts were on a potential new 

relationship" between Russia and the 
United States/ 1 ’ 1 Kushner testified that the 
meeting primarily entailed Gorkov telling 
Kushner about VEB, with which Kushner was 
entirely unfamiliar, and "that was really the 
extent of it." 262 Gorkov gave Kushner two 
gifts, which Kushner registered with the 
transition. 263 

(U) In January 2017, businessman and 
former Navy officer was 

introduced through Emirati associates to 
Russian investor Kirill Dmitriev in the 
Seychelles/ 64 [|H had no official or 
unofficial role In the transition, but had met 
twice with Bannon at Trump Tower/ 65 
HI testified that his meeting with 
Dmitriev lasted 20-30 minutes and focused 
on "trade matters," and "how the United 
States and Russia should be working 
together to defeat Islamic terrorism." 20 '' 

stated that he and Dmitriev did not 
discuss sanctions, the Russian government's 
"desire to have a relationship with the 
Trump administration," or "any channel of 
communications between the United States 
and Russia." 267 further stated that he 

had had “no communications or dealings 
with [Dmitriev] or any of his colleagues 
before or after that encounter last 
January." 263 

(U)The Committee did not find 
evidence that Kushner or||| did 
anything inappropriate during or following 
their meetings with Gorkov and Dmitriev, 

To the extent that one or both meetings 
reflected art unsuccessful attempt by 
intermediaries of the Russian government 

TOP Q £ C ftLT/ji 



\ ir> tr r—v f 

w t.«r 4 * U. u~ • % (• " £ £ 


— - *. - i 

to set up a "back channel" to the incoming 
Trump administration that purpose was not 
shared with or accepted by Kushner or 
^K~and potentially reflected an 
absence of such channels during the 
campaign." 69 Kushner, who was connected 
to Gorkov by Kislyak, asserted that "the fact 
that we [we]re going through the normal 
channels during the transition hopefully 
serves to show that there were no existing 
channels through the campaign." Similarly, 
noted his meeting with Dmitriev 
"didn't happen until... more than 2 
months after the election. So if there was all 
this collusion [before the election], why 
would there even need to be any other 
followup meetings?" 270 

Clinton Campaign 

(U) Using a series of intermediaries, the 
Democratic National Committee (DNC) and 
Hillary for America (Clinton campaign) paid 
a research firm to conduct opposition 
research on candidate Trump and his ties 
with Russia. As part of this effort, research 
from numerous purported Russian sources 
was obtained and provided to the Clinton 
campaign, thereby constituting indirect, but 
substantial, links "between Russia and 
individuals associated with political 
campaigns" relevant to the 2016 U.S. 

(U) Fusion GPS (Fusion) is the trade 
name of a Washington, D.C.-based 
company. Bean LLC, that conducts research 
primarily on behalf of corporate clients . 271 
According to longtime Wall Street Journal 

reporter and Fusion co-founder§-_“3 'i 
Fusion "specialize^] in finding 
records and reading things and digesting 
large volumes of information." 272 Fusion's 
general practice is to "do engagements on a 
30-day basis, and at the end of the 30 days 
we write a report about what we found.... 
And if you think what we told you was 
interesting and you want more, we can sign 
up again." 273 Founded and led by former 
journalists, 274 Fusion maintains relationships 
with numerous reporters, and provides 
information to news outlets on behalf of 
clients that include law firms, media 
organizations, and lobbying 
organizations. 275 

(U) As described below. Fusion was 

who represented the DNC and the 
Clinton campaign. Fusion was paid to 
conduct opposition research on candidate 
Trump. Fusion subsequently hired 
Christopher Steele as a sub-contractor to 
obtain information from sources purported 
to be current and former Russian 
government officials. The information 
Steele collected was reported back to the 
Clinton campaign via Fusion and|^H 276 

(U) Finding ##36: Prior to conducting 
opposition research targeting candidate 
Trump's business dealings, Fusion GPS 
conducted research benefitting Russian 

(U) Prior to conducting opposition 
research targeting candidate Trump's 






business dealings, Fusion conducted 
research benefiliing Russian interests. 227 
Specifically, in 2013, Fusion was retained by 
a law firm to assist with representation of a 
Russian defendant in a civil forfeiture case 
arising out of alleged money laundering 
activities uncovered by the late Sergei 
Magnitsky (whose name was subsequently 
given to the U.S. human rights law, the 
Magnitsky Act)/ 73 |H^^|acknowledged 
that the Kremlin’s interests in the case were 
aligned with his client and against the U.S. 

(U) Russian lawyer Natalia 
Veselnitskaya hired the law firm for which 
Simpson was working, and that firm 
retained the services of Russian-American 
lobbyist Rinat Akhmetshin, both of whom 
attended a meeting at Trump Tower on June 
9, 2016, described in the first part of this 
chapter. 280 During the litigation, 
Veselnitskaya received, via the law Arm, 
memoranda summarizing 
research/ 81 Certain topics—including the 
Ziff Brothers (a venture capital firm 
specializing in capital investment)—were 
the subject of both (1) memoranda 
Veselnitskaya received and 

(2) the presentation Veselnitskaya made to 
Trump campaign officials. 282 
acknowledged being with Veselnitskaya at a 
court hearing in New York on the morning 
of June 9, 2016, prior to her meeting at 
Trump Tower. 263 He further recalled having 
drinks and dinner with her and others, 
including Akhmetshin, in Washington, D.C. a 
day or two later. 2,4 However, he denied 

discussing the Trump Tower meeting with 
her before or after it occurred, and claimed 
not to have learned about it until 2017. 281 ' 

(U) Finding «37: The 
hired Fusion GPS on behalf of the Clinton 
campaign and the Democratic National 
Committee to research candidate Trump's 
Russia ties. 

is longtime counsel to the DNC/ 5,J 
I^H^^Balso represented the Clinton 
campaign, from which it received $5.6 
million in 2015 and 2016. 2S7 Pursuant to 
that representation, during the 2016 
campaign, "[tjhere was an expectation that 

would hire the consultants, 
including research consultants, necessary to 
enable us to provide services to the 



(U) In approximately March or April 
2016, 269 Fusion principals and 

approachec^^l "and indicated 
that they might be a good fit for doing work 
to support the legal efforts" 
clients. 293 flUiestified that Fusion "had 
been retained ... by a wealthy Republican . 

.. to do research on then candidate Trump . 
.. and thought that if I was going to be 


looking to hire a consultant to help me 
advise the campaign on issues relating to 
Trump, that they would be a good fit." 293 
^^Qwas looking for a consultant to, among 
other things, sort through the multitude of 
public records pertaining to Trump's 
business dealings . 272 Although he had not 
previously worked with Fusion, he chose to 

ivr ocA-nct//i 



hire the company based on its familiarity 
with Trump's dealings, including "his 
business holdings, his financial holdings, and 
the kinds of litigation he had been involved 
in." 293 m further testified that "[t}hey 
were recommended .,. [and] thought 
highly of in the community." 29 ' 1 

(U) The Committee determined the 
"wealthy Republican" who funded Fusion's 
initial Trump Research 

ln September 2015, 

the Beacon retained Fusion to conduct 
opposition research on Trump. 255 
leadership have publicly stated they "had no 
knowledge of or connection to the Steeie 
dossier, did not pay for the dossier, and 
never had contact with, knowledge of, or 
provided payment for any work performed 
by Steele." 295 

testified that—based on a careful 
review of the relevant documents—he had 
identified "zero overlap in the work 
product" between the dossier and what 
Fusion providec^^^l 1 , 297 

(U)|^Jsought and received "budget 
approval to be able to spend money in 
order for me to retain consultants," from 
Clinton campaign manager 
but did not specifically identify Fusion to 
^^|. 293 Fusion's Simpson was "definitely 
aware fhatj|^^^^B represented the 
DNC and that they were the client in this 
matter" based on a general understanding 
that^l^^l' represents the DNC. 299 

Fusion's expenses, including the hiring of 
Christopher Steele as a sub-contractor, 

were passed on to ana 

ultimately to the Clinton campaign and 
DNC. 301 In total. Fusion paid Steele (and 
$160,000; Steele's efforts were part of a 
larger opposition research project for which 

paid Fusion over $1 million. 302 

(U)m| testified that Fusion began 
its opposition research work by "review[ing) 
what we had learned over the previous 
months," presumably including 
"information about candidate Trump's 
business ties in Russia," although had 
not been aware of Russia-specific research 


at the time he engaged Fusion. J Fusion 
"began to develop more specific lines of 
inquiry," and eventually hired Steele, whom 
had known since approximately 

2009. 304 

signed off on the decision to hire Steeie as a 
sub-contractor in June 2016—around the 
same time he learned that Fusion was 
beginning to focus its opposition research 
on Trump's ties to Russia—but was not 
aware of Steele's identity until July 2016. 305 

(U) Finding #38: Christopher Steele claims 
to have obtained his dossier information 
second- and third-hand from purported 
high-placed Russian sources, such as 
government officials with links to the 
Kremlin and intelligence services. 

(U) Between June and November 2016, 
Steele produced sixteen reports for Fusion, 
which comprise what has become known as 
the Steele dossier, "concerning Russian 
efforts to influence the US Presidential 


election and links between Russia and 
Donald Trump." 300 Steele did not travel to 
Russia to compile these reports.’ 0 '' Instead, 
Simpson stated that "[Steele] hire[d] people 
who can travel and talk to people and find 
out what's going on." 30 ' 1 

(U) Of the separate claims the 
Committee identified within the dossier, 
almost ail are attributable to Russian or 
Russia-based sources, such as: a "senior 
Russian government figure," a "senior 
Russian leadership figure," an "official close 
to [thej Russian Presidential 
Administration," a "Kremlin insider," a 
"former top Russian officer," a "senior 
Russian financial official," a "senior Russian 
Foreign Ministry figure," a "Kremlin official 
involved in U.S. relations," and a "former 
top level Russian intelligence officer still 
active inside the Kremlin." 30 ' 3 

[U) The Committee is concerned with 
the degree to which the Kremlin may have 
sought to influence information that was 
ultimately provided to Steele—through the 
potential provision of disinformation or 
otherwise—consistent with its ongoing 
efforts "to undermine public faith in the US 
democratic process ... ” 310 In addition, the 
vast majority of witnesses the Committee 
interviewed, including^|, did not know 
the Identity of Steele's sou rces. 3 ’ 1 Steele 
declined to testify before the Committee, 
and the two witnesses who claimed to 
know some of Steele's sources—Simpson 
and a former U.S. 

Department of State official—declined to 
identify them. 31 * 

(U) Finding #39: Christopher Steele's 
information from Russian sources was 
provided directly to Fusion GPS and 

and indirectly to the Clinton 



(U) Fusion began receiving written 
reports from Steeie in June 2016. 313 At the 
same time, Fusion provided updates— 
approximately weekly and usually orally—to 


receiving some of the information later 
included in the dossier "maybe late June, 
early July." 115 exchanges with Fusion 

were not one-way communications: he 
specifically recalled directing follow-up 
work on information gathered by Steele. 330 
Ellas recalled personally being briefed by 
Steele on his findings during a late 
September or early October meeting at 

office and 

formed the impression that "the Fusion 

folks thought it was important that Mr. 


Steele hear from me directly that I was 
aware of his work and was appreciative ." 31 ' 
The Committee requested 
records related to this meeting, but the firm 
was not able to locate any. s,s 

(U) led regular briefings that 
contained Steele's Information for senior 
Clinton campaign staff, which included 
Clinton campaign managerand 
campaign chairman John Podesta. 313 m 
also began "relaying ... information 
received from Fusion GPS to the DNC... 
around... convention time." 33 ’ 1 


1. H FSO,' i n te^I rgs n ce Com mtftee Otalftna n* ft a n ft ng M e mb^r tsxa bfeh Para meters for Russia f n veahgar. on*" gnos/ 
i nt g'• "■ ~ahou sa .a&v/nfews * d Ji umgnbineleass*?Dccu t n;lD=757. Mar* 11, 2017. 

2. H P5CJ, Executive Session Jnterutsw cf I efferso n B. Sessions* Nov* 30 P 2017. 

3. HP$t], &cscutfv& Session Interview of Donald Trum p* X Bee. 6, 2017; M P$G, Executive Session interview sf Jefferson S. 
Sessions, Nov. 30,2017. 

4. HP$D* Executive Session Intefi&hv of Jefferson B. 5>£ssie:rts r Nov. 30,2017. 

5. H PSC 1 Executive 5e ssl on In teiv;ew of: a red K u s n na r t Ju fy 2$, 2 di ?. 

6. HPSO* *3ugsten Acirve jvi eaiures During the 2016 Elects n Campa ign/ May 23,2017. 

7. HP3Ci, + Russian Active Measures During the 2016 Election Campaign/ May 23* 20l? 

B. HP$C\ Executive Session interview ot James Clipper, Ju 4 y 17,2017, 

S-. HP5C 1 * Executive Session Interview cf James Capper r iuty 17,2017. 

10. HP5CX Executive Session interview of Donald Tnirftfr Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 

IX HRSCi* Executive Session interview oi Michael Cohen, Oct- 24* 2017. 

17., dP$Q r Executive Session Inten/itrwof Michael Cohen. Get 24,2017. 

13. Morgan, lewis & Sotkiua CLP, Utter from Sheri A. Dillor ^rtd Wllllsm F* Nelscn io President Donald J. Trump, Mar. B, 

14. H PSD. Execu rive Soss \ on Iniervi ew of M xtia el Co n e n, Coil 24, 2GI7* 

15. HPSG f Executive Session Interview cjf Ike tewstedze* Nnw 1 T 7017. 

16. H P SO* Execu dv e Ses si o n lmerviaw of 1 k e Ka va Sad i e r Hou. 2,2017 

17. HPSQ, Executive Session Interview of Ron {xvkterone Dec. IS, 2017. 

IS. HPSC* Executive Session Interview of ftac Gladstone. Dec. IB, 2017, 

IS, HPSO. Executive Session Interview cf Rob GoldsTone* Dec. IS, 2017; HPSCh Executive Session Interview of Mtcheel C^ 
hen,Get*24 2017. 

20. H PEG, Ex&cli □ vo S^s si on I ntervitiw of l ke Kavc I a & zfc , H ov. 2,2017. 

2X HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Rob So Id stone, Dec. 16,2017. 

2?_ Twitter, ^realOo^ddlYump* Xme IS* 2013,£;1? PM 

2 3, HPSQ, E>:sc u tlve Ses si on 1 n ‘ e rview of Rob Sold stone, Dec. lB t 20! 7* 

24. HPSQ, Executive Session Interview of Rob Gold^tone, Dec 13,2017. 

25. HpSO, Executive Session inter vi^iv of Rob Golds tone, Dec l& r 2017. 

26. HPSC, E<ecoiive Session inreervievv of Rob Goldstone, Dec. 13, 2017. 

27. HPSD, Exetuuve Session Inl&rview of Keith Schiller, Nov. 7 f 2017; HPSCJ, Execj^v* Season Interview of Roc Golds!one, 
Dec. 1% 2017. 

2$. H FSO, Executive Session Interview of Rob Goldstone, Dac 1 &, 2017. 

29, HPSD, ExecutiveSeiston Interviews* KailbSchtilsr, 7,2017. 

3G. HPSD, Lsacutive S^^sion Interview of KeRh SchtllEf. Nov. 7,2017. 

31. HP5G, Executive Session inren^ew oi Rob Golds!one, Dec 16. 2G17. 

32. HPSG. Executive S^i^icm Interview cf Donald Trump* >r. r 6, 2017 

33. II PSD f Exouubv e Se ss i on htemaw of M: chaoi Cohc n, Gzz. 24,2017. 

3-. HP5Q, Executive Session Intenraew m Michael Cohen, Oct. 2~, 2017, 

36. hpSD, Execudve loss Ion interview dfmf, Dec 20* 201 ?- 

3 6. HPSCI r Exec utive Se s s ion 1 nterview o f Micbael Coho n* G cl 24 f 2017. 

37. H FSO r Execu tive Seision I nterwew of re^i^ 5ete r, Dec. 2 0,2 017, 

33. Text Message Exchange Between Michael Cohen ana F^Dc Sac^r r D^i 29-31,2015. jFSHRG0112-30] 

39, Email fr&n) felix Satef to Michael Ccren, ,f Re :Putin/Tfun\3 / No 1 /; 3> 2015 [M0C-H-0C2552] 

40. Ema5 from Felix Sater to Mkhae) Cohort, fl Re;Putin/Trurrw 1 ,J Nov 3 r 2015. [MDC I1-CC0692] 

41- HPSC, Exhcu trie S&s^ion Interview 20* 2D17. 

42. HP5G* Executive Session Interview Doc. 2ft, 2017 

43. HPSG, Executfve Sessi on Interview c f* Dec, 2fj ,, 1017. 

44. H fi $G. Ex^cutiv e S »ssi o n Interview of SV1 icha el Co h e n F Coi 24 ± Zfll 1 . 

45 . h PSCl Exec u tiv e Sessi on 1 n:erview cf M l cha el toh e n, G cl 24 r 2017 . 

46. Text fvtessage Exdiange Be barsen Machael Cohen an ri Hi bt Sater, Dec, 30-31* ZOlX "R5HRD0112-30] HP5Q r Execurive 
Session Interview of Felix Sai^r, Dec. 20, 2017. 

47. T^X Message frem Felix Sater to fWfehael Cohen* Dec. 30,2015. [F5HR00U4-7.5] 

4S. Text ?4c553ge frem Felix Sater to Ml-thael Cohen* Dec. 20,2015. [FSHRO0125] 

43, Email f fom Michael Cghen tc into@prprsi3^EOv*nj* 'Trump Tower-Masccvu/ l^n, 14, ZG15. fMDC-K-CCC590j 
SO* Email from Michael Cohen to :nfo@prpr^, Trump Towor-Moscow/ J^an. 14* 2016. fMGC-FUOOO3S0] 

51. Small ft cm M i chae t Cohen \o info it prpres^. gov, ru. Trvm p To wer- Mosc OW, v la n. 14* 2016. [M DC - H ^ G DOES 3} 

52. HPSO, Executive Session Intend of feil« Sat^r, Pst, 20,2017* 

.or jtLiUIlJ 


53. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Felix Sater, Dec, 20, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, 

Oct. 24,2017. 

54. HP50, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct 24, 2017. 

55. HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Felix Sater, Dec 20, 2017* 

56. HP SCI, Executive Session Interview of Felix Sater, Dec 20, 2017. 

57. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Qtl. 24, 2017* 

53* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr,, Dec 6, 2017. 

59* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017. 

60. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017. 

61. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017, 

62. HP SO, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr,, Dec. 6, 2017. 

63. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr*, Dec G, 2017, 

64. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec* 6, 2017. 

65. HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec 6, 2017. 

66* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec* 6,2017. 

67* Morgan, Lewis Sc BocMus LLP, Letter from Sheri A. Dillon and William F, Nelson to President Donald J. Trump, Mar. 3, 


68. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017. 

69. Eliot Cohen, Bryan McGrath, et ai, "Open Letter On Donald Trump from GOP National Security Leaders," War on the 
Rocks, Mar* 2, 2016, 

70. Daniel W. Dresner, "Why can't Donald Trump dose the deal with any foreign policy advisers?,' 1 Washington Post, Mar. 9, 

71* Missy Ryan 2 nd Steven Mufson, "One of Trump's foreign policy advisers i$ a 2009 college grad who lists Model UN as a 
credential," V/ashlngton Post, Mar, 22, 2016. 

72, HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Jared Kushner, July 25, 2017. 

73, HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017 
74* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017* 

75* HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Waiid Phares, Dec* 8,2017, 

76, HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017. 

77. HPSG, Testimony of Carter Page, Nov, 2, 2017. 

78. HPSCI, Testimony of Carter Page, Nov, 2 t 2017* 

79, HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jared Kushner, July 25, 2017* 

30, HPSCI, £ xecutiva Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017. 

SI H PSD, Executive Session Interview of , Dec, 5* 2017; - RNC National Security/Military 

Platform Subcommittee Proposed Plank on the Ukraine, Undated* [DENMAN 000012] 

82* — RNC National Security/Military Platform Sub Committee Proposed Plank on the Ukraine, Undated. 

000012 ] 

S3. HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017, 

84* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017* 

85* HPSG, Executive Session interview Jan. 17,2013. 

86. U.S, v. Paul J. Msnafort, Jr,, and Richard W. Gates Hi, "Superseding Indictment" {l;18-cr-S3, Eastern District of Virginia), 
Feb, 22, 2018, 

87. HPSCI, Executive Session interview Jam 17, 2013; Alexander Burns and Maggie Haberman, 

"Donald Trump Hires Paul Manafortto Lead Delegate Effort," The New York Times , Mar* 23, 2016. 

38* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jan* 17, 2013* 

39. HPSCI, Executive Session interview Jan. 17, 2013; HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Hope 

Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018. 

90, Andrew E, Kramer, Mike Mclntire, and Barry Meier, "Secret Ledger in Ukraine Lists Cash for Donald Trump's Campaign 
Chief," The New York Time s, Aug* 14,2016; Jeff Horowitz and Chad Day, "Trump advisers waged covert influence cam¬ 
paign," Associated press, Aug. 19, 2016. 

91* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks* Feb* 27, 2018. 

92* HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27,2018* 

93. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb* 27, 2018. 

94. H P5CI, Executive Session Interview of Ja red Kushner, j u ly 25,2017* 

95. Email from Paul Manafort "Arming Ukraine," July 30, 2016. [Sessions production; 2016-07-30—Arming 


96. Email t0 J ac ^ "Fwd: Ukraine/' Aug. 1, 2016. [Sessions production: 2016-08-01 —Fwd; Ukraine]; 

Memorandum "GOP Platform; National Security, Ukraine Amendment^Sequence of Events/' Aug, 


1, 2016. [Scions production: 01—Fwd; Ukraine— ATTACHMEffT MEMO—Ukraine Am endive" (IK pci] 

37. Memo from J.D. Gordon "GOP Platform; fiaricmal Security, Ukraine A mend meal—Sequence of Events/ Aug. 1* 2016* 
[OJTFP00004693} EmaTfrom Jahn Hemerrivay to j affray D. Gordon, <t tlkr£i!ft£—Revised Format/* Aug. I r 20l6. 

[QJT FP0ODO46S2-93U 

3S. H PSC I, Te $tfmcmy of Zz~z?r Pa g®, Nov. 2 , 2017. 

99. DHS and O DMI, Jc tn t Sictem en c from the Pep onm+n r oft tome fan d Seturir/ and Ojfce of me Dirt aor of iVo Coco: /n ref/fr 

£TtT!C$ or) £}gctiCfl Security, h fins://v/vy 1 .^ .dhs, rcy/n= v* s/20 1 n/I gl/ g?/ i rurtT-^STgTn g i-*i g aarfcfr. er.t-hnrr. e: ■ e r*3-sa£*= r_ItyJj_QcT 

c free- d i re etc r- nan c r ■? , Oct. 7, 2916, 

100. HPSCi, Executive Ses^cn Interview of Donald Trump, Jr-, Dec. 6,2017, 

101. H?*SCi, Executive Session Interview of Jefferson 3, Sessions, Nov, 30,2017. 

202. H?SCJ, Executive Sassicn interufew of Hop^ Hicka. Fsh, 27,201S- 

203. Mark Hench, “Trump: 'Wove WikiLeaks/ 4 ' Tbs ml Ccl 10,2016. 

104. Ashley Parker and Dawd t. Singer, 1 'Donald Trump Calls on Russia to Find Hilary CEngcm's Missing Ema&s/ flfew /ark 

Tiroes, July 27, 2016. 

105. HP SCI, Execute Session Interview of Matth-sw F. Tafr, CrL 6. 2017. 

IDS. HF5CI* Executive Ses fxi interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27,201S; HP5CI, ExBCtmveSession interview cf Trump, Jr., 

Dec, 6,2017- HPSO, Executive Session Interviewcf Jefferson 2. Sessions, Kcw. SO. 2017. 

207. DA, "Director Pompen Delivers Remarks at CS1S/ hr? s:/Awvy.cja-£ov,lnws-^fc ‘rr.atfori/ji.pq acnes-ts?r":ri -r+y/lCl 
accachcs-tc a = monv rcc m ceo»da.*ive js- remcis him! , Apr. 13, 2017. 

108- U-S. v, George Papad^wulos^^atement of the Gffsnj£ JT (l:17-cr-l82» District cf Columbia J, Oct. S, 2017. 

10$. Fmaif from Michael FlpiJl to flflU J uly 15,2016, [FLYNN HP5CI 0000203^513- 

110- Manu Raj Hr and Jeremy Herb, 't rn2l1 pointed Trump campaign to WikiLeaks HacuTiiants/ CNN r Den 6, 2017- 
ill. HP5CL Execn^g^gsMggrHi=w of Dona-d in,—Jr,, Dec 6,2017, 

111- Email from^^^HH^HtO Donald J, Trump, etaL f "Trump: Another WikiLeaks DNC Upload/ Sept, 14,2016. 

113, Email from Donald J, Trumo, «t aL “Trump: Another WikiLeaks DNC Up load/ 1 Sept. 14,2016. 

[TRUM P_0 

H4* Oliver Darcy, 4 CNH corrects story on email to Trumps about WUa Leaks/ CN'fv, Dec 3, 2017, 

115. HPSCl; Executive Session Interview of Donald Trumps Jn, Dec. 6,2D17. 

lib- HPSC* r Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, } t. t Dec $, 2017. 

117* H?5CT, Executive Session Interview of Donsid Trump, n\ t Dec. 6,2017. 

US. Direct Message from WikiLeaks to Donald Trump Sept 20, 2016,11S& PM; Direct P^essage from Ccoz.rf Trun?.p Jr. to 
WikiLeaks, Sept, 21,201 5+ 11:50 AM; Direct Messas- from WikiLeaks to Dc^aid T amp Jr„ Oct. 3 f 2016,1:25 PM; Direct 
Message from Doneki “rump K, to WikiLeaks, Oct, 5, 7016,3:01 PM,; Direct Messap from Donald Trump Jr. tc Wik¬ 
iLeaks, Oct. 3,2016,3:03 PM, [DJTiK012£5 56J 

HfJ. Direct Message frnm WikiLeaks to Dpnald Trvmp Jr., Sept. 20, 2016,11:55 PM; {/reit Message from WiVi Leaks to Don el p 
Truntp Jr., Oct, 3 t 2015,1:25 PM. 

120, HFSCI, Executive Sesscn Interview cf Dons*d Tnimp, Jr., Dec. 6, 2917, J> 107. 

121. Direct Iron Wrldljeeks to Donald T rump Jr.. Sept. 20,2016, il;59 PM* [DJTJRQL255j 

122* Direct Message from Donald Trump Jr, to V/Mteafes* Sept. 21, 2016 f 11:50 AM. [DiTJR0126bj 
123. hPSG, Execurve SeSsiCn Interview of 0On eld Trump, if., Dec. S, 2017* 

124* Email from Donald Trump ir. to JCeflyanne Conway, el sL* M V7iki!eal(S/ Sept. 2± r 2016. [TR JMPQRG_11_C9D0Q07J 
U5* Email from Donald Trump Jr ta Kellyanne Convey, et a!., "WJkileaks/ Sspt* 21* 2015, [TRUMPaSGJ 1^09990071 
126, fr/SCL Exectnlve Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27,2018* 

127* Direct Message from aks to Donald Trump Jr., QcL 3,1016, L:2S PM iDJOR 01166-66] 

123. Direct Message from L^r.dd Trump Jr. to WikiLeaks, Od- 3, 2016, 3;01 PM- ;OJT)ROI266] 

IIS* 0>ect Message from Dcrtafd Trump Jr, to WTdLeafes, Oa* 3,2016, 3:03 9l,t ;DjTJR02266| 

130. HPSCI, Lxccutrvt: Se^slcn Interview of Donald Trump- i% Dec* 6,2017* 

131* Ofred; Message from WikiLeaks to Donald Trump Jr*. Oct* 12, 2016,8:31 AM, iDJTJR01267] 

152. Dfrect Message from WSelLeaJcs to Donald Trump ir. r Oct. 21j 2016,5:46-9=54 AM [DJTJR01267-59] 

133 Direct Message from WikiLeaks to Donald Trump Jr,* TJov. 8, 2016, S;35 PM. ^GrTJR0l269-7Gl 
134. DVect Message from VTTviL^aks to Donald Trump Ir., ffov* 9, 2016,12:49 1251 AM. :OJTJR01270) 

135* Direct Message from WikiLeaks to Donald Trump Jr., Dec. 16, 201S, 11:3S{Q!TjRDl2yiJ 
136* Direct Message from WTdLeaks fo Donald Trump Jr., Apr. 26* 2017,12:01 AM. JDJT1501272] 

137. Direct Message from Wiidleaksio Donald Trump fr*, ;uiy 11, 2017, S:29 AM. iDHjR3127B-74] 

138. hPSCJ, Exficrutivs Session Intefvfgwof Donald ^rymp* Jr*, D^C* 6, 2017, 

139. HP5CL Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr*, Due. 6, 2017. 

140* KPSCl Executh fc 3 Sssscn Interview of A!=xer*der Idx, f-ec. 14,2C17. 


141 email firari AEexander fifes to Pe:er Schwe lier, et &\. t Re: Remember ne? 1 have an idea to win/' Au§, 26, 2015. 

142. MPSCt, Executive Session Interview of Alexander Nr*, D^t. 14,20S.7. 

143, HPSCi, Executive Session Interview of Atefcande^jxJ^c 14,201?. 

144 HFSCI, Executive Session Interview ofet, 2s, 2017. 

145 HPSCl, Executive Session Interview cr Alexander Nix, Deo, 14,2017. 

146, WSO t Bcerutiwe Seioro^ Interviewer Alexander Noe, Dec, 14,2017, 

147. HPSCl, Executive Session Interview of Roger Stone, Sept. 25, 2017. 

143, HPSCl, ExecutiveSfesiisn Interview^Rogfi/ Sione,Sirot. 26,2017. 

149. hpscj. Executive Session Interview of RogerStone, Sept, 26, 2017. 

150. HPSCl, Executive Sesscn Interview of Roger Stofie t . SepL 26, 2017, 

151. Kenneth P. Vcgel "Under Mueller Scrutiny, Democratic Donor Tony Pcdestn Resits ^rom lobbying Firm,' The He w York 
Times, Crr. 30,2027; HF5CL Executive Sessions Interview of John Fcdasta, Jtme 27, 2017: U.S. v, Paul!, Menafcr*. ir., sr.d 
Richard v. r , Cates Ell, Trvd!cTment v <l:17-cr-291. District of Colombia), Oct- 30,2017 (describing rote of ''Company A" and 

‘ Company R'}. 

152. HPSCl, Executive Session Imerview of Roger Stone, Sept, 26, 2017, 

153. H?SC!, Executive Session Interaev/ of Roger Ston^, SepL 26,2017. 

154 letter frem Robert C 8u$chel to The HongrebH K. Michael Conatv-y, Tte; Fallen// Up to Appearance of Roger Stone or 
September 26,2017,and Supplement to May9 F 2017 Request to Produce Documents*' Do. 13,2017. 

155. HPSCi, Executive Senior Inter-* l*vt oJ Roger Stgrre* Sant. 26, 2017 

156 Andrew r-lske* ""Roger stone, Ymrop confidant acknowledges Innocuous' Twitter conv^rsstiqo vrih D.‘JC hackers/ 
Washington Times, Mar. ID, 2Q17; HrSG, Executive Session Interview of Roger Stone, Sepi, 2h, 20X7. 

157, LetSfif fjem Robert C, Boschel to The Honorable K, Michael Conaway"Re: Fellow Up to Appearance of Roger Stone or- 
September 26,2917* arid Supplement to May 9,2017 Request To Produce Documents^ Oct, 23, 2€17, 

153 - Leuer from Robert d Buschel tc The Honorable K. Mochael Conaway ^Re: fellow up to Appearance of PiOgcr Sterne on 
September 26, 2017, and Supplem ent to May 9, 2017 Request to Produce Documents* Otr, 13,7017, 

159. HPSG, Testimony of 2 r 2017 

3 GO. hpsg r Executive Session interview ot JeffreySordcn, July26,2017, 

162 FmaT fujsrri Carter Page to Jeffry D, Gordon et sL *fte: Corrjr.encement Address, Class of 2016, rrew Evcromk School 
.MtSj, Jeiy 7, 2916. (D^?F0QQG3$92; H?5G, HxecumeSB^sfsrc interview ^Jeffrey-Cordon, July 26, 20l7. 

162. HPSQ t TestflTHWY Of 2, 2017. 

163. HPSCi, Executive Session interview of Jefferson B.s-ssicns, ?isv, 3D, 7017 

164 6 m si I from Carter Page :o Jeffrey D. Gordon, Tora Dshl arid 77alld Pharos, feedback from - Executive Summary/ 
July 8, 2GI6, [DnFPCO£CE4023-24] 

165. HPSCC Ts^timo^y or Carter Page. Nov, 2 T 2017; Josh fiogin, ‘Trump's Russia adviser speaks oof, calls socosaiforii 

'compete garbage"* Washington Post, S&pti 26, 2926. 

166. HPSCE Testimony of Carter Rage. Nov, 2* 2017. 

167 HPSQ, Russia Active Measures in 1 m station. Mar. 20, 2017; HPSCl, Tfesiimcny of Caaur Pege, Nov. 2,2017. 

.168, HP5D. 'Russia Active Measures Investigation/ Mar* 7.G, 2017, 

169 HP5G r Tesrirricny o ; Cartar Page, Mov. 2. 2017;Josh Rc^ln, "Trump's Russia *di/iser speals out, calls accusations 
^nnplets gamage/^ iv^/ir/i^ron Posi^Sep. 2^ 2D16* 

2/0. HPSCl, Testimony of Carter Page, Nov. 2.2017* 

1/1, Sbarcrfi ufraniere, Mark Mai 2 ettf r 3 ad Matt Apuzao, “How the Russia Inquiry Be^n; ACoraoaign Aide, Driaks and Talk of 
PoEErica! Dirt," Washington post, De^ 30,2017; Err al from jcan Mashbum 10 ftlck Dearbom 0rid Jeffrey C* Gordon, 'He 
Travel re!mbursement {*teceived em aT3 from Michael Gfessner) / Jure 2 4 2 0i& [ UTTFPDOCfflS 14' 

172. tmail from George Papadopoubs 3l. T "Re: MeetiriEWfth Rushan leadership—m Hu ding 

Putin/ Ma^^g^DrrFPOOOlom-12] 

173. Email Ceo^ PfipadopobElB aH Meeting v.-tlh Russian leadership—induding Pirrin/ Mar. 24. 

2916. [DJTFFOGOlGlllj 

174. &n3!lfrc.*n^e-2^ge PsoadopnuIoste^U^Upt aL, Meeting with E?u5sian te«dership—includtng Putin/ Mar. 24 
2016, {DUF PK3O101 Hj 

175. HPSCl. Executive Session interview of JeSarsod B. Sessions, Nov, 30,1017, 

176. HPSCl, Fiecutive Session Interview cf Jefferson B. Nov. 2d f 2017. 

V77. H?SG + E^scufiva Session interview of iefferson 6. Sessions, tjov, 30,2017* 

17S. HPSCl,ExvcvtiveS«5K>a Interview oi Eons^ Nov.30,2017, 

179. HPSCl, E>^uutive S^A^rtn E f 2017, 

130, HPSCi, C'lctutlva Sess'icn Interview of ?r,, Dec, 12,2017. 

131, ibaron LsFrania.% Mark V.gzretti, and Matt 4cuz20, ’Howthe Ryjssa Inqu^Seg^n; A -Campaign Aide^ C'lrks and Ts'ko; 


Politick Dirt/* Washington Post, Dec 30^017^JPSCi Executive Session Interview of 8,2017, pp. 7B- 

3P; Email from Goor^a Papadapouios Nov. 13,1016 O made the Introduction between Mr 

Trump [a]ml president Sisl toad primely on Utc (runt tho ruG'on to on my woi* etc") [UJTfPOCOWSfl] 

182- Lou Dobbs, Interview with Donald Trump, Fpx8v£tae&& t $QpL 22, 2016, 

183* Email from George Papatfojjoulos to Paul ManafOrt^Fwa/ May. 21, 2016. (GAT-HPSCI-000002531 

184. Email from George;PapadapeutostoPaulManafart, "Fwd/ J May*21* 2016. [GA7HPSG-OO0OQ2 58-59] 

185. Email from Paul Manaforr to^^^^H'Fwd/' M *Y- 21, 2016. [OAT-HF5C1-0000)2 53] 

136* Gimall from Paul Mam foil loHHHnta:* May. 21, 2D16; [GAH4P5aoaxx>253] 

167. Email from George PavndQ&SwQsiQKm Dearborn, “Travel rmmbur sen tent (received email from Michael (Staner)/' 
June 24,7P1£[DJTFP£0022S15^£^^^^ 

168. Email JeJfray D. Gordon, TWO: Travel reimbursement (received email hem 

Michael 6l assner)/*June 24,2016. [DJTFF000 22915] 

139- Email Jeffry D. Gordon, * mq : Travel reimbursement {recuivod umnii from 

Mlclwl G l a syne i)/June 24 ^ 2016. IDJTFP 0002 2915] 

ISO, Email George Pap adopautos, "Ret Travel reimbursement (received email from Michael Gtessner)/* 

June 24, 2 016- [DJTFP0002 291Bj 

191. Email from Gaocgu Papadopoufos, "fio: Travel reimbiir&tfVtent trect^tod email from Michael Glassier)/' 

June 24,2ofl^^^^^R;2918] 

192. HPSCI. Executive Session Interview oi Rob Goldstar^ Dec. is, 2017; Executive Session interview of Donald Trump, Jr*, 
Dec. 6,2017; Email fromto Rob GcMstone, rt F W-Message-from '26-Copier-Exec/ Apr- 2b, 2016 (passing 
along handwritten response from candidate Trump to email from Aras Agalarov) (EG 00 00331 

193* HPSCi, ExocuHvtr Session I ntary tew of Rob Golds tone, Dec. 13, 2017. 

194. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump. Jr-* Doc G, 2037. 

J%* HPSCI, lixg cytivtf Section Interv iew of Roll GoldiloiW, Due, 18,2017. 

196* Email [REDACTED], "from the of (fee of Donald J, Trump/" Mar, IS, 2016 (passing along hand* 

written responsHfOjr^annioatt? Trump to typewritten note from Aras Agalarov] [DJTJR004G3-03!; Email from Rhone 
Graff to Rob Go Id stone, ¥ FW-Message^rom 'IG-Copler-Exec/" Apr* 25, 2016 (passing along handwritten response from 
candidate Trump to enroll from Aras Agglargv] [RG0DQD33] 

197* Email from Dob Collisions to DonoJcJ Trump Jr-- *Ro; Re; ftus&b - Clinton private and confl don rial/' June 3, 2016, 

193. Email from Donald Trump Jr to Rob Gold stone* "Re: Russia - Clinton - private and confidential/" June 3.2016, 

199 Email from Rob GoStfitOfie to Donald Trump Jr*, T?t*; Russia - Clinton - private and confidential," Jurtu 7, 2016* 

200. Emol/ from Donald Trump Jr to Rob Golds lorn;, Tte; Russia - Clinton - private and conjlduMfal/* June 7, 2016. 

201. HPSCh Executive Session Interview of Ike Revetedse* Nov, 2, 2017 
202* HPSG, Executive Session Interview ot Donald Trump, Jr,, Dec. 6, 2017* 

2D3* HP5C!| Executive Session Interview of DontfldTrump* Jr*> Dec- b> 2037* 

204* HPSCI. Exucuiivu Sfasiion Interview of ftobGoldstene, Dec* 18,2017* 

205, HPSO, Executive Session Interview of Rinat Akhmetshin, Nov IS, 2037; HPSCI Executive Session interview of Anatoli 
Semochornov, Nov* 2S, 2017, 

20$. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Ike Kaveladte, Nov, 2, 2017; Sharon la F ranis re and And rev; E* Kramer- diking 
Points Brought to Trump Tower Mauling Worn Shared With Krumlln/' Ttie Now Yo/k Tims 4 Oct 27, 2017. toud on pub¬ 
lic reportfng- VewdnlUfatyu previously shared a version of the memo or talking points with Yuri Chaika* 

20? HFSG* Executive Session Interview ike Kaveladze, Nov. 3, 2017; HPSCI- Executive Session interview oi Kln<fr Akhmet- 
stun, Nov* 13, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session trrtersfiswof Anatoil Samothornoy, f^ov. 2S, 2017, 

7*0S* H?SO, Executi ve Seiston Interview of Ike Kaveladze, Nov* 2, 2017* 

2D9. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trunvpjr,, Dec- 6,2017. 

210, HPSCI, Exocutwo Snssfrm Interviev; of Anatoli Siimoch&mov, Nov- 2Z* 2017, 

211 HPSCI, Executive Susiiort inPsr>/(Bwof Ike Kavebdie, Nov* 2, 2017. 

212. HPSCr, Executive Session interview of Ike KavofadZftj Wov. 2^ 2017; HPSO, Cstcutivif Session Interview ol E>onald Trump, 
Jr*, Dec* 6,2017; HPSCfr Execub've Session Interview of Anatoh Somochornov, Nov* 2S, 2017; HPSCk Executive Session 
tnteiviiswof Rinat Akhmetshin, Mov. 13,2017; HPSCI, Est-cutivs Suiiion InteAriew of Rob Goldstorte. Dec* IE, 20^7 
213* HPSCI, Exmilive Session Inlorvlcv/of Ifrc- Kavdacfre, Alov. 2, 2017; HPSCI, CKecunvt> Sasslan |jvcor\4^w of Donald Trump, 
Jr,, Di:c* $ t 2Q17; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Ami toll Samochornov, Nov. 28, 2017i. HPSCI Executive Session 
Interview of red Kushoe f t July 2S f 2017, 

214, HPSCJf Executive Session Interview of Rob Gordstonu, Dec* 18 f 2017. 


215. HPSO, Fxetutive Session Jr.Tervf£'.v of Rob Gold stone, Dec. 13. 2017. 

216. "sxt Message Exchange Between fared Kushnerz^d Paul Manefort, June 9,2DI6. fNHPSC00DG014S] 

217. HpsCL Executive Session Interview of jo rod Kusfuier* July 25* 2017. 

218. ! I PSO, Btecutfve Sasscon Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dei. 6, 2017. 

219. HPSCl, Executive Session Intervtevv of Ike Kavefadie. Nov, 2,2017. 

220. HP5G, Executive Session Interview of Iks Kavefadis* Nsv. 2, 2017. 

221 . Ema il frcm ike Kauefrdfee to A. <ave-adte K "He: how are yoc," iune 14 , 7016 . [HiC-KAv__ 06 Q 2 C] 

722. KF3Q, Executive Session Interview of Rob Goldstone, Den 13,2017. 

225. HP SCI, Executive Ssss^Dn interview of Stephen Bannon* Jan. 16,2013. 

224. i^yan T^sgire Beckwith, "Sead Donald Trump's Subdued Victory Speech After Winning r*evw Jersey/ Tffrfi* iuna S. 2017; 
email from Dona'c Trump Jr to Rob.Go!dstone, *R&: Russia - Clnton - private anid confidential/' June 7,2016. 

22 S HPSCl, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27 r 2018 : "full transcript: Donald Trump NVC speed's on slakes O' 
the etectioV PO£/nt( 7 ,iun* 22 , 2 CI 3 . 

225. ftftA* “2016 MRA Annual Meetings & Exhibits Fiji! Event Schedule, “ huo y.// ww w. "r?am. gr z / m od fe r 1641 / ti-a u. r - _■ e n: - 
s:h'5<j'j*=.pi3f undated. 

227 hPSOr Executive Sestic n irtt&Fvtew ,-T O nnald Trump* Jr., Ogc. 6, 2D17, 

22S. Email from 
non: 2016-Q5 
22S. Email from 
tiom 2016, 

250, Email ro; 
tior: 2GI6435-16-Se 

251. Email from 

Russian backdoor overture and dinner invite/ May 16,7016.[Sessions groduc- 
r overture and dlrmsr : nvrte (3S)] 

rI Russian baeftdeor overture and drone rrovrte/ May 16, 2 016, IS&ssions produc- 

2^ Russia backdoor overture and dinner invite (26J) 

"Hu safer tisclicccr overture and dinner invite/ May 16* 2016. [Sessions produo- 
r overture and timreir *rwks (36)] 

c Pea* MenjnorT, er ah, "Twd: Russian backdoor overture end dinner invite/ May 17,2016. 
[Sessions production: 2Q16 -F5-1? -fwd Rus sian backdoor coverture end dinner invite [2S;j 
232* Email from Jared Kushner t< 

233. Email fren 

"Re: Russian backdoor overture and dinner Invite/' May 17, 2016. 

Ro: KY Request/ May 18,2016. {5oss.cns ?rodaction: 2015-05-13-^ KV Re- 

sn* 17,2018. 

"Kremlin CormEctran/ May 10, 2016. [RG0C1D78] 
^KremlinConnection/ Mey 10, 2016. 1RD000D76] 
^Kremlin Connection," May 10, 2016. [RD00007B] 
"Kremlin Connection/ May 10, 2018. (RD C0007G1 

P < _ ^i^ *j D v, 30 r 2017, 

an. 17.201S- 

234. T?5Ch EVg oitiv 

235. Ernst! from 

236. tms’d from 
737. EmsI! from 
233. Email firom 

233. KP5CI, Executive Session interview oUfi 
240* HPSCl, Exficulfve Session Interview 

241. hp$q, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Cen. 6, 2017. 

242. nPSO. executive Session intsrvisv/ of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec 6^2017. 

243. HPSO, ExecutiveSesstar InteLTviejV of Donald Trump* jr,, Dec 6,2017. 

2^4. H?SCI, Executive Session Intsr^sw of Donald Trump, Jr., Dac 6, 2017. 

24$. HPSCl, Executive Sess' r on Inte^iew of Jefferson B* Sessions, Nov. 30, 2017, 

245. HPSO, Ececutfve Session Inisivfew of is red Ktishncr, JuV 25,2017. 

247. HPSCf* Executive Session Interview of Parsd Kushner, July 25,2017. 

24S. HP$Q, Executive Sesston Inter^ew of Jefferson 6. Sessions, Nov, 30. 2017, 

245. HPSCE, Executive Session Intsnne^r of isffsrson S. Sessions, Nov. 30^ _ 

250. radersi Election CornrniiS^oc. 'HilJar/ for America Tisburserren\s 2615-2016, wwiv.f=c=0‘tf; rt JS5 

Sihsdde/ J u ly 16,2035. [2015-07-16- Jntitled (15}-ATTACH M EWSchedule with Drop By (5^:ons 


251. *JB5Schedule/July 15,2016^ {Session* Production: 2036-07-16'Untitled (153-ATTACHiVENl JB$Convention Sihedute 
with Drco 

25L HPSCl, Executive Session Intsrvimvef Jeffrey 6ordcn F July 26,2017; Ccurtney Orrrac, "D-S. Senator Bob Corker Speaks at 
Ciobsl Cleveland's Global Partners in Diplomacy Event/ G 'c ba Ic^eve fend .or>?. Jan. 31* 2017. 

253. s iBS Schedule/ Jdy 16,2015. [Sessions Production: 2Q 15^7-16-Untitled (ISJ^TTACHMWT J&S Gcnvontion Schedule 
vtrflh Drop ByJ 

254. HPSCl, Executive Session In^ertriawof Jefforson a S&ssior-s, Mcv. 30, 2017, p, S6 i^l J^et him, as I recall r^, rn-^re 
v/as an encounter after i made a speech at the RepuMrcan Ccnventign. (dMn T t—didn’t kno w he wss go\r,g lo b; there* i 
spoke to a number of ambassadors artd other people and v/as standing in front of ohe podium and he and i chatted a 
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297. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview ct 12, 2017 * 

298. HPSG, Executive Session interview 2017* 

299. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of 14, 2017* 

300. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of 14, 2017* 

301. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of13, 2017, 

302. HPSCJ, Executive Session Interview of^MB^BBNov* 14, 2017- Mark Hosenball, "'Ex-British spy $168,000 for Trump 

dossier, U*5*firm discloses," Reuters, Nov. 1, 2017. 

303. HPSCI, Executive Session interview Nov. 14, 2017. 

304. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview Nov, 14, 2017. 

305. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of^^^BBDet. 13,2017* 

306. Gubarev et ah v, Drbis et al„ Defense, (Claim No, HQ1 700413, Queen's Bench Division), Apr. 3, 2017, 

307. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Nov* I4 t 2017 (stating that, as a known ^former undercover British 

Intelligence officer who worked In M oscow/' Steele w ould not have been able to travel to Russia safely). 

303, HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Nov* 14,2017. 

309, Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia/' BuziFeed News, Jan, 
10, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session interview of David I Kramer," Dec* 19,2017, 

310, ODN1, Assessing Russian Activities in Recent US, Elections, Jan. 6, 2017, 

311, HPSCI, Executive Session Interview Dec. 13,2017* 

312, Letter from Robert M, Weinberg to K. Michael Conaway and Adam Schiff, Aug. 21, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Inter¬ 
view of Glenn Simpson, Nov. 14, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of David J. Kramer, Dec. 19,2017* The Com¬ 
mittee issued a subpoena to Kramer, but Kramer still refused to identify Steele's sources. HPSG, Executive Session Inter¬ 
view of David J. Kramer, Jan. 10, 2018; Letter from Lawrence 5* Robbins to Representative Devin Nunes and Represent** 
tive Adam Schlff, "Re: December 27, 2017, Subpoena Issued to David Kramer," Jan* 10, 2018. 

313, HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Glenn Simpson/' Nov* 14, 2017. 

314* HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec, 13, 2017. 

315. HPSO, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec* 13,2017. 

316. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec, 13,2017. 

317. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13,2017. 

318. Email for Katherine Ruemmler to HPSG Staff, "RE: Production," Jan. 24, 2018. 

319. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jake Sullivan, Dec* 21,2017. 

320. HPSG, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017; HPSG, Executive Session interview of Jake Sullivan, Dec, 
21, 2017; Jennifer Palmieri, "The Clinton campaign warned you about Russia. 0ut nobody listened to us/' Washington 
Past , Mar* 24, 2017* 


(U) C hapter 5 - Intelligence Community Assessment Leaks 

Key Question M: What possible leaks of classified information took place related to the In¬ 
telligence Community's assessment of these matters? 

(U) Leaks o( classified information are 
criminal acts, and have the potential to 
damage U.S. national security interests, at 
home and abroad. 1 even more concerning 
is that the lives of 1C employees or assets 
may be placed in danger due to unauthor¬ 
ized disclosures of classified information, 
finally, when leaks of classified information 
come from congressional sources, such 
leaks jeopardize the effective oversight role 
Congress plays over the 1C. Therefore, as 
part of the Committee's investigation, the 
Committee reviewed leaks related to the 
classified ICA on the Russian active 
measures campaign targeting the 20:16 U.S. 
presidential election, focusing primarily on 
leaks that occurred between the IC'S estab¬ 
lishment of the CIA Director's fusion cell | 

and the publication of the ICA 
in January 2017. 

(U) On January 6, 2017, the DNI re¬ 
leased the unclassified ICA. The ICA states 
that Russia conducted its active measures 
campaign for the dual purposes of (1) sow¬ 
ing discord in and undermining the U.S. 
presidential election process, and (2} help¬ 
ing elect Donald J. Trump by denigrating 
Secretary Hillary Clinton/ Unfortunately, 
the public release! of the unclassified version 
of the ICA was not the first time that the 
public had seen the IC's various assessments 
related to the Russian active measures cam¬ 
paign. Although outside the scope of this 

chapter, leaks related to the Russian active 
measures were already happening in 2015 
and 2016. For example, there were press 
reports regarding the hack of the DNC, as 
well as the potential hacks of pro-Trump 
and Republican groups 2 Du ring this time, 
the Committee carried out a healthy dia¬ 
logue, which included briefings, with the 1C 

1 ' i " 1 i 

related to these matters as part of its over¬ 
sight responsibilities/ 

(U} In addition, this chapter covers 
leaks of information about 1C assessments 
ihat were likely classified at the time this 
information found its way into the press, 
especially in light of the fact that the leaks 
reportedly came from government sources. 
This chapter does not make any determina¬ 
tion as to the accuracy or analytic integrity 
of the Information leaked to the press and 
subsequently produced in the ICA. 

(U) Finding #40: Leaks of classified infor¬ 
mation regarding Russian intentions to sow 
discord in the U.S. presidential election be¬ 
gan prior to the election day—November 8, 

(U)The leaks related to Russian inten¬ 
tions to sow discord in the U,S. presidential 
election took place prior to the November 8, 
2016 election, and notably, after the IC's 
establishment of the fusion cell!'_: 


A. >»» * 

later on October 7,2016, the U.S. govern¬ 
ment formally accused Russia of hacking 
political institutions, but did not attribute a 


specific hack to the Russians.” 

(U) At the time of these leaks, the infor- 
mation contained within them was still clas¬ 
sified. These leaks of classified information 
endangered U.S. national security by reveal¬ 
ing key information about U.S. Intelligence 
capabilities to its adversaries, including as¬ 
sessments on adversary intentions. The 
Committee finds the timing of these leaks 
particularly concerning. These leaks hap¬ 
pened during the early stages of the IC's on¬ 
going assessment of Russian active 
measures, thus permitting adversaries to 
not only potentially discover U.S. intelli¬ 
gence capabilities, but also provided adver- 



saries, including the Russians, the oppor¬ 
tunity to thwart or manipulate the ICs on¬ 
going assessment. 

(U) Finding 841: Leaks of classified infor¬ 
mation alleging Russian indentions to help 
elect candidate Trump increased dramati¬ 
cally after the election day—November 8, 

5, 2016, the administration had not 

acknowledged any attempt by Moscow to 
influence the election in favor of candidate 

(TS/NF)Ttty However, four days later on Decem¬ 
ber 9, Adam Entous, Ellen Nakashima, and 
Greg Miller of The Washington Post repon.- 
ed that the CIA concluded a new assess¬ 
ment that Russia intervened in the 2016 
U.S. presidential election to help candidate 
Trump win the presidency, rather than for 
the sole purpose of undermining confidence 
in the U.S. electoral system. 16 





rs* ; V *=3 irn C«mx^Cc -=zi*ciM ■/> 


Soc rzr. T.*k tibvscg&R Pryj. 


(C/NF) (uj In addition, on December 10,2016, 
John Walcott of Reuters reported that a U.S. 
official familiar with the IC's findings stated 
that as the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign 
progressed, Russian government officials 
devoted increasing attention to assisting 

candidate Trump's efforts to win the dec 







Intelligence Community Assessment. 

(U) It is important to note that Evan Pe¬ 
rez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bern¬ 
stein of CNN reported on January 12,2016, 
that President-elect Trump was briefed on 
classified information indicating that the 
Russians have compromising personal or 
financial information that the Russians 
could use against President-eleetTrump. 33 
The Committee's investigation revealed that 
President-elect Trump was indeed briefed 
on the contents of the Steele dossier and 
when questioned by the Committee, former 
Director of National Intelligence James Clap¬ 
per admitted that he confirmed the exist¬ 
ence of the dossier to the media. 40 

(TS/NF) in reviewing the various leaks both 
before and after November 8,2016, a trend 
becomes evident—prior to the election, 
leaks of potentially classified information 
focused on Russia's attempts to sow discord 
with the U.S. presidential election. I 

(U} Finding #42; The leaks prior to the clas¬ 
sified Intelligence Community Assess¬ 
ment's publication, particularly leaks oc¬ 
curring after the U.S. presidential election, 

correlate to specific language found in the 

(U) During this review, the Committee 
found that leaks of potentially classified in¬ 
formation permeated throughout the media 
both before and after the November 8, 

2016, U.S. presidential election. 




l S 



Quotes in Article that Mirror ICA 

■—• -■* -ml 

"Secret CTA assnssmont says Russia was trying to '"Tne CIA has concluded In a secret assessment that 


i Russia intervened in the 2016 election to help Don * 

ntd Trump win the presidency, mthci than just to 

i undermine confidence in the US* efecLoral system, 
■ according to officials briefed on the manor" 

help Trump win White House'" 

* Date: December 9, 2036 

* Outlet: The Washington Post 

Final ICA Findings 

Page 1: "We further assess Putin and the Russian Govern¬ 
ment developed a char preference for President-Elect 

"Tt Is Live assessment of the intelligence community 


that Russia's goal hare was to favor one candidate 
over the other, to hetp Trump get elected/ said a 
senior US. official briefed on an intelligence presen* 
tatton madn to U5. senators. 'That's the consensus 

; Page 1: 'Nonetheless* Putin publicly indicated i\preference 
{for President-elect Trump's stated policy to work with ftus* 
[ sia, and pro-Kremlin figures spoke highly about what they 
saw as his Russia*friendly positions on Syria and U3;raino. 
Putin publicly contrasted the President-elect's approach to 
i Russia with Secretary Clinton's 'aggressive rhetoric " 1 

"Russian Hackers Acted to Aid Trump in election, '"We now have high con hide nee that they hacked Use Page 3: "Russia collected on some ftepubllcan^fflriated 

US. Says" 

* Pate: Deedniher D, 20^G 

* Outlet: The New York Times 

i UN.C and the H.N.C, and conspicuously released no , targets but did not conduct o comparable disclosure cam* 
documents'from the Republican organlratfoth one paign* 
senior ad ministration official said, referring to the 

Page ?: "We assess with high confidence that tin 
'A.P.Yh 28/ Is believed to have crest*, and WiffiTuaks to 

cri two outlets on the internet, Guccifer 2.0 and in cyber operati oris public* 

I DCLcaks, to make Democratic documents public, f iy and in exclusive* to media outlets. 

(VI an y of th e do a j men t s w e re a I no p ravt cl ed to WI k * , 
iLeate, which released them over many weeks be- 
Fore the Nov. 0 election " 







^ - v' 

1 -” ' 

— 7 - 

*^T t TV^ v “ 

- .„>■■■— 14 . 

1 ! > *'■ ■ ■ - J J - * J ^ 


■ I i ■ - • ■ — ! »■ 

"U.S. Officials! Putin Personally Involved in u*$. Election 

« Date: December 15, 2016 
* Outlet: NBC News 


"Intel analysis shows Putin approved election hacking 
■ Date: December 15,2016 
4 Outlet: CNN 

"Report: Putin, Russia Tried to Help Trump By 
'Discrediting' Clinton" 

* Date: January (l 2.017 

• Outlet: NBC New 

Quotes in Article that Mirror ICA 

"Two senior officials with d I reel access to the 
information say new Intelligence shows that 
Putin personally directed how Hacked material 
f from Democrats was leaked and otherwise used* 
; The intelligence came from diplomatic sources 
( and spies working for U.S. allies, the officials 

! "Putin's objectives were multifaceted, a high- 
level Intelligence souico told NRC News. What 
begun m ti 'vendetta' against Hillary Clinton 
| morphed into an effort to show corruption in 
; American politics and to 'split off key American 


| allies by creating the image that (other coun* 

: tries] couldn't depend on the U.S. to be a credi* 

bit* global leader anymore/ the official said.'" 

Final ICA Findings 

Page 1: "We assess with high confidence thrat Husslan Pres¬ 
ident Vladimir Putin ordered an Influence campaign In 
201b Dimed at the US presidential election.. ** 

Page 1: Tulin most likely wanted to discredit Secrewry 
Clinton because he has publicly blamed her since 2011 for 
inciting moss protests against his regime in kite 2011 and 
early 2012, and because he holds a grudge for comments 
he almost certainty sow as disparaging him.** 

I Page l: "In trying to influence tha US election, we assess 
the Kremlin sought to advance its longstanding desire to 
undermine the USded liberal democratic order, the pm* 
motion of which Putin and other senior Russian leaders 
view os a threat to Russia and Putin's regime." 


The intelligence community has assessed that 
in order lor this operation to hove been execut¬ 
ed, K couJd not hove boon dono without the 
| highest levels of the government, including the 
\ President himself,' 

Page 2: "We assess that influence campaigns are approved 

at the highest levels of the Russian Government— 
particularly those that would he politically sensitive/ 

"The unclassified report does not identify who , Page 3: "We assess with high confidence thu 

transmitted the information or how* A senior 
official with direct knowledge, however, told 
NBC News Thursday that the U.S. has identified 
the Russian actors who turned over stolen Dent ■ \ 
ocralir. material to WikiLeaks." 

layed material it acquired from the DNC and senior Demo 
ernrte officials w WikiLeaks." 

(U) Finding #43: Continued leaks of classi¬ 
fied information have damaged national 
security and potentially endangered lives. 

(If) Finding #44: Former Director of Nation¬ 
al Intelligence James Clapper, now a CNN 
national security analyst, provided incon¬ 
sistent testimony to the Committee about 
his contacts with the media, including CNN. 

(U) When initially asked about leaks 
related to the ICA in July 2017, former DNI 
Clapper flatly denied "discussling] the dossi¬ 
er [compiled by Steele) or any other intelli¬ 
gence related to Russia hacking of the 2016 
election with journalists/'"'' Clapper subse¬ 
quently acknowledged discussing the 
"dossier with CNN journalist Jake Tapper," 
and admitted that he might have spoken 
with other journalists about the same top- 
ic. s= Clapper’s discussion with Tapper took 
place in early January 2017, around the time 
1C leaders briefed President Obama and 
President-electTrump, on ''the Christopher 
Steele information/ 7 a two-page summary 
of which was "enclosed in" the highly- 
classified version of the ICA." 47 

(U) On January 10, 2017, CNN published 
an article by Tapper and others, which 



claimed that "classified documents present- ty analyst.* 1 
ed last week to President Obama and Presi¬ 
dent-elect Trump included allegations... 
about Mr. Trump" that were (1) "presented 
in 3 two-page synopsis... appended to a 
report on Russian interference in the 2015 
election" and (2) derived from "memos 
compiled by a former British intelligence 
operative/" 16 Those claims were sourced to 
'‘multiple U.S. officials with direct 
knowledge of the briefings." 46 The next day. 

Clapper issued a statement describing a call 
with President-elect Trump in which dapper 
"expressed my profound dismay at the leaks 
that have been appearing the in press" and 
"emphasfeed.,. that I do not 1 believe the 
leaks came from within the 1C*" 30 

(U) The Committee assesses that leaks 
to CNN about the dossier were especially 
significant, since CNN's report "that a two- 
page synopsis of the report was given to 
President Obama and Trump" was the prox¬ 
imate cause of BuzzFeed Mews' decision to 
publish the dossier for the first time just a 
few hours later." Until that point, the dos¬ 
sier had been "circulating among elected 
official, intelligence agents, and journalists,*' 
but remained unpublished. Ji As the accom¬ 
panying article explained, "(njow BuzzFeed 
News is publishing the full document so that 
Americans can make up their own minds 
about allegations about the president-elect 
that have circulated at the highest levels of 

c m 


(UJ In approximately early August 2017, 
shortly after his testimony to the Commit¬ 
tee, Clapper joined CNN as a national securi- 



1. Espionage Act of 2917 (codifeo as amended at 18 U.S.C 73>7SS], 

2. GO M1 r Ass essing Russ ion A cinrittes attd Sotentio ns in Recent tSS BezUo,n$ T, 7017. 

3. Ellen ftskasnima, "Russian (Se , .=entm£nt Hackers Penetrated DriC r Stale Oppa^ rton Research on Trump," Washington 
Post, June 14, 2015; Joseph Menn r ^!ark I losenball, ana John Walcott, '’Hackers Targeted Trump Campaign, Rep util, can 
Pa try Groups: Sources/' ftetrrers; Aug, 13,2015. 

\> M PSO. Staff B ri efir.g on Cyber Taf gerii g of pgIrtica I Pa rtt£5, June 14, 2 Q LG; H Starr 3 Flaring g o Wi k\ Lea ks a r d Hac long 
of Campaign Systems, Aug, 3, 2025; HrSCh Member Sriefrng on Russian Cyber Activities, 6, 2016; G^ngaf 8 

Briefing, Russian Cyber Act^nies," SepL o, 2016, 

! 1. DH5 and 0DN1, Ticint Statement from the Department cf Horr.eEa nd Security and Orf^e of the Director of Katiofial intel¬ 
ligence on Election Security," Oct. 7,2016. 





16, Adam Errtous, Ellen Nakashlma* and Greg wilier, "SecretOA Assessment Says Russia Was Trying to Help Trump Win 
While Housed Washington Post. Den 9, 2016. 




20 . 

21 . 

22 . 










John Walcott “^ussra intervened to help Trump win election: tntel^ence officiate,* Dec, 10,2015. 


























Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bernstein, "Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to 
compromise him," CNN News, Jan. 12, 2016. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. Regarding his communication with Tapper about the 
dossier, Clapper stated: "I don't know exactly the sequence there, but It was pretty close to when we briefed it and when 
It was out all over the place. The media had it by the way. We were kind of behind the power curve, because the media, 
many media outlets that I understood had that, had the dossier for some time, as did people on the Hill." 

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. Former CIA Director Brennan testified publicly that 
the dossier was "not In any way used as a basis for the Intelligence Community Assessment." HPSCI, Russian Active 
Measures During the 2016 Election Campaign, May 23, 2017. However, NSA Director Rogers clarified that, in late Decem¬ 
ber 2016, a two-page summary of the Steele dossier was "added" as an "Appendix to the ICA draft," and that his consid¬ 
eration of the Appendix was "part of the overall ICA review/approval Process." Letter from Michael S. Rogers to the Hon¬ 
orable Devin Nunes, Mar. 5, 2018. See also Evan Perez, "Biden confirms Obama, VP were briefed on unsubstantiated 
claims against Trump," CNN, Jan. 12, 2018. 

Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bernstein, "Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to 
compromise him," CNN, Jan. 12, 2017; Twitter, (SJcnnbrk, Jan. 10, 2017, 2:13 PM (reflecting the story's initial publication 

Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Car) Bernstein, "Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to 
compromise him," CNN, Jan. 12,2017. 

ODNl, "DNI Clapper Statement on Conversation with President-elect Trump," Jan. 11, 2017. 

Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, ‘These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan. 
10, 2017. 

Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan. 10, 2017 
("originally posted ... at 6:20 p.m.). 

Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, ‘These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan. 
10, 2017. 

Transcript, "President Trump Takes Working Vacation; Analysts Examine President's Recent Poll Numbers," CNN, Aug. 7, 
2017 ("Joining us now to talk more about this is CNN's new national security analyst, James Clapper."). 



(U) Chapter 6 - Summary of Related Committee Oversight Efforts 

(U) During the course of the Com¬ 
mittee's investigation into Russian active 
measures targeting the 2016 U.S. presiden¬ 
tial election, the Committee identified sev¬ 
eral issues within its jurisdiction that re¬ 
quired additional attention and oversight 
outside of the broader investigation. 

Sufficiency of "Unmasking’" Procedures 

<UJ In March 2017, the Committee be¬ 
came aware of senior Obama Administra¬ 
tion officials' requests for U.S. parson identi¬ 
ties related to President-elect Trump's tran¬ 
sition team. These U.S. person identities 
were previously redacted in 1C reporting. 
The Committee initiated its investigation of 
the process for requesting [dentines, collo¬ 
quially referred to as "unmasking," to deter¬ 
mine the sufficiency of existing policies and 
procedures related to the release of U.S. 
person identities. As a result, the Com¬ 
mittee recognized gaps in the "unmasking" 
processes, including the lack of IC-wide 
standards related to the justification for re¬ 
questing U.S. person identity information. 
Therefore, the Committee's findings related 
to these processes necessitated an immedi¬ 
ate change in policy. 

(U)The Committee believed that the JC 
should use specific procedures related to 
the "unmasking" of U.S. person identities in 
1C reporting, including additional review re¬ 
quirements for "unmasking" presidential 
tra nsltion team officials during a presiden¬ 
ts transition. 1 The Committee felt that a 

change in policy was necessary for the 1C to 
protect U.S. person privacy and the sanctity 
of the peaceful transition of presidential ad¬ 
ministrations, all while resulting in no oper¬ 
ational impact. As part of negotiations of 
the FISA Amendments Act of 2017, DNI 
Coats and the White House agreed to devel¬ 
op a new IC-wide policy for handling 
‘'unmasking'" requests. Therefore, on Janu¬ 
ary 11, 2013, DNI Coats signed intelligence 
Community Policy Guidance 107.1 (see Ap¬ 
pendix D), which includes requirements for: 

« 1C element heads or designee approval 
for requests for U.S. person identity in¬ 

« Documentation for names or tides of 
individuals who will receive the U.S. per¬ 
son identify information; 

♦ A fact-based justification for each U.S. 
person identity request; and 

• 1C element General Counsel concurrence 
for U.S. person identity requests that 
relate to Presidential transition team 
members prior to those identifies being 
approved for release. 

(U) Using a series of intermediaries, the 
DNC and Hillary for America {Clinton cam¬ 
paign) paid a research firm to conduct op¬ 
position research on candidate Trump and 
his ties with Russia. Fusion GPS (Fusion) is 

the trade name of a Washington, Q.C.-based 
company that conducts research primarily 



on behalf of corporate clients/ tvlarc Elias, 
chair of Perkins Cote's election law practice 
who represented the DNC and the Clinton 
campaign, hired Fusion in spring 2016 and 
paid Fusion $1 million to conduct opposition 
research on candidate Trump. Fusion sub¬ 
sequently hired former British Secret Intelli¬ 
gence Service officer Christopher Steele for 
$160,000 to obtain information on candi¬ 
date Trump via a Russia-based primary sub¬ 
source and numerous sub-sub-sources net¬ 
work who were purported to be current and 
former Russian government officials. The 
information Steele collected was reported 
back through a series of memos to Fusion 
and Perkins Coie. Steele produced sixteen 
memos, which comprise what has become 
known as the Steele dossier; 1 * 3 

(L>) By the end of September 2016—in 
addition to Fusion and Perkins Coie—Steele 
provided the information m the Steele dos¬ 
sier to the DOJ, Department of State, nu¬ 
merous press outlets, and the FBI. [ 

(UJ After uncovering this information, 
the Committee voted to publicly release two 
memos, one written by the Majority on Jan¬ 
uary 18, 2018 (see Appendix E) and another 
written by the Minority on January 29, 2018 
(see Appendix F). In addition to the Com¬ 
mittee's oversight of this matter, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee identified the same 
issues in a criminal referral sent by Chair¬ 
man Grassley and Senator Graham to the 
DOJ on January 4, 2018, describing Christo¬ 
pher Steele's exploits in detail (see Appen¬ 
dix G). 

(U) Ongoing lines of effort include (1) 
continued oversight of DOJ and FBI (see Ap¬ 
pendix H for relevant correspondence); (2) 
inquiries into the State Department's han¬ 
dling of information from Steele, including 
the dossier;'’ and (3) post-election anti- 
Trump research by Steele and/or Fusion 

1 H.R_ 4J78. § 207, US ,r ' Cong. 

2. HFSCi, " Executive Session interview ot GLsnn $1 rrtpsor.," fJ ov. X% t 2017* 

3 The dossteo however, has. coropositfon. 7!-e version published by BvzzFteti does not necess^rrJy ervp^ly corre¬ 

spond Mith documents provid-a to other parties. 


4* - crmer State Dep3 ft me nc official h a s sta ted pu b! i riy the t, ot-er a pence of a p p r cod m a te?y two year s, n e 

□rcvid&d ever JJ 1Q0 of Steeled reports with the Russia experts at the State Department/ ircludir.g Assistant Secretary of 
Sl^te '/ictoriA Nutend. tn. Septe^be 2G16, Winer was personally bfteted by on tha dossier, and shared a two-page 
summary with Nuland, who ensured that Secretary of Stale lohrt Kerry was m^de aware of Steele's Inforcnatfo::, Adds- 
^cnaHy, eceived from CSnturt associate HHM^^^^Hnforma^on collected by an individual named^gj 

Snearer which “alleged the Rushans had cam promising information cm Trump of a sexual and financial nature.' Winer 
snared with information with Steele, who provided it to the FBI, '-'Devin Nunes 

ts mvMfegating me. Here's the truth.,' Washingicn Post, Fab. B, 201S; Susan 3. Glosser, ^Victoria Hu land: The Fu p l Tran- 
script." PQUTtCO, Feb. 5,20 JS; Appendix G, Trie Committee believes that arfdihcnaj Stere Department officials were 
aware of Steele's efforts In 2016, 

5. cu rren ^y tea d s; 'a res ear ch a nd i nvc- strgatc ry a dvisofy 1 ’ ca' led the Penn Gu. a reef Gro u p l PQS ), Is a 

former employee of The Daschte Group. LLS. Senate Select Committee on £S5G], and FSJ; white at SSCI, he 
serv&d a* th-e "chief author' of "Ire Committee Study of the Central intelligence Agency's Detention and Interaction 
Program." The Perm Quarter Group, 'Gur Leadership/ jh e f - cc m / tea m / teg d ?Hj p; nttss:/7 

■A'\Wf, 1 1 r<ed anie . ■ ones . hi late March 2017, Jones met with FBI regarding ?GG r which he described si 


expos ins fa re ip influence in Western dGctians/^J(|to-d FBI that PQG wss being funded by ? :o 10 wealthy donors 
located primarily in Mew York and California, who provided approximately $50 rhiltion. ^^^further stated that PQG had 
secured the services of Steele, his associateand Fusion GfS to continue eaposiog Russian interference in 
the 2015 ILS, Presidential elecficru planned to share The Information he Obtained with policymakers on Capitol Hill 
and with the press, and 3Iso offered to provide PQG's entire holdings to the FBL H>*302, Mar, 23, 2017. 



f U) Chapter 7 - Conclusions and Recommendations 

Russian Influence Campaigns in Europe 

(U) For at least the last decade, Russia 
has aggressively engaged in an information 
war against the West The Kremlin takes 
advantage of the openness, freedom of ex¬ 
pression, and respect for legal norms en¬ 
joyed in Western democracies by con- 
ducnngtargeted, multi-faceted influence 
operations against its adversaries, Each in¬ 
fluence campaign is unique to the populace, 
media environment, and internal dynamic 
of the country being targeted. 

(U) The factors that make Russian oper¬ 
ations effective also make them difficult to 
counter. Nonetheless, countries through¬ 
out the West are taking a variety of actions 
to impede, counter, and where possible, 
eliminate Russian influence operations. 

{U} The vast majority of Russian tactics 
Share a common denominator: proliferation 
through mass media. Therefore, this chap¬ 
ter's recommendations primarily focus on 
ways to degrade the impact of nefarious 
media activities and make them more diffv 
cuit to conduct. 

(U} Recommendation #1: European govern¬ 
ments, non-governmental organizations, 
businesses, think tanks, and academia 
should strengthen legal and regulatory en¬ 
vironments, promote media pluralism, 
build professional media associations, and 
improve the financial sustainability of le¬ 
gitimate news outlets. 

(U) Russia exploits free media spaces 
and open democracies through a network of 
Russian state-owned news outlets and me¬ 
dia platforms. Those platforms amplify pro- 
Russian views in Russian-funded and local 
media, provoke doubt and disagreement, 
and propagate false news stories, in many 
Eastern European end Baltic countries, local, 
independent media outlets often operate 
with extremely limited resources, limiting 
their ability to acquire and produce high- 
quality content. In contrast, the high pro¬ 
duction value of Russia-owned content pre¬ 
sents an attractive alternative. Russian in¬ 
telligence services or their agents of influ¬ 
ence also purchase, invest in, or partner 
with existing TV and radio channels, provid¬ 
ing editorialized content for redistribution. 
Furthermore, Russian propaganda is occa¬ 
sionally re-broadcast by legitimate news 

(U) Strengthening legal and regulatory 
environments, promoting media pluralism, 
building professions 1 media associations, 
and improving the financial sustainability of 
legitimate news outlets will help to: in¬ 
crease access to legitimate news reporting, 
improve production quality and financial 
sustainability of local media, and profes¬ 
sionalize journalists. 

(U) Countries that contain sizable Rus¬ 
sian-speaking popuiations are more vulnera¬ 
ble to the effects of media-enabled Russian 
information operations. As described 



above, for many of these populations, Rus¬ 
sian media saturates local markets, provid¬ 
ing few alternatives for news and entertain¬ 
ment and non-Russian editorial viewpoints 

(U) For countries with large Russian- 
speaking populations, strengthening legiti¬ 
mate Russian-language broadcasters and 
independent media outlets that disseminate 
fact-based content would provide both bal¬ 
ance to the media space and more viewing 
options for residents of these countries. 

(U) Recommendation #2: European govern¬ 
ments, non-governmental organizations, 
businesses, think tanks, and academia 
should implement and encourage multi¬ 
pronged, country-wide efforts by both pub¬ 
lic and private entities to combat Russian 
propaganda, technical, and cyber opera¬ 

(U) Russia utilizes a whole-of- 
government approach in its information op¬ 
erations, mobilizing a variety of tools to 
achieve its goals. From hacking of govern¬ 
ment networks, think tanks, and universities 
to spreading propaganda via social media, 
Russia’s tentacles are many and far reach¬ 

{U) It is therefore imperative that West¬ 
ern nations implement country-wide efforts 
to educate its populations and inoculate 
their governments, media outlets, and other 
organizations from Russian influence cam¬ 
paigns. To do this, Western nations should 


encourage increased partnership between 
public and private entities in order to com¬ 

bat Russian information, technical, and 
cyber operations. 

(U) Recommendation #3: European govern¬ 
ments, non-governmental organizations, 
businesses, think tanks, and academia 
should implement more stringent cyber 
security practices, such as multifactor au¬ 
thentication and encryption of sensitive 
data, as well as educating workforces on 
basic cyber security topics and best practic¬ 

(U) In the last decade, Russian cyber 
operations have targeted governments, mil¬ 
itaries, industrial control systems, business¬ 
es, think tanks, and universities worldwide. 
While Russian intelligence services can em¬ 
ploy extremely sophisticated means for 
gaining access to sensitive data, often sim¬ 
ple tactics such as spear phishing can prove 
just as effective. 

(U) Given that cyber operations are rel¬ 
atively low risk/high reward, difficult to 
attribute, and even harder to consistently 
combat, it is likely that Russia will continue 
to utilize this tactic in its influence cam¬ 
paigns. Network defenses have to be right 
100% of the time; a cyber intruder-only has 
to be right once. Therefore, it is imperative 
that governments, NGOs, businesses, think 
tanks, and academia invest more resources 


in cyber security defenses, implement more 
stringent cyber security practices, and con¬ 
duct regular workforce education and train¬ 
ing on these topics. 

(U) Recommendation #4: European govern- 



merits should look to long-term solutfons 
to lessen economic dependence on Russia. 

(U) Russia utilizes economic ties to its 
advantage. Economic vulnerability - such as 
reliance on Russia for trade or energy - can 
be leveraged to change behavior, send a 
message of displeasure, or Inflict punish¬ 
ment. This is especially true for smaller 
countries within Russia's periphery, such as 
Moldova, where Russia is among their larg¬ 
est trading partners. Yet even large, eco¬ 
nomically secure countries like Germany 
depend on Russia for a large percentage of 
its energy needs. 

{U) The United States should look for 
opportunities to lessen European countries' 
economic dependence on Russia. Exploring 
alternative sources of energy and diversify¬ 
ing trade relationships would diminish one 
of Russia's tools for imposing Influence on 
its neighbors. 

Russia Attacks the United States & America 


(U) The Committee's findings concern¬ 
ing the Russian government's malign influ¬ 
ence campaign during the 2016 U.S. presi¬ 
dential election are largely consistent with 

the facts outlined in the ICA. The Russian 


effort was multifaceted, persistent, and 
effective in sowing division. The effort in¬ 
cluded cyber operations (hacking), the use 
of social media, the creation of automated 
accounts and fake cyber personas, the use 

of third party intermediaries, and state-run 


(U) Evidence reviewed by the Com¬ 
mittee also showsthat the Russian govern¬ 
ment and its proxies used social media to 
advance Russia's malign interests. While 



these efforts were limited - some even 
came after Election Day-they were effec¬ 
tive at sowing divisions within American so¬ 
ciety and promoting false information. 

{UJ America's reaction to the Russian 
active measures campaign consisted of a 
tv hole of government response, with vari¬ 
ous activities conducted by the iC, law en¬ 
forcement, and policy makers. Despite ar¬ 
guably the best of intentions in addressing 
the Russian cyber menace before and dur¬ 
ing the 2016 election cycle, the Executive 
Branch's response fell short of deterring the 
Russians from conducting such activity in 
the future. 

(U) After analyzing the Executive 
Branch's responses to the active measure 
campaign, the Committee identified various 
gaps in current law and policy that must be 
addressee in order to haip protect U.5. elec¬ 
tion systems and increase the efficacy of 

victim notifications in the future. In addi¬ 
tion, the Executive Branch must diligently 
inform U.S. presidential campaigns in the 
future of counterintelligence threats, to the 
extent consistent with national security and 
law enforcement equities. 

(U) Recommendation #5: Congress should 
identify options available to the private 
sector and federal government that would 
address the social media vulnerabilities ex¬ 
ploited by the Russian government. 

{U) The exploitation of social media 
platforms by the Russian government for 
maiign purposes demonstrated 5 'significant 

vulnerability. The response of social media 
platforms to this threat should be examined 
closely and evaluated against ongoing 
threats. Furthermore, social media 
platforms should consider implementing 
methods to help counter malign foreign ac¬ 

(U} Recommendation # 6 : Congress should 
consider updating the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act to cover malicious interna¬ 
tional cyber actors. 

(U) As part of the Committee's initial 
FISA Amendments Act reauthorization dis¬ 
cussions in 201 ?, the Committee sought to 
address the changing threat environment as 
it relates to malicious cyber activity 
thresting the U.S. national security. Given 
the difficulty in attributing a specific cyber 
actor, the lines between independent hack¬ 
er and government cyber operator are often 

blurred. U,S. adversaries are consistently 


attempting to obfuscate their identity and 
location in order to evade detection. Unfor¬ 
tunately! current national security authori¬ 
ties are inadequate to counter the growing 
cyber threat 



(U) Unfortunately, the proposed addi¬ 
tion to the FISA "foreign power" definition 
did not make it into the final version of the 
FISA Amendments Act of 2017 given con¬ 
cerns thatsuch a designation would dilute 
the key distinction between two different 
legal purposes: intelligence collection and 
law enforcement. This concern, while un¬ 
derstandable, fails to take into account the 
changing threat environment, as evidenced 
by Russian cyber actors, such as the internet 
Research Agency, that attempted to meddle 
in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. 

(U) The Committee renews its call for 
Congress to update the definition of 
"foreign power" and "agent of foreign pow¬ 
er" in FISA to account for entities engaged 
in international malicious cyber activity that 
threatens the national defense or security 
of the United States. Adding this new entity 
to the definition of "foreign power" would 
permit the 1C to target international cyber 
groups without having to connect that 

11 '!' f V>v f i j 

group to a foreign government or terrorist 

111 A * Lj ' * l 

organisation, so long as the cyber entity is 

jfiW'i;' / 1 

threaftng U-S. national security or defense. 
Such an addition provides the 1C with much 

needed flexibility and will help keep the 
United States ahead of its adversaries. 

(U} Recommendation #7: The Federal Bu¬ 
reau of Investigation should improve 
cyberattack victim notification. 

(U) When = state-sponsored cyberattack 
is directed against U.S. critical infrastructure 
or systems related to national elections, it is 
essential for the appropriate federal officials 
to work quickly to both understand the na¬ 
ture of the threat and aid the victim's de¬ 

(U) Although the FBI maintained an on¬ 
going dialogue with the DNC related to the 
Russian intrusions, the engagement re¬ 

mained at the-working level. These interac¬ 
tions continued for months, despite no signs 
of effective mediation to the problem. In 

J Director Comey testified that, had he 
known at the time the seriousness of the 

problem, he would have "walked over 



there" himself. 

(U) On the other side of the notification 
process, the Committee found that 
cyberattack victim organizations did not al¬ 
ways grasp the information conveyed by the 
FBI, even when that information was rea¬ 
sonably clear. As a result of both govern¬ 
ment- and private-sector failures, Russian 
intelligence agencies were afforded critical 
time on breached systems. During this 
time, extensive amounts of data were sto¬ 
len for later use as part of Russia's malign 
influence campaign. 

{U) While the DNC failed to handle the 
Intrusions with the level of seriousness it 
deserved—given the severity and national 
security implications of the particular intru¬ 
sion sets—the FBI should have engaged 
more vigorously at the senior management 
level. The FBI cannot, and should not, force 
a victim o? a malicious cyber evert to take 
specific remedial measures. However, the 
FBI should update its internai processes to 
make it clear that if a victim is neither will¬ 
ing nor able to take remedial measures in 
the event or a significant national security 
cyber event, FBI leadership should contact 
the victim and engage at the leadership lev¬ 


{UJ One way to implement these proce¬ 
dures is to provide specific guidance to FBI 
agents conducting victim notifications as to 
the circumstances under which the agent 
should elevate the situation. Additionally, if 
the cyber intrusion is attributed to a foreign 
government entity and the victim is a politi¬ 
cal party or campaign, FBI senior manage¬ 
ment should be responsible for victim en¬ 
gagement immediately. 

(U) The Committee therefore recom¬ 
mends that notifications associated with 
state-sponsored cyberattacks should be 
conoucted as soon as possible, and at the 
highest levels of the victim organization. If 
intelligence sources and methods are 
threatened by dissemination of information, 
the (C shoulo work with the Department of 
Homeland Security {DHS) to provide specific 


recommendations on what actions can be 
taken by system owners to defend their net¬ 
works from the state-actor. The DHS and 1C 
should designate personnel and resources 
to carry out this task and should establish a 
triage system to prioritize tasking during 
periods of high demand, 

(U) Recommendation #8: Threats identified 
by the Intelligence Community to state and 
focal elections infrastructure should be im¬ 
mediately briefed to appropriate state and 
local officials. When threats are identified, 
the federal government should conduct an 
expedited declassification review to ensure 
that the threat information can reach ail 



necessary state and focal officials in a time¬ 
ly manner. 

(U) The Committee found insufficient 
information sharing between the federal 
government and state election officials in 
2016 regarding cybersecurity threats to fed¬ 
eral elections. The Committee has attempt¬ 
ed to address this deficiency in the FY 2018 
Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA). 

(U) Section 502 of the House-passed IAA 
would require the Director of National Intel¬ 
ligence {DNI), in coordination with the Un¬ 
dersecretary of Homeland Security for Intel¬ 
ligence and Analysis and the FBI Director, to 
post on the internet an advisory report on 
foreign counterintelligence and cybersecuri¬ 
ty threats to election campaigns for federal 

(U) The provision also allows the FBI 
and DHS to make available additional infor¬ 
mation to appropriate representatives of 
any campaign for federal office if those 
agencies determine that such campaign is 
subject to a heightened foreign counterin¬ 
telligence or cybersecurity threat. 

(U) The Committee has seen some re¬ 
cent improvement in this area on a general 
level. In February 2018, the Office of the 
Director of National intelligence, FBI, and 
DHS held a classified briefing for election 
officials of all 50 states. 

(U) Recommendation #9: The Secretary of 
Homeland Security should provide certain 
designated state and local election officials 
appropriate security clearances to enable 

those officials to respond to election- 
related threats.. 

(U) Even if all parties recognize the in¬ 
terest in sharing information, the classifica¬ 
tion—or even the knowledge of the exist¬ 
ence—of a threat may impair timeiy sharing 
with state and local election officials. Con¬ 
sistent with the need to protect sources and 
methods, the Secretary of Homeland Securi¬ 
ty should provide certain state and local 
election officials with necessary security 
clearances in order to share information. 

(U) The Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence-passed FY 2018 IAA also 
attempted to address this issue. Specifical¬ 
ly, Section 402 of the IAA would require the 
DNI to support the Under Secretary of 
Homeland Security for Intelligence and 
Analysis and any other DHS official in spon¬ 
soring a security clearance up to the top se¬ 
cret level for each eligible chief election offi¬ 
cial of a state. In addition, the DNI may is¬ 
sue interim clearances to a chief election 
official for the purposes of receiving appro¬ 
priate classified information regarding cy- 
bersecurity threats to election systems. 

(UJ Recommendation #10: Significant 
threats to U.S. elections identified by the 
Intelligence Community, including 
cyberattacks directed at political organiza¬ 
tions, should be immediately reported to 
the congressional intelligence committees. 

(UJ The House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees should be informed whenever 
the 1C determines with medium confidence 



that a significant cyber intrusion or active 
measures campaign by foreign 2Ciors is in¬ 
tended to influence an upcoming election 
for any federal office. Accordingly, the 
Committee recommends that the FBI Direc¬ 
tor, the DM1, and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security jointly provide a briefing to the 
Congressional intelligence committees no 
later than 14 days after a determination of a 
significant cyber intrusion. 

(UJ Recommendation #11: Congress should 
encourage the adoption of National Insti¬ 
tute of Standards and Technology cyber 
security standards, such as those adopted 


by the Elections Assistance Commission, by 
providing federal resources to state and 
local governments to facilitate such adop¬ 
tion. Funds should be tied to the adoption 
and certification of elections systems to 
appropriate standards. 

| It 1 " f I i # | 

u 1 i'j 1 i / 'i§ * 

(U) Election systems are owned and op- 

* i 1 

era ted by state and local governments. 

Their acquisition and installation is costly 
and recapitalization is infrequent. 

(U) The federal government largely op¬ 
erates within the limits of establishing vol¬ 
untary standards through NIST, providing 
technical assistance and sharing threat in¬ 

(U) NIST is working with state and local 
election officials to develop further en¬ 
hancements to election agencies' system 

(UJ the adoption of new standards may 
involve system replacement, particularly for 

aging systems. To encourage adoption and 
in recognition of the federal government's 
responsibility to protect the nation against 
foreign threats, the Congress should consid¬ 
er providing significantly more resources to 
state and local governments. These invest¬ 
ments could be lied to appropriate en¬ 
hancements in election system security. 

(U) Recommendation #12: Congress should 
consider additional funding for the Nation¬ 
al Institute of Standards and Technology to 
enable better outreach to state and local 

{UJ With additional resources, NIST 
could host more frequent engagements 
around the United States to promote the 
adoption of new standards and to provide 
more technical support to state and local 
officials, furthermore, separately identify¬ 
ing the budget for this activity within the 
NIST would further convey the importance 
of this effort and allow Congress tc more 
closely track progress. 

(U) Recommendation #13: Congress should 
consider a one-time grant to state and local 
election agencies to conduct a risk assess¬ 
ment of those agencies' computer systems. 

{UJ Because voting is administered at 
the state and local level, even for federal 
candidate elections, there is a patchwork of 
electronic voting systems. In addition, 
those varied systems are not subject to con¬ 
sistent maintenance and replacement re¬ 

(U) Congress should consider allocating 


funds to be transferred to state and local 
election agencies to conduct a risk assess¬ 
ment of their systems. Doing this would, 
the Committee believes, further demon¬ 
strate the need for the implementation of 
the NIST cyber security standards for elec¬ 
tion agencies. 

(Li) Recommendation #14: Congress should 
consider strengthening the Kelp America 
Vote Act of 2002 to ensure that both state¬ 
wide voter registration and tabulation sys¬ 
tems are better protected from foreign 
cyber threats. 

(U) As noted above, DHS Secretary Jeh 
Johnson designated U.S. election systems as 
critical infrastructure on January 6, 2017, 
which was one day after the release of the 
classified ICA and the same day as the re¬ 
lease of the unclassified version. By labeling 
election systems as critical infrastructure, 
DHS can ''prioritize cybersecurity assis¬ 
tance" for those who request it, as well as 
provide election systems the same interna¬ 
tional legal protections afforded to other 
critical infrastructure. Implementation of 
such a designation takes time. As of Sep¬ 
tember 1,2017, the U.S. Election Assistance 
Commission reported that the election criti¬ 
cal infrastructure subsector plans were pro¬ 
gressing, in hopes of finalization in time for 
the 2018 elections. The Committee ap¬ 
plauds this designation because it helps ad¬ 
dress the threats to the nation's voting in¬ 

(U) However, as articulated in recent 
news.reports, even with election systems 
designated as critical infrastructure, the DHS 
"risk and vulnerability" assessments take 
time and resources, and there appears to be 
a lengthy wait list. Therefore, in preparing 
for the 2018 midterm elections, DHS should 
continue to work with the states on priori¬ 
tizing these assessments for election sys¬ 
tems - and other stakeholders must do 

(U) Recommendation #15: The Department 



of Homeland Security should provide the 
owner or operator- of any electronic elec¬ 
tion infrastructure affected by any signifi¬ 
cant foreign cyber intrusion with a briefing 
and include steps that may be taken to 
mitigate such intrusions. 

(U) The Committee found that commer¬ 
cial providers of electronic election infra¬ 
structure were not informed of f oreign 
cyber intrusions to their systems. While the 
1C and federal government may be aware of 
malicious cyber activity targeting election 
systems, the information is of little value if 
appropriate threat information cannot be 
shared with the owners and operators of 
affected systems. Accordingly, the Com¬ 
mittee recommends that DHS provide a 
briefing and mitigation steps to the owner 
or operator of election infrastructure sys¬ 
tems targeting by a foreign cyber intrusion. 

(U) In addition, DHS has offered state 
and local governments a network monitor¬ 
ing tool that alerts election system opera¬ 
tors about known foreign threats using in¬ 
formation obtained by the 1C Not all states 
have adopted this tool. 

(U) Recommendation #1$: State and local 
governments should be encouraged to es¬ 
tablish redundancies that are not depend¬ 
ent on current elections infrastructure, 
such as a mechanism that retains individu¬ 
al vote records, ensuring the integrity of 
the vote in the event of a compromise of 
voting infrastructure due to a foreign 
cyberattack. An example of such a redun¬ 

dancy is a contemporaneously created pa¬ 
per record reflecting the voter's selections. 

(U)The vulnerability of state and local 
election infrastructure has been well docu¬ 
mented. These systems, which are not fre¬ 
quently updated or replaced, are not devel¬ 
oped to defend against state-sponsored 
cyber threats. The fact that voting ma¬ 
chines themselves, as well as tabulation sys¬ 
tems, are not directly connected to the in¬ 
ternet does not offer adequate security. 
Rather, it can create a false sense of securi¬ 

[U) To heip protect the integrity of the 
process, state and local election authorities 
should consider building in additional re¬ 
dundancies to ensure an audit trail in the 
event of a compromise of the electronic 
voting systems. An example of this is a con¬ 
temporaneously printed record of votes 
that is securely stored at the polling place 
and transported to the relevant election 
oFfice at the end of Election Day. Tne Com¬ 
mittee is miraful of the reason most juris¬ 
dictions replaced the paper ballot, but 
building in a redundancy using a paper rec¬ 
ord of a vote will help guard against the po¬ 
tential for manipulation of voting results in 
the event of a breach of the electronic 

voting machines. 

{U] Recommendation #17: While ft is im¬ 
portant to implement lessons learned from 
the Executive Branch's response. Congress 
should not hamper the Executive Branch's 
ability to use discretion in responding to a 



particular foreign threat. 

(U) The Executive Branch's response to 
the 2016 Russian active measures campaign 
was neither timely nor effective. As dis¬ 
cussed above, the Executive Branch did not 
publicly attribute Russian attempts to hack 
into various political institutions or compro¬ 
mise emails of U.S, people until October 7, 
2016—roughly one month before the 2016 
U.S, presidential election. The Executive 
Branch also waited to issue sanctions 
against Russia, expel Russian diplomats, and 
close Russian diplomatic facilities until De¬ 
cember 29 , 2016. further, DHS did not des¬ 
ignate U.S. election systems as critical infra¬ 
structure until January 6,2017, which was 
two months after the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election. While the previous administration 
made attempts in diplomatic channels to 
dissuade Russia from its ongoing activities, 
such attempts apparently feil on deaf ears. 

(U) However, despite the fact that the 
Executive Branch's remedial actions were 
arguably too iittie too lats, any efforts by 
Congress to introduce certain legislative 
"solutions" are misguided. The President is 
the primary recipient of the intelligence 
produced by the 1C, as well as the individual 
constitutionally empowered to command 
the armed forces of the United States. As 
such, if a foreign government conducts ac¬ 
tive measures targeting U.S. elections in the 
future, the Executive Branch should have 
the ability to craft a response based on the 
intelligence known at the time of the inter¬ 
ference end, If necessary, the readiness of 

U.S. military forces. These are variables that 
the Congress cannot possibly anticipate in 
drafting potential legislation. Therefore, 
despite potential calls from both Democrats 
and Republicans to legislate the threshold 
necessary to trigger attribution or reaction 
by the President in the wake of foreign hos¬ 
tilities, the Committee urges Congress not 
:o hamper the Executive Branch's role in 
responding to foreign threats. 

(UJ Recommendation #18: Congress should 
consider repealing the Logan Act. 

(U) Congress passed the Logan Act and 
President Adams signed it into law on Janu¬ 
ary 30, 1799. Broadly stated, the Logan Act 
prohibits U.S. citizens to influence any for¬ 
eign government vis-a-vis any disputes that 
government may have with the United 
States, it provides a punishment of a fine 
and three years’ imprisonment. 

(U) Over the course of the Act's more- 
than-200-year history, there has never been 
a conviction for its violation, and there have 
only been a handful of indictments that nev¬ 
er reached trial. 

(U) Despite its demonstrated disuse, 
the law has gained occasional congressional 
interest, in 197S, Senator Ted Kennedy un¬ 
successfully sought to remove the Logan 
Act. In 1980, Congressman and former 
House intelligence Committee Chairman, 
Anthony Beiienson, introduced legislation to 
repeal the Logan Act, staling that the prima¬ 
ry use of the Logan Act was to provide for 
"periodic tails for prosecution motivated by 



opposition to the cause being expressed in¬ 
stead of actual concern about treason." In 
1994, Congress updated the Logan Act by 
changing the $5,000 fine to "shall be fined 
under this title." 

(U) Due to the lack of prosecutions un¬ 
der the Logan Act and despite the various 
apparent violations since its passage, Con¬ 
gress should evaluate the law's utility and 
consider repealing it. 

(U) Recommendation #19: All U.S. presi¬ 
dential campaigns should receive unclassi¬ 
fied counterintelligence briefings at an ap¬ 
propriate time prior to a nomination con¬ 

(U) During the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election campaign, candidate Trump and 
candidate Clinton did not receive a classified 
intelligence briefing until after their respec¬ 
tive nomination conventions. Since 1952, 
the sitting President typically offers the U.S. 
presidential candidates classified briefings 
as a matter of courtesy, bui only after the 
nomination conventions. However, the 
Committee's investigation found that a 
counterintelligence briefing before the 
nomination convention, even at the unclas¬ 
sified level, would be a significant benefit to 
the candidates and enhance the integrity of 
the campaign. 

(U) U.S. presidential campaigns are a 
significant target of interest to America's 
foreign adversaries. It should be expected 
that various foreign intelligence services will 
conduct offensive operations to penetrate 

such campaigns in the hopes of influencing 
U.S. policy and discourse. Therefore, it is 
critical that the 1C educate presidential cam¬ 
paigns on counterintelligence issues as an 
important protection measure for campaign 

(U) For example, at an appropriate 
time, the 1C could host unclassified counter- 
intelligence training sessions for each cam¬ 
paign. Such training would assist the candi¬ 
dates and campaign leadership in under¬ 
standing the severity of this issue, and 
should cover a range of topics, including: 

• (U) The intelligence collection pro¬ 

• (U) Reasons why foreign intelli¬ 
gence services, generally, would 
want to penetrate a U.S. presidential 

• (U) How to better secure campaign 
communications and practice good 
cyber operational security; and 

• (U) Hypothetical examples of suspi¬ 
cious behavior that may warrant 
questioning or the dismissal of cam¬ 
paign staff. 

(U) Recommendation #20: When con¬ 
sistent with national security, the Intelli¬ 
gence Community should immediately in¬ 
form U.S. presidential candidates when it 
discovers a legitimate counterintelligence 
threat to the campaign, and promptly noti¬ 
fy Congress. 

(U) The Committee is not aware of any 





notification to candidate Trump that the 
U-S. government conducted couniej’intexi¬ 
gence investigations of people associated 
airertiy or indirectly with the campaign. 
While the Committee understands and ap¬ 
preciates the IC’s reasons for not disclosing 
such information to protect classified 
sources and methods, the FBI should have 
provided candidate Trump some sort of no¬ 
tification, even if it is general and at the un¬ 
classified level, that the 1C is concerned that 
a potential counterintelligence threat exists 
to the campaign. 

(U) The DN1 should issue an ICD to pro¬ 
vide guidance on how and when the 1C 
should notify a U,S, presidential campaign 
of a legitimate counterintelligence threat. 
Similar to victim notifications in the cyber 
context, when the 1C has an individual under 
an active counterintelligence investigation 
and the 1C becomes aware of that individu¬ 
al's affiliation with a U.5. presidential cam¬ 
paign, the 1C should have a responsibility to 
notify the candidate, when consistent with 
national security. There may be instances 
where such notifications are not consistent 
with national security, such as if the candi¬ 
date himself or herself is under a counterin¬ 
telligence investigation. 

(U) Further, given the sensitivities asso¬ 
ciated with counterintelligence investiga¬ 
tions, if the 1C decides that campaign notifi¬ 
cation is required, the 1C should promptly 
notify Congress of the campaign notifica¬ 
tion, including the classified details under¬ 
pinning the counterintelligence threat. De¬ 

pending cn the sensitivity, such notifications 
can be made to the leadership of the House 
and Senate, as well as the chair and ranking 
Members of the House and Senate intelli¬ 
gence committees - known as the Gang of 
3 . 

{U) Recommendation #21: Both houses of 
Congress should consider requiring ail staff 
to receive an annuat counterintelligence 
awareness briefing. 

(U) As with presidential campaigns, 
congressional staff members are targets for 
foreign intelligence collection. The fC 
should coordinate, and Congress should 
consider requiring, an annuel counterintelli¬ 
gence briefing for staff. 

(U) The briefing should be unclassified, 
cover both physical and cyber threat aware¬ 
ness, and should emphasize that ail staff are 
targets for foreign intelligence services. The 
Committee's investigation of the 2016 elec¬ 
tion demonstrated that many campaign 
staff members were unaware of their status 
as a potential target for foreign intelligence 
services. Congressional staff may a iso be 
unaware of the counterintelligence risks as¬ 
sociated with their positions. Increasing the 
awareness of staff—even in an unclassified 
setting—that they are potential targets 
would enable them to take precautions 
measures and be better prepared to coun¬ 
ter the threat. 

Campaign Links to Russia 

(U) Recommendation tf22: Political cam¬ 
paigns and law enforcement should ensure 



that their counterintelligence defenses ap¬ 
propriately account for the rale of cut-outs 
and intermediaries. 

(U) Russian attempts to influence the 
American political process, including via in¬ 
termediaries and cut-outs, did not end on 
Election Day. The universe of pre- and post¬ 
election contacts between Russian interme¬ 
diaries and Trump associates described in’ 
Chapter 4 suggest a sophisticated effort to 
target unwitting Americans by leveraging 
existing relationships, interests, and oppor¬ 
tunities. 3 Therefore, both U.S. government 
entities and campaigns in particular must 
strengthen their defenses against such sub¬ 
versive tactics, beginning with expanding 
counterintelligence education and training. 

{U) The 1C should work to provide as 
much information to campaigns and law 
enforcement agencies about foreign intelli¬ 
gence agencies' efforts to target them. The 
Committee is mindful that sensitive coun¬ 
terintelligence issues often involve some of 
the most highly classified secrets the U,S. 
government has, but the iC should work to 
provide some basic training at the unclassi¬ 
fied level about foreign adversaries' use of 

(U) Recommendation #23: Congress 
should consider amending current cam¬ 
paign finance laws to further increase 1 
transparency regarding services provided 
by foreign persons or entities. 

(U)The Committee is concerned that 
current campaign finance reporting is in¬ 

sufficiently transparent. For example, the 
DNC and Hillary for America used Perkins 
Coie, which they billed as “legal services" or 
"legal and compliance consulting, 1 ’ to fi¬ 
nance opposition research by Fusion GPS, 
which in turn utilized Christopher Steele, a 
foreign person, to compile the dossier that 
he created for use against candidate 
Trump. 4 

(U) Under current federal election law, 
foreigners are prohibited from making con¬ 
tributions or donations in connection with 
any campaign in the United States.' Howev¬ 
er, ft is not illegal to contract with a foreign 
person or foreign entity for services, indud- 

■ t 

ing conducting opposition research on a U.S. 
campaign, so tong as the service was paid 
for at the market rate. 

(Uj In light of the use of foreign people 
and foreign companies for sen/ices oy the 
2016 U.S. presidential election campaigns, 
the Committee encourages Congress, in 
consultation with the Federal Election Com¬ 
mission (FEC), to consider whether Congress 
should amend campaign finance laws to re¬ 
quire greater transparency when U.S. cam¬ 
paigns obtain services from foreign persons 
or entities. Congress should consider 
whether U.S. campaigns that contract with a 
foreign person or entity for services should 
immediately disclose to the FEC a contract 
with a foreign person or foreign entity, as 
well as a lengthy summary of the types of 
services provided by the foreign person or 

encneRTY of the us . house of representatives 


Intelligence Community Assessment Leaks 

{U) Based on the extraordinary number 
of leaks of classified information over the 
past year, it is apparent that government 
officials are not afraid of the criminal penal¬ 
ties for such unauthorized and illegal con- • 

(U) This leaves the Committee with an 
impression that criminal statutes related to 
leaks of classified information are not strong 
enough to deter potential criminal acts of 
leaking classified information. 

(U) Recommendation #24: Each compo¬ 
nent of the Intelligence Community should 
update its guidance regarding media con¬ 
tacts to ensure the guidance applies to eve¬ 
ry employee, including senior officials, 

(U) The Committee found significant 
leaks of classified information around the 
time of the ICA. The Committee believes 
many of those leaks were likely from senior 
officials within the 1C. This recommendation 
is similar to a provision of the FY 2013 Intel¬ 
ligence Authorization Act that expired in 
early 2014. That provision required a notifi¬ 
cation to the congressional intelligence 
committees in the event of an authorized 
disclosure of classified information to the 
media or anybody else who had the intent 
to make the information public. 0 The pur¬ 
pose of the law was to ensure that congres¬ 
sional intelligence committees were in¬ 
formed on a timely basis -when there was a 
disclosure of classified information to the 
media, and the statute specifically carved 

out disclosures made under the Freedom of 
Information Act, in litigation or administra¬ 
tive proceedings, under executive orders, or 
to any federal employee with an active se¬ 
curity clearance and a need to know. 

(U) Recommendation #25: Congress 
should consider legislation to increase the 
penalties for unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information. 

(U) To date, based on publicly available 
information, there have not been any prose¬ 
cutions of leaks pertaining to the Russian 
active measures campaign. As evidenced by 
the lack of leak prosecutions, difficulties 
often arise in finding a culprit behind leaks 
of classified information. However, when 
the Executive Branch is successful in identi¬ 
fying an alleged leaker, there should be no 
bar to prosecuting that individual. While 
prosecutors may utilize multiple criminal 
statutes to prosecute individuals who leak 
or mishandle national defense information, 
the construct of the Espionage Act does not 
lend itself in favor of prosecution and as a 
sufficient deterrent from individuals break¬ 
ing the lav/ for their own political purposes. 
Therefore, Congress should consider legisla¬ 
tion to clearly articulate stronger penalties 
forthose individuals who make unauthor¬ 
ized disclosures of classified information to 
the media. 

(U) For example, enactment of Con¬ 
gressman Chris Stewart's bill - H.R. 3448, 

the Classified Information Protection Act — 
would strengthen the Espionage Act. Unlike 



current unauthorized disclosure statutes 
which, fay virtue of their complexity, create 
difficulties in building cases, H.R. 3448 dear¬ 
ly prohibits any current or former individual 
who had lawful access to classified infor¬ 
mation from knowingly providing such infor¬ 
mation to a person who is not authorized to 
access the information. If someone is found 
guilty under this proposal, the leaker will be 
finea, imprisoned for up to three years, or 
both. This legislation originally passed both 
chambers of Congress in 2000, but Presi¬ 
dent Clinton vetoed the bill. Given the pro¬ 
liferation of leaks, it is essential for Congress 
to examine amending the Espionage Act to 
strengthen our Saws needed to protect clas 
sified information. 

(U) Furthermore, given the significant 
number of ieaks and instances of mishan¬ 
dling classified information coming from 
within the 1C in the past several years, Con¬ 
gress should consider ways to strengthen 
the protection of classified information. 

This legislation could include requiring the 
head of a federal agency to suspend the se¬ 
curity clearance of an individual who inten¬ 
tionally or recklessly fails to comply with 
security procedures for handling classified 
information. The legislation could also pro¬ 
vide for the ability of an agency's inspector 
General to make recommendations to the 
President related to potential violations of 
security procedures by senior agency offi¬ 
cials. Finally, the legislation should consider 
mandating annual training for all individuals 
with access to classified information on se¬ 

curity procedures for handling classified in¬ 

{U} Recommendation #26: The Executive 
Branch should consider instituting manda¬ 
tory polygraphs for ail non-confirmed po¬ 
litical appointees that have top secret 

(U) Despite employees in the executive 
Branch having extraordinary access to a sig¬ 
nificant amount of highly classified infor¬ 
mation there are very few processes in 
place to ensure that these individuals han¬ 
dle such information appropriately. 

*- i 

IU> The DNI is responsible for policies 
and procedures governing 'eligibility for ac¬ 
cess to classified information or eligibility to 
hold a sensitive position made by any agen¬ 
cy." However, pursuant to 1CD 704, the DNI 
delegated the authority to grant access to 
an 1C element's Sensitive Compartmenteti 
Information (SCI) and other controlled ac¬ 
cess program information to the heads of 
such element. As it relates to the admin¬ 
istration of polygraphs curing personnel se¬ 
curity vetting, the DNI issued Intelligence 
Community Policy Guidance (1CPG) 704.6. 

(U) 1CPG 704.6 provides basic instruc¬ 
tion as to the types of polygraphs and cir¬ 
cumstances by which polygraphs should be 
administered. White 1C elements should 
have discretion in terms of the timing and 
circumstances by -which to conduct SIPs, 
every employee not subject to Senate- 
confirmation thai is granted access to TOP 
SECRET classified information should be 





subject to at least a counterintelligence 
scope polygraph (CSP). As a result, the DNI 
should revise ICD 704 and ICPG 704.6 to 
specifically reflect this requirement. 

1. 50 U.S.C. § 1804. 

2. SO U.S.C. § 1801. 

3. HPSCI, "Russian Active Measures During the 2016 Election Campaign," May 23,2017, pp, 31-32, 

4. Campaign Legal Center and Catherine Hinckley Kelley v. Democratic National Committee and Hillary for America, 
"Complaint," Federal Election Commission, www, ca m pa i an 1 ega 1 ce n t e r. org /doc u m e nt/fe ocom p i a i n t - h i 11 a ry-a merica- d n c- 
failure-disdose. Oct, 25, 2017. 

5. 52 US.C § 30121; 11 CFR 110.20. 

6. Pub, L No. 112-277, § 504 (2013), 



(U) Appendix A - Scope and Methodology 

(U) On January 25, 2017, Chairman 
Nunes anc Ranking Member Schiff released 
a joint statement detailing the Committee's 
inquiry into the Russian active measures 
campaign targeting the 2016 U.S. presiden¬ 
tial election. 1 The final parameters of the 
Russia investigation were agreec to by 
Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member 
$cbiff on March 1, 2017. 2 The review's key 
questions were: {1} what Russian cyber ac¬ 
tivity and other active measures were di- 


reefed against the United States and its al¬ 
lies; (2) did the Russian active measures in¬ 
clude links between Russia and individuals 
associated with political campaigns or any 
other U.S. persons; (3} what was the U.S. 
government response to these Russian ac¬ 
tive measures and what do we need to do 
to protect ourselves and our allies in the 
future; and (4) what possible leaks of classi¬ 
fied information took place related to the 
Intelligence Community's assessment of 
these metters?The Committee remained 
focused on investigating the answers to 
these four questions and designed the in¬ 
vestigation's methodology around them. 

(U)Tne Committee interviewed and/or 
transcribed testimony from 73 witnesses, 
conducted 9 open and closed hearings and 
briefings, and issued 20 subpoenas. The 
Committee identified witnesses to interview 
by reviewing open source material, includ¬ 
ing news reports; official U.S. government 
documents, including classified intelligence 
!C source material; IC agency briefings; and 

folio-wing up on leads acquired from formal 
transcribed interviews with current and for¬ 
mer administration officials, as well as vol¬ 
unteers who offered pertinent testimony or 
documents to the Committee. In some in- 
stances, prospective witnesses were unre¬ 
sponsive or unwilling to be interviewed. 
When appropriate. Congressman K. Michael 
Conaway, in consultation with the Ranking 
Member, made a recommendation to the 
Committee Chairman Devin Nunes in ac¬ 
cordance with Rules of Procedure for the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
to issue a subpoena. 3 Subpoenas were used 
to compel witnesses to appear as well as to 
compel the production of pertinent docu¬ 
ments in compliance with the Committee’s 
lawful authority, Six of the witnesses the 
Committee requested to interview invoked 
their 5 th amendment protections from self- 
incrimination, which resulted in the Com¬ 
mittee not being able to obtain pertinent 
;nfo r mstion from those particular individu¬ 

(U) During the interviews, the Com¬ 
mittee Members and staff questioned the 
witnesses about activities that generally 
took place between April 2015 and January 
2017. If the Committee discovered anything 
that arose before April 2015 or after January 
2017, the Committee made a determination 
of its relevancy. If it was identified to have 
an impact on the campaign or election, the 
Committee defined it as relevant and includ¬ 
ed it within the scope. However, none of 



the witnesses interviewed indicated poten¬ 
tial collusion that would have led the Com¬ 
mittee to adapt a broader scope. The Com¬ 
mittee also collected over 307,900 docu¬ 
ments and 230 hours of witness testimony. 

(U) What Russian cyber activity and other 
active measures were directed against the 
United States and its allies? 

(C//NF) fu) The Committee collected and ana¬ 
lyzed 1C products on Russian influence oper¬ 
ations 2 nd activities from the period begin¬ 
ning with the summer of 2015 and ending in 
January 2017.' 1 The Committee did not ex¬ 
amine the motivation of the Russian actors, 
but instead focused on what it found about 
the Russian's activities. The Committee also 
spent approximately 1,200 hours reviewing 
the classified Intelligence Community As¬ 
sessment on Russian Activities and inter¬ 

viewed the Chief of the CIA Director's fusion 
cell, which was an interagency analytic 
group run by the CIA that was stood u(( 
to produce products focused on 
Russian cyber and other influence activities 
targeting the United States. The Committee 
also interviewed the FBI's Section Chief for 
the Bureau's Counterintelligence Analysis 
Section, in addition, the Committee traveled 
to Bulgaria, Cypress, Estonia, Germany, Mol¬ 
dova, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom to 
interview these nation's foreign intelligence 

services about the Russian active measures 
against their governments. 

(U) Did the Russian active measures in¬ 
clude links between Russia and Individuals 
associated with political campaigns or any 
other U.S. persons? 

(U) The Committee investigated facts 
related to the FBI's investigation through 
May 2017, until the appointment of Special 
Counsel Robert Mueller. The Committee 
avoided examining events thereafter to 
avoid interfering with the Special Counsel's 
investigation. The Committee also exam¬ 
ined allegations of collusion by investigating 
the interaction between the political cam¬ 
paigns and Russian agents of influence dur¬ 
ing the 2016 election cycle. The election 
cycle was defined as April 12, 2015, when 
Hillary Clinton launched her campaign for 
President through November 8, 2016, or 
election day. To answer this question, the 
Committee met with the head of Counterin¬ 
telligence for the DOJ to understand the 
context and events surrounding the investi¬ 
gation into the Trump campaign. The Com¬ 
mittee also interviewed several officials 
• • 

from the FBI and DOJ to collect official testi¬ 
mony about the investigation. In addition, 
the Committee collected and reviewed per¬ 
tinent FBI and DOJ documents about the 
counterintelligence investigation. The Com¬ 
mittee also coordinated closely with the 
Office of Special Counsel. For example, the 
Committee shared the list of witnesses that 
the Committee interviewed 3nd kept the 
Special Counsel's office apprised of any 
changes or developments on a monthly ba- 




(U) What was the U.S. government re¬ 
sponse to these Russian active measures 
and what do we need to do to protect our¬ 
selves and our allies in the future? 

The Committee interviewed current and 
former officials at the NSA, FBI, and CIA. The 
Committee interviewed these witnesses 
about Russia's active measures, the impact 
these active measures had on U.S. intelli¬ 
gence relationships and alliances, as weli as 
the agencies* response to these attacks, in 
addition, the Committee traveled to seven 
countries in Europe and met with 1C, De¬ 
partment of State, and foreign intelligence 
service representatives to obtain other na- 
tions' perspectives about the Russian active 
measures, the potential impacts of these 
measures, and the U.S. government and its 
allies’ resconse. 


(U) What possible leaks of classified 
information took place related to the Intel¬ 

ligence Community's assessment of these 

(U} The Committee collected, reviewed, 
and analyzed open source articles contain¬ 
ing leaks that occurred between the IC's es¬ 
tablishment of the CIA Director's fusion cell 

the publication of the 

classified and declassified version of the 1CA 
in January 2017. in addition, the Committee 
collected and analyzed laws and policies 
pertaining to the release or publication of 
classified information. Finally, the Com¬ 
mittee also compared the leaks found in the 
identified articles to the classified and un¬ 
classified intelligence Community Assess¬ 
ment to determine any similarities. 

1. HPSQ, “Joint Statement on Process oi B'partissn HPSCI Inquiry Into Russiars Active MeasureV Releases* Tta;.. 
g fe nc£. hsuSc . any, Ja ft. 2S r 2017. 

2. KP5G , “ImeiIigence CommOh3uro=vi, Ra nk \ng Merrfeer Establish Paremetc f s for $ussia investfgation, -y.i 
g a ope ,h . Msr* 1,1017 

3. H P5Q, Rutes o / Pro c eduro fo r zh? Per rr. an on t Sfcfecr Cornmi irou on in td!(g an cc. Lin Had St = t as Ho u se o f ft e p re* arri a feves, 

115^ Congress. 

4. The 1C comprises 1 / different organization*, or 1C elements. to include the Office of Director of Matic>nal in csHigence, 

the Central intelligence Agency, ths federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Intettgenee and Couni^rmteFigerice ai 
the Department of energy, !h* OfiTcs of National SEeurity intelligence at the? Department qf Justice's Dru^ Entree msnt 
Administration, t^e Office of and Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security# the Bureau cf Inteilh 

genoe and Research at the Department of State, the Office of in to’ Usance and Analysis at the Depart ment of Teesury, Air 
Fore* fntei licence, Army Intelligence, Coast Guard 1nterii=enee, Defence Intel licence Agency, Marina Corps 'ntefligenc^, 
Waricnai Geospa tfal-In tel I ig.-wice Agency, fte conn*' 55 a nee Office, Nation?! Security Agency, and Navy Intel IF 

^ence- Fcr the purposes of tfm nevlcvr, the Committee reviewed Intelligence products from the Central inifif^ance Agen¬ 
cy, Federal Bureau of Investigonoft, 2 nd National Security Agency because these agerxies were tee 1C partners for oonv 
muniiy^ids aisess.-nertt of Ruiiian Measures. 



{U} Appendix B- Russia Investigation Parameters 




An cxam m apoo iito Russian cyber activity and other active measures direct at Oic U.S. 



fflhtil problem tin?you trjnzin svhe? 

One of HPSCrshighest priorities is oversight ox tlic Imslli pence Community’s activities to 
counter Raisin aggression! mcltiding the cyber-attacks directed against ifee Coiled States la the 
Iasi yeer. Aipangf this oversight, responsibility, the Cormmitee isundaiftkkij* abi-pmiisan 

iavcstigacon inio tites* activities direct ai ihs 2016 election and the underlying intelligence 
used to draft ^Intelligence Community Assessment* u R\iSsi[m Acivbdcs md Intentions in 
Recent OS Election 17 The Investigation will hdp us better understand Russian active measures 
against the Uni led States and our allies inform efforts to prevent simile episodes in the 

future! both hcru and abroad 

££7iir frjwLu 1 inte r? ^ #mc£ii£-Tre? 

The intended audience is die Members of Hi 3 SCI and—to the crxtc^t permitted by classification 
-<±n<\ sectsrily ndcs—the brooder Hons; of Rejuxsenbuives and the Airvriciin people. 

IVhfti are the key qitestwm yen wk to £my>tar* 

■ What Bmsiian cyber activity 2nd other active measures 'were directed against tfieUmied 
Stales and its allies? 

* Whfii couaieriistdtigiriice concerns exist related to Russia and. tht 2 &id U.S. elections, 
including miy intelligence regarding links between Russia individuals ^sedated with 
political esnpaigus? 

t Whs: was theUfjn response u> th™ Rushan act:ve measures and wiiar impact:: any. 
did the Russian activity have on Ladingsnee rclatxojiships anti tmdnxons] alliances'? 

• What possfolc leaks of classified informatioa took plate rented to the Intelligence 
Community's ssscssmenl of these makers? 

What is ywr intended outcome pnotfrteffs)? 

The Comm [lice intends to complete a report at the highest claSsdEcation necessary' to answer the 
key quesdoais and. where possible, teponfe) ni low classification bvds nele^bte to the House 
of Representatives an d the pub! ic t as tnzsop?i±t^ 



4 - . 











What intended impact will there he for budget, legislation, or press? 

The inquiry and report may uncover vulnerabilities within the Intelligence Community and/or 
USG agencies or institutions. If so, the Committee may identify avenues of improvement that 
would be reflected in IAA provisions, stand-alone legislation, IC budget adjustments, and/or 
further areas to focus RPSCl's oversight efforts. 

The Committee also expects that there will be significant interest from the press, given the 
delicate political issues surrounding the topic* Staff will remain bi-partisan and focus solely on 
the facts uncovered in our investigation* 

What intended effect do you want those products to have? How does that fit into the 
Committee *s oversight plan? 

The objective is to better understand Russian active measures directed at the 201G U.S. election, 
and to better position the IC and the broader USG to respond to and defend against the threat. 


What are the boundaries of your review? Please consider time, substance, agency> and range 
of activities* 


The Committee will focus primarily on Russian uclivc measures deployed during die 2015-2017 
timeframe, but may pursue activities germane to the investigation that took place outside this 


• IVhat: Tlie Committee wi \\ invest(gate Russtan activitics aimed at USG agencics, political 
parties, NGQs, individu als, and private industry, as appropriate* 

The investigation will also assess whether there is any 
intelligence that identifies insider threat or Cl concerns* including whether Russian 
activity involved any USPs, including those on or associated with campaigns. 

o The investigation will also consider what USG officials believe to be the impact 
to US, intelligence of both Russian active measures related to the election and the 
associated recent disclosures. 

How: The Committee will, investigate the methods by which Russia targeted the 
aforementioned groups. 

V/hy: The investigation will consider Russian leadership plans and intentions, including 
whether and in what ways Russia intended to influence U S, policy or undermine U.S. 
political systems and democratic institutions. 

USG response: The Com mittee will examine how the U.S. government responded to 

Russian active measures.|~_. ,, ~~Y 

~| It will also-i nclude an a ssess ment of the proc es s used to generate the IC 1 s 
report and any deviations from standard practices in the IC’s report. 





and an accounting of whether a person or persons in the iC or 
the White House leaked information on the report prior to its dissemination to the Gang 
of Eight, Congress, or the public. 

o The report will also assess whether intelligence relating to US. persons was 
collected and disseminated in accordance with applicable laws and policies. 

* Rvcommendations: Several recommendations are likely to come out of this investigation. 


* The Committee expects to be in contact with CIA, NS A, DHS, FBI, DrA, and ODNl. 
However, The Committee will pursue ail avenues of inquiry, which may include agencies 
not listed here. 

* The Committee will also engage current and former IC and USG personnel, private 
industry, and any other parties with knowledge relevant to the investigation. 

* The Committee will examine the process by which the Intelligence Community 
Assessment, 'Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections,” was created and 
the intelligence underlying the assessment to determine whether the IC comported with 
all relevant Intelligence Community Directives and security precautions when 
researching, writing, analyzing, and releasing their product, and whether the assessments 
meet a reasonable standard of credibility as determined by the investigatory team. The 
Committee will focus on evaluating the ICs work on the Assessment with regard to IC 
rules and procedures, but not create a new or separate assessment of Russian acti vities. 

Given the above, and competing priorities, when do you expect to complete the project? 

The Committee expects the invest!gallon to take several months, at least, and the drafting of a 
report and any declassification review to take additional lime thereafter. Above all, the 
Investigation will prioritize comprehensiveness over completion by a particular dale, while still 
seeking to move as quickly as possible to ensure the report is timely and useful. 

What if/any political or jurisdictional issues exist? 

The inquiry's subject matter carries political sensitivities. Nevertheless, staff will proceed in a bi¬ 
partisan and objective manner, both in conducting the inquiry and In drafting the report. 

* The Committee's investigation will not interfere with any ongoing criminal or 
counterintelligence investigations. Staff will, however, seek relevant law enforcement or 
counterintelligence information consistent with the Committee's oversight jurisdiction 
and investigative responsibilities. The objective of seeking such Information will be to 
assess whether any collusion occurred between Russians and USPs, and the leaks of 
classified information. 

* The investigation could implicate the work of the agencies within the jurisdiction of 
Homeland Security, Judiciary, Oversight, and Foreign Affairs Committees. However, 
because the investigation will focus on an active measures campaign by a foreign 

ad versary p the in vest i gat i on c lead y ties withi n the j u ri s d ict i on of HPSCi, Add i ti on al ly, 
House Rule 10 provides that HPSCI shaft study the sources and methods of the 1C on an 
"exclusive basis." r S 





What if/a ay cotnparnnentation }&$(*& exist? 

Staff end Mcrirrb^ conducting the investigBlien will need access to Orag of Light material, T tits 
nscessfiaies a seivuIL nimble group, urd will require special amm^ssments for proper storage of 

comportmented information 31 HE 3 SCI. 

— « # 


WIH it ft* bipartisan? Who wiit 6e involved? 

This Investigation is bi-jEitisaiL Gang of Eight access will be required for the investigatory team- 
- Lend :f-j (Majority) 

J (Minority) 


1 L- 


i (Majority) 


| (Bi-partisan fellow) ■ 

* Investigators 

* Advise 

* Technical Advisor 

What information do you anticipate wiU be necessary to achieve your purpose? 

0 Access io and custody of aJ 1 underlying intelligence used, to create the Intelligence 
Community Assessment, *'Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US ElectionsT 
This includes repotting cuireuily only available to the Gang of Eight and ihcir Staff 

* Access to and custody of other relevant reporting on Russian active measures, 23 it relates 
cd the timeframe and topfoti described id the Scope of Investigation, as needed. 

* Interviews with li SG and no n-b SO indhiduals with knowledge o f R ussian active 
measures, Including those in the Intel licence Community, private industry, NGOs, 
pQli Ileal prices atu^br other groups.] 

Committee -nay abo wish to engage cyber experts from our National Labs, both resident 
at HP SCI and outside the committee. 

* Access to docmuffils and information regarding Jaw enforcement and coudtctinSfilligeacs 
investigations, coosistcn t with the Co omit tree 7 s oversight jurisdiction and investigative 
responsibilities, as further described above. 

What rotes wilt Members play? At Vfftaf points will they be brought in $0 provide feedback or 
guide tbs project? What Committee events a fay be necessary? 

* 'fbe investigation Is of highest intcresr to HPSCI Members, They will need Eo be updated 
on the status of the mve^tigulicn »i regular jnLervnis, likely through oTp ■jjlisun 
investigatory team memos and Majority* xid Miiroriiy-specsBe channels, as necessary. 

* Mem beta may also be ime rented i 11 j oirtiug imerv lews j f they an* o f Ingh j a teresi. 

* As needed, the Committee will hold hearings, both open and closed, on elements nf the 


-FrTi f* rrrnP^ ^ 



How wilt you gather information (what types of dotmaent requests do you plan la suandt; who 
da you plan to interview; where do you intend to travel) ? 

* The Committee has already requested nom the ODN1 access to and cuaody of aJJ 
imdij^ejicc rcporimg included in the Iniclligocc Conminnhy assessment, ^Rujsfen 
Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections/' 

* The Coraminec will submit farther requests for documents, and for interviews* as the 
inquiry pmeceds. 

* The Committee will interview current and former USG pc^onnd, industry peiSnuitd* 
those who work or worked in NGOs and/or political perries tuid others as the Committee 
deems appropriate* 

« The Committee wifi also seek exiting *C infcnnaikm on Russ tan activity against U.S. 
fillies during their elections. 

How willyou file, organize, md retain all of the infortunium received? Have you factored in 
sufficient tone for declassification renew, if necessary? flow will that occur! 

* The Committee vviii need to flceonnftadatc doemnem review and storage jti HPSC:— 
particularly as i: relumes to compartmented infomaiion. Tor Com mi lies wit! also need to 
Victor in the time it mey lake ugeaefes to reswmd to document access requests, 
declass it! cation reviews, and/or making available tudjvjduak for interviews with the 
investigatory team or 3TVSCI Members, 

* The Commiuix sterThavc already sci-^ digital folders on the HPSC1 classified system . 

:o hold ah relevant ooa-Gang of Eight planning atid scoping documents, with the proper 
permissions based m responsibilities tmd Majoritjv'Vimoriiy status. 


Provide specific, intended dead fines for each phase of your revir* {data gathering analysis, 
writing, cv ordinal ion/editing, publish ing. 

The Committee will pureus a phased* bialdkig-blocks approach to the mvestijffiiofl, vriiile 
prioritizing comprehensi veness above completion by a fixed end date. Tkt strict jring of the 
investigation into Phases* end the consequen: priorifettion of specifically identified investigative 
activities or research, wit! nor be construed to limit staffs ability to gather or anzlyzo rckvara 

ffre Committee expects each pkssc will take ivocks to months to complete. 

+ Phase I will focus on mitial t general knowledge acquisition ^boul the Russia active 
measure campaign, thcTU.S, response, comtcrintclEgettCtaonoenis* and the other key 1 
questions identified above* 

o Pho5^ i will include reading wzd tumlyring intcl l itticv reporting relevant to the 
Russia cyber Threat, rndlKiing nil underlying trtGeUigtnce used ;o produce the 
Intelligence Cammimfty Assessment, ^Russian Activities rmd intentions m Ro^ni 
US Elections." 

o Phase ! also will include meetings with USG and industry personnel generally 
knowledgeable about the tricar: mcctiDgs vdtb USG personnel knowledgeable 
about Uie ICTs analytic process; and meetings with former USG 




luwwicdgcablc about USG posture against the Russia target^ to include 

o Phase 1 also will include witness testimony* following investigative leads, and 
document production relative in the IC Asses&uenU toumerimeUigence concerns, 
the USG response, tint! leak Alfeguiinns. 
o Tiiroiglunii rha$£ 1, die Committee will pursue document acquisition and 

schedule interviews necessary' to conduct Phase 2 . 

t + 

« Phase 2 wilt build on die baseline Jsraowled^e acquired in Phase 1 through 2 focused and 
spcciff e invc siigaiion. 

o Phase 2 will include a detailed analysis of the intelligence production process, and 
conclusions m Ibc Intelligence Conimunir/ Assessment, ^Russian Activities and 
Intentions in Recent OS Elections !r to assess whether the IC comported with all 
relevant In let licence Community Directives and security precautions when 
researching, writing, analyzing, mu! releasing their assessment, 
g PEta&e 2 wilt include interviews with specific USG ami mdusiry personnel 
knowledgeable about the specific loples discussed in the IC's report and the 
process used to compile* review, nod disseminate the ICs ttgwn. 
o PIinto 2 miiy include dclnsicd inlcrvlcws mul iintily at s rcgardhig the Ros^inn ru;tivc 
measures campaign; the U.$» respond; coLimettnudllgpncc concents; the impact 
of lUmian active measures on U.& aides; arid whether the IC or the White Utilise 
leaked information on the report prior lo it* dfsaemlfinlinn to ilpe Gang of Eight, 
Congress, orihu public, 

► Phase 3 will locus on writing, coordinating* editing,* tinnamiulnfj for dec bass flea (ion 
review (if accessary), and releasing the Committee's reports at appropriate classification 

* Throughout oil three phases, the Committee will engage Members for any feedback nnd 
in corporate lh«t feedback into our process* 

4 * * * 

Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Committees Rules of Ihoeedun^ 115th Congress, we hereby jointly 
agree to the scope of investigation described above. 

Date: February 27,2017 




(U) Appendix C - Russia's Media Propaganda Apparatus 

(U) Rossiya Segodnyo 

(U) Created by Putin in 2013, Rossiya 


Segodnya is Russia's overarching state me¬ 
dia company, Rossiya Sogodnya acts as an 
umbrella for outlets like RT and Sputnik. 
"Rossiya Segodnya" is translated as "Russia 
Today," but it is different from the television 
channel with the same name. According to 
Russian press reporting, in September 2014, 
Moscow tripled Rossiya Segodnya's budget 
to 6.48 billion rubies and increased RT's 
2015 budget by 41 percent to 15.38 billion 
rubles, which is equivalent to roughly $600 

(U) Russia Today {RT} 

fU] This 24-hour worldwide television 
(TV) and online network was created fn 
2005 to promote Russia's image abroad and 
to show foreigners world events from a Rus¬ 
sian perspective. Nominally independent 
but Kremlin-controlled and funded, Russia 

Russia Today was rebranded RT in 2008. 

(If) RT employs 2,000 staff to provide 
coverage in Russian, English, Arabic, French, 
German, and Spanish in 100 countries and 
on the Internet from its studios In Moscow 
and Washington DC- RTs central slogan, 
"Question More, 11 is indicative of its over¬ 
arching goal to urge viewers to doubt even/- 

thing they see in Western media and from 
its leaders. 

(U) Sputnik 

[U) A Russian state-owned network of 
media platforms producing radio, social me¬ 
dia, and news content, Sputnik was created 
in 2014 to act as Russia's multimedia hub. 
Sputnik is based in 28 countries and oper¬ 
ates in 33 different languages, broadcasting 
pro-Russian messaging and disinformation. 
A recent GAO study found that Sputnik-pro¬ 
motes anti-West narratives and undermines 


support for democracy.^ ’ ^ 

(U) Russia Beyond the Head fines 

(U) less ideologically hostile than RT 
and Sputnik- Russia Beyond the Headlines 
fRBTH) pays for printed inserts in many 
leading European newspapers and targets 
Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Macedonia, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, 
and the UK. Comparatively less anti- 
American in tone, RBTH provides another 
avenue for Russian propaganda to reach 
wide audiences in these European coun¬ 





2, GAO, Russia: U.S. Government Takes a Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformation Overseas, May 2017. 


(U) Appendix E - HPSCI Majority Memo about FISA Abuses 

January IS, IS 

To; HFSCI Majority Members 

From: HR SC I Mnjori [y Stiff 

Subject; Foieitju TTtLdfijpjnca EurveiUuitsa AUt Abw£& cl Department of .lastice md the 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 


This. m&riofjrtdttui provides Members an update art tigjufKfljit thets pkirtg to tb= 
Committee’s ongoing. investigation into the Department iA Justice (DQJ) and federal Buroau of 
Inv^stigatioa (FBI) and their use of lb; Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (H$A) ditriQQiAs 
*201 C* presidential election cyde. Our findings vdiich arc detailed bdow, 1) miss conue-ms with 
the kgulnascy and legality of certain DOJ and FBT interactions ^itfi the Foreign hiielllgecce 
Surveillance Coi-id (FISC), and 2) lepr^em a ttcublins breakdown oPftgal processes estaMisfcsd 
DO piQtecl the .American people from abuses related to the ITS A process. 

Invest! carton Cud ate 

On October 21,2016, DOJ and FBI *QUghl and received a FISA prcbfible cause order 
(rcA under Title VII) aahori/in^ electrocite surveillance oc Carter ?ig< from the FISC, ts a 
iJ-S. ci tizen who s erveJ <isa vo! ranee r * dvisor to the 1 Tramp presidential campaign Cc nrif£mt 
with requirements under FIS A, the application had to bo first trerr.i fisc by the Director or Deputy 
Director of the FBT. It then required the approval oCth- Attorney l^eptny Attorney 

General (DA Gy. or lhe Senate-confirmed A^juant Attorney General for the National Secant y 

Hie FBI iTid DOJ obtained one initial FHA warrant large Ling Carter Rage and three FfSA 
renewals trem the FISC As required by statute (50 U, S_C. § L5Co(d;U))* a PIS A order or. 
Anaexicaa citizen uiust be renewed by the FttSC every IX* day? and renewal requites a 
srp=mite lindim^ nf probable cause. Thcii-Dircc-or James Cam ey signed tfcrce FISA Application? 
in quest ion su behalf of \kt FBI airi Deputy Director Andrew McCabe signed 0 "-a. Thcn-DAG 
bally Ysfccs* then-Acting DAG Dan* Boeuie* acd DAG Rod Roseunein each signed tmo ur more 
FISA applications on he half of DOJ. 

Due tn foe sensitive nautrt of ferdgLi Mlis^not acfrviry, FISA submissions (including 
restate) held re die FISC ore Lkssifiad, As such, the public^ confidence in the integrity of the 
FT$A proeesi depends <m the court's ability to hold die government to the highest sTnndwd 
partteulariy ^ i: re lair- to suTvoii’crcc of American citi&titft. However. the FISC’* rtgor in 
protecting the rights of Americans, which in nmfjTesd by 9€-day renewals of surveillance 
orders, is necessarily dependant or iha govcmarenTH prcdoctioxi to the court of ail material and 
relevant facts. This should in elude trformaiioz potent) ally favorable to the target of the 7Tf>A 





application that is known by the government- In the case of Carter Pago, the government bad at 
least four independent opportunities before the FISC to accurately provide m accounting of the 
relevant facts. However* our findings indicate that, as described below, material and relevant 
information was omitted. 

t) The “dossier” compiled by Christopher Steele (Steele dossier) on behalf of the 
Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Hillary Clinton campaign formed an 
essential part of the Carter Page FISA application. Steele was a longtime FBI source who 
was paid over 5160,000 by the DNC and Clinton campaign, via the law firm Perkins Coie 
and research firm Fusion GPS, to obtain derogatory information on Donald Trump’s lies 
to Russia. 


a) Neither the initial application in October 2016* nor any of the renewals, disclose or 
reference the role of the DNC, Clinton campaign, or any party/campaign in funding 
Steele's efforts* even though the political origins of the Steele dossier were then 
known to senior DO.T and FBI officials, 

b) The initial FISA application notes Steele was working fora named U.S, person* but 
docs not name Fusion GPS and principal Glenn Simpson, who was paid'by a U S, law 
Firm (Perkins Coie) representing the DNC (even though it was known by DOT at the 
time that political actors wore involved with the Steele dossier). Die application docs 
not m cut ion Siedc was ultimately working on behalf of—and paid by—the DNC and 
Clinton campaign, or that the FBI had separately authorized payment to Steele for the 
same information, 

2) The Carter Page FISA application also cited extensively a September 23, 2fM6, Yahoo 
News article by Michael Isikafif, which focuses on Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow. 

This article does not corroborate the Steele dossier because it is derived from information 

leaked by Steele himself to Yahoo News. The Page FISA application incorrectly assesses 
that Sieejc did not directly provide information to Yahoo News. Steele has admitted in 
British court filings that he met with Yahoo News- and several other outlets - in 
September 2016 at the direction of Fusion GPS. Perkins Coie was aware of Steele’s 


initial media contacts because they hosted at least one meeting in Washington D.C in 
2016 with Steele and Fusion GPS where this matter was discussed. 

a) Steele was suspended and then terminated as an FBI source for what the FBI defines 
as the mosL serious of violations—an unauthorized disclosure to the media of his 
relationship with the FBI in an October 30, 2016* Mother Jones article by David 
Com. Steele should have been terminated for his previous undisclosed contacts with 
Yahoo and other outlets in September—before the Pago application was submitted to 






ihc FISC in October—but Steele improperly concealed from and lied to the FBI about 
those contacts. 

b) Steele’s numerous encounters with the media violated the cardinal rule of source 
handling—maintaining confidentiality—and demonstrated that Steele had become a 
less than reliable source for the FBI. 

3) Before and after Steele was terminated as a source, he maintained contact with DOJ via 
then-Associate Deputy Attorney General Bruce Ohr. a senior DOJ official who worked 
closely with Deputy Attorneys General Yates and later Rosenstcin. Shortly after the 
election, the FBI began interviewing Ohr, documenting his communications with Steele. 
For example, in September 2016, Steele admitted to Ohr his feelings against then- 
candidate Trump when Steele said he ‘Svns desperate that Donald Trump not get 
elected and was passionate about him not being president’’ This clear evidence of 
Steele's bias was recorded by Ohr at the time and subsequently in official FBI Hies—but 
not reflected in any of the Page FISA applications. 

a) During this same time period, Ohr’s wife was employed by Fusion GPS to assist in 
tile cultivation of opposition research on Trump. Ohr later provided die FBI with all 
of his wife’s opposition research, paid for by the DNC and Clinton campaign via 
Fusion GPS. The Ohrs’ relationship with Steele and Fusion GPS was inexplicably 
concealed from the FISC. 

4) According to the head of the FBI’s counterintelligence division, Assistant Director Bill 
Priestap, corroboration of the Steele dossier was in its “infancy*’ at the time of the initial 
Page FISA application. After Steele was terminated, a sourco validation report conducted 
by an independent unit within FBI assessed Steele’s reporting as only minimally 
corroborated. Yet, in early January 2017, Director Comey briefed President-elect Trump 
on a summary of the Steele dossier, even though it was—according to his June 2017 
testimony—“salacious and unverified.” While the FISA application relied on Steele’s 
past record of credible reporting oil other unrelated mailers, it ignored or concealed his 
anti-Trump financial and ideological motivations. Furthermore, Deputy Director 
McCabe testified before the Committee in December 2017 that no surveillance warrant 
would have been sought from the FISC without the Steele dossier information. 





5) The Page FISA application also mentions information regarding fellow Trump campaign 
advisor George Papadopoulos, but there is no evidence of any cooperation or conspiracy 
between Page and Papadopoulos. The Papadopoulos information triggered the opening 
of an FBI counterintelligence investigation in late July 2016 by FBI agent Pete Strzok. 
Strzok was reassigned by the Special Counsel's Office to FBI Human Resources for 
improper text messages with his mistress, FBI Attorney Lisa Page (no known relation to 
Carter Page), where they both demonstrated a clear bias against Trump and in favor of 
Clinton, whom Strzok had also investigated. The Strzok/Lisa Page texts also relied 
extensive discussions about the investigation, orchestrating leaks to the media, and 
include a meeting with Deputy Director McCabe to discuss an “insurance' 1 policy against 
President Trump’s election. 





{U) Appendix F - HPSC1 Minority Memo about FISA Abuses 

TO: AH Members of Hie House of Representatives 
FROM: HP SC] Minority 
DATE: January 29* 20 IB 

RE: Correcting die Record -The Ituisiit Investigations 

The HPSCI Majority's mavc tc release 10 the House of Representatives Us jUtegabocs &ga:r*$t the 
Federal Bureau of love si igsiloa (FBI) ard the Department of Justice (DOJ) :ss transparent cftbrl 
to undermine those agencies, lfc:c Special Counsel zzd Congress' investigations, St also risks 
public exposure of sensitive seureea and methods for na purpose. 

FBI and DOJ officials did not ^r.busc 1 the Foreign tolrilt&cnceSOTcillm* Act (FISA) process, 
omit materia] TntV>mxat[oys» or subvert this vftaj tool to spy on the Trump campaign. 

in fact, DOJ and ti7C FBI would have been remiss in their duly lo protect the country had they nor 
sough: a FISA warrant and ^peated to egraJud temporary survcHbu^oe of Carter Page, 

someone iho F3T assessed u> be an nger*; of she Rcsska SoveranccL DOJ met the tigor* 
transparency. and ev identia ry basis needed 13 meet FISA's probable cause requirement by 

o comcuiporaneons evidence 0f Russia's elrc:ion mterffecerate: 
o co nc emln g R u^sj an imb and outreach t a Tram p c am pri go o ft! ciiU; 
o Page'£ rustary with Russi an intc llig cncc; tad 

o P-ge’s iu -: p tc i o cj tc titties b 2016* i nd tding m Moscow. 

The L’cmnriTtec's Minority has therefore prepared this memorandum to conca the record: 

* Christopher Slcda'a- raw inkllfficccc reportiog did mrt laforoi the FBra decision to 
initiate 1 is counterintelligence investigation in late July 2016* In fact* the FBFs closely- 
held mresitgaiUre team only received Steele’s reporting in nrtd-Scptembcr - mere than seven 
weeks later. The FBI - and, subsequently* the Special Counsel's - investigation i^jd links 
between the Russian government end Trump t&mpoisa assembles has been based on 
troubling law enforcement and intelligence mformstkm unrelated to the “dossier/ 5 

BQ«Ts October 3J, 2016 FISA applicjfloti nud three subsequent rrarwnh corefalty 
outlined for the Court o multi-pronged miUmnle for surveying Page, who, ct the tirpoof 
the tot application, wns m longer vriih the Trump camprion. DOJ detailed Page's past 
relationships With Rossis spies or.d Interaction *ritn Russian officials during the 2016 
campaianOOJ riled multiple sources to support the rase tor 
sorvcluing Page—’bul m?iz only narrow itacof ttiflmnatIon from Steele's sources about 
Page's specific ectlvitits in 2016* chiefly his suspeefed July 2G16 meeting in Moscow with 

Rissuui oHrcinlsJ 

L In fact. 

iho FBI Jmm iewed pjge in March 2016 about Ids contact vath Russian intelligence, the very 
month candidate Donald Trump nnnred tiim a foreign policy adviser* 

As DO/ informed 1 ha Court in subsequent renewals. 
5reeled reporting about Page's Moscovr ntefidD^a 

. DOJ’s 

applications Si net oshMwiEe rely on Steeled reporting, melting cny “satodous 11 alle^ttoi*-* 

Redactions match 
p revio usly released 


redactions taken 



about Trump, and the FBI never |inid 5 luck far this re parting. While captaining why Die FBI 
viewed Steak's reporting and a on rets as reliable end credible, DOJ also disclosed; 
o Steele^ prior relationship with the FBI; 
o t h c fa ct a f o nd rcas on far h is t c rm I not Ian ns a so m vet; and 
o i h c bs*c ss cd po I (Ika I motivaten of t I io se who hi 3rd h i m. 

o T l« Com ml I lee (VEnj o n ty * s inem oranUunt, yy| if eh d ni w s sel tet I v ply on h \ gb ty se ns I five 
classified iDfarmnrtoDr tn eludes or her tfbioritom and mis rep res emu lions dim era 
contradicted by the utterly mg classified documents, which ihe vest majors of Members of 
the Committee and the House have not hod the opportunity to review ■ and whidi Chairman 
Nunes chose not lo read himself. 1 


On Junu&ry 18, 201B, ihe Committee Majority, dunng an unrelated business meeting forced a 
surprise vole lo rdctvac to the full House a profoundly misleading memorandum alleging serious 
abuses by the FBI and DOL Majority staff drafted ihcdpcurmnU in secret on behalf of Chairman 
Devin Nunes (and reportedly with guidance ami input from Rep, Trey Dowdy), ackI ibM rushed 
a party-line vole without pnor notice* 

This was by design. The overwhelming majority or Commiltee Members never received DOJ 
authorial ion to access the underlying classified information, and therefore could not judge lira 
vcnicity of Chainmm Nuiiics' claims* Due to sensitive sources and incOjoct^- DOJ provided access 
only to ihs Coromltleifis Chair mid Running Member (or respective designees), mi limited 5lafT* 
to facilitate the Cnrrmdhcc's investigation Into Rujfia's coven emupaign lo influence the 20 ifi 
US, elections. 3 As DQI lias confirmed publicly, it did not authorize; the Wonder release of this 
information within Congress or to the public, and Chairman Nunes refused to allow DOJ nod lhe 
Flirt to review his document uiuit He permitted the FBI Director to sec it for the first time m 
HPSCl'a secure spaces tala on Sunday, January 2B - 10 day* after disclosure tpihc Housed 

FBI’s Cou uteri ntfcHkcnec Inycstyqiiflon 

3n its October 2016 FISA application end subsequent renewals, DOJ accurately informed the 
Court ito i hc FBI initiated its eptmicrirn dligcneo invealigation on July 31, 20 id, nfter reviving 
mfbnnafionGeorge Papadopcoilos reveal* 

^ni who took interest m PapudopciiTo? m a Tmrpp" 

campaign foreign patfcyjuiYiser, informed him in late April 2016 rhm Russia I 

Papadgpouks ,, s disclosure, 
moreover, occurred tigainst Jhtf backdrop of Russia's nggr«fivo covorl enropaiga !o InlTucntt 
our elections* which file FBI vvra already monitoring. Wo would kter I coin in Pnjradopoutas's 
plen that tfvoI ilto wforroulkm the Russians could assist bynnonymmisly releasing were thousands 
of Hillary Clinton^ emmta 3 


DOJ ttrfd the Court the truth. lls icpprscrnl.ilioii v,us cortsiilcal will) Ihc i-EJl 'a underlying , 
iuvcMlfiUlivo recent, which cumin and Conner icnitrf official* Inter corfehowtwl in extensive 



Ccmrmnea testimony. Christ opher Steele s reporting, which he begon to sbore with on FBf scent 
!' J thro jgb the en d o f October2016, played no rale !n lautf£hing the 

FBI’s counterintelligence Investigation into Russian Laltrftrtnce ard lints to the Trump 
campaign. In feci, Stye's reponing did n&i no^b the ccunierimtUigCjicc team investigating 
Russia at FBI headquarters until mid-SepicmbcF 2016^ more tbfri seven weeks after the FBI 
opened its invest) gaiion. because die prop's existence was so closely held wilhm the FBI* By 

then, the FBI had already opened Eub*jRqi:xries into| 

i Individuals linked to dre Trump 

and (brrosr campaign fbnrign palsy advisor Carter Page, 

As Co mmittee icsltmony bears out, the rB! would hivecom inucd ?i* mvesilgmk!^ including 
cgdnsJU^intfividinils, even if it bad never received informaium from Steely never applied 
for a FISA warrant ro^Jnsr Page, or if the FISC had rejected the application^ 

OQJ J $ FISA Ann Heal ton and. Renewals 

The initial ttantint spoliation and subsequent renewals received independent scrutiny nr,d 
approval by four different federal judges, three of wham trarc appointed by President Geerpc W. 
Bush end e^by President Ronald Rcpgan. DOJ first applied to the FISC on October 21,2016 
for a warrant to pearl! the FBI to initiate electronic surveillance and physical search of Page for 
9 D days, consistent wjOi FISA req vtre r p enU, The Cetirf approved three reflffWHls — in early 
January 2017, early April 2017 t and late June 2017- which authorized the FBI to maroiain 
SOTveillance art Page until laic September 2017, Senior DOJ end FBI officials appointed by the 
Obama end Tramp Administnuions^ including acting Attorney General Dana Boente and Deputy 1 
Attorney General RodRi>5 znstem, certified the applications with the Court 

FISA was not used to spy on Trump or his campaign* As the Trump campaign and Page have 
acknowledged, Page ended bis formal affjlhii&n with lb; csropeigp months QOJ applied 
for a waronL DOJ, moreover, submitted die irufial application leg* than throe weeks before the 
election* even though ihe FBPs invest! gad on had beer* ongoing since the end of July 2015. 

DOJ's warrant request was based on compelling evidence and prcbcblc cause to believe Page was 
knowingly assisting clandestine Russian intelligence Ktiridcs in the ITS.; 

Page*s Conneciions fo Russian Government and Intelligence Ofnetek; The FBI had on 
irufepsrateflt basis for invest ?ec tin g Pang’s ma ft various and actions during the cam pit pp. 

I runs«bn. and following the inauguration * As DOJ described jo detail to the Court, Faga hud 
an extensive rec ord 

* ^f* 5 prior io jotrina the Trump eampoign* He rc&rdsd In Morrow from 2004- 

2007 and pursued business deals with Russia's staic-qwncd energy company Gazprom— 

As cariy ss| |, a Russian inteiHgcoccoElcer| 
rvc rui tm e n L Page showed I 

Uqgpfcfl Page for 




Redactions match previously released version--no additional redactions taken 


Page rem oiotd an the radar of Russian imeifigenEc and the FBI. Li 2G1S, prosecutor 
indicia tluce othtr Rushan spies, two of whom targeted Page fur r&cimunent The FBI also 
interviewed multiple times about his ftosslun intelligence contacts. Including in March 
2016, 11 The FBFs cccccvti about knowledge of Page's octi villas therefore ]eng predate 

the PSPs receipt of Steele's inform aiton* 


Poge f s Suspirioiis Activity Caring the 2ftl 6 Campaign: The FISA applications also ddat 
Page's suspicious activity after joining the Tn rmp campaign in March 2Qi 5. ^ ~ \ ^ '*! 

; _____ _ ____ _ J Era-Veled Iq Moscow xu July 2016* during 

w fuch he gave & university commencement sidresa — an honor uiusJly reserved ft* well- 
known luminaries-. 

o 1th in ibis jpwiGc suti-scefum of (he applications that DQJ rpiers to Scdt’j 
reporting on Fags arcd i%h alleged coordination nyiib Russian ofBdah. Steele's 
information nboul Pago was consisted with die PSPs assessment of Russian 
intelligence efforts to recruit him md his'Connections io Russia persons of interest. 

o In particular, Stale's sources rcponeti Thai Pog^ met separately while in Russia %\ith 
Igor Sechin, a dose associate of Vladimir Putin end executive chairraan of Rosneft, 
Russia's 5i3lc-owTicd oil company, end Igor Dlvyekin, askuoi Kremlin officiaL Sechin 
allegedly discussed the prospect of future US.-Rus$i& energy cooperation a^4 *tai 
associated move to lift Ukraine-related western sanctions unci nit Russia J* DSvyekJn 
allegedly disclosed Id Pago thnl the Kremlin possessed compromising ififormotion on 
Clinton C^mpromai") and noted possibility of its being released to Candidate 

rtt 1 * campaign,* 11 {Nm $: "C&mildaic $1* refers to candidate TjumpJThis closely 
tracks %vh =1 oihar R ush an eoatacis iroe infcrmlag ar^rher Tramp foreign pQ\ky 
adviser, Gccrgc Fcpadopottios. 

« In subsequent FISA rewsvaii, DOJ provided additional information obtained through 
multiple independent; sources ihitt eomjhDnsted Steefe^ reporting. 

This Lnfpnusticis ecnuodlcis Fagc's November 2 t 2017 leatSmonvf© she Committee, in which 
ha initially denied any wh meetings jtnd thru was forced 10 odmii specking with 







Dvorkovich tm-sting with Rosneft's SeeJmMtcd investor rctetrsns chief, Andccy 


» T lie Co u rt^p n roved s u rvc ill aucc of Pag tail owe d FI11 to co Licet valuable in I el f *ge a cc* 
Tilt; RSA rraews's demonstrate ihn uin FE! collected ftnpaiidjit tovcsfig&tivt* iriformaTkm 
ond leads by ccndueimg Court-apF^^eclw^eithrice. For Instance] 

Page's efforts ao 
sworn testimony to our Committee 


DQJ*a Tran spare nev about ChriLvtoreheT Sleets 

Fas* from ^omitting" materlat facia about Stedt, us the Majority claims,^ DOJ reputedly 
Informed theCourt about Steele’s background* credibility, and potential bias* DOJ 
explained in detail Steele's phut rdali unship with and coir.pcitsEtiOfi from the FBI; his 
c red \ bill tv, report mg history. and source network; ihc fact of and reason for his tormina* ion as a 
source te late October 2016; atid the lively pottlical motivations of those hired Steele. 

* DOJ wajc trntupnre n rsvif h Court aban t Stce!e's s o u re trtg: Thc Committec MajonD'j 
which bed earii zt accused Obnmn AdminismtiOft officials of improper “unmasking faults 
DOJ for not jgwsKog Its n^rtits of Specific U.S* persons and etitirfes tn the F(SA application 
and subsequentrenewal*. In fact, DOJ appropriately upheld its forigstaidinj* practice of 
pro Bering U, S* citizen information by purposefully not “unmasking' 1 US- person and entity 
twines* unless they were themselves ihc subcect of ft counterfeit el licence invcsitgafiori* DOJ 
instead used gen ere identifiers the! provided the Court with mere than salScicnl mfcnnnticn 
to ondtrtUmtl the political context of Steele's research* in art extensive expLuwlrarito the 
Court, DOJ discloses tbit Steele 

Vi? rjppjncncfef/ £y art fr/£ff/0ra/ £.1.5! li'fip Irrdk&fixiiQ So^rcs *f[Sfede} 2 ‘ shot a 

£/£~$OSftJ fffwj7fwr* J terf hired th± ItknHfkd U.$, Person m CQtidtz: research regarding 
C&xdfrtate dt ’£* tits to Ruxsfo* (Iht identified US, Person md Source 3f fxrve a fong* 
standing btafness ratoUonship) Jhs afzfMPiJ US, person hired Sonnet Pf to conditcl this 
research* 7f>a fift miffed U.S. Person never advised Senate 81 as 10 'he teoitvoUon behind the 
research fcic Candidate 8} s Iks to Ruzxo. V-c FBf <pc at foies ;ho: theJi'erMRzd U.S. Ptrmn 

Ivor likely f&ifan't for infannUfon then Id bejissd to diztzrrdit O sndftfitfc ttJ S COmOtliVtl, * 


Contmry to the Majority's assertion iltal DOJ fads lo nwntton Lh=i Sieve’s research ^*as 
commissioned by ^potifical actors'" :a**obfrfo demsatory inforTnaJiooofiDcnald Tntrnp’s 
tics to RussiaT*' DOJ in fact Informed !he Court accuratcTy that Slcde waa hired by 

•Q? GlCRZT fi 




politically-motivated US. persomand entities aati that hi* research nppca red in fended 
for use ^ to tltremlii*' Trumprampufgn. 

1>0J explained the FBI 1 ! r cese treble bush for finding Steele credible: The applications 
correcily described Si celt as | ~ 

). The gpplkaiiprti sl&> reviewed Steele's multi-year 
history °fcredible repenine on Russia 2 nd ci'^ex matters, including infonailion DOJ used in 
criminal proceedings 77 Senior FBI and DOJ ciTidab have reputedly ufUirccd lo the 
Committee Ibt reliability and credibility of Slide’s spotting, nn assessment el so reflected is 
die FOTs underlying scuxctdoeumciils. 21 The FBI hiss undertaken 5 rigorous-process 10 vet 
allegations irem Steetek reporting, including with regard to Pz&z?' 

• The FBI properly notified she FISC after It remitted Steele ^to source for ninkfog 
untinihorked disclosure) to Hie medio* Tfre Majority rites m> evidence that the FBI, prior 
10 Filing its initial October 2U 2016 application, actually knew or should fcave known o Party 
allegedly inappropriate media contacts by Steele, Nor du lliey cite evidence ihci Sickle 
disclosed to Yahoo! details included in die FISA warrant, since the British Court filings to 
which they refer do nos eddress wbnt Stcclc may have said to Ych&of. 

DOJ iofbnncd the Court b iia renewals that ihe FBI acted promptly to tom i wile Stock after 
learning from Mm (after DOJ filed the first warrant application) That he hid cliscusrcd his 
work wilh n madia cutlet in fate October, The January 2DIB renewal further wptflfoed io the 
Crnrn that Sleek sold ifcc FBI dial he made Ms unauthorized media disclosure becouse of hb 
frustration at Director Ccjmcyk public jmacuoccmcnt shortly before the election tlia* the FBI 
reopened its investigation iflio candidate Clinton’s emMl use* 

DOJ never pM Seecle for ibe “dossier* 1 : The Majority assorts thanks FBJ had "sqxiraitly 
cuthorreed payment" to Steele for ht£ research on Trump but neglect so mention that 
payment was cancelled and never mpda* As the FBI’s record & m d Commit ree testimony 
confuros, although the F3I in itially considered cmapensmloQl _ _ £ 

^ | Stcde ultimately never received pay in cut from Ike FBI for 

atny “dosslcHVrcksfvd ieforrantfon^ DOJ accura tely in formed the Court thsl Steele hnd 
been an FBI confidential human source for which he vas ^compensated 

I _ ',. „_ | by the FBP - paying for previously-shared inferrearion of value 

unrelated to she FBI's Russia investigation,^ 

Additional Omissions. grrera, and Dlslortiptis in the Majority^ Memnraqdum 

" * ' ' - «i 

* DOJ appropriately provided lire Court with a comprehensive explanation of Russia's 
election interference? including evidence Ibot Russia courted another Trump campaign 
advisor* Fapadopmrics, and thatRtUHSm agents previewed their back amt 
dissemination of stolen emails* Tn claiming that there ts “no evidence of any coop mi ion or 
conspiracy between B&gc and Psp^dopoulos,*^ iht Majority misstates the reason Y/hy DOJ 
specifically expired Russia's coLcnmg P^psdopoulos. Papadopouic^s mTeiaaion with 
Russian agents, coupled with real-time evidence of Russian dcaiort irasference^ provided 
the Ccort with n broader ccwiicxt in which :o c^-katc Russia's cfandeiime activities 
Page's history 1 alleged conlaci with Ru55 ; on officials. Moreover, since only ik^c j ‘ ^ 




_no evidence of o separate conspiracy between him and 

'spadapoulos ^vas required. PCM would hftvc h«n ovyligcnt in umillingvllul information 
ahotil Popadopoutosand Russia's concerted efforts- 

In its Court filings, DQJ mzdt proper use of news coverage. Tbc Majority falsely claims 
rhst the FISA materials ‘TcIIcd heavily 11 on a September 23,10TS FaftopfNewa article by 
Michael TsikolTand that this article “does not corroborate the Steele Dossier bccausc il fa 
derived fram infoirmrtion leaked by Steele himself." ^ Tn fee!, DOJ referenced IsskcfTs 
snide, alongside another article the Majority fail* lit mention, not lo provide separate 
corroboration for Steele's reporting* but msiearf to inform the Court of page's public darns! 
of his suspected meetin gs in Moscow which Page also ecfrosd in a September 23* 2016 let ter 
to Co mey. |., 

The Majority’s reference to Bmee Ohr fa misleading. Thf Sfajority mlschnjBCteriz^s 
Bruce Ofc’s role, overstates the significance of his Interactions v/ilh Srccle. and misleads 
about due limefranre of Ohr s commtiriccibi with the FBI. in ktc November 2016, Oiir 
informed the FBI of his prior pmfessiodd tvtotioaship with Stade end information dm 
Stede shared with him (including Steele's concern about Tnirup being compromised by 
Russia). He also described his wife's contract werk with Fusion GPS, the Him that hired 
Stcsle separately. This occurred weeks drier the election end more then a month flRtr ihfl 
Court approved initiol FISA op plication. The Majority describes Bruce Ohr as s senior 
DOJ official who Averted closely with the Deputy Attorney General, Votes and Inter 
Roscnatcm,” \n order 10 imply that Chr y <ves somehow involved in the FISA process, bill there 
is no indication ibis is Efcc c£sc. 

Bruce Ohn's 0 weti-mpecied career professional whose portfolio La drugs and organized 
crime, not eotmterifiielUgefice. There is rro evidence Lhfti he would have known cbout ihc 
Psge FISA applications md ihdf contents. The Majority's assertions, moreover, txc 
irrelevant in determining llss veracity of Steele's reporting, By lha time Ohr. debritfe wnh the 
FBI, it had already terminated Steele as a source and was independently corroborating 
Steele's reporting about Page's activities- Bruce Ohr took the iniiiaiive to inform lirc FBI of 
what he knew, and the Majority dots him a grave disssmce by suggesting ho is part of some 
malign conspiracy. 

Finally, IktcrStrzok and JLba Page 1 * test rocisagcs arc irrelevant to the FISA 
application. Tie Majority gratuitouslyincludes reference to Simok and Pago os the cud of 
their rttemrtraraJoni, In an effort lo imply that political bios infected ihe f BTs investigation 
□r.d QQTs FISA applications. In fact, neither Stezck nor Page served as efriaftts cn lhe 
applications, which Were the product ofextensive and senior DOJ and FEI review.* 7 In 
demonizing both earner professionals, ike Majority accuses Them of'Virec os mating teaks 10 
Lbs media." — a serious char^; »mi!s inCQRVari'eR: lext meJESJ^CA, in whkh they Critiqued n 

wide range of other afTicirjs wd cerdidLties from bcih parties: docs not disclose tha* FBI 
Deputy Director McCrtbc lertificd to the Committee fet he had no idzz what Page sad 
Strrok wereicfcmny to in tbcii l, tnsunn« polky" tcslsp 1 end r^orcs Slrzok's 
aci^owledgsd role in preparing o publle declaration, by then Director Comey, abcul fermer 
Secretary* ClinLjo^’s^ajUrenT* careJas^nass" irthardfing classified informarion-^wfuch greatly 
damaged Clmic^s public teputmion in the days jusi prior to the presidential eleci!cn_ 






Tnn rirrnirr/ 

1 LcUo to J1P5CI CWmtan D«in Nrnio. Aaltouii Attorney Ccrura! Stephen QijiJ, Deptfljncnl cfJuiiice, 

1 Letter io IfPSCl Chalmum D<vtn Nunes, Aftpmry General Stephen Ocpsuiincri. of JuiJicr, 

January 24, 2011 O0J dUd ccnfirmnd ]r> writing ■* Mftlttffiy $nif DOI urul FBTs term* ofrcvicui 

Ihe DepEtiTcnem hAs tfrSCrs oversight requeu by jilfowms ftpetfedin ctmcrs gf 

Ibe rftsreri&l mrn Appropriaic assure facility under i he general stipulation iha! {!) 1 lie Cbalr(t»r fib 
delegate) &nd ifct Ranking Member (or MsdcEqjuk} an J two mfTnebi xiilli appropriate itturlly 
tkaraoses hr uirpHttl to rstitw oa brtoirof ilit Commute, C^titaitfteiievfmY peXe phce in u reading 
room scl up ill Ihc Department, end (3) that ihc documi-s no; leave ihc physical control of the Etepurtinmi, 
and (5) that the review eppertumtica bz blpanhmi ifl rtaiure- Though \vt originally ratpuSaed that no ntric* 
be uhco, tn neXoo'iv'RdsJ^t.oj'o by ilie Cmurailtectind recognizing that rite volutct of document 

had terrcmrd with time, Ihc Dcportnvcm evcmuaily altavvcd boiw la be taVerj to fyejtftnle HPSCl's review. 
Also, Initial rtvftwi ofThe material include {sic] sjtan briefings by Department officials lopm ike mtfcrial 
\n EcntextamS Id provide sgtficaddJttoca] mfannaAiocL 

Em&i] from Stephen Boyd id HPSCI Minority SpfT, Janunry l&, 30 E$ {tmphflii.i supplied). 

1 Uttej to I4PSC1 OittimWi Devin Nune*. Auidtiilt Attorney Cenend Slepkcn Boyd, Peptflfltcni of Justice, 
Jimimry 24.201S, 

1 Papadopoutefa Qm\xt 5 t 2017 piUy plea add* further JeMnft m this Initial tip, by clarifying to a Kuulrm r$em 
mid Papnctopcultn trim w Thry [the Ruisbms] have dm tmlwr’ 1 ; “The Ru^toliihod emails of Clinton": ’they Ime 
(limiauid* pfemillV' US tv George ttopnAopovlQi (JM7*cM£2, District of Cnfu Tib to), p, 7> 

7 Untfor the Special Ctnuiiel’j direction, Rynn and PupmlopauJtM have both pleaded guilty ii> lying to fttfcrul 
tmestlptofS cjid [ire co&pcPtTAg with ihc Special Ortutsd'a wltrEo MannFan ejidlib I^AgoIrnc dOt, 

fomicrTajrppdrpyly cafitpnJen rnaJinger Rick Gxt% have bam Indicttd m multiplecoima nmd art tw^klns etJuJ, 
Set U.SL v. MteJmt T. Ffytm (1:17^-232, 0 k Met vt Com mb??); US ^ PeuiJ, Manafon, Jru ond fiidwrd IK 
Cotes Ilf (h I7<r-20J, Obiritt of Columbia^ tf.S. a, Gctrgti Pc^ljpout&i {1:17-tM B2 k Dbtritt of Columbia). 

n DcpDJimcntofJLiilkVt Foreign Intelligence S'-rvcilbnce Court Applicailan* CMebrr2ti 20ld t p.lS. RepraloJ in 
suWqwni renewal cpptlceiioM 

11 Dcpurtnwtit of JuJilte* foreign IntelUgeiwc Sorttillsuicc Court Applkallon, June 2? f 20l7 t pp. 2(p2 \ 




___ ihc FBI mi brafidtr Intelligence Gm^rjmi/lWgk 

ccniiOciice iiijt”rr;irnE Vrjtt i&c K^t iso £3 rtittmt ai i eo la a eevert (ckteifcrmce campaign in inf! irsiec thE 
2S1G elect icei. including laai HLj'ien in m :ren« 2 rears"‘eonftjircmiYcd ±c OKC“cnd WiluLnb subscc k jct>% 
l£s3tcd in JcN 20!6 “a-trove 1 ’of DMC trali Dcfrarttfosl ofiutfice. Femign tadF£efK£ SurveBbftee Cojrt 
Application Catcher 21, 1QI&, pp. 6-7. Repented lh- 3 updated flew ifiFMTna'ion tfi sc^j«;jRrL rrnfi^vsl 
appl %d?, icfi= D epiitmcitf cf Itta ifae, Fcnr^ TftTcHigMKe Server! : 3 : Cc urt Applicali do. June 25.20 f 7, sjk 2v-21 * 

1 Oc^nirrtnlof i:sl!Ct, Forrign InteH^c-cc Survetfliirr Court Applies! iai\ lers 35,201 ?. pp. 36 . 46 , A&. 

Dcpaftpeni of JnsJkt, JvuelH$rx* SujwUiece Court AppJScdloix. Jlt: 29 r 20?7, p, ftk 

K HPSCl Mq^^MBnerarjduiP, Foreig ;1 /d f rf%Mee 5- rvclitesff Ac! Abuses *t iht OeparftflVr/JiA'its ecrsrf 
Federfl/ 0 /ftr w jF ^ff rtfefr 1st;; ray l B r 2038. np_ 2*4 {cr’ax^br "cantoris" af feL Tegardxg S'cdc 

*rd his ecttviuct, fro/n the P^cFlSAsppISoalioas), 

** Glenn SecpGe. 

" Christopher Steele, 

J ?cfrhx Cose IX?. 

:J ttattld Tre^pi 

J Dcjanmni of Juatfoe, iriklligaace Surrcijtsm Catm AppficElwca, Oci-sbcrRl, 201^ pp* E5-'c. r. S. 

Repented bs WJKequcotTCwrail epplf salens- 

a 'HPSCI Mstafy MemeiSidqnv Fortfsz Jdir/f&ciKS $wv£i!te*K&*ki Abuses <Z ite Dtp&zfifi r 0 /vfetflSSr enaf 
/fte ArimoJ Bxrrsst 0 //.TTarigo/foT. Jasxaj £5,20IS, c*. 2. 

” Dffpwtr&eai af Jualcp, Fcecfgn Imdligtfiat SurvelC^ce Co^r. Apptezikm, Ckr_*er 2!. 2c 16 . p. 15, fiMtzoce 3. 
Rsptaiftd Co ichi^juont*at applisstT^ii. 

n fettrifiew of Araircw M-Citc (FOl CHrp:[y DircclOt.V Ho^ PCOAuCsT SelectGfcamilWfc e't btrlli^trct^ 
Dtcoip&cr i9.2Cn, p> 45, lOO; til£rvi^ cf Sally VotciifooTJer D*Tft^ Affooej Gohiorol), Ho^k PzurmtL: Ee!ki 
C jTuninec on Ir^clligenes, Kov^rpbcr 3, 2017, p. J 6; tesEcview sfuh Jaha Caifei {ttitttt Ant-.T^y Gastral 

{fee WfiLfaittl Searityj, Ko^ew FitmaoccE Select Comfin'r^e on July, 203", p. 2> + 

iTUervtew of Andrew M<Cab=^03 Dcpjry Dl^cror), Hoieye Pern^^t Select m Jrtt«Ili£rr«, 
December 1%2£:X& LOO-107, \ 15. 

72 fa&evigwoTFEH Ag<nz. ^<ntec Pcrrn^xot Sekei C^^iiree cs InieiEijonos, Deoen.ber^O, 017 E p, HI 

J> Oipamr.eiucf-ustfce, Fairiga InlelfeiceeSuTvelSJtacfeCourt Appiiczlian.October 2J, 203fvpp, 15-id.rL S, 
Repealed :a ^db^uonE opplte^kaitf, 

H^SCI MtniitSEdnTC, FereSgr inteiUgffisz Sxnpegfaxs AfZ .ibiutr &ih*t Qtp&vr^Ti of J&Jtt ard 

t : \? Frdtrd B^fsn of AhoijjgafNifi. ient^ri- IS, 20IS, p, 4 (TF-* FISA app!;caiwn (rsfitloE» nlbxntaJiDa 
rtcirtiln^ fdlew Trurnr* ra,T^i^> advl^rCjorge Pip^fcpculo?, bet there it r-Ocridowe of any eopperahrs cr 
coj^prrccjr ber^en Page zrd PipadopocteT) 

l - !1PSC1 Ni»jcn?/ Fof&zrr kutti&ObfrSzrvtAlhr-r** Ac* AbuttfZmlks Q&srtestftt dfJusFcr zrd 

;h* Fedtrd S,v£}» t>f ifttcSJr^ciinsi, Jteiiiry IS, 2D IS. p, 2_ Nri'-hcf Ii^cojT nor T^Aoof sjc spec; fimlly IderjirHed tn 
Sbe FISA MaEerrilE, in hcetbg wjCiI ht FBI'S |cctrii prxticeof c» rtferrti^hg U S, per^tJS, 

** Ocpartrt^onl ofJtmrce, Forrijr* InEcitis^'ice Suzv eBhree Coun Applrcetfc^ C^nbcr 2!^ lO^G w p. 25; D-rparrTijm 
5 _ rJuske, foreign Intdil^cace S'^rV'etflzrr-a Coufi AppL'^Eui, fftdiuy |l r 2017, p. J1: Cansr Fage, Leixur D F31 
^ recto r iCenne y. Sept crater 2y, 231G. « 


* SBtemcurcf Aodrsw <r! =Cabe [FBI D'rcdc^ Heist Pcsrc^m SslJfC Oe^SJCitt« ?n CntelligeEre. 

Oe^Uf t9 r 2€i7, p, IS?. 

, jp igcft g 




(U) Appendix G - Senate judiciary Memo about Steele Referral 


{UNCLASSIFIED when separated from etfechment) 

Hiram Starrs Smart 


The HooomWc Rod J. Rasennnn 
Deputy Attorney General 
U,S. Depertmem of Justice 
950 PamjylvmJa A'.emue, MW 
Washington, DC 20530 

The Boocahle Christopher A. Wray 

Federal Bureau of Invtsil^don 
93 5 Pemnsyivania Avscue, NW 
WtahmgtGCL DC 20535 

Dear Dcpcny AttOEtey General Rosetvstonsnd {Xraeisjf W*ay: 

Attached fmd t deified metooreEdimi related to curtnin cammtmicEiicTis between 
Christopher Steel* *ad multiple U.S, ncwscsiikts r^gartHctgthe sorted *TrttEp dossil Ihsi Mr, 
Sleek compiled cu behalf of Fcsimi GPS fa: the C lie ton Campaign «Ed the Dcn<ximk Nfifiioiusl 
Committee and eha provided to the FBI 

8ocd an the tcitxTmrion contained theresa, we arc mpcafuUy referring Mr. Steele to you lb? 
mvcstigaSlan of potential violations of tl U.S.C. § tOC!* for statements tbe Committee has reason to 
bdleve Mr, Stock nusdc nrgErdicg hb db*-rihuiittn cf information toettairsd & i!« dAsslaf, 

Thfick, ycu fbr you? prompt aaenGoo to iMs toipqfterit mutter. IFyou have my quest'otu* 
please ccTTitazi Patrick Davis cr DcLv^a Ley of CbnLTTtan Or9sjIcy*fl Itafl s3 {202) 224-5225* 


Committee mi the hsSidary 

Eudomre: Ai staled. 


(LTOCIASSIFIED when separaled from atfccehmtm? 






Anon*? Oc&enJ Rojcmuin wvd Director Wny 

Jimmy *l k 20!K 
Pag* 2 of 2 

cc: The Honorable Dionne Feintlcin 

Ranking Member 
Committee on the Judiciary 

The Honorable Rjeherd Burr 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 

The Honorable Made Werner 
Vice Chairman 

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 


The Honorable DevioNunce 

House Pemtanenl Select Committee on Intelligence 

The Honorable Adorn SchifT 
Ranking Member 

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 




FROM: Charles TL Grassiev, Chairman, U.S* Scrxie Committee on (he Judiciary 

T. tnJscy 0. Graham, Chairman Subcommittee m Crime and Tejremm* 

U. 5. Senate Committee on ibc Judiciary 

TO: The Hocwrabte Rod J. Roscnstem, Deputy Attorney General* U.$* 

Department of Justice 

The Hoonnibit: Christopher A. \Vray, Director, Federal Barest of 
ta vestige an 

RE: Refrrnu. cf Chrisio pher S loci e for Po icDtisI ViaJar: cm efl ® U. S .C §1001 

£U) As yen know, ibifticj Drftfoh Inldligeftcc Officer Christopher Steelc was hired by the 
private firm Furs bn GPS b June 201ft 13 father mfcratfion obovT '’links benv^ti Russia aad 
[ibethprescfemial casditb^c] OonaJd IrumpS 1 Pursuant to that harness eira^cmenL Mr. Steele 
prepared a series of documents syfcd ss tfttelii§ei&e reports, SfriM ofwhich fflisr complied 
bto a ''dossier' : nrd published by ita^/Wf/ia January 201 ?.* On the face of the dossier, :i 
appears that Mr. S$ee*e gathered muoh of his mformaiioii from Rician government <c times 
inside Russia. 1 According to (he Saw fi-m Ptiiins Coia, Mr, Secies dossrer-rcUf cd efforts were 
funded through Fusion GPS by ihat lew firm on behalf of the Democratic National Comovucc 
aM the Clinton Campaign. * 

(U) In response to repeating fey the iV<xshtn%im Pass nbtnjt Mr. Steele** ratatianshi p Vrith 
the FBI relating lo this ponim dossier project, the ludbisty Comaucte* begtn raising a series of 
qiwstiO-is to the FBI oral the Justice Department abcu; these matters ns pen of the Committee^ 
coostitetiend oversight respoosfbilmesf 

CLT> The F33 has since provided the Committee access to ebssiffcd documents relevant lo 
the FBI’s relationship with Mr. Steele sod v-hether tic FBI relied on his dossier wort- As 
explained in greater detail bdovv, what iiubmiaticn tn those closes tied documents ts evaluated b 
fight of sworn stmemanti by Mr. Siecle is British litigation, it &pp££rs lhai either Mr Sieefc lied 
to the FBI or th£ British court, ct ihat declassified dxumcnis reviewed by the Corrjruuco 
contain mmtmlly false statements. 

’ (U) Deduce* Giib^rcr u M r QrbZ: Sxii*±M U'gcnc* Lifcita* dftiCtejfo&pktrSfttf^ Chum Ha. 
tlQSTDQOJl5, QtfCfe’J Bexscb CAp. 4, HJIl), cenr $ (HeJcsaJla "Sfcrck S££«Eteoi T] [Ar^dLasniT A], 

3 lU> fJ st pan. JO: KaiBod^\ Mki&Si erd Mart Thu*p.cpnrrj Alirgt Tne»p Hoz C<^p Tits 


7 {uy id 

*(11) .to u 2 J sai, Devlin E^rrcq *%c K.asaliod £ tkKkrm**. Gta AV'C feJfxr rbal L&J 

to RiitHa tfeujjVr, T:r^ WAsiitv^rns Pt,isT (Ox 2J t 2G17> + 

- (U) Tan i^rf RmitPd S Kddanus, f 2/ Ortce FAaoctf/o Rru ak 

Fhra^p THE- A^ASNiNiOtLis Ft^T (FdL 2?^ 20171. 


Tor jICRLT/j 1 

■ ?i - 0vC ’ r ; ^ 



(U) In retpnme fo the Committee's inquiries, the Chairman cml Ranking Member 
received a briefing on March 15,2017, Dura ihen* Director Jtmes B, Comey* Jr* 

briefing nddns««l the Rutttio MVCttigjiliDfi, \}k lOTa relationship wxUi Mr, 
SteeK wad the FBI's reliance on Mr. Steeled dyesitr in two applications if riled for surveillance 
under ihc Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FtfiA). Then* on March 57, 2017, theChuinnrut 
arid Ranking Member were provided copi es or die two retevnnt FiS A applications, which 
requested authority to conduct surveillance of Carter Faye. Doth relied heavily on Mr. Slack's 
dossier claims arid boih fipplicall om uw granted by the Foreigo Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FJSC)* In December of 2017* ihe Chainvuin, Ranking Member; and Subcommittee 
Chnirnian Graham were flowed to review a torn! of four FISA applications rely mg oo the 
dossier to seek strive! tace of Mr. Cana Page, ns well as tin mams other FBI documents 
reiaung to Mr. Steele, 

(U) Similarly. in June 2017, forma FBI Director Comcy testified publicly before the 
Serna e Select Committee cm Intelligence Owlw h&d briefed President*Fleet Trump on the 
dossf or allegations In Jim wiry 2017, whkh Mr, Conley described os “sdaeiour and 

cvjkctl id the Mmch 20H briefing why the FBI relied on ihc dossier in tht 
FISA applications abwmr mcsmtigrui cunobomliDfi—wtd m light of die liighly political rmidves 
&wrcmlin^; its cnsaUorv—tlitn-Directoi Comey slated thru the FBI included ihc dossier 
allegations shout Ccoier Page In Ihc FISA npplicnticms because Mr. Steele himself was 
tonM tiered tt liable due to hb pn*t work with rite Ourcau- 

^U^ndoed, the documents we have njvievvad show that the FBI lock important 
investigative steps largely based on Mr. Steele's information—and relying lienYtly on bis 
credibility, Specifically, cm October 21,2016, the FBI OJed its first wrurttU application untlcu 
PISA fc; Cencr Pegu. This inula) application relics in pen on EMegec past Riissum anempts to 
recruit Page yaws ago. That ponton is less than five rsges. Hie bulk of Out application consists 
DfullcgfliH>a5 agtunsi Pugc thal were disclosed so the FBI by Mr. Steele trnd ara also outlined in 
the Sleek dossier, The application appears it? contain no additional information tenroboraemg 
the dossier allegations against Mr Page, although It does eric to a news ankle thru appears in be 
secured to Mr, Steeled dopier ns welt 

fr £\J j Slfllsmert of j|Mt9 fck G&niey. Jr., Heaifia of lie UJK. Sen Seiner Coxirk on fnlel%mw flux; t 4 20! T| 








|TT*£ FBI discussed thereliability of this unverified mkrTrairen provided byMr. 
Sitclc in fooijxxcs 5 aad 15 of Ui? USA wamtst appUcaiioiL First ibe FBI raced re a vaguely 
limited extent the pel ideal origins of the dossier. fn fgoutde 8 Ibe FBI £3ic-d thru ihc dossier 
Information was compiled porswret to indirection of a tow ten who h^d hired an "identified 
U.S. penorf—now knottn es Oinm Simpson tJ Fusion QFS^-^to terd^t f^sc^reh regarding 
[Trump'si tics to Russia The FBI farther “*p«uiaic[cl]" that Ml Simpsor* 'hsts likely looking 
for information Ihei ccdd be used lo discredit [Tnsmp's] careprign " The application Med to 
disdosc that the :dcntttic3 of Mr, Simpson's ultimate efforts were ihc Clmirnt cunpaijn und ’Ik 

FBI ;tatoi to Lie HSC lhai "tased an [Steele's] previous repairing h friary 
with [Slccfej provided reliable infnmvuign to the FBL the F£! bdtffVCs 

[Steele si reporting re be credible/' in start, it appears the FBI relied cn scanned ly 
LmwnobtrroictS mfamaiiQQ* fumlcd by end obtained for Secretary Cliaeifs preridciutal 
campaign, in order to conduct surveillance of «n associate of the opposing presidentiaj candidate. 
It did so bused on Mr, Sleek 3 pcrsocnl eredjfccJ iv* and presumably having frith in hb process of 
obtaining the infcnnsifcn* 

(I?) But there is substantial evidence surest ing Ih&t Mr. Sredc materially misled the FBi 
aJboui a ter asp ec: oFhis dossier effort one wtJch beam on his credibility 

lb the October 2016 FiSA^plieoimn, and In each of vta drnre renewals* niter 
relaying Stede's dossier ollc^arions against Cirxr Page, the FBI simc-s: * ISt«ftifoM ifceTBJ 
that hc/sbeonh' piavrded !bii information to ihc business aft j qciak IFarinn G5*$l and the 
ESI " 7 (emphasisadded). Indeed the FISA rcnewu!ap^fieationitt January 2017 notes ihci 
Steele hod received 1 

F et the FIBA applications rq:c tbc exist axe of a news enicle doled September 
23 1 .2016, winch in partkoloi remained some cf the same dossier information dxmi Mr. Pig: 
compiled by Mr. Sicde and on which the FBI retied in its application^ While rst explicitly 
slBEeth this b presumably ihe crticle by MIdhid rrikuff of Yeh&v tiled ^U,S- Inlet 
Officials Prebs Tiu Between Trump Adviser c?A Kremlin,'' After noting \hsi Mr. Steele had 
claimed lathe FBi he had only provided ihfr iaicnnarioa Iq the FS! cr£ Mr. Simpson- the 
appfrcaikm attcirrpu u? explsin nw'&y &< UKonsbtency between Me. Side’s asscetion to th^ FBI 
and the existence of dte ankle, apparendy re shidd Mr. SrecleVs credibih^ orr which it srilS 
relied for the renewal request lire app^cadcn to the FISC .said: "*Cvivan thaMh? infomtllbn 
canlrixnM in the September 23 d news allele generally matches ibt Likrreali ai; about Ps^c ih*t 
[Stcefc] discovered doing hix ( ?ier research,I 

*iK FSt JUi f4ikd to pravtk the CctjTl^* -hs 102?^ ^cjnoiting iLi wf Mr. Serer^svem-a^ tD the 
FBI, so the Ccwwiiccc d relying tm dw acciray cftisc FSfs F15C tJwse st^snnenK. 




—_ _ _ ___ . ^ 77ie FBI dim not bclitvt lhat [Slrcic] directly provided this 

mfoiTOlion i& the press' 1 {emphasis added). 

foy ith>:c 9 of ils January 2CO 7 cppliuiriixi (t> renew to PISA wamui! Ibf Mr. 
Page. to FBI 2gak addressed Mr. Stede'scredibility. A i tot lime, to FBI rated that it had 
suspended its rekooosiap with Mr, Sltfle id October 2016 because of Steeds "tmmithonzBd 
disclosure of infqnoziira L& to pres** Tha FBI relayed toi $tesk been byihervd by die 
FBI's ftotifjeaii&ft io Congress in October 2016 sbous to rrap^cmg of to Clinton investigHiioiv 
to B5 aresuti ^{SfeetcJ mdeptoeruly ?jid to prior admoiusnmeiil Sttn to FBI to 
speak mfy m\h to FBI on this maher, mewed to tuning dlsauscd herein * dossier 
dkgatioos against fage] !d zn identified nows argpmi?jaimn/‘ However* to FBI continued in 
cite to Mr. Sietk’a psst work ss evidence offe reliability, end staled tot t4 to kcidenl toi led 
to to H5l sutspertdir^ its refetoarfiip wish {Mr. Si«k{ occumd ahe? [Mr. StcdcJ pro^-kted" to 
FB1 with to dossier information described id the application. The FBI finther asserted in 
IboLDore 19 tot ii dhi rart believe that Stcdc directly gave InfoniiclioD to yahoo jVfH r 3 fhfifc 
^Wished the September 25 News Article* 

doamxfttotl in the FISA renewals, the FBI still '■ccn'rd to bdic^cd Mr 
Stetle^&nie^telns tail be bad only provided to dossier information in to FBI and Fusion— 
snd not to to medi^—prior w Ms October media coatsci toi resulted in to FBI suspending the 
rd&iicmahijx Accordingly, to FBI still deemed to infomratioa he provided pries to the October 
disclosure to be rrfolfe After all, to FBI already believed Mr- Siedk wns retkble, he had 
previously told to FBI be hajinoi shared the mforre^tion with to prtsj - nod lyln^ to to FBI ii 
£ crime. In dcfrouiraj Mtr. Steele's cnrdibiliiy lolhe FISC to FBI hsd potoi an innocuous 
expisnnlioft foe toScpsnibeu 25 ankle* based on the assumplipn tot Mr, Sleek had told to 
FBI to innii afcpa His contarlB. The FBI then voutod for him tvdec more, uriog the 
rationale, In aubsa^sami Replications tiled w-itfuhe Foreign Inttltiffncc Sunrciltanct 

Court in April and Juce 2017, 

(U) However. public reports, co\srt Slings, End informfliion obTalnzri by the Committee 
during witness iulcroc-As in to course of its ongoing javestJgoimo indicate thoi Mr, Steele no* 
cnly provided dossier inform atinn lo to FBI, bn aka to numerous oictiia otunm^tions prior !o 
to end of bis relationship with the FBI in October 20I6P 

(U) )e> Stock's sworn court filings in liiigcBon In London, he cjhniaed toi he “^gavcofl 
the record briefings id 4 sipeII mtitvbn of jOtumlrsts about to preelection rnemoiflilfk [i«., ihe 
dossier] in lata sumnieraurumn 2016/^ In auotor swxtrr filing in fci css£, Mr. Siiaete ttutor 

* (U)£*r s^tele Stevesi It Zt«pc=xw w fer FttfCpt Icfcrir^an Pmo-iS» CFR 

ball t E, Gi^anjv At r. oncf Va. HQi 71>2D413, 

Ocsto’s Bscdi JS. 7% [HmawJki 5<aUrsirn 2 "J T<rr. and 

S Heldemm. fery Fcttttt foirisri^v'^rte C&T^^rir^f Tra^.Soj.Tjer, TIE 

V/ai f 0KGTa\ POST (Fst^ 2|. 2D IS^i5or; Traser^. Cl Foe 3 ch- C<Etn. <*; cmy. 

r (U> StceLc Stattmcm I - paix. 22. 




stated iha5 joumafea &dri New York Times* the Washington Post* Yahcm Ncwb* ihe New 
Yorker, and CNN - were ^briefed si the end of Sep ft m her 20(6 byfSftd*} Fysjan ai 
Fusion's srtsmKticn_ +T 0 The filing rimher states chat Mr* StctJe J ‘subsequently parikipsted in 
Anther rneetjngs a: Fijian's insttuciion wfcfc Fu^cfv md the Nrw York Times* the Washing! dr 
P ost, and Yahoo New, sroich took place raid-Qcsober 2016/* 11 Accord Jug to ihcse court fdmgs* 
Ttjhc bricSngs involved ihe disctosuKOf Jimflrf tnTcttigcncc regarding tadicariofts of Russian 
interference in the US election process t ht possible c<M>fdm£ftcn of members ofTnuop*$ 

campaign icnmacd Russian govemroem oflScialsT^ fn hb interview with the Committee. 
GCcrm Simpson of Fusion GPS ccafinnrd this &£ccuni by Mr, Steele sod his ecmptti y as filed In 
the British coon. 1 ' 

he fim of these filings was publicly reported in the lf*S. madia in April of 
20l7~yet the FBI did not subsequently disclose ;o the FISC this evidence >uggesUngthai Mr 
Steele had 3 led to the FBI. Instep the appUcadoti still retied primarily cn tas credit Etny prior *> 
the October media modem. 

FBI received similar [afoonatioo from a JtsUee Department 
official times Oftr* wcej maintained contorts w*th Mr. Simpson zmd Mr, Steele about (her 
dossier wrck* whose wife also waited for Fission GPS on the Russia jproject. In mi interview 
with the FBI on November 22,2015, Mr. Obr siKed that Mr* Simpson gave ihe I 


same interview Mr, Steele w^s “desperate to see that Mr* Tnurrp was net elccied 
president/* None of ahtictfonnatfon provided by Mr. Ohr in his itttenriews wfeh the FBI was 
included in the Fl&A ttr^wzi applications, despite its relevance to whether Mr. Steele tei lied lo 
the FBI about his eoflEsets with dw media as vreii ss Its brosder relevance to his credibility end 
hb stated political motive. 

1 xifttra, 13. {fmpftuti iJixJ). 

[A Tbt £ib£ (±sa described hr ccdb lomsci rau-ted ^ iIre FETs scjpcrtt *on of K? 

7*nE5?5r!j7rtriS}i Mr. Sjrric, jtaric^: *'Io oddi-Sior. and zz 2 ±j c yufca'i rnDDdka ra 'e'* OvUSx* 201 G Freese! 

rWcretiiTt HricTrJiLmofiit fjrca Mother Jm* 5 irv Si>p=— 


>nTl «*«««■ ‘Tjjpjcrtpt, Oa FjJj iritb tbeSea C^otzl ^ She JEdftiiry El205-07. 

hmowov; 2 x 2019 

£cRHQ2{Pe& 12,20(F) 
ftr *=T3~jOT (Not* 22,2D 1ST 






! Mr, Slcclc lied fo foe FBI ulxjyt htf mcdm cOniocU nrkviinl for m 

least hw First* it it relevant to hb credibility a* n mjutcc, panic ulajrly ^i^cn the lock of 

corroborjiinn for fab dnimj, m tot at the lime they were included in the FtSA ppplicdAikmv 
Second, it is relevant [q i lie rduibitiiy of hrs mforrnation-gofotring effort*. 

(U) Mr. Sltxlc conduct'd h\% work for FuiionGPS compiling the "pnNdrciion 
meniorwuhT "(l)]mram June and uarfy November 2C16 " pt in dm British litigation, Mr. Suselu 
acknowledged briefingjounvi lists ebom \ht dossier memoranda "fa foie summer/nmumn 
20I6,*' 15 Urtsiwpjfaiogly, durfag the summer of 2016, reports of m least some of foe dossier 
:d legations began circulating ozneng rcpancre end people involved jn Russian issues.^ Mi 
Stedc also admitted in the British ihigaitot) to briefing journalists from itvc JftaMigran F&v, 
Yahoo Ht swi, foe to Ibrfctr, and CAW fa September of 20)6*® Simply pul, foe men? people 


who ecmleniporKncously knew that Mr. Specie waa com pi ling h is dossier, the more JtMy it was 
vulnerable 10 itUEnipu!mioit + In foci, in foe British IhigaliDo* which involve? a posi-elcciien 
dossier meraomuduni, Mr, Steele mfotitisd font he received and included in it imsoiiciU4 —and 
unverified—allegations/* Thai filing implies that he similarly received unsolidted inidligence 
on these matters prior to the election aj weil, stating that Mr. Steele "continued to receipt 
unsolicitedfattfHgettte cm the matters covered by the prc^clcvlion memoranda after dvr US 
Presidential election " a 

(U) One memorandum by Mr, Streic lhal was net publis hed by ff uzr/h 1 */ is dated Octo ber 
19 , 2 Q 16 . The report all^ ^iHHUjU^^ Well 

M t, Stctlfs mtmnjtavJS^S^KnnscIJmpS this report from Jon 

ES Suae Deportment/* ilai the report wiia the second In u seric^mHhijnh^epori wits 
th at came fr om n foreign tub-scutcc who 'Is in tocontact 
friend uffocClinrciw, whopped ti itHHH B istroublingenough 
foul foe Uimoti Uornpcngn funded Mr. Stctfe r « work, but ihullhes* Clinicn touOCtatc* were 
contemporaneously feeding Mr Steele ailegn items auks additional concern* about hta 

17 (If) Sit* ft StaivmEjvi 1 ci pw P, 

** 1U) SEcdc Stoivrncnt t ■: fwrn, W 

tf (Lf) Ahlunpifoln Tr&aKTfat On Fik vrhhthc Sen, Canuti, an fop Jttjldtfy (Nfr. AhXflieuhJn InCamcd fo* 
Commtia= ihutfai began hsa^i^ ft om Journal in* about iht before k wiy p^tl/ihed, ccMjihoti^'j it wto iJi^ 
nurjner af2D15>. 

15 [U> Stcc^k Sttuerr^ftt 2 u\ pcn, 19 (flnptum atkkilj, 

#l fU) Surk Stsjcmesil I a p«m IS wxi 20c 

r * w SiaeIc StakdEfi 2 at ^ rScet nci Kthrly adughi, K >tt5 merely tcceSfr^.n 


w a e e uwy/ 



Steele then apparently passed this report to the FBI. 

fc:np!y put. Mr. S.'cdc Told the FBI be had col shored the Carter Pigo dc^sicr 
infon^^^^WxTtd his client end the F3L The Department repealed ihn! china id d* FISC. Vet 
Mr. Steele acknowlodged in swnm fifing* that he did brief Yahoo j\V*vj end other media 
organizations about the dossier around the liras of the publication of the Yahoo A f ei rs article thst 
seems to be based cn the dossier. 

(U) On September 23,2016, Yahoo Hwi published its art-tfegritted**U.S. Intel 
Officials Probe Tics BemcnTnwrp Adviser aad Kremlin," 1 * ThattcrticJc described claims 
about meetings between Caret Page and Russians, iocludirg Igor Sechin Mr. Srcftln is 
described in the article as “a longtime Putin associate and former Russian deputy prime minister^ 
under sanction by the Treasury Department in response to Russia's sedans in the Ukraine.’*' The 
ankle attributes the information te»"s well-placed Western intelligence source," who reportedly 
said lhAt**fc]i their alleged meeting, Sechin raised the issue of the lifting of sanctions vrilh 
Page/' 25 This information also appears in multiple ^racroomrrda 4 * ihst nrske up the dossier. 24 

(U) in sum, aiound Inc same rime Yahoo tieirs published ris article containing dossier 
infonnniior) about Carter Page, Mr. St tele and Fusioo GPS had briefed Yahoo &Vwj and ether 
news outlets abcut information conraintd in the dossier. 

_[ifcese fads appear to directly contradict the FBI’s assertions in its initial 

application for the Page PISA warrant, as well as subsequent renewal application*. The FBI 
repeatedly represented to the court that Mr. Steele raid the FBI he did n at have unauthorized 
contacts with the press cbotii the dossier prior tc October 2016. The FISA applications make 
these claims specifically m the context of the September 2016 FsAca Kevn elide. Bui Mr. 
Stock has admitted—publicly before s court of law—that he dl4 have such contacts with'ihe 
press at this time, zrd his former business partner Mr. Simpson hw confirmed i! to the 
Committee. Thus, the FISA eppJ leal tons are either materially false in claiming that Mr. Steele 
said he did not prov ide dossier information to the pros prior to October 2016, or Mr. Steele 
m3de materially false statements to the FBI when fcc claimed he only provided the dossier 
information to hi* busmen partner and the FBI. 

Bj: this care. Mr. Steele’s apparent deception seems to have pc«d significant, 
material consequences on the FBPs investigative dec iso res and representations to the court. Mr. 
Steele's information formed s significant portion af ihc FBI's warrant application, and the FISA 
application relied more heavily on Steele's credibility than cn any independent verification or 
corroboration for his claims. Thus die basis for tbc wwrrmi authoricug survciJI&Dcc on a U.S. 
citizen rests largely on Mr. Steele's credibility. The Department of justice h=s a responsibility ro 

23 AO Mkb*! lstkefT. US Intel Ofjktvi: ProSe 7>r? Si C*m Trans AdrUir owl Krtxlia. Y»foa Ntwv (5ept. 2i. 


? *(U)W 

* <U) U 

* tU) ftttfir.gtr c 1. st, BtTzJtHrt 




TQ. n scoter/ 

m/mo roar. 

determine whether Mr. Steele provided false information lu the I’BI and whether the Fill's 
representations to die court were in emir. 

(U) Accordingly, we are refer ring Christopher Steele to the Department of Justice for 
investigation of potential violaiion(s) of 18 U.S.C. 5 1001. 


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ti Clerics 5ns to jt tfcs PsrtjoJsn G& i~ *rr*3D 


t. Save thst It is Emitted Orel lh» Second ard ThErt? C&Vnar^s arta testing 
lnlna 3 truc v *^e companies £ased in St© Netf^ands and Cy^pjs raperihrely, nc 
admlss ans cra&ada as to psfsgtapfts l aod 2 , 

2 Pa 3 -S aco edjn&sd 

3, Ofbto was kxrtiad in 5003 by tto Second DefsndanJ &nd Burrows 

4 , Tfoo SeeofW Defendant erd Cfetotopiw Series fofrea^y santor fend 
experienced Cccwm servants in ihft Rr^jgn end CsmjrrOfrwesEfli C 55 ^* 

5, Andrew Wood GCMG was 14 b Brtdsft Ajn&assodoi lo fcetv*sen 1595 end 

2000, Ha Is an Associate Peltow cJ ins Russia end Eu/acta PrcsfafVfiO st the Roys3 
EftstiEuifl for intentions! Aftecna el Cha Ha h on A^cdate oE O rbto. 




6 . Fusion GPS f Rested)is a consulsncy bssed In Washington DC ruioerch. 

nbz&?c inSe$*genee &i*i due difgtfics service a a? 

7 Prior to ->s ever ,is in bsua m this cass ihe Defendants Jtq- a ¥rorX : 3£ 

niatonsfrp with Fustoo ore* a rumbcr c'ysiis, 

& Ai o 3 “j;srtci &r&i Putkxi wsc to an ofrfgalion fx;l {a dr^^ow) ta [K-ti 

psrti^a ocnfdeafcLal totetTgtfroe mflter'ai provided tn 11 by Uia Ccferdants Ln the 
course c? ffias «*2.r5dnQ nHaisonsh^) v^ w r^ tfta sgf&Emerrtcnhe Defendant. 

7hc pre-efeetten memoranda 

9* jtrai and early November 2C!S Obis was on^agsa ay Fustoct ic prepare a 

Eftf:es cd confldsnSal rttscscivnda co hntnitt^oc^ nonce-rng RLiasfen eftorta to 

indlusrjca ;ha US Fro&/ffcrtfcal efecGcfl pracssa 4<id Brtita btfvrcsto Russia ar«f Do^a*d 

'-0 The Defendants produced sitioat iraitteKaiitia. Thse^i va, be referred \o for 
GQnv&fucrrCe as Tfta piBHetecSOfi msr*m<Kte' h ftetfng bee* propered before Cte 
201$ US ftwsfctaufel tilectkUL Vm Isit coo wto produced Li the tetter pan af 

Ocfctiw? «.016, N-eftc wore p^dwaf h FfMftfbtr 201S, Jtora cf tha pr^Qlodic?n 

memorsnda conlstaed Any n^Ercrco to. cf intelBsanca about Lbe Qaknanta. 

11. As en Assacssia cf Qrtss* s# PixittM Wood w» fcvtfire cl the Second DefemSanrs 
Ih^ganeQ gathering for [f>c pre*efeeC , cr5 nx!morAnda 

Snnctor Jchr* McCain 

12. Ssrvsl&r -tefin McCain b the CheL^cf Lha US Snrsato Amwd Serves Committee and 
s member af ttia US Senate Commf^w on Hcmctaraf Seo*rry ana <Soronri>&rEl 

13. Dov£ KranwMs a former US S®9 Depa/vnonl civil sarvar:: and was US Afi&ssafH 

Sfccrot^ry is/ Slila far Doms^acy, Rlghia, and Labor imr* 2COS to 2D09- ^ 

te ths Ss'tfsr Dlrscsor far Hl'TOh RJghis £Jtd Hyman Fr^dsfi^ si Sefsbr WcCa^i's 
[rislirixafcr rntero^Jona! Lasdsnh'ix 

K ARef iro r^odfort of Donald Tramp 3* the 45*' Prosfdent cf 3^ Untied States ors a 
Nowmbi? 20lS, Str Andros Vtcod A!r Kmmar and Sera^f McCe^ fit fs^ii 
of tbe'r o^cussto^ S3r Ancre^ afrargetJ fer die Second D^tr^ni to rnee^ Mr 
Kramer* sa Lhe r&proserttstiva o-f Senator f^cCa^ In o^" to &bo* ^Vr> lha p.*e- 
^ledJco m^-n^rarxJLa on a coofidenSai basis, 


TO P 5PgR?T 



15. The rr^ti’jg fcor.*.«eeri the Secood CXandivil end Mr Kreiw* toe*. ptoce on 2B 
Novwnbor 2018 to SLoey. Mr Krc/oer told the Second OofcrxirrT. toa! the Intciflgenca 
be had SBtoensd rased tesu» of poter.^a. notonai security cnpori^nca 

18. An arrangemcnl wsa then msdo upcn Mr Kramers return to WGSfcif#on lot Fusion 
to provide Sen. 5.^cCsf/i wfch hard cooiea tf the pre-olecbcn cttmonjrxta on a 
oo/iWonLa) bes^s vai Mr Kramer. 

t7. Oft boteif o? Sot McCain. Mr rsqucsiec to bo prodded wCtft any turner 
Intelllgar^a £2?hGrsd by tn* Oeteftrtants Ebsu: ateood Russ&r 'rferistorca in (he US 
P/osidcr&Ei e&clion. 

The confidential Do comber momDfondum 

18. Tha Ds!ar4£5U5 cenUnuod to reoeiva ir^r^liod meUloonce cn toe rraEana covsrwJ 
by itve pre^lecSjcn memoranda after tfcs US Presidential etectSor. and tha condition 
of the assignment for Fusion 

19. Altar receiving vcme such jnttflisenoa the Second Defendant prepared the 
confidant Docombor memotandjm. referred lo at paragraph 8.1. on ftte cwm 
inlfefiv© cr. cr ewnd f3 December 2019. 

20. The Defoodarls oonsktored, xxmsssy. tel cno raw Sfrieifigence n toa December 

a. *£a d ccnaideraOte importance to relation to aBsgecJ Russian interference to 
too US PrcskJsnliai &aetior: 

f>. had (rripitcabons for tha naSona" secuniy of '.ho US e?vd toe UK; end 

c. wooded to be analysed and fuS^r rTrrafigaledfvcrifted. 

21. AccordfogV toe Second Defendant pro/5dd & ccpy of toe Deoerrfcsr msmwandUFn 

a. A sentor UK government nabocii security oflteto! aclng In fis cMrctel csps&ty. 
on a ccnfiecrrtinl basis in teed copy form: end 

b. Folios, by snerp hared cttu'J veto sn inatn>cocn to Fusion to pcovkte a hare 
ccpy to Sen. McCeto viu Mr Krarrsr. 

Liability for tha publication complained cf 

22. SnvtJ that it is admitted toe! too worts ccmp^3=r»ccJ of cod Eel o»*i tocrsln u^/o 
contained to toe conWerJlal December nemorarkium. paragraph 6 6bdnC. 





23. II Is defied thjii in b'veif naliral sod meaning, Et (her proper context. the 

vrcrite compiatoed of bore or vvero capable of tesftng tfte.mser.r^ ptedsd at 
paragraph 7. 

Z4. Read n oortfaxl «ho naiunil bt :2 cnnifiaiy meaning of Cvo wants ccrrpGinod of u«3-s 
lh5l tf^T3 vmno grounds to tnves&geriQ ufcihei- the Osimancs had been coe^n&d by 
Russia. into hscjtng the computers U 2 ^d by tf» US Democrat Party tead&fs&p. 
Irensrrtiftng viruses, parting bu*$, stealing dote and ocr-di^cUrxj f\5s»:^g operettas 

25. Ss ve insofar as k is admitted ebovg pareQrj-ph 3.1 js dar.'ed. 

2$. The first sentence of paragraph 8.2 & noted Thtj is undorsianoabto. The ocr.toni* of 
(he Drcerribsr memorandum wire h'rgnry wr.sitivo and the Defendants CfCy 
(Bssemtoatod ccpiw cl U In sbict cutficiafise fia ataroGsa. 

27. The remainder of paragraph 3 2 is. ?n the* pramisas. denied in ks enfk«y. 

23. Siib-porsgrgphs 3-2.1, 3.2,2 end 8.2.4 are admitted, 

29. As to **£>-paragraph £.2.3: 

a. fn fe? e? IK'S sub-p^s^raph refers Jo Ihg pre-e!ecSon rwncranda; 

L Tha first »ntenco is too va^?e lor mo O-afendanto to pfesd to in sr.y 
mfiantngftil way: 

11- Tho second sentence is deleft 

b. in so 1st sp u retore tc thn cortfdGnial December framesndinr: 

i. Ths first asntewa fe again too vaguo to- the Dctadax;ia tn ptood »in 
any mearrfngfu} way. The December memorandum vvss provided to 
(he rec-pteaU i^orlAed above so met that tho Infonrstta in II vros 
known to (he IMsd States and United Kingdom governments hI a 
high level by person wKfi ff»poo&&2ty for natta^ sec^rty: 

It. The second senfence is cterdcd. 

30. The first sentenos d sub-paragraph 9.2.5 is noted. The Defendants dk} not, 
prc»v!(ta &ny of the p«*«tec5csn memoranda to me^a of^r, 2 atcr<s orjoumafels. ter 
did (hay aulhwce anyone to do go. Ngc did tosy provldo lira confiden53t December 
trsrrvwandum to media Of$antea^ons or JournaRsCs. ter cad they eutbcrfzo eny&ne to 
do so. 

31. The second sentence of sub-paragraph 3.2.5 b cfentod. 




I tt 



.12. Save thnl it to odmlttod that iha Second Defendant gtivo oH Hkj fuconJ briefingi. to □ 
smnH number of Joumnlata flboul INj prn-olocljon momoftindo vi inte 
aummof/eulunm 2010, su^parograpti 0.2.G la (tonJoth 

33. Paragraph &3 c admliiod but Habflty for such publication resides with BuzzFecd. 

34. No odnfeedons ora mado paragraph 5.4. 

35. Paragraph B.5 ta dsraod. The Defendants ana r,c>Mi&bto for pubtteelion by Sunrwd 

Qualified privilege 

35. further or in the oilomaUvo. Uxj confidcnlial December memo jb nil um y/Bs published 
by the Defendants. as ptaatfed ct paragraph 21 above, la good f&Wi, oo an ocotmJon 
of qualified priv^ego. 

37. In the dfcumatenecs out cul obovo Uvi Dafco&niln wore un%tor n duty to puoa tho 
Inlormollon In llw Docomtw; memorandum to ih* fipnlo; UK Government nanorval 
weurity offldo) end Sea )4cCrth ot> thai It woa known to tho Vo )led Kingdom *utd 
UnHml SJotoa govD/nrnonli ut u high tovyt by persons wkh r&eponnlbfflly for ncllonsu 
tocurtfy. The«o raciptonia hod o cofrosporvJiog duly <v inta/ost to monlvo U In fhoir 
copouilloii iw eortoi rvpttuwntaltattof thvuo yovornmnnla with «uch rflnporafelSlfttt. 

313. Tho Inddeotiii pvWfcoHonn to Fuiten urwJ Mr Kramer worn rca&crtnblo oo o meant) of 

bdr*glng fete uonsttlvo rfecumoM iricurOty to tho dttoatton of Son. MoCuln. 


39 Tho DofemJcmto dkl not pubttrh tho Do cc mb or mamorwvJufTi to uny of the wikt 
rariptonlo wRh the Intention il 4houW bo ropub’Wiod to tho world at itiqjc nor did they 
ask any of thorn to ropublish the Dooernbor trusmora/idu/n to otlwtrs. ff any of Iho 
roriplonlD did eo with tho roadl that It v«s pubHRhod to the \wrtd e»I targo too 
Defondorls, In the Clrwm&toOOCIS, retain tha protection of quoIHknl privilege. 


40. Li relation to paragraph 9, rt Is admitted that publication of .the words comprstnod o? 
by BuzzFced for Bny subse-queol Entemel rcpubflcallon of thooo words by third 
partes) was lively to causa re nous harm to the reputation oJ Uvo Find Claimant. Save 
es aforesaid, paragraph 9 is ncq admitted. In particular, li not admired ihsi lha 
publication of tho wds complaIn&d of by Buzz Feed (or any such subsequent 
ropubltootion) has caused e<wtous financial Iodb to any of tho cWiante or that It b 
l kely to do so In firtirro. Tho Ctacmonls a/o ro<pif<nDd to provo tha exhuonoe and extent 
of ony pout rmncidl to*s erte/or any llkoly fvfwo finonefol tow cam«xj hy tho 
puWlcaftY) of Ihn vrordfl compfo'mid of. 






HI. Paragraph 10 is notec. II is ncc acnKted that tho tew of ssch of tto ! , ir-sd*eiicr.s in 3v> 
Euroocen Union H which the**cras comptelned cl wore published wcs sr.d la. so f*f 
as ma'.gria?, Vjs ssma as the lavr cf Engtertc snej Wefes. 

42. tn j&atoci to percjrw-ph f 1: 

a. Paragraphs 23 and 24 dOqtb ara r^poalDd and cub-par&arofh 11,1 Is coated: 

b. Sub-paregraph11.2 ia ©dmiiied but H is defied that the Qetendsnta pgtrshsp 

or coorod *ta pubfcctoa of fba worcs ccm pained of oxiremefy widely; 

c. Sub-peisgraph 11 3 is nel admitted; 

43. The fers; sentence paragraph *2 is not flxfcrdtoo. 

•W. Lrs redden la tho second 6fiA!ins& of psra^apfc 12. II s dcn'&d that tha CleSnsarCt 
er$ cntlJod to cisim dsmegss. whelhe' assisted or otherwise, against the 
Defendants as opposed to Buzzrsed. 

45. In ro&txyi to par3^phs Ifcl and 12.2, II is sdrrtiU&d that the Defendants drd nor 
confect the Ciarrants p/for to the pubSkaEcn of *swis ccmpiainfei d by 
BuzzFsed. In nghl of the rosters pleaded sbeva irra Cefeodonts hod ro reason to 
contact Su* Ctobreott In refetfon tc the pufcScattoo or tha December memmndum cy 

46. Paragraph 12.3 U denied. The First Second and Third Cfeimsr,*s sen! a latter bafcra 
acton to the Oefervaarte on 23 January 20*7. The Defendants acknowledged recall 
of fcg ?o£or before fiction through a tetter from \hssr former ectfertora. SchSlngs. cn 30 
January 2017. Tfn Defendants then pravkted a debiltod response to ine tetter before 
acboo four days later on 3 February 20T7. The Defendants poUtiad out tr*ci the 
Claimants* fcUs< before RClion cW col meei the raqtirerrrsnis contstr-ed fn the Pre~ 
Action Protocol for Dc^smctior.. tn paflJcula* Olfi Jailor te'oea action* 

a. staled that McOorroon v/Ji 6 Emery vwre hstructed try of vte 

Second end Third Cte fondants. btft did red pnowce iho osroas or any dciflTa cf 
tnodo 'aflEsfesf. Nor cid ft slate another McDermott W5I & Erosry wore 
Instructed by e.o Fcir^h CSafrnsnl; 

b. <£d not Identify the oasttcuter p^caocr^e) tftst s*«re the subj&a of Cte 
pooapoeSfw C 3 :n:, conimxy to paragraph 3.2 of the Fre^AcCoo Proleori 

c. d«d not kienSfy the meantog thal lha Rsi fo Thi-d Clalnwtb sttrtsutec La fts 
«ords complair-ad of, center/ to paragraph 3.3 cf the Pm-Accon Phoiycci fix 

Th.e Defencfanfe theroforo requested Ihe Oaimante to provide ihe necessary 
inform seen in order k> etiabte the Defendarrta to prtivkte a fefi reeponso to tne 



V» I ■» I 




proposed clrrm Notwithstandncj the fee! thal the Defondanls provided a dotailed 
response to the Claimants’ latter be*o;o action written 11 days of that teller being ser.t, 
end notwithstanding trie numerous deficiencies in Uto lotler before acuon, on 3 
Febniary 2017 the Claimants Issued and served proceedings on the Defendants. In 
the circumstances, tbo Claimants' decision lo issue proceedings less than two '//oaks 
aflor the teller beforo action v/ns precipitous, incompatib.'e wth the overriding 
objective in tho Civ.l Proceduro Rules, und breochod tho roquirornon'o of trio Pro- 
action Protocol fur Dufurnutton. 

47 it is denied that The Clotmmls are entitled to an injunction against the Defendants us 
pleaded n paragraph 13 of the Particulars of C''H:m or oi all. 




I ho Defendants fcoliavo that the facts set out m meso Particulars of Claim are true. 



Christopher Steel© 

Director. Orbis Business Intelliganoo Lid 

Date: 03 April 2017 


THH7Sn7WM v’ 

ro r :> curve i / 







Claim nCr.HQ17D00413 


(2) WE B2 ILL A B.V. 


Cta I mania 





UrnUr p4rntjrftpfta 7 find fl 

0/: *A! utf mftiQtvti turns Airman ?v*i to an obligation not to tfizdoao to t/m 

(Mftwn cortfttotjfliaf fcr»fu%{WO rwdob-V fa tt by (hi? DvfiwdiU&i in tin p ciutV7,o 

ctffftV vrothlnn ifttoVonihlp wltfxxA fto ognoGrttonf o/frto ftfttnnfontx * 


1. Whotftftr flioflftd doty of c^nfidofitiOHy w sjikI to nnw* by ^orurecs or m 


2. IF by cortnicL stnto wheffior ttra duly tiroa© undsr (□) □ ennerd ciwtrad ut 
rotofow; or lb) *pscMlc cont/sda <ol»1lno to tfit sswofle 

3. to either svoni Mato whether any contacts) re&od on v^re wouon or ora?; if 
oral, jteftotj when and botv/e-on whom lfatjiy macto. 


Tbs' duty *rms both by ccnlrapt and in Oqsity. A vyrtttflfT 
a^probrnorri was condudad babi-tefl tfto Rfsl Dfrfehdanl SOd a raprasentoliva of 
Rwton tri J armory 2010 to ra^bon to Wdrtt conducted by FiiBkm for Lltfi Rnt 
OtrfericUinL Fi^rlharmor^. Foal an wo* erwfira of tha contideriljalfly of IrHaftg^nco 
report* Ovough U>a course & business with tha Deteffidant© ar-d* to rafalton to 
the d^cto3uru of iha memoranda to Mr KraTher, tba Stfrrand OeferYte/it anb 
FuiJoo ban had specific tfsaus^one In which toa ccnfiiS&tffeSfcy of IN 
memoranda tei boon graptmstteis and Fusion vre* Iravuded ii> tofexm Mi 
Kraraa^ of Ifteir confldaobaUV* 


■ t* 




H OrO 'ftH 

4. S!sle whether me ai*eged 4icy not so disease such intef-gertce io Iffetf parted* 
u&htwl ma p^or agreement cf fra Defendants m D>3 course of me working 
reiatorship extended to dlscfesura by Fusion to their p*n clients (io Tna clter-ts 
who had com.T.issJcyvad tho intevigcnco -nntenat: scs paragraph 5 of Ihc 


in nsteGon to the prc-atecton men»crarxi& the- d«.-ty not to tfi!sdo<so .THsToanco to 
third jbe^es without too prior agreement of Ovs Defendants did net extei*? So 
d-sctositfs by Fusion to ifc ijenTs), aRbeugh Ihe Oerendgots undertfend Bwl 
coptea cf the mcrr.ara.ida wena no* flincfcsgd by Fusion to its cfiar.tfs). 

ln./i3aiion to ihe December mesnotB&durn, Itris vybs nst prepared pjretfsni to 
a ay ccnl/cct os stated el paragraph IB cf iha Defence. Tf e fluty no? to disetese 
thk tafiefigence report to ttt?^ parties without tt» prior agreement of 0>s 

Cefcr.dzntB Iherefere did erxizrxi to drscioscre by Fu*(cn to ito c^err^s; 


5, Stato whether tho Defendants owed any fecfprocai duty c* conScence to Fuser 
snfi/or Fuse’s c&rfa in rnlaTon to iha Ir.Uftgenca they prowfad. 


Sine© A »/3o not prcd»^ced ptswiiU to the enjopcmcrsi wrih Fusion described &\ 
paragraph 9 pF tha Ooteneo. tho Dcfoncscts did not pw«o any cKgatton 
confidence to Fusion ond/cr Fusion's dtontfr) in rofstion to the trfelfigenc* 
coniftinod in the December meTtocandum. 


e. State wither Fusion‘$ client, inscfar a$ tfsefosure to v?ss pen^ftaed (ses 
Request 4), were under any duty to Ite Dsfemtenb, snd'oc Fuston net to (a) us e 
and/or {0) dketosa IM tntaL^ra. sre* t K 50, g^ti Bks partaters as to how ihai 
duty & aieged to srS£3. 


The rwponea to quostoi 4 above s repeated. The Dc ; endunts understood that 
the arrangement beN^ssn Fusion and its ciisnife) was that intetSgence wou# 
nol be drsekwed. As a*pTai-*d absva. the December r^ernor^ndu^ was not 
produced p^syari to the enpa^ernerjt rEferred to at paragraph 9 o? the 
Dafenoo find tDGratora dlscicEoia o? Decernb^ namnnar^Lir. to their 
eEen^s) witfl not pemvited. 

Under paragraphs 9 and to 

Of jvoe end ee/fy Wove^bsr 2G1 d Orfc^s urss e/^pasfSd by Fusion to prepare 

c aw.ts of cQrJxfcnl& m&rcfsncfa based go L<stefisencO“ cortc emteg Rustic tffcrti to 
ififhepcc the Lt5 FrosxtevCal ertc^oo pc COM end bof^eon Russia znd Oon s-*3 










7, Pwtvso irtamtfy (soo prvmorivpn 6 tw nno Pofama) Fu&tfln h o dinp^fij m roipiton to iwt 
partculor {rrfPfcuratnl. 


TM roquft&i is ooithof reasonably nocutsft/y nor pJ&povBfHi&lo to enflWe iho 
Cfflimanlft to propofo tncar own.caso nos \o understand tho case limy haw lo meei 

OF *Tho DoferHtarUz produced sixteen svzJ] (iK-mot aorta. Those wfl to rulcrred to for 
corrfBrJsfgti £3 7h& p&-e faction /n&fnpromfd* having boon jseparetf JteAtfff (ns 20 TS 
US FrssAfofltetf etectton. Tho tetf ono wjs ^rcxfucstf tff Ifcfr teifley o? October 20 fa 
Atone rvttra produced Jft Nc\>xxr>bcr 201 a Atowo of pranateciitin memoranda 
cowatofrd wyrtfojwcs fo, or foto*^grwK© adcuf, tf?o CtokmuttsT* 


Q f In vtow erf ihn sswlton ihsl no irwnonmda v^o pradurjcd in Now*mtK*r 2010 , 
p h aft £0 fllfllfl ttift ruilufa d tfi* enQagoro&iU Ln Gariy November 20 IS a& ra terror! 
(o In paragraph 9, uorf v^athor Uvta onfl eg citron t wan ooffc/roed and whoi 
inltiftgoncc a ratalod to, 


Thu nHiuru tit the PtKondanEV tmpujifirnofit by Fuaton dW not ohunpa <tuir# U» 
potion bufw«f) thu pfoparartoti of Vhj tool pRHihidkm rnemer«iwk*i> an 20 
Ociobar ?0l0 onn thn ttato ol tfto US PtMckwooi oNwifon Hk»rVfW rineo th* 
Dclon&mLa dkl rwl rocetoo any retoVBrtt lrrtotigBiK*v concerning Rwhin offotiu 
to bthicrjica Ih* US Pmikianbal oltfellon ihgow and fimku biftiwnn RmsU mid 
DonnW Trump during Hite pefi<xJ P no rrwrnomndi were produced pu/euttfti lo 
thaoog&aomenl nftor H) Geiotror 2010, 

Under perncfpph^ 12 on ri 13 

OF “Sunafcr John McGoJn Is l/ro Cu air of (ter US 5d0£to Asmtt S&v^ooo CoTimftto? 

and a member of Uro Us Scnolo Comtrvtm on Homokmo Boom^y ar>tf G&mmjTKttdal 

Affairs* £rrd 'Cyvx/ Krvoior a farmer US Sfpm p&p&hwMt cM? sanafi^ dnrf kv^5 US 

Amstanl SwtfBty tit Sim ft* Omotttcy, Huaw* Rights. &{>d L&bor fwm ZQSB tc 

2QQ9> Ho 15 tfio Sonror Ok&etor tef ritman Rjgfys and Himm ftwto eJ Sznotz? 

Mcdrn‘3 tnunatQ itt m&rmtimof \j02Gw i $h t p*< 


3. Fleese confTfm (as pamgrpph 200(0 Ihe Ualnnca ^ge^ls) IMl Scaler 
McCaim and R* KiBnifif ar^ afltegtpd (P) io bays hoan acting Jn tiwo effi^ai 
C^pacItSop: ano (bj onFy In rolaUim lo ibosa cap^tfes h Ihe course c: tb& 
matloni ptoQdcd in paragraeba 14 lo 17 snd 2)b; ond P IS not, tdBnljfy any o'Jw 
capadly In vrfisch tltay were acting ofxi ^'hcc and tor whol pwtpcibo(fty 


■ 3> 


The Def&ra^ts beievsd lhaS Senator V.zZzx) and Mr Kramer wans esi ?>3 only 
in their cartes caoecztios end were no: Wormed of eny other cs sadly cr 
cupose ifi v&kti they were esSnp. There were no groins that fed Cha 
Dofomfents Jo suspect thaf Senator McCin and Mr Kramer wore not ad&ng In 
• Choir officii capacffces at any too up to ond sioredkng the pjbtatan cf lhe 
December rnsmcrBra*j?n Iq M* ferra*. 

Under paragraph 14 

Of “As a casuj cf &asz CKssvsstans Sir Andrew errsr^-jd for the Secern Bef&ufMt lo 
PKoi Hr Kramer, zs tfw rcpr?$sntaifr$ cf Sor^ior KtcCsin. In ordsr to nkn {fro 
pr&elecUon monomnds cn a confide nUst basis' 

QE flgSI 

10. Slelo whatss mearJ hy’on a ccnfejans^ basis', hdicating precisely use or 
usqb Senator fctcCato waiters penr.^cd lo maKe cl the pre-siectfen 
mom cy and a end vrf^ther these uses wti epecif>ed to Senator UcCaii and Mr 


The Defendant* understood that the content cf tire memoranda 'anaufcf be 
trealad h iha stricter conndencG and wouij only be used by $arabt f^cCirin fen 
hte official Capacity fo* tine sore purpose cl analysing, (nvOTtSgsfcng end vs*ifying 
frielr contenb to ersbie si>ch action to be taken 35 necessary tor the opposes 
erf protaefng US national meatfly. The Second Defender^ arproeely Vlkrmod 
Mr Kramer ts^i the pro-ete&ioft ntsmenanoe were only to be used far this 
exclusive pi*qjosa before he showed Mr Kramer any of the msmctarsls. Mr 
Kramer wes not at this lime pnrAted w&h copjM of Iho memoranda thin had 
been prepared «s al that data, on* •#$$shown copies. 

Under paragraph 13 

<y *Tho £>0/5nc3r-fs corfcnt/etf fo fTOwiVe indigenes cn tfro melton 

covered by iha pre^oc^cn msrnor&r.tfn a*ar the US PrszfdandS otocto* and fhe 
corK&sdon oltfe as&Qrsnenl forFu&Ofi*. 


ll.PJeaea stele vrttstfrw $iich ytresi^enca was acuvsty sought by >ba Second 
Ocfonfeni or marety received {es presinfiy pleaded}. 


Such Intd^encc was fart adh-ely sought*, ft rros merely rece?red. 

Under paragraph *9 

. £ 






Q1 *A!tOf fVCV'Wd QUftHi rMClt WiQtttyUflGQ ite iffl&O/l(f DotCfitfaM prQfMrGtf tfti 
lg nfidonttat OoLiurjtw /wmofarnfan totivtod to n! wtrawajtf] 8.1 t m o^n Mlttotm 
on or ttrtkmd f 3 Dtuxtmbtir WW 


12 Plnane Halo wWKfHtf Iho woftfo Vn lib own fnillaUvu' mean mat too DacemtioT 
memorondum wn/1 not [flj t/OulUi), or provided to Fucutm pumuafll to any 
uonirrici If noi, pUjado uprc fy Wil> coni md to question 


Hie December meiTK>randjrn wssnoi create os prawEd&d to Futiton put a Liam i ft 
orvy ccntoact 

Under pan)grtjpft2a 

Of 'The Qefsncto^is consftfemat cottekA^ ifiat tos i<tw toto/fajoneo in tho Qtic&nbpt 
rr&miy-fc\durn, 3 tms of cor i&'jsfv&fe mpoflorxQ in min&on to Rus&irt 

t^iar/jinjrrc& h ttm US Frosktsnti^i otycftpo; £ 3 . fmd i^ytic&lions [or tbs fiBtion&t s&xrity 
cT !ho U$ and (be? UK and a rteedeo ip be firtgfy'Sed end /urffrer inv,?tojiA/JTnTtecP 


13 Rougo frliiis wbatoar lha Saoond Dofondani <MiV to&ch&d fftte c^ncHiaton on 
bohEJlf of ItoFtfrt DoramJani or wfioirwr Christopher Burrows an Iter Si; Andrew 
ur^ro party to hJa iitisossmenf. 


T>id Defend mnlif umobviiM thni the pra-oioetton momoramto nnd sny 
r,uh?.nqimm rokttort inteulgaaeo wfitori Ihoy rt^^cxJ atinuto bo dtteto^xf to toe 
ifldMttonIs rof<Vft>d to a\ pir»gmph 21 of Qv> Doforwo wtw rcuadwd foUcviVjg 
fttyjftffife CtoClWfclOttft bfllVWton Ihfr Second QfcfCKXJkvrt un0 {1} Ch/^topho? 
Bufiuwn of (hit RnU Ootorttfortti (fi} f*lr And/tM Wend fwfio hftd tipofcflfl with 
Snnntor McCain); £W) Cav'd Kramor (who vra> ncllnn wi Debutf of Swx>to f 
MnCato) fuxJ (*v) urn VK oaitoEtol r-ccumy lofurrod to Qi ponujrup^i 2 Ubj 
of Ihu Defence Mr Burred chonjO irm CiKomfnfii tt tis»wmrmtfli iho 
rofovoni iimo, TM Oofeixtoms DonoWwod mi ifio lMui» warn out ovidonOy 
ro^avonl to tim fiolkjiiol tecurlly of tbo US, UK «nd ihtvH n'^oe thol 
nut«jm;oOTit Dug onto robing to Him aiutfi ouejJH to bu disdo^cd to too 

iitolvtouate lofosmti 10 ol pangraph 21 nf ihe Dotouoo, tach 0/ ih n irxpvftfuate 
va'tfi wtwin ttio Sooond Octortonnl dl&qwwxf too Isoye tnevod tJiVi vlaw nl too 
llrno end, to tori Socood Ocfarwin^pa knov/cdjo and boJtef. conSoue to fajld 


IHP 5 ETRn 75 | 



vlrirer p^r^graph 20- zr.d 2* 

stole ^-stbe* she o^cefr&ar memaransuny vtzs prorctod to (oj ii^ JK 
raiEor^ see^ty offibe-; andfetf ( ;o) F^sbn. a miter (cj M* Kr^n^f myd Sonakv 
MoCs^i wiih :fts awrcs of tna a^s^bons ^ei ih& CIjs ^nra fBcso^otf of 


?r/ofn»3t5an p&rtalhlng to tftfe E^LftoS oi lb a EG-urcsfe) (rf in© tofe^genc© COHtaiOGtf 
frviTin the Oecefrfeef namonsndain wns ncl rsdati&d tvhon fewas prc rated to 
e';hEF !ha UK fsatfortti socu<fy cJfefa sndftr Flxcicn aad'0* Mr Kroner srcl 
Seriate' McCato. Ths intaratan cc^air-d tfuun Ot© rrcaflHiSftca report 
C^rtalptog tc the sie fees o4 Lhe souroeisl we * gqrt^eitnt wiSh Dff^ndfy^' 
CCrtScsSUS efforts [jrt&scf fre -dentlty tf lhs &tx!rce{«} 


*£. Rsaso stole wt&tftfir to Fuebrt caflcbvxl any expose fe'fc'fctftoe 

to cccf4or4ja]ly (corral paf&gfapn 21a vrfHCh ti/pfiesEly tafeis to tor? a 
eoqftde^teJ bass'}. 


a the Seccrto Defenisnlfe st/nir^ruaijers wfrh Fysksc surround ng tf» 
provtejen oi irre tostructfari fey cndp^cr^d ©ttiaa, tl wtw sapUc:^ stated Sifet lh* 
^arm?narKfa v^e only Ea be poV}d3d p Mr Xr&rn^r fer to? p-jrpoEB ©f pas^-g 
Iharn oc to Senator t^cCain. SdJiiei^^ ewiversaibs© t^hsisn Lhs Secern 
DaTarK&lt enj Fusiuci to [[ies /naUar w«cs EBOduded uSvig istXif© 

■■siephcra ccm.Ti^Joa-’^ns i>jrvsg c hcz& seai*G cona^onlcs^ons, Fto Skc-t^ 
Defendant oxpra^sJy sr^fEKitod tTrsl Oe CecsFr^r rnenrar5r*&sri was 
to lh© iymo strict rafctftctions ©n di^dcs^ to S&srcf perSaa as \nsra tfensalfie© in 
Chft wrfen Ggn>:?Tiarut d«gcrito^cl to tfc© mspanaa io jfs^tfais t to 3 above. 

Und&f paragraph 21aand b 

Of '^Gsorpjingjy the Sscc-^tf D?femcforJjTDMxM o cc^ ^ Dc<w^w t n^wrer-^ 

fa* a o ^yitor i;K <jcv^jrfer?C iscij'iy odftciar G-fefiijg to hla capacity, Oft 

3 oGnftS§M&i to hartf ccj?y f&s?; $fi d h fuztift. by 6r>dptecd e/TH’? (rtth 
(o P^£k>n 'fepnovfsfs u hsrc' co^y to a&i. AdsCi.'a Mr Jtervjf' 


ia F,£sa6ft =&3tG stneiher P^ctocfed fc>- Ih© Cofen[fcjils to F^rdon wss 

gs^sr^Fy pttvteod to exrpf>*fi<f fem. 



pop sttM'i 


lolftflloonco provide,d by tho Daiondflrvte to Fusion was provkicd sccufolyand 
\^?wo pravtdod oloctromcaily ft was prodded in onclplwrod form. 

Urvdbr pnranrnph* 23 mid 24 

Of 7f >s dciYfCd ttio\ in ih&tr nohsmi end ottfinory n\ coning, in thoir proper ooni&xi Iho 
»vo rds cwnptatnod of bora or x&n oupnbto of be a my (he wearing pit: acted at 
paragraph V and "Pond fn context tf& oalursJ end ordinary meaning of the 'fronts 
complained of i */as that in&r& were grounds to tnYosttgate whdhss toe Claimants bed 
boon coorwd by Ruttki into hurting the computers used by the US Domocrutec Party 
toextorshfp, iranzjTcUirtfj wti.ich, pfo/rtf/ig tnuyi steeling dole amt corKfoctlng oliodr.g 


17. Please Identify flip context ratiod on and cha r&adGfpj) jo whern d was allegedly 


TftO readers rct£nx?d Id are lb® roadors cl loo Dotembar ftv^morandurn vjt-.o 
ecceosed and read die uonia complained of via tha ertlcia that «ra& publishes 
on Iho SwaFoOd 10 Jwiuory 2017, 

Ttvo December memorandum waq d row tntonvgonco repon which coittoineo 
informottan gathered from n confidential oource(a) about vortouj natfcyioi 
security issues lhal warrarUBd further invDstigation. 

Further, Iho words -ccmpiainfid -of were published by BurzFsed as part aft an 
article vrtfch oirosaod evil iho oanianto of iho ctoMfor (which Included iho 
DnaomtMK momofmKlum) woro *iv/ri /cnlrctT, ‘uncaotttmotT and emMlnod 
'vwortflt Ht end potent My <wvt?/M»fote oik) gnl tons*. Tbo ortfrolo Added thfll. 
'Buzzfood terwa roporldrs in iho US and Europo how boon InvtistigoUng (ho 
ftfiogcxl fads m (ho do&st&r but have not v&ifkxJ or i&sited thorn.' The urtcfe 
reported thai tha Prasweru-eteci'a oiiom&y, Michael Cohon, held said thet 
allegations fn the dossier 'hw ubeotvtdy ?&$&. 

In thuflo c^carootoneafl, reador* of Iho words co/Tiplainod of \me thoitjforo 
iwam Ifuil (i) the aunieriia of Iho December rooroomodum dW not ropmwmt 
(unci did iial purport Id repro&efil} wrifiod focis, hut woro rev* tnl 9 $igonea which 
had Identified b range of a&igationa that warranted investigation (jlvon their 
polontkil osuonal soevhly fmpfcfiUons; (TO perwns menllcned zn iha December 
rmyrnorandu/n wono imSk-ofy lo hovo tnoan approached for comment, end 
(hmofom meny of ihoso por&ooc wore liberty lo dony iho oWegnUonu contamcrf in 
tho row (moJHgonoo; and (^1) while tho Oocomber rnoirwfflndumvstit peupnrod tn 
good ffllth, Ils oonlant must bo cdlicdly \oowed In light of tha purpoon for and 
drcumnioncoo in which the information was coHectad 





Under paragraph 32 

Of a ts sdntiux] ttm r tm Sgocjw DaflmdCanJ off jtsccrd ix^gs to z 

&n*£ n&xb&r of f&jfnafigs atom the patt'erifon sifiTvr>&feuttntf{f 

20 TS, r*b-psfnjs^h 5.2# fatfenfed" 


IB. P^eass Idenhjy the fcnafl&d by Ihe Secorci Deter d*nt end tteis who?; 

£T<j ho* bri^f^g ^3 done m each case and G^ogtel cf whaf wa? conveyed. 

^ s ^ ME 

The [currs m mittafty briofoO ei l>: end e? Sep lumber 2018 try fra Second 
Qof&qdur-' and Fusion §t Fuitoa's fra unction were fraeti 0» fstew Yerts Times, 
513 Wssterrjion Post Vchoo rho htav YoriCer and CNN. Tl>a Second 
Defeocfent sotaequpitfy pajticg^s:*: n further n^s&igs ei Fusign's ira-rutttoo 
arifr Fusion srvs the Ne^ Yarfc T3&aa» fre Waji^gScn Fott arc* Yehcc Itofta 
look ixeca in n^d-Odober 1016 In each cf tho^o esses the brieTrg was 
conducted v^rb^ty in person, fo «SO 0 cn H arti ££san el Pj^ZoiVfe frfcfr^ton, \n 
a:a OcEct^r 20 i 6 the Second Datsndsni briefed ® ^ourraSsI fnom toolbar JOno* 
by SScypsr. No cojjtea of fro pm^fedlon sneortc^nda v >er8 ever ahown or 
prided to any toL&ns%i3 t?y. Of itafr the oJ, fra Etofendaafi*. Tho 

briefing sTjcIved the dbdtfsu/u ct Seated te&£gw» raga^'nig intfcniicns d? 
Russian ^ertefcnc# tn ifte US eiso^on poos** 3.nd flio psasibte oo-aTflnabo n 
of m&mtcr^of Tftjrnpta carops^n and R^n'in «rtirra ft I cEida-B. 


7S P ease ssis whet ts mean* by ofT tho rec&tf and, it particular yntafrs.* Si 

Thn infomicton pit^dod wes nei id fce puttehed {bi£ tr^grij be u£E££ 

(pj Tho Jnformotfert rrJ^jhl be CRjbT^heo Uui 00i khe Dfc&ndanta Tn 

any v^y: 

( 0 } As (b]_ ind fr 3 D^fendsnis cdui3 to canencaity doocnodd, Dus not uy ns mo. 


The Seccrtd Defendant understood tmL Iba nformsTfcn pra^eo rr^hl bs lor (he 
purpose cf further maMrth, bat «oukl no? ts pubfeb-etf cr The G^endarts 

mpeat that no o?f the record trtefr^ loo^ p^oe cono&rnin^ fra Drcsmbo: 
fifieuto^ndura, rv: coote cf sny oj the 7fc^ecc : dft menrtOKi-id^ cr DecernDer 
fneTTVsmrdum worts ew ptevidsd tc jourrcSas by* or (ho eutherfas^ th* 


20 . Pfeasa sia ra wiisfraf L-- 5 « ienr>s \v5r3 Ks by Che ^wiststs ccr»^ 5 mi?cf. 






Tho Socond OelorKfard mz load by fusion Itol U\o lurwa trad boon (ixplnmod lo 
iho rckivnnt joumutal* in odvftnoo by them nod llvi Second Dofemlont 
retnlorcod Iho basis on nh»cft ho v/an speaking lo wch of the (oumaiiniE ho met 
In pdffian. Norto of the Journalists raised any objection. 

Under paragraphs 3$ to 39 


21«PIbs$d state \phefoer ilia OqJckvc© of quntfipd prlvitege ia rotted on by the* 
Defendants if they ora Heid to be llabfo for piAIicaUon to ths wortd et Igrgo ae 
distinct from the admitted pufctotlon to lha Individuals identified by pve 
Defendants In Uk* Defence. 

&SEQN 56 



The Defendants behove ttiat Ihe facts staled In LhU Rosporvso ora trua. 

PoxWtorv. Legal fXrnctor. RPC; Dofimdonto' legal ropflO&onlwtivo 

Unto: 16 ?Aoy 2017 




de ci ult ; 



Claim No. KCH7OD0413 



(2) WE021LLA B.V. 


Claimant g 







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Sr Kalnnnne's Way 
EtW 1AA 
T: 020 306 0 G003 

Rster&nee. OREM f 

Solicitors Ihu DtfervJijn;3 

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Appendix H Table of Contents 

(U) Letter to Acting Deputy Attorney General Dana Boente (March 8,2017) 187 

(U) Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuel R. Ramer {March 17,2017) 188 

(U) Letter to FBI Director James Comey et al. (March 15,2017) 189 

(U) Letter from FBI Assistant Director Gregory A. Brower {April 4,2017) 191 

(U) Letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions {May 9,2017) 192 

(U) Letter to Acting Attorney General Mary McCord (May 9,2017) 194 

(U) Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuel R. Ramer (July 7, 2017) 196 

(U) Letter to FBI Acting Director Andrew McCabe (May 16,2017) 197 

(U) Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuel R. Ramer (July 27, 2017) 199 

(U) Letter to Special Counsel Mueller and FBI Acting Director McCabe (May 17,2017) 200 

(U) Letter from FBI Acting Director Gregory A. Brower (July 26,2017) 202 

(U) Letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Sept. 1,2017) 204 

(U) Letter to FBI Director Christopher Wray (Sept. 1, 2017) 2116 

(U) Letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Sept. S, 2017) 208 

(IP) Letter to FBI Director Christopher Wray (Sept. 5,2017} 209 

(U) letter to Attorney General Sessions and FBI Director Wray (Sept. 15,2017} 210 


(U) Letter from Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein (Sept. 22,2017) 212 

(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Sept. 26,2017) 213 

(U) Letterto Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Nov, 2,2017) 21S 

{U) Letterto Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Dec. 28,2017) 216 

(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Jan. 4,2018) 218 

(U) Letter to Former FBI Director James Comey (Nov. 8,2017) 220 

(U) Letter from Former FBI Director James Comey (Feb. 1,2018) 222 


(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney Genera! Rod Rosenstein (Dec. 6, 2017) 223 



(U) Appendix H fCont.) 

(tf) Letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (March 14, 2018) 225 

(U) letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Dec. 12,2017) 227 

(U) Letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (Dec. 12,2017) 228 

(U) Letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (Jan. 19,2018) 230 

(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein and FBI Director Wray (Jan. 25,2018) 233 

{U) Letter from FBI Assistant Director Gregory A. Brower (Feb. 2, 2018) 235 

(U) Letter to Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd [Feb. 16,2018} 236 


(U) Letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (March 7,2018) 237 

(U) Letter to Former FBI Director James Comey (Feb. 20,2018) 238 


(U) Letter to FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe (Feb. 20,2018) 240 

(U) Letter to Attorney Genera! Jeff Sessions {March 1,2018) 242 

PROPERTY of the u.s. house of representatives 


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March 8, 2017 

The Honorable Dana Soenie 
Acting Depuiy Attorney General 
United States Depanmai; of Justice 
950 Pennsylvania Ave, XV/ 
Washington. D.C. 20530 

Dear Acting Deputy Attorney General Eocntc. 

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (the Committee) is aware of 
recent media reports bdicating the possible existence of Foreign Intelligence Suneiilsrxe Aci 
•FISA) applications submittedby the Department of Justice {DoJ) in 2016, ar-d'or Foreign 
tnldligenoe Surveillance Court (FISC) orders ct criminal wsnants pursuant to Title HI of the 
Omnibus Crime Control acd Safe Streets Act of 1963 that may have authorized the collection cf 
communications and/or information regarding Presidential candidate Donald J, Trump or his 
associates in 2016. 

For the purposes of this leittr, "associates” includes any Trump campaign surrogates, 
advisors, or employees; any Trump Organization surrogates, advisors, or employees; and fajm-y. 
friends, end business associates of Mr. Trump. 

Accordingly, the Committee requests the following information, if it exists: 

1. Any and sil ccpies of cny FIS A-app!icaiions submicced to the FISC by the CoJ in 
20f6 regarding then Presidential candidate Daueld J, Trump or his associates, 

2. Any and all copies of any orders issued by ibfc FISC in 2016 regarding then 
Presidential candidate Donald J. Trump or his associates. 

3. Any and ail copies of any wsrrani issued by a Federal J udge or Magistrate pursuant to 
i tile IJ1 of ihc Omnibus Crime CcmroJ ana Safe Streets .Act of 19u8 in 20 16 
re-rarding then Presidential candidate Donald J. Trump or his assoewfes. 

We seek copies of the foregoing documents, if they crisi, ro later than March 13,2017. 


Devin Nunes 

Copy to: The Honorable is.mas Comey. Dimeter, Federal Bureau of Investigation 




tLS. Department of Justice 
O flies of Legislative Affairs 

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Office erf the Assistant Attoni sy General Weiskington, D.d 20530 

iVfarch 17. Id 17 

The Honorable Devin 

Pc undent Select Committee un intelligence 
U.S. House of Representatives 
Wash ingion, DC 20515 

The HoTiomale Adam 3. Schift' 

Ranking Member 

Pcnnsacnt Select Committee on intelligence 
U .S , Ho us e o f Repress laii ves 
Washington. DC 20515 

Dear Chairman Nunes hi d Congressman SchnE 

Enclosed please find classified documents responsive b you r request. which we ana 
providing for review only by each of you and for return lo us today. !n addition, pursuant to cur 
agreement. one srdTmember for each of you* cvho has tk rcq^sUcekatrazi-ccs, also may review 
the materials. In the event chat chher cf you is eoi available today :o review these nmeribls, yen 
racy designate one staff m era ter with the requisite dearan a s to rev! ew item in yo ur £aea& 
attorney from ;hir office will remain with liir documents at alE times and return with them to tbs 
Departmeat today. 

We heps that this inibflnctiotl ;s 3tdrJd. Please do nol hesitate to contact this office if 
we may provide cddltionai assistant regmiing tbb or any other matter. 




I MWil ft. M>u^ 

\ spaniel R. Renter 
Acting Assisianr Anomcy Gencnd 


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March 15, 2017 

The Honorable Admiral Michael Rogers 
Director, National Security Agency 
Fort Meade, MD 20755 

The Honorable James Comcy 
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Washington, D.C. 20535 

The Honorable Mike Pompeo 
Director, Central Intelligence Agency 
Washington, D,C. 20505 

Dear Directors Rogers, Comey, and Pompco; 

As you know, the Committee has been very concerned regarding the purported 
unauthorized disci osures of classified information, particularly when they pertain to intelligence 
collection on, or related to, U,S, persons (USP), To take a prominent example, a January 12, 
2017 article in a major newspaper was Ihc first to claim that "Retired Ll* Gen. Michael T. Flynn. 

[then President-Elect] Trump's choice for national security adviser-phoned Russian 

Ambassador Sergey Kislyak several times on Deo, 29." 

Such stories would appear to contain the unauthorised disclosure of USP identities. This 
potential misuse is a key reason why the Intelligence Community (1C) has developed robust 
‘'minimization procedures 11 for the prelection of USP information, including requiring the 
“masking" of USP identities in most circumstances. 

However, as recent news stories seem to illustrate, individuals talking to the media would 
appear to have wantonly disregarded these procedures, The Committee is concerned that USP 
identifiable information may have been mishandled in violation of approved minimization and 
dissemination procedures pursuant to statute and/or Executive Order 12333, as amended. 
'Therefore, no later than Friday* March 17, 2017, each of your agencies should pro vide the 
Committee with the following: 





L All d d c po 1 1 c k s an d/or proecdures each agency cm p] oy $ to m a kc 3 detenu {n 31 i on 1 0 

unmask-and disseminate ihc identity pfaUSP; specifically, the Committee requeirts the 
approval process require to authorize such a dnaEIon within artd outside the 
flgetwy* including the number of individuals v/ho een approve an unmasking in e&ch 
, agency: 

2. The total uumherof dissent marie tvs of any unmarked US P identities between June 2016 
and January 2017, if they exist: 

X \f * h cy exist, the names 0 f any urunasked USP& whose idemities were dUseminsted in 
response to requests from IC agencies, law cnfbrcctecri* or senior Executive Branch 
officials between June 2016 and January 2017, and that relate to Presidential candidates 
Donald J* Trump tuui Hillary Rodham Clinton and Iheir assadaies In 2016F 

4 . If the y ex is t* th c twin cs of any 1 C age n qi es> law e aforccmc m age tides, an d/or seni 0 r 
Executive Branch officials (lint requested and/or authorized the unmasking and 
tllsseminaiion of USP information relating to the specific individuals ami entities 
specified in request ^3 above, ns well as the tides of till specific recipients of that 
unmasked UttF informadon; iuk! 

5, 1 f it exists, the suited reason, pursuant \o the relevant mlnlnitaoiton procedures feu 
unmasking cacti USP identity feinting to request iQ above. 

We appreciate your prompt attention to tins request. If you have any question* regarding 
the foregoing, please comoei lire Committee at (7.D2) 325*4121 - 


Devin Nunes 

Adam B, SehlfT 
Ranking Member 

Cepy to: 

The Honorable Michael Dempsey, Acting Director o{ National ImcJEgeirce 

1 Forthe puipfrici cf thto Jj>c lude iny juirfrgniCA, wiviion, v* employees: tmy Trump 

Or^irttMUVffi flrClmtoA PopnU^ki.i wiitc-yim, ndvSwn, pc emptoyc**, said fmuily. a/id bu^fi-^i AMOckaict 

ol MO Trump and Xlrs t CUfirtoiL 


Property of the u,S, house of representatives 

US Depa rtrnent of Justice 
Foetal Bureau «f fovcttigatiaTi 

April 4,2H 7 

Honenible Devin Niuies 

Permsaem Select Committee oti lntdilecnsc 
U.S, Ho^se of Representatives 
Wa^b^tiQz* DC 2i)S*S 

Adam Bp Scbi£f 
Rjmlting Member 

Pe^anim SilecL Gominirtes Cti !t^c][|^=£c 
U.S. House of HcpfcscnUti ves 
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Dcs; .Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

This roipo-ds to your teGer deted March S £* 3QI? ;o Admiral Rogers, National Seca^iy 
Agency; Phector Ptsmpoo, Central Iruclli^cnrc Agency; and ftticcicr Comey. Federal Euieei: of 
InecH^atba (FBI)* i^cs^ng informs; on concern i /35 rash agency's poticiea=Jid procedure* 
trilling to the dissanlfi&ioii of US. peism mforra&ticm 

As wc have discus^ with your staffs on jgvtis! oceasioos* we WStcOGiS sti opportunity 
to brier iheContmiltet* concermn^ the FBFs policies ejjd procedures in order 10 Identify 
infcnumioii held by the FBI that is of interest to ihc Committee. 

'A ? e appreciate yourcontinued support Ibi (he FBI ami tU misrlacL Plezsi contact this 
oiffcc is wt can be of further assistance. 


Gregory A. Bra^xr 

As&iftaai Director 

CfFxc of Onit£jcss:ojial Affairs 



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May % 2017 

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The Honorable Jeff Sessions 
U,S. Attorney General 
VS. Department of Justice 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue WAV. 

Washington, D-C 20530 

Deor General Sessions: 


As part of its bipartisan investigation Lmo Russian active measures directed at the 2016 VS, 
election, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requests that you produce 
certain documents and other materials to the Committee run! arrange for your participation m a 
voluntary r transcribed Interview at tho Committee's offices, 

First we rcspcctMy ask that you produce to the Committee, by no later tlmu the close of 
business on May 22 . the following: 

Any documents! records, electronically stored information including e-mail, 
communication* recordings, data end tangible tilings (including tart not limited to* 
graphs, chartu, photographs, images and other documents) regardless of form, other limn 
those widely available {<;<&, newspaper articles) that reasonably could lead to the 
discovery of any fhets wlltotn the Invesijgallon's publicly-announced prummeten* 

In complying with tills request, we ask that you furnish to the Committee, in imredacted form, 
any md all responsive materia 1 in your oemu! or constructive possession, custody, or control or 
otherwise available to you, including responsive material possessed by any third party to be 
transfected to your possession and shared with the Committee, This request is also made on an 
ongoing basis: if after making an initial production to the Committee you find additional 
responsive mareriah you should produce that material to ehe Committee. 

To the extent not encompassed by the above request, this letter also requests preservation of all 
documents, records, electronically stored information, recordings, data sad tangible things 
(including, but not limited to, graphs, chans, photographs, images md other documents) 
regardless of form* other Elran those widely available (e.g,, newspaper articles), related to the 
Committee's investigation, your interview, tmi any ancillary matters. 



UNC LASS* na^COM^l'lES senstti ve 

Should ;i becc-atc necessary go, ihg Cftmrni Etc^ m nv supplcmcnt th^ document recutst 
contained in fats letter at anv time* 


Comrai';.^ star: wiJl \\Qtk wii you ;o anaujsjfc you: interview nt a tiiue and date sjfcequqm u> 
youj pieduciion. of dccc-ienvs to the Codintrl'^e. The fncwvinw Tti&y enter say tnpio within the 
publidy<tfiflottQCOd parameters oftht Coraevtetfs Investigator!, icdntftng Russian cyhor 
activities directed ;fte 201#t;_5. election* pcit^hcl lirAs between Rtsshi cn-I individuals 

isolated with pal i tits I camp^^s* the H,S. govern men fs response ro these Russiai: active 
saeamiJttS. and i elated Leeks atdassi&ed iiiiaraaiicKi. 

ShtruJiJ you hive any ideations at any liine,, plccsc contact Conr#fnittt^ siafTit (202; 225-4 t2L ] f 
you cqHcscntcti by an suomoy, p*=3sc fa rased this letter *3 your artomey. aad have him or 
her conEicc the Coramittaa on your bskdf. 

Sincerely, v" 

K_ Mitb;! Ctrc^ay 
Mem ter of Congress 

Adam Scfeiff 
Ranking Member 


Aitadunatti: Pa revelers tor Russia invest! cation 




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Ms- Mary McCord 
Acting Assistant Attorney General 
U.3. Department of Justice 
National Security Division 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W. 

Washington, D-C 20530 

Dear Ms. McCord: 

As part of id bipartisan investigation into Russian active measures directed tit the 2016 U.S. 
election* the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence requests that you produce 
certain documents and oilier materials to the Committee and participate in a voluntary, 
transcribed interview at die Committee’s offices, 

First we respectfully ask tluit you produce to the Committee, by no later than the dose of 

business on May 2X the following: 


Any documents, records# electrcdedly stored itiftrrrmUiun inducting e-mail, 
communication, recordings, 6m and tangible things (including, bui not limited co, 
graphs, chints, photographs, images and other documcnlsj'rcgardlcss of form, other than 
those widely available (c.g.* newspaper articles) tout reasonably could lead to the 
discovery of any facte within the investigation's publicly sumo unced parameter. 

lit complying with this request, we ask (hat you furnish to the Committee, in imrcdacted ferm, 
any and all responsive material in your actual or constructive possession, custody, or control or 
otherwise available to you, including responsive material possessed by any third party to be 
transferred to your possession and shaded with the Committee, This request is also made on an 
ongoing basis: if after making an initial production to the Committee you find additional 
responsive material, you should produce that material to the Committee, 

To the extent not encompassed by the above request, this letter also requests preservation ef all 
documents* records* electronically stored information* recordings, data and tangible things 
(Including* but not limited to, graphs, charts, photographs, images and other documents) 



regard'ess of form, ciccr than those widely evailable (e^,. newspaper iirticks), related to tire 
CcnuniEfie’s iuvcsfieatiom your interview, ard any ucdllary marten 

Should it h&cimtfc neetflaarv to do so. the C?mmtttv£ ttiay auapignuftt fbr document nsmUrst 

cop biased in rhk tetter at auv time. 

Cfljnnuttec staff will work wilh ;w 10 arrange your Interview, at a time and dale subsequent to 
you' production of documents to the Committee. The interview my cover any topic withia die 
publicty-anncimced psninjetcra of the Ccnarutiee’s Investigation, including Russian cyber 
activities directed against the 2016 U.5, election, potential links between Russia and individuals 
associated with political campdcns, l he U S. governments response to these Russian active 
measures, find related leaks of clarified inhumation. 

Should you have any questions ai any time, plz-tse contact Committee stafffat (202) 225-41 It. If 
you are ^presented by art attorney, please forward this [fitter to your attorney, and have hlia at 
her contact the CommiSiee on your fcebs1£ 


" t 


k, Michael Conaway 
Member oF Congress 

Adam SchuT 
Ranking Member 

Attfichnaeat* Rurumsters for Russia Investigation 



property or the u «. house oe representatives 

U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of LcEwtMtve AfBsfrji 

Office o£lhc Aarislunt Attorn^ Ucwu&I Washington^ RC 2 OS SO 

JUL Q 7 2017 

The Honorable K* Michael Gcraaway 
Penr-aacn: ScJbcc Committee on InttllifiCffiCC 
U.S. HbviSd of Represent lives 
WnaMngUm, DC 20515 

The Honorable Attorn $ebiff 
Raskhig Member 

Pcnnirawnt Select Cciumuliee on Intelligent 
IJ-S, H-Ousc ofRoproseo&tives 
Wa^hktgieu* DC 2Q5U 

Deaf Congressman Conaway and Coupes sman Schiff: 

This responds to yon: letters to the Attorney General and to then-Acting Assistant 
Attorney General Mary McCord ofehc National Security D1 virion, both dated May $ t 2017, 
which, requested doutimentfi in oomiecUon with UwOottimiuc^KinvawliBuUan into Rimitm aciivo 
mtwsmcs directed at the 201 6 US. election* 

As yon know, on Mny 17, 201 / r the Department of Juulfau (Department) announced the 
appointment of Robert S, Mueller !fl to setvo a 9 Slieclul Counsel to oversto the previously- 
eon/In nod FBI invalidation of Ruwian government of forts to influence the 2016 presidential 
electiou and roltitinl ni After. j. We ana advised that tlift Special OniniBOl \m begum to infte step* to 
ftiUiil these lospoviribilitics* Under these dreumslnaccs and consistent with the Utspartmoil's 
hm^slanding policy cctyurilng Ibis confidentiality and sensitivity of information id&ting to 
]>euding matters, the Deportment is not prepared to rc&ponJ ftirlhcrio your revests at this time, 

We appreciate dye Committee's Interests in tills matter and hope that this informed on is 
hcjpihL Please dsy not hesitate to contact this office if wc may provide additional assistance 
about ony oihcr matter* 


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May 1 6,1317 


Acting Director Andrew McCabe 
FBI Headquarters 
935 PennsyLven 1 ^ Avecwt, NW 
Washing O.C 20535-0001 

Dear Acting Director McCabe: 

As pan of lu h(partis invest t^tion into Russian sense measures directed ai the 21116 U_5. 
eiccticjEi. che Hou^e Formancm Select CcLTrmiires on [md tiger. :e request fcl yao rroduc- 
cci^in docamfcEls and other maiertiils io ll*£ Ccnicmnee tod ssranyt for your ptrtkipqiioo in a 
voluntary, transcribed interview et The Committee's offices, 


First we respectmlly isk That you produce to the Comzdrtee, by no Iansr than the of 
b ad ness ofl Mjnr23 T the fbllcv/ing; 

Assy tioctlEWDlS, records. el ectren-tally stored tafbijlieticfi rrdutiing o-mmi, 
ttxmmuni cation, recordings^ dm and tangible things (ieduding, but ivot limited to^ 
grfcphsi charts j phQiograprti, images aad ocher decline nttj regardless of form, ruber than 
these widely nvaikble {e.&, newspaper icicles} that reasonably could kad io the 
discovery cf any uets within the investigations pubUdy-mtceuccod parameters. 

tn eonipljmg with thte request, we ask that yon famish to the Committee, in ^redacted fonts, 
any and ell responsive msTorijil in yoiif ectu&l or constructive possession, comedy, or control or 
otherwise available to you, including icspsnajve rtvatetial possessed by any third pnny to be 
Gt-'^bned :o yovr possession end sfrsred with the Committee. This request is also resile m 2 n 
ongoing bciis: if*fter nuking an Inltinl production to the Committee veu find additional 
responsive mater at, yon rbould nrodtios that miistlal to die Ccimtuaee. 


To the not encom pssssd by the bbove roquet, this brier also requests pmservetien of alt 
4 ecu meats. records, ckcttnmcaily stored £n formation, recordings, dat&and tangible thicks 
(tr^iudin^ but not Iiirrlted to, graphs, ttexs* photography im&£es s^A other documeriK} 
rc^unless of iom, other than tiiose widely available tri^spaprr artidcs), reJaodto the 

Ccnimilfe's mvesiigatior^ your interti^', und ajviUaiy x^Licr^ 




Sliuuld \t hero mu necessary to cto sa, the OmmlfW n my surcpkmtnt Hitr doco^^it request 
contained Irt ihh lei ter at nnv time. 

Committee staff will work wiih you to arrange your interview, at a time and date subsequent to 
you* production ofdticunKms 10 the Committee, Tina Interview sooty cover any topic within the 
publfcly-onnounccd pemmeiers of the Commit Ws investigation, including Russian cyber 
activities directed against the 2015 U.S. election, potential Jinks between Russia and Individuals 
associated tviih political campaigns, Ihs U.S. govonment’s response to these Russian active 
measures, and related leaks of class] fled inform atoi. 

Should you have any questions at any time, please contact Ccnuniltee staff at (202) 225-4321. If 
you an: represented by an attorney, please forward (hts Letter to your attorney»and have him or 
her contact the Committee on your bobali 


K, Michael Conaway 
Member of Congress 

Adam Schiff 

Ran king Memo bet 

AtUucJirneM! Parameters for Russia Envcstip p alion 




US* Drpartomjt of Justice 
iDfUce at LeglsLuive £\p?\m 

O Rice of the A3 stebaL Attorney Gccersi Wpshtx&on, D, C. 20530 

JUl 2 7 2017 * 

The Hbneo&h!t K- Michael Conaway 

PenDiiasaxt S?bot Committee on bieiligcaec 
U.S. Hmt3& ofRe^rw^ltvcs 
WasMEQtOTt DC 20S1S 

The Hccorabb Adm ScHJf 
KoE&og Merrier 

Permanent Seket Ciinumtiee jn btelitstcce 
VS. H#use afRc jp t wntatr vcs 
Wjshln^cia, DC 20515 

Dear CangcrssEnaiiQmswfcy srd ConcrcssTiSi Schiff: 

This responds to your letter to Federal Bureau of Iir^estLgsCQa (FBI) Acting Direct 
Asdiew MeCibe, daied May 2017* which reqvsitec documents b eeenretion with the 

Cormtwltrtfs invriligatb)} into Russian udxve nrc*sure3 directed 2 Uhe 2016 U,S- deCtiorL 

As yoa maw, cnMoy 17* 2017 the Dcpartaaertl of telice {Dcpatfeznt) anoooooed the 
^rpoiitecm cf Rptet $, Moeikr )£E to ctvTve sf Special Crasd/ro orarsec Ac previously- 
consisted FBI investigcnoo ofMussisi g£) vmmftfll sfilbristo influence th= 70 Id praddotial 
eleetaea mid rdatedtogsas. We cm advtfcc] Ihut fo Specif CouLsd has hegoa to take seeps to 
£bJ5U these respotmhiUdes. tinder these drcumsisiiccs end crasifsat with the D^ertasnt^ 
long* 5 ttcdSag policy itgKding the cc^nTdenUdit)’ and sensitivity omfoimVioii relating to 
pcadina raatte^, the Department la not prepared to respond tbiicr to yaur isquesi ci this tim c, 

We t^pcfccxMe the Grantee's bicrests to this n&nex aud iswe th^t this infaqnaHoo is 
hd pfuL P lease do not tesit&z to came c thk o fric^ if we may provid e a ddiccaal existence 
about ££y otte matter. 

$kccrak : 



Sarttori R- Racier 
Actic§ Assistant Atrosuey GenemJ 


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May 17,2017 

tvlr, Rnbcri M vd I c c 
Special Counsel 
U.S. Decartnscm of Jusike 
Washington, D.G 20530 

ifr. Andrew McCabs 
Acting Director 

Fcdara! Bureau of fcyc^gEJion. 
Washing UC-20535 

Bear Mr. MtralLcr snd Andug Director McCabe: 

Mr. Moelisr'fi at»pcii^:eiu 33 Special Counsel is a necessary end posttsve m ihz 

Dspart^ot of Justice's iovcsiig^tion regarding Russia As pad of 0*-tl Vip^itUsn inquuy into 

Russian mivc encashes, to insshidf coontejirfdHgcncc EoncEms, the Camming wiU be 
conducting rigorous overdgh: to ensure *rvd die Depsitm&ft of Justices ivork, to include the 
costing CouritcrifUtelli^eoce investlg^ioD regfitdieg Russia by tf*e Federal of 

jives^fitiiOfR* is not impeded cr inttjrftrcd ’with in eay wsy. 

Accordingly Ibe Comzninse requests that tas Dqvsrt^em o: Justice, Including ibar ederal 
Bureau of investigation preserve and prudtice to ibs Committee: 

(1) copicc of all documents, records, electrtricajly stoned, infcn^acon including e-mail, 
c&fumcnLcsucfi. msordi a£s, daig md :en&ble flings* rcasdless Of feru* other than 
iios& 'widely available (c.jl, nuwspipsr snicks} thfit reference Mir. Geajoy*$ dismiss^] 
ss FBI Director that no poVnrfally rdcvnnt to the Bureau's no^erintc111 aer^ce 


(2) dl docuciEDis memorializing conventions between tbc Presides end fvlr- Comsy 
regjtfdifig bis todvrtfea as Director, tc include all rnemtKaraS^ coles, lt aih*a: 
cocwncmsrcs^rdiiigsudi conve^elicus, Ita arc potentially reJcvgariolhe Bureau’s 
coimtarii^dligctca invistigarioiL 


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US' Department of Justice 
Fcdoml Buruau oflnvcstlgnlion 

mtiktn&cn. D.C 2 r jttS-60Q1 

July 26 , 201 ? 

Honorable K, Michael Conaway 
M ambur of €ong?m 

Permanent tided Committee on Intelligence 
US* House of RefM’esojitetives 
Washington DC 20515 

Iformmbfc Arinin Sehlff 
Iteming Member 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
U.8« House ofRepncscnietfves 
Washington, DC 20515 

Dear Ccmgieasnmn Conaway ;md Runkiw# Member Rchiff; 

Ttii$ is in icsponsc to your letter io Acting Director McCabe and $p*cUi Counsel Robert 
Mueller dated May 17> 20174 sacking all documents, records, and data, that reference 
*Mr, Comey's dismissal as FBI Director dm arc <b paieianally relevant to the FBFs 
ccimitriitfexigence mvostigtfiorf' ofRtmhm interference in the 2016Presidential elcodon, 

As you know, Acting Attorney General Roscnstcia announced the appoinlmem of a 
Special Counsel “to conduct the investigation confirmed by thw>FBI Dcrcntor Jamc3 B, Comcy 
in testimony before the House PercnunetU Select Committee on Intellig&FfUc on March 20, 2017, 
including: (i) any links and/or coordination between the Russian government end Individuals 
associated With iho campaign of Prcddcut Do nald Inunp; and (ii) rmy matters that arose or may 
arise di;eutfj from live Investigation; ond (til) any other mutters within i)ic scope of 23 ChRR. 5 
600 L 4(ft) " As a result, your reqaert fleck rmra^tiptwc mmcriab related to m ongoing 
investigation* and, consistent vrfih long; landing Department of Justice policy, we would decline 
to produce those rent crisis at this time. 

in addition, yon requested all document* memuriulmng cohimmucittions between die 
Pj^idtrrt nod then FBI Director Comey. We Arc advised that the Special Counsel^ Office and 
the Dep&itoism of Justice have provided the Cumniiliec with access to the memoranda md 
docLimenta of former FBI Director Comcy* Io light of ihflL accommodation, we believe this 
requcai bits been addressed. 

iw iiLkii; 


rtorcorablE K. Miehael CAruiv^y Monar^Hc A dsn ScbiE 7 

Please contact inis office tfvr-c can <w of as^ist^ace coaceroiag otter otters. 

We ££precbie your cccti rru^d £jpp£rt for tfce F8f srd its mr?iion* 


Gregory A- Slower 
AsakanL Director 
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September ^2017 

The Honorable JisJTScwdwi* 

AUrtn^y General 

United Sides Dcpoitoueiit of Justice 
950 PfimisylveiiJa Avc* RW* 

WfjsTurt^gn, D.C. 2(1530 

iUectr Attorney Session:: 

Go August 2A t 2017* the House Peimaircnt Sciea Commitveu on Intelligence ( ll CtJuimiKee 14 ) 
served subpoenas on ihs Attorney Gewral, In bis MpHCtCy s* h ntd of the Dupaitmm of Justice 
{^DOr}* and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("MV*) for production of 
documents relevant to the Committee's ongoing uiYt&tigptiau ofFUujriua Intel furenee in tltclOlG 
US, uresldcnUal elmUpn, including alienations of collusion between tlx? Trump ctu^fiGp and 

The iaibpuciiis di reeled DOJ and F31 to produce any and all docunimts rtladrig lu the agencies’ 
idfltiaiuiiiip with farmer British Secret fotdli fence Service office*' Christopher Suajo tmri/oribe 
50-caikd "i rump DtiwicC InoImJIrtg tbese memmMtitag FBl'rt idittionihip with Mr. Stcelo* 
payments oaisdc to Mr, Steele, and efforts to tarroborate information provided by Ml Steele 
end h\?i Kub-soUTCCs—whether directly or via Vision GPS* The subpoenas al^o directed DOJ and 
FBI to provide copies of any Foreign ItflclJigeuec Survdilm^ Act (FISA) an plications 
submitted fo the Foreign Tnsel Hgeuce Sur/dUanee Gr>urt (FTSC)—whether or cot approved by 
the FISC— incatpmating information provided by Mr, Sicde, hln tfiifo-sourcco, anrifor Fusion 

Resort to compulsory process was nsosseary because of DGi*s and FBFs iipjoIBo^tl 
leapoiisivencss To (be Committee's aumcrou* Ru$sMftvestf£a(lou related rtqutm avar tfict p m 
sovcml months* On multiple occasions, through written requests mi direct engagement, the 
Commitico \wj ittufihlbut failed (0 receive idepmvkJve ictfimtmy oj tloeiunente from DOJ and 
FBI. Fpr example, to date th e CojQsnrCiec has not received a meanmgfiil response to its May !>, 
3017, request to Attorney General Sessions* AdditiosaUy, 00 May 15, 20L7, the Committee sent 
a tetter asking then-Acting Director Andrew McC&bc fo pjsrttoipate voluntary interview, and 

produce relevant documents* Thu Committee received tic reply until W 27—more than two 
numthti later—when DOT declined the interview request and indicated ihttf "the Department B 
not prepared to respond furthw' to your request at tbltJ time," 


Previcmsly. cm March S, tbs CcnumE&s slight fiorr< DOJ eertni* doctKsuentE* mefcdiqg relevant 
?5 Sa appEcaticcts tzd 1 : ISC orders, mo or, March 17 sfloUed twa billets to review 
lespansvs documents on 3 read-arLt^rerriEi basis* The Commutes ^ not provided 4 copy of 
tht^c doca^tais, cm} tine Cofniniltc^te request to review them again was defied. 

The subpoenas issued on AugusS ?A required production 310 later thas l2:0Cpoi cm Seeember 1, 
2(117. Keiths DOJ tut FBI provided any doeunLenu by tbs deodHn^ On o*e of 

August 31, teas than 24 bears before the dvtt the Corerei(tee received 2 * initial response 

ftocc the DOJ Office of Lcgjs leave Affairs on behalf of bcOt pof eni FBI— 

sdditio^d time to comply vddi tbe subpoenas- 

TheCnmfritiM requires timely proiiftios of tire subpoenaed do$tta£5&t£ in order to execute irs 
avt^sigbt responsibilities cn twaJF c: tht Amertetti public and folly tftaln&i&thc sen oca of both 
DOJ ardfcFBI. There ism tegp&rjire teis fer BDTs EuJtofe c 0 jr*»edpg£u% eugagethe 
Coccminec until the evo of the deadline or begin production 33 a show 02 " good fifth. 

Moreover, diere is no legiibnatc basis tur BOJ 1 *reqttcsi fbr additional time to comply, became 
D QJ «nd the F3I are well sware ofthe idoth£y c Hhc rc.quesTed coaaocirfE, In dcKi, as noted 
abov^ ctiKstECjnsof them have Greedy been compiled acd mefe ramporarily avail &kfc for ihe 
CommiltBB^ rtvlfttv, end the Razrcfcfcg requested doaunente are readily identifiable. 

Nofetithstending these the Conttciuee hereby grouts an additional Lbiitseo (15) days 

for full cccptiarxe and production to occur m later then 9:00 cm an September 14,2017, at 
the local specified m the cngbsl sribpocne. This revised deadline vvil* ad be extended 

In ibe aitenrativs, if £31 responsive dncumeriSi are ocFt produced by the revi$r:j desdllac. the 
Attorney Geatni s?A the Director of the FBI shall Appear before the Committee 3*9:00 amen 
September 3 4> 20! 7, la Rr cm HVC-210 01 rhe U.5. Capitol during 00 open hearing, to explain 
uode: oath DDJ’a end FBPs unwiHi.rg*iass or isabilliy to comply m iuT with the subpseoas 
issued on August 24. 

Pieces be idv ised that, in the event that DOJ 01 FBI Jsib to srevide the docOTenls in fill Ci 
leEtimony^desfidbccJ shove, ihe CoTrsnittee expcesaly reserves ItsrigJii to proceed with any acd 
all svsiEefe je$&l options—ineludb?g reportins to the full House of RspctEcri^tJves a naao l uf an 
to hold the Aftemiey Genes! snd Db^ctor of the FBI in cectompt of Caogc&ss. ptsssuaXttn 2 
U.S*C 35192 , 394 - 


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Federal Bureau of Investigation 
935 Pennsylvania Ave, N.W, 

Washington, DXh 20530 

Dcur Director Wmy: 

On AUgU?- 24 f 2CH7* the House Permanent SsttCl Cbmmittct Oft Intelligence f'CtHIirofacef) 
served subpoena on the Attorney GeatjaUn hts capediy as head of the Department of Justiee 
( u D0J")i and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Invearganau (*1 ; B] FT ) for production of 
documents relevant to ihc Commtiieu's ongoing investigation nf Ru^iwi interference in the 7016 prcsideirtlnl dot lion, mdudiu# ^Legations of collusion between ihe Tnitnp campaign an C 
the Russians. 

The sufcm^naa directed DOJ and FBI io produce any and all doc unvote misting to the agencies* 
relationship with fornix Britiih Secret Jmelligcnce Service officer Chrirtfophtc Sleek and/or the 
W'culiod f Trum|> Dossier/ 1 he! udhjg hose memo fiat bdng FUF® roltillonabvp with Mr. Steele, 
tiny payments made m Mr* Steely and efforts to corroborate information provided by Mr, Studc 
and his sub-sources—whclhndiimiy or vk Fusion GPS. The wtitpoenssako directed TX)J snd 
FBrtn p(\vjide copies of any Foreign Intelligence 5iuve<tisncc At4 (FISA) apptieatians 
submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Sur/d Manet Colli* (FISC)—whether or not approved by 
Uic FISC—inwvrpornting infnnnnlion provided by Mr, Steele, M& Mtivflourccs, aud/or Fu.^icm 

itesort la compulsory process wes necessary because of DQJ\s mid FBI's insufficient 
responsiveness to the Committee's numerous Russia-investigation related requests over the past 
sftvmtil months, On multiple ocowthms, through written mrpiests and dfreet enanEcinems. the 
Committee \m sought butt failed to rtculvc respomiv v tedllmotty ot documents from DQJ and 
FBI For example, to 6m the Committee has not received a meaningful response to tis May 9* 
2017* request to Attorney QenenJ Stsstoas. Addhionsllyvcn May L6,2017, the Committee vcnl 
q letter asking thtstt-Aeting Director Andrew McCabe to p^rtidpate voluniflry intemeWj end 
produce Krl^vtqil dvemueritSw Tli^ CcmumllCve it^civcd no ritply until WWf 27—-more than two 
tiMlki hter—when DO! declined rhe [ntervicw raquert ana indicated thut HbC Department Is 
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FISA Epplicat’ocs and FISC orders, snd on Mtidt !7 ^5 allotted two bi Hefei to review 
:t^ponsive dacaaieatS an a read-and-renim basis. Tfea Comaifucc v.^ net provided a copy of 
those doct>rncn^* fin£ ths Cojrjtsicte^’s request 10 review i_heta a^Ato was denied. 

The subpce&ns isaiKd on August 24 required produaion so bier than 12: Q Gem tm Sqfte^ter l , 
2017. Neither DOJ oor FBT provided eny documents by toe choline On the afls^on of 
Aegust-U, less than 24 horn before the due dale, the Committee received an initial response 
Drooi the DOJ Office 0 f Legislative Affairs requasilng—on befreLfafboth DOJ and FBIr— 
additional ditto to cerrroN with due £ubpoam 

The Cummins* require zhcely pjoduatofi of the subpoenaed docuiaeats to erder to eoreoito its 
Oversight respEmblKtSes on bcitelf ofthe American public «id fill Ly cvaiimte dis setions of both 
DOG sod chs F3 L There to no legitimate basis fbr FBPs failure to oea/ungfidly em^ge toe 
Committee uati! too eve of the deadline or begin prc-iuctfort a* n show of good faitb- 

Bdoccbror* ibere is no legitimate basis for FBfs request fcr additional time to comply, brar^ 

7)02 end ihe F33 are aware of the identity of the requested doaunoits* kdfccd, zs noted 
sfeovc, u Least potrc of than have already been compiled and made temporarily avaflabte for the 
Ccmnaicre^s review, and the remaining legated docemcn^ me-readily Ideoinabic. 

N r otvwth£tandtog these conccrr^ the Ccerutoftec heresy p^ors an additional thirteen ( Lj) days 
for Sill ccmplfeaco snd ptocfac&m, to occur n;> ieis: than 9:0f} cn September 14,2f})7,e 
the locii specified to ths origins! subpoena. Thn revised deadEno will not be earjenced. 

Is ihedtcruative, if all responsive decuniens 30 not pro-dveed by th; revised dc^dltoe-, the 
Acotoey Genera! and the Director of die FBI shall appear berbro tbe CGmininec at 9:Q0 amw 
Scptooiber 14,2017. mRoxn KVC-S IQ of the U-S. Capitol during an open he&ring, to expl-toi 
usder oath DOJ*s md FBDs unwillingness ui Liability to comply in ?s\l with the subpoenas 
issued on Angus 24* 

PIca$e be advised that; to the event that DOJ or FBI fails ;o provide the documsnia to fall or 
testimony described above, the Committee expressly m^rves ioi rtot: to proceed with a^y «d 
ell avdbtoto Ecg^l options—incItKhnc reponhi^ to the fdliidoor^ of Rc|vrescrJstivcs a resolnhc-n 
to hold tts Attcropy Genera} Director of the- FBI to contempt of Centres!, uursttent to 2 

UL&C. B X$2> 194. 

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The Honorable Jiff Scszi cm 
Attorney Gtsemi 

United Slates Department of Justice 
950 PfaiiLS^Jvimid Avfc,W,W* 

Washington, EXC. 20530 

Dear Attorney General Sessions: 

As explMncd in my Ic&tf of [September l, 2017], if die Department of Justice tails co comply in 
full with the jmbpocno for production afdocunjtnte Issued by the House Pomarccai Select 
Committee on ]htoUlgenc& (Committee) on August 24, 2017, tlic Committee requires that 
Attorney General Jeff Session* uppcisr before the Committee on September Id, 2017 to explain 
[ton Mfurc, The accompany tug nulpoetii, isEued today* U iou^jJed tu eumpliiijnce with 

that requirement Should the Dqiatimeni of Justice comply in full and in a timely manner svllh 
the CQrtirniiieo'a subpoena of AuguM 24,2017, then the Attorney QciwtfiVa appearance wilt net 
be ceccrauy, and Urn appeiinuicc subpeerm dated Septembers, 2017, v/iM bi* withdrawn. 



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On Intsjjosjce 

Scp^ber 5*2017 

The Hocmabk Christopher Wray 

federal Bluest of lovcstigeUEka 
935 Petuxsyivarie Av^N.W. 
WashiTjgtcn, D,C 20530 

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Ce£f Diz^cioc Wray; 

As eKpiS&Kjd in my letter [September 1,2017], if Ok Federal Bissau of Inve^gattem tails V> 

comply iti full with the subpoena for pfcdu£t:art of docutoeDChi issued by tbs Hqie= Pen^armi 
Select Cotnmifc on toll Ig^nee (Ccttzoifta*) m August 24,2 Q17, ihs Ciymnint* requires (feat 
Direct Christopher Wray appear beibre the Comruittoo cm September 14* 2017 to explain that 
rail lire. The aceompamdng aohpoena. issued :oday> is rotaM^d to ensure coimplknce whh that 
;=qu5iemenL Should the Fedend Eureka of lsvest : giDoo ncmrply In Ml and iu a timely asuaner 
with the Cornice* s scbpoeniof August^, 2017* then th£ Directs appiamnw will not be 
necessary* and tbo acptarMccsotopoerv; dsted September 5*201?, wilt be wiLbfcwn- 





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September J5,2017 

The Hottotubki Jeff Sessions 

Attorney OeneoJ 

Utirted Stages Department of Justice 
950 Pennsylvania AVfc* N.W. 
Washington, D,Ci 20530 

’Hie Honorable Chiictqphtx Wmy j 


Pcdfcf&l Biiidiiiof IrTve^ttga^ori 
935 Fctmsyh'Oiiia Ave, K.W. 

Washington* D*C, 20530 

Dour Attorney Otiuuai Sessions and Director Wrayr 

On September 14,2017* representatives from the Deportment of Justice (‘i3Q,nj and Federal ! 

Bureau of lavT^gotion(*FBP s ) mlbnired the Committee that thsy wore not prop wed tfl produce 

i/wy documents reGjwfiyjvc to Ilia nubpoentu issued an August 24—definite ft 13*<Iay CtflDuritia 6t 

the orictnal Sqrteinher l rteadlimj that was gunted at DOJ's rcr|ttt'Kk (was particularly 

concerned tq 3cam that, in the past three weeks, efforts la assemble such doconiettlfl had not 

advanced beyond a prelunrafcty sf&gc. 

As noted la my letter of September the Committee ccaUuura to seek an y doeumema ?cgammg 
tbo osicfiC of ymir pftcticier/ retnlloiisliLp with former British See rat Intelligence Sendee officer 
CMttqpTrer Steele mdJor the s^-cidlcd^rcvirup Dossier” retevam to the Committee^ ongoing 
inrveat i action of Russian interference to the 2016ITS. presidential election—including 
allegations of collusion between the Tjvmp and the Ruvims. Tint Gcntimittee he* £JsiO 

sought any Foreign Intelligence Court Surveillance Act (FISA) explicit;eras sirbscittcd to tho 
Foreign In tel I i^encc Surveillance Court (HSC) - whether or not approved by the FTBC - that 
rwiy hive meorpof/ued riny Information provided by Mr.Stectv wad/or Fufiluu OPS, iv<h*tci no 
documents have btcu provided. 


Un&miioA^ly* HOJ's and last-wii'iiUtB fingfc££jmmt withthf Comraltt^^ c*guiding 

iubpocnneomplitu>ee sind failure to produce <u}y documents—indiujlicg those ptsvdtiusly made 
available—Iibr into u continuing ptfttem of insufficient rcspcKUiCvcncfin lei written Conunlttev 
finests d^thtg brick imt 5 moniltf, Indtidlhg tor docuarcab raid to^limon)' Ciom Attorney 





ChsMS&l Session;, Hit Dctjuty Director Andrew McCafce, er.dt form ^Acting Assistant Airomsy 
Cfccnd Mary McCord, 

The Gjirunitise rstticios canumtiad to exarci^ij* its cocstfmiiQnaJ oversight responsibilities, zzd 
coninvuo seeking you? <w’^ec2.lio£ ^svith these efforts, COJ snd FBi are therefore- gresied 
cxtzsai&raty eran^un of eu adoftioEd seven (7) cs>^forpcodsictfcn Otat sstasSes the August 
24 subpoena, to oeciir no !s££t ten 9:£f3* on S^p member 22,20 L?. la tbe s. T iemaii%"^ £ad 
[wsnan* to dtotsstnuonhi sobijoe^i^jcd on Septcsihcf < tbs Attorney and the 

Dtroctartifdio FBI shall appear fer scopes bosiingat3:CKJana en September 25,3GI7, mRocm 
IIVC-2J0 of the tf.Su Ccpitoi, to tcsiiiy uairr sath. 

Jn die event of continued r^ru^oropliari*, ihe Committee reserves its right to pmoced mihany 
and =11 available legs! opnras—indixaragTspomog to the fid* House ofRepRser^itiv=s a 
itsolndon to bold thcAttorroy Qr net4 and Dilator of &s FBI :□ seniors cf Congress, 
THUSttami^iU^CX §§ 152* 


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Scptcm^r2^, 20)7 

The l lonimiblL* Devin Nunes 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
U'S.'Housg of Representatives 
Washington. DC 205 IS 

Dear Chairmpn Nunc*; 

_ #» 

Our Legislative Affairs Office has been consulting with your stuff fo an elTuft eu 
arrange for me to meet with you to <l»fcu5s tin: CommiUee'H inquiries. T understand tbal 
ynu have been on foreign uwvcl this week. l wi)) be on foreign (mvcl fur the next live 
diiya. I therefore request that you extend the deadline staled in your September 15 letter to 
the Attorney General and the FBI Director, so that we can ammgc tu uddrcsM your 
request* without nnduly damaging notional security end disrupting any ongoing criminal 

I appreciated uur brief telephone I'onvcr&atton Uni week. I know that you 
understand that the executive branch's obligation to safeguard ihteltigenc* sources and 
methods and protect the integrity of investigations sometimes warrants accomniodaiUn. j 

This is not a novel issue, and it is not a partisan issue. Law enforcemcol <uid 
nurional security mailers me kept confidential for good reasons. 

Wise legislative and execute branch officials have worked together for many defend our nation's long term interests by protecting the confidentiality of 
Department nf Justice invest(gdions and preserving the Deportment's independence from 
the political arena. 

) hope thin lonitsfonding tiadition will continue ou our watch. 

Thank you for yow continuing courtesies 



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D^ar Deploy Alttcr-ey General RoscEStoiB: 

Thank you for yaur letter of S=p!£saber 22* 2017, As y;r.i we well aware, the House 
Peznaoenl Select Co rnmlKec on ir*£dligenc& (the C ossai flee) is uniquely equipped to safeguard 
in tel: igottefr souiccs and cicthcKi*. 0 i hex scca^dve b^sucii £gcr< d e$ bsrc provided the 
Committee wLlh to Cocmri=ais n^ce^sary co conduct its (Pgain^ in vcsttg^&on into to 2016 
pnrsdsiriiul eleetkm, tofadingmghly-ckssified inform^Eoa ofoanaidlniny sensJSvSy* The 
Ccmmirtoe has to groai lengths to avoid irjzr tiering w^th cny ongoing ettCCuEiv? branch. 
:nrYes%^C33, uni w stoud ready to wt?rk with you Ib Oris regard. f ebo take this opportunity To 
tindersco re tot our requests for infbrmauoa are likely to be fer in ffimte and smaller in 
seopt than the typical qtmBOflS judges and attorneys would ask in aiotoal probes. 



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September 26,2*117 

Fiirtormore, just as the Department of justice (DOJ) end Federal Bureau of fo.v&=tigaOaEi 
{FBI) have eaejtiistjoaAlubtigilicus, so too does Confess, which is jsspouelfate for <? vessels 
both DOJ egJ FBL While the Ccnmjttce fans b&en very pehenr over ibisfi to sist moalhs, tot 
pairenc* is cot without limit. To <btc, mcaninghil compfejico wrtfa the CorroovWciJ’a munerccs 
results h&s been Tm nmrnl, and to Comiurtto bis nut received any* documents pursue to 
Bui^KKnas Issued 3 month Tor wHch to deadline hss been twice aaeudal The fsci tot 
certain Inform alien mny he tnifessrassins ut east DOi or FBI in & light yo-u prefer to avoid is not 
suinefont grounds to deny to Committee »o^ to m^torhd^ ntevftod to its overright 
responslbilidcs, Nor nre tore any lawful justifications fur such a derdd to Congress. This 
flfa^eace of responsiveness Sam the world’s prcnEcr law enforcement agency is unacceptable. 

forcEHrapl^ on Msich i7 p to Coccmttsee 1 *^ aKojled iwo,billets to rt^kwcocucoCTLs 
lesponsivo io 4 request ror Foreign Mdligcrjcc Swvediknoc Aci (FISA) sppHcaEikns -tud 
Focrign IntoUi^eacQ SmvsIIlMicc Court (F!$C) orders. TEodocnnwcra were ponded cq a rcai- 

cad-rchim thi Ceeunhto9*3 fiaquaflC eo rr\ r l^v them 2 ^ am Vx’as deejed. E Qrr, 

poiticularly frustEasd fay COTs lack of ocopcrRdon 10 providing doci-TCTfs to wltich the 


Cotrunittcc has already been §Jvcn a sees aivd additionally hive renson tv believe thni 
rcifpmvjlve documents were impiopcrly wiupheld from the March production, 

Witli respect to the pending subpoena the repeated loa-nduute responses by DOJ and 
Fftt to generous deadlines hove been wholly in&dequate. Given the Coas* 1 ^ 3 ’ 3 obligations to the 
American people, Cenarcss r # ceds answers* Therefore, I look forward to dUcussfaflf three matters 
in pm sou vrilb you on Thursday. 


Copies to: The Honorable Jett Session^ Attorney General 

The: Honorable Christopher Way, Director, Federal Bureau oflav estimation 



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November 2/2017 

Deputy Director Rod Ros=ri£reiii 
IL 3 . Departmec: of Justice 
950 Peon^ylvcda Avenue, iVW 
Washington, DC 20530*0031 

Deputy Director RxkI Roscnstcin, 

I hereby designate Congressman Trey Grady as my proxy for un in camera review of 
documents mads available par die subpoenas issued to Attorney General Sessions and FBI 
Director Wray dated August 24,2017 This designation is without prejudice to, end shall not 
limit or waive the authority of all Members of the House Pcnracent Select Coramittte ca 
Intelligence frem reviewing the documents it a later date upon request. 

It k my request that this review occur by dose of business on November 2 . 2017 . 

Best Regards. 


Devin Nunea 





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Phrmanekt Select Co.^crTEe 
on Intelligence 

HVC^WA, Tmj C»MW0l 
VJaS witrf on , EC23&J5 



December 2ft, 2QJ7 

Hie Honorable Rod Rosxastcm 
Deputy Attorney Genetal 
U<$, Department Of Justice 
1201 PctrooylvAnin Avo, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20004 

□tint tvk* Roscnsidiiu 

The HousePcmunem Select Committal* on hildtigefjcc{the Committee) write*in 
re&pciujc to the Department of Juaftoc’ft (DOJ) and (he federal Btircauof Investigation's (FBI) 
Mum to fully produce re**xjn&ive document* end provide the t educated wjtnesaw to compliance 
wfEhthe subpoenas issued over/bur months ag& t gn August 24* 2017. 

Several vrocks ago, DQJ in formed the Committee that the basic tovestiptory documents 
demanded by the subpoenas, FBI Form FD-302 interview wnw*ne$ p did not exist However* 
shortly before my meeting with you in early December, DOJ subsequently located and produced 
numerous FD-302s pertaining to the Steele dossier, thereby rendering the toitieJ leapunre 
disingenuous ai best- As it turns oui; not only did documents jurist that were directly resbonsivs 
to the Coramftise's subpoenas, but th&y involved senior DOJ Rnd FBI officials who were swiftly 
reassigned when their roles in irmltem muter the Commute o's inveatigaticn were brought to 
light Given the content and iroptwi of these supposedly newly hoovered FD-362s 3 tha 
Committee is no longer able to accept your purported basusfbr DOJ's blanket refitsal to provide 
responsive FBI Fmrn FD-EQ23$~^documenting tneetmp between FBI officials and FBI 
confidential human sources—or anyth Leg less then foil ajid complete ccmpllunce with its 

As <ne&ud( of the numerous delays and distrepmteies that hare hampered the process of 
subpocast complEunoc, the Committee no lunger credits th& representations mads by DOJ andfor 
the FBI rcgartJing theao manors. Accordingly, DOJ and (he FOE we instructed to promptly 
produce to the Committee—no Inter thrni January 3,20 IS—ALL outstanding record n tdfiniiftud 
as rertpMfcivc so the August 24 subpoenas, including but uoi limited to; 





• All responsive FD-1023including tlL reports that summarize asriiiigs between 
FBI confidential hunun sources tnd FBI officials pertening to toe Steele dossier, 

• All responsive FD-302S no: previously provided to the-Committee; and 

• In sdefiden to the FD-302s ar>d E^D-1023s, ecstsia responsive analytical asd 
reference documents tin were specifically identified end requested by the 
Committee, and supposedly subject to hrsnlncnt producer., as of Dasember 15. 

Should DOJ decide ^ withhold any respmsivc records* or portions thereof, from the 
Ccnmnitree, it must, consisted* with the subpoena instructions, provide a written response, under 
your signature, detailing the legal justification (br failing to coreply with valid congressional 

Additionally, fay ihe came deadline, please provide—u> writing—available ctetes in 
Jeuu&iy 2018 for interviews with the following officials: 

• Fcitmer DOJ Assoctefc Deputy AKcmey Gene**} Bruce Ohx; 

• F31 Supervisory Special Agent Peter (SSA) Sczclt; 

■ FBI Attorney /antes Bak e r ; 

• FBI Attorney Lisa Page; 

• FBI Anoniey Sally Moyer; and 

• FBI Assists:: Director for Congressional Affairs Greg Browsr 


The Committee further reminds you of these other oufcanding reqosss for inforcaton: 

• Details concerning en apparent April 2017 meeting with the media inyolviflS 
DOJ/FBI personnel, inducing DOJ Attorney Andrew Wdssrnai (due Deccnbci 
!3) axid 

• The remeiiing text mresajes between SSA Stack and Ms. Page (doe Dssemoet 




HVC- 30 *. The Cu-.tcjl 

W^ISC^ t DC2:^3 
12023 22S-4;2! 


The honorable Rod Rosen^iein 
DipLiiy Atioracy Gec-mai 
US. Bzpinxnmi of Justice 
120t Pennsylvania Ave, MW 
Washington, D,C 2C004 

Dear Mr, Rossnslc in: 

Pursuant to our phrms caB yesresday evening, l write to memorialize ih& agreement we reached 
regarding oompiirsce ',vjlh tile subpoenas isued by House Pterins qctj Select Cto^Htec cn 
Intel ligjetioe (tbc Coz^ittee) on August 2017, to ifcc Department of justice (DQJ) and 

Federal Bureau of Investigator. (FBl} 4 as well as several ciht/ciHsteadbg requests by (he 
Conrmittee for iufennarion and interviews, It is my hope Thai this sgreemen: mil arcvIda the 
Cansniirtcc with all Outstanding documents and wi f nzccsstgy to complete ;*s 

mvcstigstiong into ir^attens involving DCJ and FBL 

As agreed, de^gnated ComminEe investigfcEons aed will ho provided access to alt rtmnimpg 

investigative dbCumen!^ in unredaeted focm, fbr av:w at D QJ on Friday, January 201S. The 
draumeciu to be tevkwcd toil] include all FBI Form FIM0235 and all remaining ?Bi Form FD* 
302s reape nslvc; (p.tbe Committee's August 24,2GI7 sutjpP^ftS, The only ^ebc-upon 
exception pcitams to a siceIc f D-302, which* due to national security interests. be shown 

separately by Director TVray to myself and nay seder ircu&tig&wtf durogifae week or Jonuasy f v 



You tb^vr cortTrmtd ±ai there are no o£hcr extas: investigative documents ikt relate to the 
Ccmfnutisc'a investigations into (a) Russian mvchx4ita£ in the 20KJ Presidential election or (t>) 
DGJ/FBPs related setiocs dririag (bis time period. Thu includes FD-3G2S, FD-H523s r nud £3y 
other EUVCStigetory dOvuractiTi germane to the Commirtee’a inveififijallosifc regtmbss of form 
eedfor title. ]f 4 somehow, “pew" or^othof v responsive documents sire disoov^ri, ej discussed, 
you will notify me o imafia tgly end allow my senior invest! gsior&.to review them shortly 

With respect u> thje witness jjEer/bws requested by ihc Committee, you sevs agreed that ail stidti 
wilfcVtt - ely T feeder BOJ Associate Demtfy Attorney Central Brcce Ofcn FBI 
Supervisory Special Agect Peier Sbraok; fonaai FBI Gcneml Counsel lances Bafcer; FBI 
Atromcy UsaPsge; FBI Artomcy Sally Moyeq FBI Assistant Director Gzsg Brswo-; FBI 
Ajste rant Director Bill PricMsp; and FBC Special Agcni James Rybackj - will be meric avoUah^ 
for interviews, to be conducted hi January- 





Lardy, as eg tittnrraimnsapprcshrtfneiy 9,500 ten rocs&rgea herAwi F0I Supervise ty Spted 
Agent Peser Snzsk arid his mispress, FBt AStontey Lisa fegw It :s myxsidcra&ttdiug fessed pa 
yo-JT ceptTessncjf^om that ar-Olher search is being ccndarxed isr.d sit rcJevaCl massages will be 
provided* Aoctjjfegiy, the Cflnrnitefc icqpcst* pcrfuericrtof aws® rr.essEges cy tto facer titan 
clcse cf business,Thcraday, Jwteiy 11,2Q1S. Sbmkrfy, 1 unzzrstgnd thst yen* ofline is 
ce^ching records faia'ted so th* details of an April 201? meeting belwsen DO? Attorney 
Andrew Weissir^ (scree the senior attorney for Specif Counsd Robot Matter) rad the mttE% 
which will also br provided to this Co mmi t te e by dose of business on Tfcvraday* Jsoosxy IT, 
201 $. 

ft was farther agreed tfcfl eJ! documents n^de svmLflhffcCo the Committee will alsu to sreifobk 
lor review by the minority Ranting Member a:J dc3jg?^:^i staff* 

The nuibnda we -am rctr^-u^cg ^ro vital f o the CotmnTTTscfa investigericQ of potesria! diusts 
into ins L: genes end &x3>rocmcn£ sgeacdss* h audliflg cf the Christo pfaer Sleds dossier. The 

ConrrJttee is ccccmely eorucemad by icdccatiocs th^t to? U.S. Gerveraattse official* who v^cm 
tcvE 5 t£B±lr 3 a pre^idcmlsi campaign rdkd on unverified fa fbamJ jgn ms: was mixled hy the 
opposing pdltfcal caropEi^ji and was tend on Jtesbri souracs> Going forward, if’s tnucial fhst 
vt* mOTorElizo on: conversations on this Usue, and taai we'm as transparent as possible with 
the Amedeo people, who deserve ansv^rs to the qiKstioaj The Cbncsteftis Efivestiga&ig. 

Copies to: 

The Honerafcie jeET Sessbns, AttDtTiey Gsne^2 

ThoHonoribb Christophs Wray, Director Feder^ Staeau of ftTV^tigarion 





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PenwAKcNT Select Committee 
on [wtell Oence 

TVlJLEMltfJT^Nf, DC *C&t3 

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Dear Mr. Comeyr 

His Honorable James B. 

Thank you for yourlT^itr-sjr.y before the House Penman ertt Select Ccfrrnfrsecn Intel!] gc&ec on 
March 20.2017 and Mzy 4,2017 in the CommiCrc^ bipartisan invcsngEtlon into Russian active 
treasures directed s! the 2016 U.S, election, In light of additional fets Jcnirad curing the 
investigation, the Committee requests thfll you pErtid pate be a voluntary. Transcri bed interview at 
cho Committee^ ofncca 

Committers stuff wilt wodc wiii you to crt&oge yciu - InEjerview for either the wede of December 4 
or December 11, irttentisw may covet any topic within the piiblictywfiotinccd parameter 

ofihe Committals iir.TsTgrcm (see gnashed), inaludingltussis n cyber ficrmrlss dtreetsd 
Hgamst lie 2G i 6 U.S, electics, potential 3aks tetweea Russia vqdldtM* associated with 

political campaigns,, the ILS. govenunenfs response to these Russian cc^ve meesures, and 
related leaks of ctesiSsd inmnnatfcm. 

We rtispecUuity ask th^l you pmccco to the CotnEdtfcSv by no lEtcr ihia the cinse of business on 
Ncrverubrr24, your availability for the iatorview dcring the time identified above. 

This letter also rtoucso prescrvstiQtt usd praduettau of all dbouinents, rraDords, electronically 
stored mfomtaticn, recordirr^s, data and tangible things (including, but not limited to, graphs, 
charts photographs, hns^cs and other dccumenis) regardteas of form, ether than thoso widely 
tvdaifibis (e.g,> newspaper ankles), mfeted to the Committee's uivesb'gsucm, youi interview, and 
any andUaiy mutters. 

Should you have any questions at apy Use, plesss contact Committee at (202) 225-4121. !f 
you are rsprestmted hy on eEcntey, plesss forward sHa letter to your^morony* and b*vs him or 
her contact the Commioee on your bchnll 


- * / 


;<.-«■/€*> iy. 

K. Michael Conaway 
Member of Congress 

Adam SchifT 
Xankin^ Member 

Attachment: Parameter for Russia Investigation 

roi w* wc<t\u • / 

property of tme u.s mouse of representatives 

February L 20! S 

United Slates House af Representatives 
Pcnnaacnt Select Committee on [ntElligeace 
ATTN: Ntck Clarismtc 
HVC- 3 K U.S* Capital 
WashingiOD, D.C. 20515 

Dear Mr. Ciarlante: 

I received your January 24 ,2018 letter, forwarding a November 8, 20\1 letter tiiat 
w $3 sent to an old mailing address of mine. 

I respectfully decline the invitation to a voluntary interview. I am confident you 
can obtain the best information front current FBI employees. Place give my best to 
Messrs. Conaway and Sehiff. I have fond recollections of our past interactions. 

^ -S i* 




Sincerely ours* 
James B. Comoy / 

TOP CCCR lift 



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December d, 2017 

The Honorable Rod Rosensdn 
Deputy Attorney Oessral 

SiEXa Dcp^rtrsoril of Juanas 

(201 FemsylVinia Av^NW 
WssHngioa, D,C. 20&04 

Pe£* &4k R^sastdft- 

I am writing you as £ foDow-op to oirr recent ccnverssiisn about she pecs* start problem of 
‘jnftnjfrr^rat of inform a D OC to *hs m±&$ frpm a&petttifv brerceh ast-ndes. 

In ten^y2017,1 ^mtc a tetter to Ihsra-FsderEl Bureau oflnv&igBlltu (FBI) DRector Jsmcs 
Cotaay expiesshg my concern teginibg the "epidejTire o f us^borized fedosuKo to tt a 
presr 1 , laasy ofvrhtch potpotted to contsm cEsssifi ed iofbm£tj'on, parfeJariy the alleged Icelc 
of Li <hVL Michael Flynn's m ms regsjding a cocv&tsaiioo ±at be tepcitedly bad ’svsch fcrrucf 
Russian .-Woassedor 3ergal KislysL in Mey 2017, f v>tg1c snathcr lettar to the L^talligezce 
COmzmtriiy inspector G^usr&l usd yes expressing & gnu/s cencetn aboel & pending articto based 
on an ampnper leak* Unfonojirndy, ilis still not eke: to lbs House Ptsma&X Select 
Comanttee on Lr^Uigsrjca (HFSCI) vragtherthe Dtprrteeni of Justice (D 0 J) h mvssdp^itvg 
ibege matters. 

in the pasi several months, r^itueroua oddide2£l leaks, some comprising pcTpcitcrily dasdffaJ 
mfosTutfiGa, h&ve eppsared tn the press m eenneenjon to the oogw n -3 investigpliMi of Russian 
interaction vrith die Trucjp cimpejgtL 

I am particularly eoatenred dboyt the poteiiEial rcle of DOJ personal in fhefliuiimg such leaks. 
HPSC1 has [e^nc41 hsi os or ahem April 1 U 2017, Egtafr behest cf tu^cmsrtar^ signed to 
Special Ctmasd Robert Mudler m AniSrew thn hetd of UOJ's Critdnti 

t)m^ s s Fraud Section, tup!, f&f-g v^jdt FBI agcnt% vdth a group of reporters frcoi a nz^jor 
mafe orgpniitttico to disccss the oogp&ag Rubais iavesrigaikn, 1& light cf this ictferneiicrij l 
request tta >tiu provide HFSCi with answers tOTiieK?KavEEg qnsiioea: 

a Did £ue rneeihg bcwccn OOJ fioto* KSi o^idflls wvd icpocte=r^oasur7 
b if ?g?s maerieg ooi^road.. 


. why mis it mil toitfcd to KPSC3 or other rufcvuni ov&mlaJht committees? 

_ Who fraus tha DOJ m&oz FBI appro vcd tiihs mc&mg? 

. Which importers aad rcpfoSctttsliveS from DOJ acd/cr FBI attended the meeting? 

- Did the anaoglpfc Kid condactof the meeting follow ail Rfevaut DOJ and/or 

- At the meeting, did my DOJ fi^d/ar FB] cL^QcLiiIfi provide wry irtfonnaliOft to thr 
rcpmnm about to FBI mvetfJgaiion or c*mj0mi any irifocnjutiou piuvidcd by to 

- Did anyone from DOJ tuid/or FEE file a com|)!aini about this mtddzg} 

. (my DOJ aiwEfar F BI rc pn^semti vee take notos during to mcettof,? 

- l o tMs nice ih i# the subject of a IG kv coti gttofi 7 

Please pitodc armors to the Oopfttuitte*? a*> fox<x thou 5:00 p.ra, on December 1J,2017, 

Copy to; The Hononiblo ?diditicl I'. Horowitz, lufepcctot Gccm), US. Depotuncsu o£ Justice 






VSt Department of 

Out ce of legislative Affair; 

Qfitei (tfUit AsaUtut AX£tsd> 

ac: ^ic; 

MAR 1 4 im 

The Honorable Dcvki Nnnrs 

Furman, esi Seteet Cenintit£&£ on intelligence 
Lf.S* Ffbuss of Representatives 
Washing DC 20515 

Dot Nunes: 

This responds to ysur lener tnthe Deputy AiiC'sey datedDceansbe? 5,2017, 

Ycnr letted expresses cone-m ste tmauifcoiizcd dis^osicra of clasMSed id&naatko. do the 
medru from executive hs mt-A agencies* sun notes your particular concern ebout the pJHeouBj role 
of Department of Justice (Department) paisomid in fficilrtaring such dlsdcsrtires. DepartissaL 
policy does not cccndl continuation of the exist care of ongoing mvestij^tions, including 
mv^sfiga&a? cf ucauixonzcd disclosures of classified infennaiioiL However, the Ltep^rtmen: 
shares your concerns about uwathotized disclosures cfcksdfied infbcmaiion v investigates suck 
disclosures. and proiccutcs offenders when sppopriatc, It certainly would bq helpful so any 
investigation thar the Dcpartvidt may be conducting for you to share any bfoxmation you hove 
abouxtfia identity of any iouividuds di any bientih of government who have disclosed classified 
nfocmalKar to the media or to anyone without a oeed to kno w tiis utibaiisdnn.- TEte Depongnunt 
will work with you to receive any Such inShnitEliim sanfitie arlally at your oonveuie^e. 

You hive afeo asked whether a occu rred among Departmentpersonnel and 

reparteis or. April L I s 2017 to ‘"discuss the ongoing Russia investigation.” The Deperuntru h 
aware cf no such meeting zt which this was the topic of dticustioit On thd date, Cepartmairi 
ofTidals did thces with reporters fromthe Associated Pri^ (AP) ;it thereporter’ request The 
Bcp^rtipciit cfn chafe excluded Andrew WaisKm^nn, Chief of the Prsud Suction af L hz Cdminal 
DKision; rtu^e FBI figentss u Dejmm-cJU ctiai tEomey; and an Assi-c-crt U_S, Attorney from the 
EasSMPiSsdaofV^ginja- Four A? reporters ertectixrA An AP report ecntecteti Mi. 
VVetsymma to snangtt the meeting, ersd Mr. Wei^smann did 50 

jDutitfg.ihc incs^ing. the AP r^ofiers pcovLied i^formeiiun to thr Dspcutmcpt that they 
had learned as a resist of their investigation of Paul Mcnttfert. They described ertiviiiis 
unrelated to any role Mr. Msnaibrt may have hud with the campaign of Plunder:! Dorald j, 
Trmuu and focused primarily o obis business wzetie^ (ruandal activities and relationships 
with, tijrcigu indivi duals or entities. The AP reporters as keti questions cf 3vc Depain^znl 
officials who declined tu comment oa tfe^quatuons. The Department undcretaatfe ihet boics 
wtc tskeo dicing the meeting Based cyi the Pro^tEtenfis curivat undcisiaLidijtg; il docs not 
zppe£r tf?a: DcpsitocntofncmJs impoperly disclosed *nyconfidcntiaI in&nnaticD. 


The Honorable Devin Nunes 
Pngc 'rwi> 

The Department baa referred 1o the Inspector General your questions os to whether 
anyone fitcrt a complaint about the meeting and whether (he meeting is the subject of un 
Inspector General investigation. 

Please do uni hesitate to contact this office if we may provide additional assistance 
regarding this ov any other matter. 

cc: The Honorable Adam B. SchilT 

Ranking Member 


Stepben K. Boyd 
Assistant Attorney General 


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Decanter 12,201? 

Tht Keaotibte Red R&scAi*rki 
Dccniy Attorney Ciisesl 
lf*S, Depanaent of femce 
5201 Fcrrosylvjmk Avc, N\V 
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t\e Fedsrui BaEtau cf JrrVdiliptiOfl {FBI) foretpies cfall cOiji^rjniEljOiii (is tC’dtidc E©cl ^=£j£^s, 
exsite* aid tay otter repaired cacraurucsiircte} te*^er* FBI Agatf Peter Strzfc ard F8I Attorney LUs 
F& 5 £* SSA Streak aad frfs, Fagc b“*e hem tfeiriGad in media reporting as sroSnr-iciml F 3 [ 
OEplCy&CS Tfifco beta pmdp^fid in difi FBFf c^untsrinrtJH^cC investigEicos son ceiling £hs HiJfey 
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rnYCtfignionS- Ms. ?££= is a rBI Offc cf (feissl Cesrasd a&DfTOy; \rtiO m &o Time* v>\^ 

To Deputy Dt^lcr Andrew McCabe's office srii prided !$£*! support to both lowest^tfe^, Bgrh 
SSA S'jrocfrfc Mi ska worked for Spc^taf Counsel Robrrt NfujJk? caetfe thia yeir bzxrara bd tg 
qu:=dy dismused u-pen (fee (feoDvqyqf fteir«tracomEal stxli" r srnjlte oma i^££ of lEsnctDaci poftfeGy 
chs^d mresagra durhg the course of bosh hs^sdjjaaons ibut wtre aifcgtsLyaiti-Tmiap nod pr> 

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coaiTDuiucafriaE* uJ will to CvEnpulseiy process if eU such decline ni* sns not del rveicd ia Uw 

CctoiiSs^ bdbra 9;O0 AM, Deoexcef 15,2017. 


U.y, Department uf Jusilr* 
Gfike of Legislative Affairs 

■- » #4 ■ i • _ 

OJ&ice of the AtdiLant Attorney Geheral 

rFGs/jfrtffOtt D.C 205SO 

DEC \ 2 IVS 

The Hina^bte Devin Nunes 

Pcnnflnem Select Ctem mitten m IiHclligerjcc 
U,S. liousc offtcprcscuisiivis 
Wufttagt od, DC 29515 

Dittr Chairman WuEca, 

This respond* to the CoulMIIjk’s request ttiai tee Department of Jusifc* (Departmcni) 
provide the committee wi(h copiw of text rnwKiHC eommurri wtions bctwctf l Mm\ Bureau of 
luvostlgftdon {PBI> employees Peter Streak and Ltea Pago, Wy oro smlme ieiww rnd Identical 
enclosure;] to a number of Coogrcsidoiml Commit won that hive tupdo Similar requests. 

As you piny Jam*, uniniumfy }2 t 2016, Ulo Department <if iuDitc'* Office of Itupeulor 
CJcncrxf (OlCjJ publicly umflUiicod that (he OJQ woujd review M uilty/itlara iIulfDupjartracTitcr 
PB] policies or procedures vvew nor Mowed in ccamwUGn with, or in jettons? lending up to or 
lolfttcd lo, tiie FBI Birectm'* public arnioUfioernwHon July 5,201th 1 mid the Director's tenoro to 
Cnngpeop on October 2 IS and November 6,20 16j utvd that certain uwfccrlying iavcatigurtvc 
dec E *faiu were toed c n improper consi d e ratfcma*^ M pan of tl irit re vie w, Qj t OIG obUiintd, 
ijniwuj trthrrttitejjs, toxr rucsiagca fccovcen Mr, Strzok and Ms, Pegs, 

Tne Department expected the doeesteuts provided herein til he provided at part of a 

completed OIG report Howcrveii public reporting about the ettitKeace of the text messages 
prompted Congressional Committee fbr the text raessetiges. Please find enclosed sn 

inirinl disclosure c>r spproxbmtcly 375 text tacaan^Q communivudom-, dated August 1 $ } 2015 to 
ttecembsr 1 1 2016, that been identified as pertinent to tes OIG itrvicw rdwuccd shave. 

The enclosed documents contain mmimiil redneitous thatprotecE the privacy totcicsts of third 
parties and sensiitofc tew traforccmeit lofamiDlfart, amlrcsiiGyc irrelevant itiftrasailor], The 
Dcpartmtnt coatmaes to review dotnmeris rad will pro side pertin^. dcH^oncnts as they becctae 

3 On ifiiit te. ttici^FBT Dij<d?rf J&ppjk D. Cctsiisy imounccd thus Ihe MJi to icconwucodte^ fa tin Dcpartarsirt cf 
JiljWcc <hg[ chutes EbquSdhe filed teUttogta (bfuttr SucittDEy of S^l<? Hilla^'Chnrfoa'Q wc uf u priviie oteTI 

£ 1K)J 010 Asnsucuccs JuidaticD of Rcvktf JuuMiy J 2. 70(7, avmJiWe az hltpiu7c fgij uVicio^v/pir^t/2017/7017* 


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by Specif Ccwawl Roben i&eTlc?, The OKt mfofiEcd thr Spcdel Cespscl cf ihe g; 

(h= m c {used ts& on cc aboct July 2.7, 201?. Mr Mud !cr irurh^ii^iy ccsclud^ ft =i 

Mr. Sirtok oatdd laager pprtfdpSEs h) Or; inveslig^iorL, srd he vv^3 rsa;o%xd ireoi the :e£tn. 

This EOT$ordiD3ty apcc^mgiarion of pro viding i hfc ^iclc=?d docusaesis is ’jai<n^tofc 
£=ts end c hugnst afi pes Cl this pert'rainrsuiter. lbsPspETEBSftt a^peL- rttsthe TpTttkOfxto 
DIG C rv thi 3 U er* looks fbrMad to the ftzdj^gs urd rccojZL^eisd^d ons arbi” g 5cai tte. Jiw, 

c^d Wui ttkfe *ppropitalc eetion os ^nantei. 

oc; Tkit HonDsabk Adem Edtiir 
Ridcug Mmber 



Rm.: 17 . \r 

LLSv Department of Jastks 
0£ik^ cf Legislative AfSfe 

Office of ihe Assisikfli A^cmsy Gen ersl Wq yhijigimx D. C 2 3518 


' h 

Tiu= Honorable Devin Nunes- 

Clalmum /AN 1 9 Ufi 

Permanent SdecdcQ CeErc^fcc on IntdH^enee 
7JS, ffouse of Reprc*ad£itvcs 
Washington, DC 2G51S 

Oe^r Chairman Kcn=s; 

Dus responds to yiKC request to the Dccssruesm of Josiioc (Dcpsrtnsent; to provide ;be 
Commute ^vith copies of text ices sage (^mnamka^orts between F-^ted Bureau of 
leivcsrigsiioo (FBI) £Siploy£±£ Peter Slrzek and Liss Pa$e, 

As yoti mny knew, *m Jenino? i 2 , 2616 . ibe Dcpzrtrr-inl^a Office cf Ikspccto: Goxrral 
{GIG) publicly jmnousecd ibsri the DIG &odd rview ^legations that D-epenrnea: or FBI 
policies cf proojduies wsrc cot followed in eennoetton wish. -or in aniens kudfcgup to w 
■related id, ifoe FBI Director^ p attic mEramcersaci on My 5,2016, 1 and tbs Director's letters lo 
Congress on October 2S and November 6,2016, or_d to extern underlying investigative 
dedsions were based m irnpreper eOnsiti£jadnaS-^ As part of Cbat raaew, Uje DIG chained, 
sjiKioe other ihircr, ^^cs between Mr. Strzc-jc $ad Ms* Page. 

Jii December 2017. wc provided you with 52 initial pr*ducGQD of apcioxlmstcly 375 text 
mtsse^e commimiCTo^ca^d August 16,20I5 to December l, 2016* In response to t h& 
reinvests for Hue lexis the Dep^lmem codec ted di text messes Mr. Seizok 

and Ms. Page avaite^sifociittie FBI for the perkd My* k 2015 to July 23,2017, 1 which was the 
same period requ^sird by ike GIG. ltd Department beg^n reviewing those dcnrrfcsafs in an 
effort TO provide ycu ibc^c merges thai ivert cither work^rrlnlcd orfbsi pokebd aqy toSigbf 
into \hz politics f vkovs of ibe penScipasis. 

* 4)ft tltai d«e, tbca-FBl Seeder imxs 3, Cotray amxiricw: to cfi= FBI wa* r^orodi^u it DcpiitE^ni nf 
Amice na chcii':* fc? tFsd rahTirffCofomef Secreaay of Hilary Ob^’s srctdL 


1 DOJ GIG AnrbouKr* dMttr, JiiSMBiy 12 . 264 ", Ei^fbbic ac hte m^o l ^ han ea* csaSIH 7 / 1317 - 

1 Although The Tcqiiasi cci&itd i<=zz tiirtstrgh July2F, 2&17, r zzrz za ifxt TSesja^f Mr. Srrook fl^d 

Ms. ?3?p afef Inly 1,201? srJ. ±e o«$tpf3 dier J toe 25,26 i 7, ^cnepcnonal in cr’ajc. 

Tnp QFroET/ 



The! laccrabJe Devin N unes 
Psjc pWO 

Tbe Depcitoteni h not providing :ex! messages ^st wc purdy personal in nature. 
Funheisrscre, the Dependent has redact from some wcik-ieLitod #ext messages pern on? ihc 
T*ttt purely parsouaL 'I’he Dcpumtcm’s Aim ia withholding purely prnoa&I text messages end 
redacting petso 22 l portions of woric-rrfred text mc3S8gc3 was primarily to facilitate the 
Committee's access to potentially relevant text messages whheat having to cull through Urge 
quantities of material unrelated to either the LTrestig&non of fanner Secretary of State Hillary 
CKnion's use of a personal ernilt server of the investigaiion into Russian effort to inrerftje with 
the2016Presidentialdecrion. .Also,the withholdingofpersonal infoimation :n someLnsteces 
avoids unnecessary embarrassment or hnrassnsmt to third parties that could result from public 
release of such iaforaiaaoo- Tkz DepartmtnL raiucred (he names of emp kjyces who *re jk>! SES- 
level employees, and in same instances, redacted SES employees' immes to avoid nnw^rrarifid 
attention u> those mdrvi duals when commenis were grenctous and did nor preside relevant 
informalim to ongoing Congressional inquiries. 

In a fcw instances, the Dcpanmeci has redected portions of unck-relaied texts that 
ccrccmocher Lnvescgcrions. Fsrally^the Deperunert consulted with the Special CcsnseTs 
OfHoe (SCO) 2 nd made some redactions related ro the structure, operation, and substance cf the 
SCO invesriganen because it is ongoing. 

To avoid eny concern cat tbs Department hzs withheld relevant informatiun, if a 
Committee has specific questions atoic why a portioj&ir text W3S periaily redacted or about the 
errere of persocal text messages widMd, the Department w»Q work with that Committee to 
cither further describe or disclose redsc:ai iiifecrnalion. in a dosed seating. ATlhough theocigbial 
sprecdsbeec conlnmcd only whzlthe Decurtmec! believed (o be worx-reJatcd text ircrsgcs, 
luhscqueit reviews itkmhried some additional per flCmal text massages within that document. 
Therefore, the document produced today contains a small number of fully redacted messages that 
were determined to be personal nx=?S2£c3 Fubs^umt to tbdr initial inriurion in the previously 
previded sp rea di h ect. The exposed docemcm also occludes ccrhunn? of information rim- 
cmusdnedouly technical infhrms.tinn such as phone ambers cr email addresses ir« an effort (o 
provide a more rrsdily rcvtcwsble set of document*. b the sashed, the ^Lntox'* do-cements ere 
hem Mr. Strzok to Vis. Page, 2 zd (he “Outbox” documents ate from Ms. Page co Mr Strzoh 

. The Department wants to bring So your attention thst the FBrs technical system for 
retaining text messages stnt and recoved on FBI mch'fc devices failed (o preserve text messages 
ibr Mr. Srrzek aad Ms. Page from December !4, 2016to epprcxfmnrdy to May 17,2017. The 
FBI has informed us tint many FBI-provided Samsung 5 mobile devices did cot c* prose or store 
text messages dua to misconfiguraiion issues related to rollouts, provisioning, and software 
upgr^nles that conflicted with the FBI's ccilectco capabilities- Vhc result was that doa (to 
should hive been isuionaebeally collected. and retained fox long-term Socage and retrieval was 
not colkiced. This problem should have been corrected with the rollcui of the Saits-mg 7$ in 




The Honorable Devin Nunes 
11 iw 

Mr. Stress Samsung 5 plume last connect*d to the storage system on June U. 2016. 

He received lus new Samsung 7 obojui on or about July 2017, Ms, Page % Saining 5 pbo-e 
fast connected to the storage system on December I3 t 2016. She reeded her rurw Samsung 7 
phone on or about May 22.201 7 * 

The Office of Inspector General pieced tuseiher the text mca;>uge& bclwccr Mr. Struck 
and Ms. Page ftom Jane [S, 2036, to Decermba 1 3, 2016, using the data from Ms. Pas*’* phone 
ivntl! the connection to the storage ^T«wn stopped on December 13,2016. On May 17,2017, 
Ms, Page 1 * data collection reinitiated s*hcn she received her new phono. 

Please let this office know if you have any questions regarding to produoiioa 

.Assistant Attorney Oeucid 

cc; 'lilt; HonomWo Adam Sehlff 
Ranking Member 


* AHJiuu&h FBI Idemiflfle May 23,21M7 is 0 k mxtfl dfltc ter MS, Ftg«*i fhanc, on licet ten icttimcdwi May l&, 
2017. FBI hu* not yet been table to account fof UrndbcrapeiKy. 



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Tee Honorable tod J. tos^nstab 

D^stty Attorney Genend 

ILS. DcpMTJcat of 3uitroc 
£50 PerjisyNtmiaAveojie* NW 
Waihlnrtcn, D.C 20530 

The Honorable Christopher Wtty 

Federal Bureau cflnve^tgsiioTt 
£35 F«eisyivonia Aveun*, NW 
Ws-hwct- D.C. 20535 

Dear Mesas. Etc^ astern toi Wray; 

For G&omits, ifco House Pcritt&iwitf Select Comirrirtoc on Intelligence has been conccn:*! a bo or 
the De partm ent^ end Eh* Federal Buiaan of Investigaim's serious in* number of cases, Leei 
weekend's reveLsrioos ifee; the D=pa^ot end tne F£! fe3k4 tc preserve - sud today’s medis 
reporting tot the Depsrtincnt 1 s Inspector General has fbrearieslly recovered - apprcsrrmcly 
fsve months often message exchanges between Special Agent Peter S^zok and FBI attorney 
lisa P^gc lave tnly onplincd d»se sooccnss. 

To ensure that Euy Committee inqTriiy is as thorough ani complete as possiblCi ^’£ xespec4flilly 
r^ii^ that the Department and the FBI ensure docLmcots and {nformsdoo rdatcdl to the 
fallowing b^cs sre preserved fe pot entia l ptn thee lion to the Cct&fiiittee; 

* Any ccsimorticatioas devices t£su eti to Agesit Strsofc and Ml Page; 

* Any eiTorts to reti ieve mfbnr^uo n Iron Agent S trzsk’a and Ml Page 1 a govcnnriccrt- 
issued devlots; 

* Arty deta on &e Sarr^ung 5 piKme issued to Agns SliaolLtaiiil on or aboutJuly 5, 


* Airy data on the Samian^ 5 phone issued to Ml Page until on or ^bctit May 17,201 7; 


* Any mfrmzatfon ^bout the aiJtgec ’'miscGnSgUretiort issi^a relied V> tallow 

provisioning, Bfi d soigne upgrades that ccnfBcfcd with the FBI’s coUaatoi: 
capabilities" thai caused ' E many FE> provided mobile device" nat to 

^oaptaie or ston; toe messages*; End* 

* Any investigation by the Dcputment or the FBI inio the circumstances related Q the 
Muns to T^c^rvji the tent message 

Tb$ DerrsitrT-cril and FBI should sntorprc* ‘"preservation" in the brc£ii£St possible oatttler, 
including eastoiig the discondn^JtoE of say f-utc-d&lKfc or shnOar factions th*t entte rr^ted^is 
after a certain period of lime, Tvls prestrvtfion request covers oil documents, reoards^ 
Electronics] ly stored tofcnsAtion, recordings, ditii, tuid tangible thb^5 (including, but no: tattod 
to, graphs chans, photoglyphs, imsges and o£kt dgcizncais), rcgsrdkss cf form sud mcdlcx* of 
storage, January L 201 & - present. 

^the Committee also requests Thai you: 

1. Eat cri £ e ns esonah to effbjis to iden lify aid noli fy fomer employees and centrmtecs, 
swbeontmctojs and cansdsstts may have access to such d^ctamk records tin: they 
arc 1C be pressed; 

2. bxsretse effects to identify* rcca ver } a^d jneserv £ my ckt^rc: c records 
v/hkh hove fcscR d=attod or narked fhr deletion btt| are stHi recoverable; a=d 

3. If it Is the ro mbc practice of ov agency c oip toyoe or coniXEitor to destroy or otiieraise 

alter such electronic record^ either hall such promises qt unpegs for the preservation of 
compete and sccuisie duplicatos or copies of r-och records* suitable for production if 
rttQU£Sia4 '' , 1 


Wc would appreciate year conSnaing th^r sH folcirani doamemfe and iftformatkn arc being 
preserved no later than the close of business oa Jamjar* 39* 23 JB, 

Should yen have jjpesTiuns 41 sny time* pbtse cortiaci K4sH Fatol at (202) 225-4121, 

cc; Michael Horewitz, inspector Gcmml, VJS* Dcp^mnzju of Justice 

" Letter SOfr. &sp?iep E, 'JcjtJ, AMjtalAlTy Gen-CIcfai of LCg&ghe R*p, Lteviii KunetL CteitTUtn ILS. 
Hc7j$< Fche^sCT Sp.lttl C^fiSTITMa an DndlijEccce, ltr_ 1*5,2D t &. 


L\£. DcparSntfskt of Justice 

federal Bureau 

of Investigation 



£* V- 

February 2,201 



Thz Honorable Devin Quires 

PcrmsnctU Scire: Committee Ofl SntcfSigcnce 
US. House of Rcpiesemiivcs 
Waskhtgton. DC 20515 

Dear Mr* Chairman: 

l"hank yci for your continued support of che FBL 


Gregory A- Braver 

Assistant Ulrcc cr 

Office of CcngfcssiarttL Affair 

1 * The Honorable Adam Sdiift' 

Ranking Member 

Permanent Select Com^iineo on UtfeihfiCJicr 
U.5, Housi of Representatives 
Wash Ington, DC 20 S15 



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Per&xxext S^cr Ccuunrree 
cn ^Tmuasice 

Febrctry IS* 201E 

Step bar K. Boyd 
AjSSiSUmt Atl^y General 
U.S, R^Lfail^i eart cf Justin 
950 Ftsnsylmsa Ave, NW 
WuhScglan. D.C 20530 

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Dear Mr* Boyd: 

On f afaroaiy 7,2015* 1 wra:e to I be Bonucsbl* Rswasjay NL Cfcllysr, Presiding, of the Orited 

Slates Forttgn Irjd-ligasce Surveillance Cccrt (FESC3, xequcstiEg th4t the Ccjcii proto* transcripts of 

eny rcizysni FISC Stearins* tssoeiaced with the Lf±J F SSA application or renewals rri^tsd to 

itU3 ekcBttij c sorvd lisnco 0 f Carter Peg?* 

tn tar resptmsa to *2ic Ciioiintrtec Judgs Cotiyer wrst^ \„ymi evay now tfcsi th= Department of Justice 
possesses (or o^S Cxrily obtain} tbfi sarsc r££pa:i=fve inhumationthe Cnzit rci^e prj^ssss, snd***h brtltr 
positbnod than lb* Coart p respond qukfcfjr" 

Thsrtfdre. in ec effort In taftno tile Cemmittst's ca^idg the Committee Keefes the 

fcrOfl scripts of any relevant FJ5C tearing,* sssceuiedi with the mi tfei FISA epfikatiori or spbssepee^ 
renewals rckjxd to c&tatroaie eurvriJUiXDi ofGtte Psge, The Comi?Jtt£3 respssifjny ttquofta thai* no 
Jb&t thin February 55. .101& DOJ infertT* *-hfi OKnctiare whcihfx Stick triE^zripis eal^ and, if scs picas* 
provide them. 

If yea hsvft Eny ipessioas, pi east? contact CKDrnia^e stiff at (££2) 22 MU'. 

Hne]sniro|J J 








V'S. Department oi Jn3iice 
Grnce of Le^isLsdvc Afraid 

Office of the dfsistznt Axtom&y Gsnsial Waskingtcm, D.C, 20550 


MAR 0 ? 2 G 13 

Tha Baanreble Dgcvia Nune 

Cyim ,' 

pg? ry.anen t Select CDnimrtfeo on IntcHigcncc 
Ufa* House of Representative 

Waafec^ia^ DC 2G515 j 

Dcaz Mr. Cnainn^ 

This responds to j£rrr letter daicc February 16* 201S, requesting transcripts of any 
relevant hearings cr tie Foreign Intelligence ScftSttfeccc Court (FfSC) associated’-^th the initial 
FISA spolicEiicm or subsequent itceweb ruined- to the electtefflie surveillance oT Carter Page. 

A3 is typical in fee consideration oi warrant applications ganefsily s including ^oit£snor>3 to tise 
F(S€* difc FiSC consider si zhs applkmlcns bassd upas thn vtmt?en siicmissioQ s and held no 
hearings* Accordingly* ro re?i|>ocdvo transcript* cxisL For your icfereoe^ we hare Ptfe.ohfrl a 
Icner dsied July 29, 2QI3 fkm FISC Presiding Judge Reggie B* Wakento the Secure CotniniTtoo 
sin te Judiciary tfirn-Circdrcaw Patrick!. L^y ths*£ oai timetf i at FISC rpactic* when 
considering FJSA applicalktis* struck icakidjes ixjBsidttatisn ofchcejsmemt^ m ^hksbaheadng 
2JQF b= required. 


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Wc heps this infiams tiop is helpfb:. Pitots do :ex ht &to omtaci this onlcc if we 

may provide additional assistance regard hg tins or aay other matter 



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February 2Qi 301S 

iw Honorable Jumna Corny 

Dcnr Dli^ctoi Gwncy; 

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T htl nk you for your prompt (Uft natter. If you l»v> any quwUutS, ph»* « n,Kt 

Committee sts(Y at 202-225-4121. 







1 - When aod bewy did you first eecom e awaxd of eny of tfr c k fo ntifliion contained hi ti= i 

St celt dossier? 

2, In vfeat fcnr.($) was fee Infom^on fee Steek dos^r presented ic yoii? By whom? 1 

(Please describe each instance) * 

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3, Who did you ^isre this iofoirnaiian vdth? Wb:a? Ia Tvttat fbrm? (Please describe cisb 

icsciricc) I 

4, What official acdoris did you take as a issidi of nsecmTtg the rnSojir^Uon coGtaiced in the 
Steele dossier? 


5, D:d you convene any it* edugs with tfe= intclligenc e coonntichy and/cr 1 aw enfo rodent 
coauniiKUcs £3 a result of the iafoiQiseon cosiamed in the Stock dossier? 

6, When dH )w £rst l$Qlu or come to hejievs feat fee Steele dnsaieo vvss futiCed by « 

Demacrax-aligjiBtf entity? 

7* When did you test kam or to believe that the StieJe dossier w&> ficideri by fee 
Danocrahc Nations! Commit (PNC) imd/ci Hillary Ibr America (CHuooti csrupeign)? 

S. When did you first become swsro fee Steele dossier WES used obtain &FISA ureter 

on Carter Page? 

9, Was President Obama briefed ca any infoEmshon eanviincd in fee dossier etlost to 


10 r Did you discuss fee mfbrmniton txmainsd hi fee Sleek dossier w ith any reporfless or 
other representatives of the media? If £t^ Vriio and \vhen? 

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Permanent Select CoMMiTTfjQ 

Pebmafy 20,201S 

HYC-ttft* Tue Ot’iTol 
WaumOTOM, DC 2V- i« 
U0?) TlW 4121 

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Mr* Aodtew McCabe 
federal Bureau of Invest igaitorv 
935 FejTnsytvanSa Airc>NW 
Waslurtfitoru D,C. 2Q>35 

Dsar Mr, MeOite: 


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or fl Vttlitnww bMi*. t)w CommiitM will mltiato compulsory pieeess. 

TUank you for yo ur prompt nflontimi fols miUcr. If you hove any iprastfon*. p! wa ,;onlllC, 
Commutes naff at 202-22 3-1121. 



- ♦ When and bow did you first btooni£ of £ny cfOi^ ibfami^ion contained m the 

Sleek dassift? 


2. in v&at fotm(s) was the Mamiatiim iu the Stetk dossier pre^tiued u> you? By whom? 
(Please describe each instance) 

3. Who did yon shore this inform a ten with? Wheo? In wfȣ form? (Fls^se describe cash 

4. What official actions did you take sa a nendt of receiving the infonnerica contained in ihe 
Skctc dossier? 

i- Did you convene aay trccerings wfdi the kielligeacs community and/er law ardbrcer^nl 
ccmmumiies ss u result oi the Istfointation counted ia the Stock dossier? 

6, When did yott fct learn or come m h^kve tlint the Stevie dossier was funded by a 
Deroccrai-aligned endty? 

7. WhtQ did you Sist lesrn or come to believe lhai ihe Steele dossier way funded by tin: 
Demccralic Nab one! Committee {DNC} sad/ot HiHsry for America (Clinton campaign)? 

S* When did y ou first become Aware that the 3 teak dass ter was tiSed to cbiain & FISA order 
cn Carter Page? 

9. 9/as Presideot Gbziua brisfed on any infcauad cn cratsbed to th a dosskr piiof to 
January 5, 2017? 

! 0, I>id yco discuss the information oemhrincd in the Stock dbdaicr with any reporters or 
other rnepitS£amiY« of the media? If so, who and when? 



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March i € 201* 

The .'[cmomble XeffSes^cns 
Aponicy GcritrsI 
U*S. Depsisciem ofimce 
950 Pconsylvenle Avec^e, JTW 
WasMiigla^PC 20530-0001 

Dwr Mr* Attorney General: 

The Federal Bureau of lirvestSgatfcn (FBI) is charged \tffch proSecthig me American people and 
enforcing ui^ in accordance with the U-S, Gonstfonim* To carry ouithia sssesriel mission, 
the FBI a strict set of internal rule? andpnwdares embodied in the Domestic Invcstiiptiens 
m$ Opcarticns Guide (DIOG)* The DIOG "»vas crested by ths Bureau itself end approved by ihe 
QcpsrSnem of Justice (DOJ). 

The iicr&dssied Ttftska af the DIOG Mijaafcle the Commisee (dated Qcaber 15 * 2011 } 
detbrelcs tsoccdurcs the FBI must follow vvfccn subaHfimg eppliotboato the Fofdgtt 
imelligenee Surveillance Comt (FISC) for ostierata ccrthici surveillance through the Foc&gu 
iritelligencftSurvciSJ^* Ac£ (FtSA). Accoidmgtg the DGtG: 

* FI SA sujwHIespgp ;s z very iotncaivemeans of udbcmflil-oa tbit mast baianoe 

the cced to obtain sensitive neatofll purity uiiam&Elon against civil iibtitjts. 

* When striking 1 bis b sJ ance, s v erifiesoion process bfc conducted mi ail FISA 


o Ubdar tfat suBseeden *TI5A Verification of Accuracy FreceduxESj” the FBI ilstif 
srikuovdedges this unpertsnet; iJr TTrc accuracy of infcmt-stiOD contsii*ed wrtiun 
FISA epplitatioins is ©fi^mos: irapoitence,,., Oitly dpcEffiieoted and verified 
jgfinnuglpfl may be used to support FBI spnUcEtiors (FISA] to the court [FISC] r 

* Tnc DIOG provides detailed instructions for ths FBI jo follow to ecscm that infemageo 
appearing in a FISA appikfitica that is presided i& ths FISC bis been thoemagBly vstlcd 
and confirmed. 

Former asd crareat DOJ eiuS FBI leadership have ecjrinetsd to tbs Committee tfc* navcaBed 

Conn^Ittee em February 2,2913 P e copy of which h aSsdietS for your iCYfew. 




Ill lt£jst of was* to be & cksr violation of FBI jeqewoIs* Ck Committee dkccts th* OOJ 

shall, gftja j ^f than March 8,2P1S, provide answeis id the fbilcrwtcg questions: 

* Were ihese pWCOis ehpEged &3er ihc 2011 v=o:cs: o allow fbr the uss of unverified 
ferib c m atioii :o support FBI FISA applications to His FISC? 

* If what steps has the 3CJ end/or the FBI taieo to hold tsoountabls those otrktals 
who violated protocol? 

I will Rmrad y ou &3t££id£ from the yic l&’j oc of these protocols, the presectsrum of raise anilfor 
unverified isformation ts> the HSC in ejection with the Career p£g; wapecii ^pplicA^ccs could 
caisi] vigbtio&sof the Allowing criminal stetatea; 

* 18 U8C M2 

- 50 USC 1809 

* Ccn^iiracy 

* Obstruction cf justice 

* Coat&opl of Court 

The FBI DIGG provides icTcmal oversight =nd ewifcob over authorised FBI tctndtioa so the 
American public can he assured the Botceu is conducting its vital mission m accoxfincs w&h 
law a^i cstibmhfid guidelines. However, Isa this instance, it's desu that base op^raiing gmi fem g 
was vloletcd. 

Conge taocal ovcraiglH is designed to hold agencies seectathbla. I trust tbsc you sfrtme thi* 
view* smd will aaste the Committee's SnvtfltigjSton :mo violations of 0100 pressdotes relate^ to 
the uic cf the See do dossier In FjSA srppli actions* 


cc: Mi steel Horowitz, EospECtor Gcccml of the Dcpsrtmsntof Justice 

Thg Christopher Wray, Diractar. F steal Bureau of Investigation 

Donocpw Tu^ 11 ^ Lira t«r n=: ^cjao^zruraTft/pt;